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“The strictest law often causes the most wrong” 
Marcus Tullius Circero – 106-43 B.C 
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Abstract 
Business format franchising is a specific, distinct and uniform type of commercial activity 
with significant economic impact in the European Union.  It stimulates economic activity by 
offering significant advantages to all those involved, improving distribution and giving 
business increased access to other member states.  It comprises nearly 10,000 franchised 
brands, which account for over €215 billion (US$300 billion) turnover per annum.  However, 
compared to its scale in the USA and Australia, franchising is not realising its full potential in 
the EU.  Its disproportionate concentration in the UK, Germany, France, Italy and Spain also 
evidences that franchising is not promoting trade between member states as much as it could 
and should do.   
Applying a comparative law approach and drawing upon member states’ existing statutory 
laws, this thesis seeks to show that this underdevelopment of franchising in the EU is, in part, 
due to the regulatory environment it is subject to.  This is primarily because of two distinct 
factors.  Firstly, a failure by the member states’ regulatory eco-systems to adequately govern 
franchising.  They fail both to adequately reinforce the economic drivers that attract 
franchisors and franchisees to franchising and to reduce to an appropriate level the inherent 
consequential risk to which both parties are exposed.  Secondly, there is a lack of 
homogeneity between the different legal eco-systems which amounts to a barrier to trade 
between member states.   
It is proposed that the adoption of an appropriately drafted directive will not only harmonise 
the approach of the EU’s legal eco-systems towards franchising but will also re-enforce the 
relevant economic drivers and reduce the inherent consequential risks to an appropriate level.  
It is suggested that the directive does this by accentuating the influence of three commercial 
imperatives on the EU’s legal eco-systems.  These are promoting market confidence in 
franchising, ensuring pre-contractual hygiene and imposing a mandatory taxonomy of rights 
and obligations on to the franchise relationship. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem Review 
1.1.1 The under development of Franchising the Single Market  
Franchising substantially contributes to the GDP of a number of EU member states.  In the 
UK in 2009 it contributed £11.8 billion1, in Germany €48 billion2 and France €47.6 billion3.  
The estimated turnover of franchising in the EU is over €215 billion (US$300 billion) 
generated by over 9,971 franchises4. 
Franchising normally stimulates economic activity by improving the distribution of goods 
and/or the provision of services as it gives franchisors the possibility of establishing a 
uniform network with limited investment, which may assist the entry of new competitors in 
the markets particularly in the case of small and medium sized enterprises.  It allows 
independent traders to set up outlets more rapidly and with a higher chance of success than if 
they were to set up without the franchisor’s experience and assistance.  Franchisors therefore 
have a better opportunity to compete with larger distribution undertakings5.   
Franchising also generally allows consumers and other end users a fair share of the resulting 
benefits, as they combine the advantage of a uniform network with the existence of traders 
personally interested in the efficient operation of their business.  The homogeneity of the 
network and the constant co-operation between the franchisor and the franchisees ensures the 
constant quality of the products and services.  The favourable effect of franchising on inter 
brand competition and the fact that consumers are free to deal with any franchisee in the 
network guarantees that a reasonable part of the resulting benefits will be passed on to 
consumers6. 
It is therefore a significant economic activity in the EU.  However, a comparison with the 
level of franchising activity in the US7 and Australia8, suggests that it is markedly 
                                                   
1 The NatWest/BFA 2010 Franchise Survey – The British Franchise Association. 
2 Deutsche Bank.  Report on Franchising, January 2008 
3 French Franchise Federation Report, 2010 
4 European Franchise Federation Statistics – www.eff.franchise.com (viewed 23/12/2010) See Section 2.2.2 
below 
5 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 4887/88 (OJ 1988 L 359/52) 
6 Ibid 
7 600,000 franchised businesses generating an estimated total turnover of US$12 trillion in 2005 according 
to Iuliana. S and Mihaela. M, 2009, "The High Impact of Franchising on Economic Affairs in Some of the 
EU Members" by, Annals of Faculty of Economics, volume 1, issue 1, pages 251-256 (Published by the 
University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics)  The turnover of franchised businesses in the USA is 
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underdeveloped in the EU.  This in turn suggests that franchising has potential for substantial 
further growth in the EU.   
1.1.2 The Under-Development of the Regulatory Environment 
A mixture of economic, cultural and historical factors account for much of this comparative 
under development of franchising in the EU.  The lack of a supportive pan EU, homogenous 
regulatory environment is also a contributory factor.  It is suggested that a uniform and 
supportive regulatory environment would help to facilitate and encourage the further growth 
of franchising in the EU, particularly between member states and so support the single market 
in a significant manner. 
As stated in existing EU legislation9, the differing approaches to regulating commerce found 
in EU member state laws are detrimental to the functioning of the single market and 
substantially reduce its ability to stimulate trade between member states by improving the 
distribution of goods and provision of services within the EU.  This heterogeneous regulatory 
environment is detrimental to both the protection available to franchisors and franchisees vis-
à-vis each other and to the security of commercial transactions.  These differences 
substantially inhibit the conclusion and operation of franchise agreements where franchisor 
and franchisee are established in different member states. 
1.1.3 Re-engineering the Environment 
The trade in goods and services between member states should be carried on under conditions 
which are similar to those of a single market.  There is therefore a need to approximate the 
legal systems of the member states to the extent required for the proper functioning of 
franchising in the common market. 
In pursuing the goals of economic growth, job creation, consumer satisfaction and 
commercial innovation such as franchising needs to be encouraged.  Franchising contributes 
to the establishment of a single European Market.  It facilitates cross-frontier development as 
it is based on the leverage which an established name or idea can give a relatively small 
investment to enable the product or service involved to spread quickly, far and wide10. 
Franchising is a commercial phenomenon particularly well suited to the challenges of the 
single market.  The combination of a franchisor’s know-how and a franchisee’s enterprise can 
boost economic activity and employment, while enlarging the range of goods and services on 
                                                                                                                                                        
8 An estimated turnover of US$130 billion in a country with a GDP that is less than 10% of that of the EU 
(Franchise Council of Australia – www.franchise.org.au) 
9 Council Directive (EC) 861 653 on the co-ordination of the laws of the member states relating to Self 
Employed Commercial Agents [2004] OJ L 382 
10 The Rt Hon Sir Leon Brittan, QC, Vice President of the European Commission in Abell. M, 1991, 
European Franchising: Law and Practice in the European Community, pp xi 
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offer to the public.  Franchising makes products and services available to a wide public and 
does not have to stop at national frontiers.  The regulatory environment should therefore be 
re-engineered to enable franchising to fulfil this potential. 
Given the heterogeneous policy legacies in the EU member states as well as the diverse 
preferences of national governments and other domestic actors, a one-size-fits-all approach is 
neither politically feasible nor normatively desirable.  A certain amount of flexibility and 
variation will therefore be needed to successfully re-engineer the regulatory environment.  It 
is therefore suggested that a directive would be the appropriate catalyst for the required re-
engineering. 
1.2 Existing Research on the Regulation of Franchising in the EU 
There is a rich seam of commentary on the regulation of franchising but there is little work 
which considers franchising’s under-contribution to the EU’s economy or the extent to which 
the EU regulatory environment contributes to this and could be re-engineered to increase 
cross border business by promoting the use of franchising in the EU.   
Books such as “Franchising. Practice and Precedents in Business Formant Franchising”11, 
“Business Franchise Guide”12, “International Franchising”13 and “European Franchising – 
Law and Practice in the European Community”14 are practitioner focused setting out relevant 
law in appropriate jurisdictions but giving little if any analysis of the bigger picture within the 
EU or the general principles of regulation. 
The International Journal of Franchising Law (IJFL)15 has published a small number of more 
scholarly works although the articles are generally restricted to analysis of franchise specific 
laws in an individual jurisdiction16 and the impact of general law upon franchising in a 
specific jurisdiction17.  Only a few focus on wider, less parochial issues.  Baer, Metslaff and 
Weinberg18 consider how international treaties, conventions and agreements impact upon 
franchising. However, this wide ranging and rather meandering work touches upon the likes 
of the Berne Convention on Copyright, The Paris Convention on the Protection of Industrial 
Property, TRIPS, WTO, the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
                                                   
11 Adams. J, and Prichard Jones. K. V, 1997, Franchising: Practice and precedents in business format 
franchising, LexisNexis UK Publishing 
12 CCH, Business Franchise Guide. 
13 Konigsberg, in Christensen, L, 2008, International Franchising. Kluwer Law International 
14 Abell. M, 1991, European Franchising: Law and Practice in the European Community, Waterlow 
publishers, London 
15 Edited by Martin Mendelsohn and published by Richmond 
16 See Appendix 13 for a list of articles on franchise specific laws. 
17 See Appendix 13 ibid. 
18 Baer. J, Metslaff. K and Weinberg. L, 2005,“International Treaties, Conventions and Agreements 
Affecting Franchising”, IJFL Vol. 2, Issue 2, p. 3 
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and the North American Trade Agreement in a rather superficial and disjointed manner 
delivering no conclusion or recommendations. 
In “International Franchise Agreements – Research, Risk and Reward”19 Zaid considers key 
clauses in international franchise agreements but does not focus on general or specific 
principals of regulation and makes no observation or recommendations as regards the 
regulation of franchising.  In “Stranger in a Strange Land: Contrasting Franchising 
Alternatives in International Franchising”20 Wormald and Scott consider the impact of 
varying franchise structures but do not deal with regulatory issues. 
“Disclosure in International Franchising”21 by Baer, Flohr, Polsky and Hero delivers what is 
perhaps the most thoughtful overall consideration of franchise disclosure laws in a number of 
different jurisdictions. However, this again mostly catalogues regimes in different 
jurisdictions rather than identifying trends and seeking to analyse their success, failure or 
appropriateness. The only general questions addressed are essentially pragmatic ones such as 
“How does a lawyer in a non-disclosure country cope with the disclosure laws in other 
countries?”   
In “Franchise Sector Regulation: The Australian Experience”22 Terry relates the Australian 
experience of regulation. His conclusion that “a healthy franchising sector requires adequate 
and appropriate infrastructure to which the legal environment is central”, remains at a very 
general level but lays the ground for more detailed consideration of franchise regulation and 
the principles underlying it. 
In “The Importance of Cultural Differences When Expanding a Franchise Internationally” 
Schulz and Kozuka23 explore the need for localisation of a franchise concept in order to 
increase the chances of commercial success. They raise doubts over the success of 
UNIDROITS’s attempt to improve understanding of franchising through the publication of 
“A Guide to International Master Franchise Agreements”24. This is a theme taken up later in 
                                                   
19 Zaid. F, 2004,“International Franchise Agreements—Research, Risk and Reward”, IJFL Vol. 2, Issue 5, 
p. 3 
20 Wormald. C and Scott. A, 2004,“Stranger in a Strange Land: Contrasting Franchising Alternatives in 
International Franchising”, IJFL Vol. 2, Issue 6, p. 3 
21 Baer. J, Flohr. E, Polsky. L and Hero. M, “Disclosure in International Franchising”, IJFL Vol. 3, Issue 
6, 
 p. 3  
22 Terry. A, "Franchise Sector Regulation: The Australian Experience", EMNet-Conference on “Economics 
and Management of Franchisors Networks”, Vienna, Austria, 26-28 June 2005, 
http://emnet.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/conf_EMNet/2003/papers/Terrypaper.doc accessed 19 
August 2009. 
23 Schulz. A and Kozuka. S, 2008, “The Importance of Cultural Differences When Expanding a Franchise 
Internationally”, IJFL Vol. 6, Issue 2, p. 5. 
24 UNIDROIT, Guide to International Master Franchise Arrangements. 
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this study.  The UNIDROIT publication’s lack of original thinking and failure to make any 
innovative recommendation is as striking as it is disappointing. 
Much academic research into the role of franchising in inter state trade within the EU has 
focused upon its vertically integrated nature and potential to prevent, restrict and distort 
competition between member states.  This line of analysis focuses upon the Pronuptia 
decision of the European Court of Justice25, the various decisions of the Commission on the 
impact of what was then Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome26, the Franchise Block Exemption27  
the two Vertical Restraint Block Exemptions that superseded it28 and relevant member state 
decisions such as Crehan29. 
Crossick and Mendelsohn30, Schmitz and Hamme31, Ritter and Braun32 and a long catalogue 
of other commentators have gone into great detail about the need for franchisors to be able to 
impose certain restrictions on their franchisees to protect their image and reputation, grant 
exclusive territories, tie in goods and services and so on.  Korah33 and Mendelsohn and 
Rose34 in particular have produced long, valuable and detailed texts.  However, all of these 
commentaries are concerned solely with the Vertical Restraints that exist in a franchise 
relationship and how and in what circumstances they can, or should be seen as, being pro-
competitive.  They do not consider how the differing legal provisions of EU member state 
law or typical provisions found in franchise agreements support or undermine the economic 
drivers of franchising or reduce the consequential risks. 
This thesis analyses the way in which competition law protects the public interest in 
franchising by preventing distortion of the market but in contrast to existing works, looks 
beyond the technical way in which anti-trust laws are applied to franchising.  It places the 
regulation of vertical restraints in franchising into the bigger picture of how franchising can 
                                                   
25 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schullgallis (Case 161/84) [1986] 1CMLR 414 
26 - Computerland Europe SA (Case IV/32-34) (87/407/EEC) [1989] 4CMLR 259 ; Societe Anonyme des 
Chausseures Seducta Charles Jourdan et fils, Charles Jourdan Holdings AG and Xavier Danaud SA (Case 
IV/31.697) [89/94/EEC] [1989] 4CMLR 591 ; Service Master Limited (Case IV/32.358) (88/604/EEC) 
[1989] 4CMLR 581; Yves Rocher (Case IV/31.428-31.432) [1988] 4CMLR 592; Pronuptia de Paris SA 
(Case IV/30.937) (97/17/EEC) [1989] 4CMLR 355 
27 Regulation (EEC) 4087/88 
28 Regulation (EC) No. 2790/1999 
29  Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan [2002] QB507, [2001] ALLER CEC886 
30 Mendelsohn. M, and Crossick. S, 1986, “Franchising in Europe: Consequences of Pronuptia” 14 Int’l 
Bus. Law. 220 
31 Schmitz. D. A and Hamme. A. V, 1988, “Franchising in Europe: The First Practical EEC Guidelines” 
22 Int’l Bus. Law 717 
32 Ritter. L, Rawlinson. F and Braun. D, 2000, European Competition Law: a Practitioners Guide, 2nd 
edition Kluwer Law International pp 263-278 
33 Korah. V, 1990, An Introductory Guide to EEC Competition Law and Practice, Oxford: ESC publishing 
(4th ed ) and Korah. V, 2002, “The New Vertical Restraints Block Exemption”, Intereconomics, Vol. 37. 
Number 1, 4-11, DOI: 101007/BF02927395 
34 Mendelsohn. M and Rose. S, 2002, Guide to the EC Block Exemption for Vertical Agreements, Kluwer 
law International 
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be best regulated.  It concludes that the “per se” approach adopted by the European 
Commission is inappropriate.  Instead it recommends one more in line with the Chicago 
School’s “rule of reason” approach – as recommended by the OECD and evidenced in the 
Leegin decision of the US Supreme Court.  This would mean focusing less on intra brand 
competition and allowing franchise chains to compete on a level playing field with corporate 
chains in terms of retail price maintenance, and harmonised multi channel strategies, 
including use of the internet.  This “Exchange of Benefits” approach will help promote and 
encourage the use of franchising and be pro-competitive.  
The UNIDROIT Study of Franchise Regulations35 is not restricted to the EU but is applicable 
to it.  Unlike this thesis it is limited to pre-contractual disclosure and does not analyse the 
contents of franchise agreements and how they might be regulated.  Its consideration of the 
issues involved in disclosure is somewhat shallow and its conclusions are little more than a 
patchwork based upon the preferences of the individual practitioners involved in the study36.  
This study is not restricted to consideration of pre-contractual disclosure.  Its consideration of 
disclosure is based upon how it can be formulated to best protect the interests of both 
franchisor and franchisee.  Its conclusions on disclosure are far more radical than those of 
UNIDROIT, recommending for example franchisee disclosure at the request of the franchisor 
and considering whether liability for non-disclosure should be strict or dependent upon 
‘defective consent’.  
The Report of the Study Group on a European Civil Code (“the Study Group”) seeks to 
identify how to overcome obstacles to the functioning of the internal market.  It, inter alia, 
proposes a way in which to harmonise the regulation of franchising in the EU.  It does so 
based upon its stated objective to produce “a set of codified principles which constitute the 
most suitable private law rules for Europe wide application”.37  
Since the Commission on European Contract law (led by Professor Ole Lando) in 1982, the 
European Parliament’s first resolution on private law in 1989 and the Commission’s 
subsequent communication on European contract law in 2001 there has been a good deal of 
academic debate about the development of private law.  This led to the establishment of 
various research projects38 and the European Commission’s Action Plan for a more coherent 
European Contract law39.  Reactions to the Action Plan were summarised in “European 
                                                   
35 UNIDROIT Model Franchise Disclosure Law – September 2002 
 
37 http://www.sgecc.net accessed 14 August 2009 
38 Such as the Trento Common Core Project of European Private Law and the Research Group on the 
Existing European Community Private law (Acquis Group) 
39 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A More Coherent 
European Contract Law, An Action Plan, COM (2003) 68 final. 
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Contact Law and the revision of the acquis: the way forward”40 (“The Way Forward”).  The 
second part of The Way Forward  dealt with the preparation of a common frame of reference 
(CFR) to “improve the quality and consistency of the acquis in the area of contract law”41.  
Academics have played a central role in elaborating the CFR42.  The so-called “Network of 
Excellence”43. 
This produced specific recommendations for the regulation of franchising in the EU.  This 
study group (“the Study Group”) has stated that the principles impacting upon franchising 
have not been drafted with a specific protection aim, but to save transaction costs for the 
parties by providing for “possible problems, solutions which parties would presumably agree 
to”44.  Nevertheless the Study Group aimed to achieve a balance between the competing 
interests of the parties and so did not only seek to reflect the common core of solutions in the 
EU member states as regards franchising but other sources such as the UNIDROIT model 
disclosure law45 and the International Chamber of Commerce’s model for International 
Franchising Contract46. 
The “Amsterdam Group” was established to work with national reporters who were asked to 
answer several questionnaires concerning the main legal issues as regards commercial 
agency, franchising and distribution47.  After formulating its proposals the Amsterdam Group 
discussed them with an Advisory Council consisting of various academics48.  The Working 
Party’s recommendations were then reviewed by the Co-ordinating Committee which 
comprises some 50 professors from around the EU. 
The recommendations can therefore be seen as an authoritative academic work on the 
regulation of franchising in the EU.  However, it is not free of political influence and some 
                                                   
40 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, European Contract 
Law and the revision of the acquis: the way forward, COM (2004) 651 final. 
41 The Way Forward, pp9-13 
42 The Acquis Group and the Insurance Group 
43 See www.copecl.org.  The Network of Excellence was funded by the Commission in May 2005 under the 
Sixth Framework Programme for Research 
44 Introduction to Study Group on a European Civil Code.  Proposal for a European law on Commercial 
Agency, Franchising and Distribution Contracts pp 93 
45 See the Report on the Fourth Meeting of the Study Group on Franchising held on 9-10 December 1999, 
Study LXVIII –Doc 20, p2.   
46 See ICC Model International Franchising Contract, 2000.  ICC International Contract Series, ICC 
Publishing, Paris, 2000 
47 The Dutch group of reporters consisted of researches of different European jurisdictions who provided 
information on their own legal systems: Georgios Arnokourous (Greek Law), Odavia Bueno Diaz (Spanish 
Law), Rui Miguel Patricio Cascao (Portuguese Law), John Dickie (Common Law), Christoph Jeloschek 
(Austrian Law), Roland Lohnert (German Law), Andrea Pinna (French Law), Manola Scotton (Italian 
Law), Hanna Sivesand (Swedish Law), Muriel Veldman (Dutch Law), Aneta Wiewiorowska (Polish Law). 
48 The members of the Advisory Council on Commercial Agency, Franchise and Distribution Contracts are 
Professor Johny Herre (Stockholm), Professor Jérôme Huet (Paris), Professor Ewan McKendrick (Oxford), 
Professor Peter Schlechtriem (Freiburg i.Br.), Professor Hugh Beale (London/Warwick) and Professor 
Christina Ramberg (Stockholm) 
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commentators feel that its exclusion of other stakeholders coupled with the Commission’s 
clear political agenda of “Europeanisation” undermines its objectivity and value49. The 
Amsterdam Group’s proposal can be seen as little more than a distillation of existing 
jurisprudence in EU civil law jurisdictions.  It fails to consider the valuable insights offered 
by non legal academic analysis of the nature of franchising.  This results in an extremely 
narrow understanding of how legal regulation can support and encourage the efficient 
exploitation of the single market by companies through the medium of franchising. 
However, some commentators believe that applying the recommendations of the Amsterdam 
Group will “most probably lead to a win-win situation for the parties on franchising …”50.  
Bueno Diaz’s consideration of Franchising in European Contract Law51 is a prime example.  
It is focused on the Study Group’s proposals for commercial agency, franchising and 
distribution contracts.  It restricts itself to comparing it with the provisions of the French Loi 
Doubin (Article 330 of the Civil Code) and the Spanish Retail Law (Article 62 of Law No. 
7/1996).  It compares the policies that underpin the respective laws in franchising in France 
and Spain and identifies the Study Group’s proposals as the rational choice for parties 
involved in franchising in the EU.  This study takes a much broader focus.  It identifies the 
reasons for franchising’s popularity, analyses the way it is currently regulated in the EU, 
recommends the re-engineering of the regulatory environment so that the legal eco-systems 
more closely reflect the impact of three commercial imperatives – market confidence, pre-
contractual hygiene and protecting the interests of franchisors and franchisees through a 
mandatory taxonomy for franchise agreements. 
The most fundamental difference is that whereas the Study Group does not meaningfully 
distinguish franchising from commercial agency and distribution, this thesis argues that 
franchising is markedly different to them and should be recognised as a “type-agreement” in 
its own right.  This study also identifies good faith as an important “doctrinal tool” in dealing 
with the franchise relationship and disputes that arise out of it. After considering the 
influential German approach to good faith based on BGB 242, the French concept of Bonne 
Fois and England’s ad hoc approach, it recommends a more refined approach based upon 
prohibiting unconscionable conduct and misleading and deceptive behaviour. 
In contrast to the Study Group’s proposal for a European Commercial Code, this study 
proposes the enactment of a Directive, that will harmonise EU member state law by making 
                                                   
49 Hesselink. M. W, 2004, “The Politics of a European Civil Code” European Law Journal Vol 10. No.6. 
675-697 
50 Diaz. O. B, 2007, Franchising in European Contract Law.  A comparison between the main obligations 
of the contracting parties in the Principles of European Law on Commercial Agency, Franchise and 
Distribution Contracts, Sellier. European law publishers, p.51 
51 ibid 
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franchising a recognised “type-contract” with mandatory, non mandatory and essential rules.  
By dealing with detailed obligations and rights of the parties this approach will allow a level 
of flexibility that is likely to promote the use and sustain the success of franchising within the 
context of each member state’s legal tradition.  This contrasts with the technocratic and 
politically driven agenda of the Study Group. 
In several member states there is a wealth of commentary on franchising and how it is and 
should be regulated.  In Germany commentators such as Skaupy52, Geisler53, Flohr54 and 
Martinek55 have produced prodigous amounts of work on franchising.  However, these are 
mostly somewhat parochial in nature and focus almost entirely upon the underlying nature of 
a franchise agreement and how it should be treated under German law – as a licence, a 
business management contract, a service agreement, a lease, a sale of goods agreement or a 
mixed agreement.  Martinek also focuses upon the impact of the relative economic bargaining 
power of the parties involved, and hypothesises that these lead to there being two distinct 
types of franchise activity, which he labels “subordination franchising” and “partnership 
franchising”, the latter of which breaks down into three sub-categories “co-ordination”, 
“coalition” and “confederation” franchising.  This study suggests that this analysis is not 
reflected in the franchise agreements considered by it and so questions it validity. 
There appears to be little appetite in Germany for a homogenised European approach to the 
regulation of franchising, as articulated by Giesler, who believes that franchise specific 
legislation could hinder the development of franchising and that, so far, Germany has done 
well without it56. 
In France there are numerous studies by scholars such as Ghestin57, Guyon58, Huet59, Collart 
Dutilleul and Delebecque60, Malaurie, Aynés & Gautier61, Le Tourneau62, Ferrier63 and 
                                                   
52 Skaupy, Franchising, 2 Auflage 1995 
53 Giesler, Handbuch Franchiserecht, 2 Auflage 2007 
54 Eckhard Flahr, Franchiseverhrag, 4 Auflage 2010 
55 Martinek/Semler/Habermeier/Flohr, Handbuch des Vertriebrechts, 3 Auflage 2010 
56 Giesler, “ Geisler/Nauschütt”  Chapter 5, Rn 6c 
57 Ghestin J, 1993, Traité de Droit Civil, la formation du Contrat, 3 ed, LGDJ, p. 200 
58 Guyon, Y, Droite des affaires, T.I, Droit Commercial General et Sociétés n.835 Economica 1996 
59 Huet. J, 2002, Nous faut-il un “euro” droit civil? (propos sur la communication de la Commission 
concernant le “droit européen des contrats”, et, plus généralement, sur l’uniformisation du droit civil au 
niveau européen), 
Receuil Dalloz, point de vue, p. 2611 
Huet 2002b 
Huet. J, 2002, Traité de Droit Civil, Les Principaux Contrats Spéciaux, 2 ed, LGDJ, Paris. 
60 Collart Dutilleul and Delebecque 2002 
F. Collart Dutilleul & Ph. Delebecque, 2002, Contrats civils et commerciaux, 6 ed, Dalloz, Paris. 
61 Malaurie & Aynés & Gautier 2005 
Malaurie. Ph & Aynés. L & Gautier. P-Y, 2005, Droit civil, Les Contrats Spéciaux, Paris. 
62 Le Tourneau 1994 Ph. Le Tourneau Le franchisage, Economica, Paris 1994 ; Le Tourneau 2003 Ph. Le 
Tourneau, Le contrat de franchisage, Litec, Paris, 2003 
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Leloup64.  These focus upon the way in which franchise agreements should be treated under 
French law and analysing France’s abundant case law on franchising.  They do not tackle the 
case for the regulation of the entire franchise relationship at EU level or consider the 
difficulties that such an approach creates. 
In Spain there is far less consideration of the regulation of franchising and what does exist is 
concerned  mostly with the disclosure law and the way in which Spanish law impacts upon 
franchising.  It does not consider broader European issues relating to franchising65. 
This study therefore breaks new ground in the consideration of the regulation of franchising 
in the EU. It endeavours to place a proposal for a single EU franchise law into an economic, 
commercial and legal context.  It argues that franchising promotes the establishment of the 
single market but its effectiveness in doing so is reduced by the heterogeneous nature of 
relevant law in the EU. 
1.3 Objectives and Scope of Study 
This thesis studies the regulation of Business Format Franchising in the European Union.  As 
the UK, Germany and France together accounted for 50% of the €215 billion (US$300 
billion) franchising turnover in the EU in 200966, it focuses on these three member states. It 
contextualises this focus by a comparative reference to the US and Australia, (both of which 
are Federal States with highly developed regulatory regimes67). It also tests its conclusions 
against empirical research amongst the relevant stakeholders, including franchisors, 
franchisees, potential franchisees and professionals engaged in franchising. The desirability 
of protecting the rights of franchisees is not disputed within the thesis. However, it will be 
underlined how this should not be the only purpose of regulation and that a balance must be 
struck between the protection of the rights of franchisees and the need to re-enforce the 
economic drivers that encourage both franchisors and franchisees to become involved in 
franchising in the first place.  It is suggested that excessive protection of franchisees can have 
detrimental effects on both franchising and on the Single Market. This thesis suggests that 
such a critical balance can be achieved through a directive which re-engineers the regulatory 
environment in the EU by accentuating the impact of three commercial imperatives (market 
                                                                                                                                                        
63 Ferrier 2003 Droit de la distribution, 3 ed, Litec, 2002 
64 J.-M. Leloup 2004, La franchise, droit et pratique, 4 ed, Delmas, Paris, 2004 
65 Echebarria Saenz 1995 
J.A. Echebarria, 1995, El contrato de franquica, Definicion y conflictos en las relaciones internas, McGraw-
Hill, Madrid. 
Hernando Giménez 2000 
A. Hernando Giménez, 2000, “El contrato de franquicia de empresa”, Civitas, Madrid.  
66 See page 26 
67  And (mostly in footnotes) to the other 24 EU jurisdictions and the 21 jurisdictions outside of the EU that 
have franchise specific laws 
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confidence, pre-contractual hygiene and a mandatory taxonomy of rights and obligations) 
upon the various legal eco-systems.  These commercial imperatives re-enforce the economic 
drivers that attract franchisors and franchisees to franchising and reduce the inherent 
consequential risk to an appropriate level. 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that franchising has failed to fulfil its potential in the EU, that 
this is in part due to the regulatory environment and that this failure can be remedied by re-
engineering the legal eco-systems that comprise the regulatory environment in the EU. 
This thesis has three primary objectives.  
The first objective is to establish that although franchising is a specific distinct and uniform 
type of commercial activity with positive influence in the EU, which stimulates economic 
activity by offering economic advantages to all those involved and improving distribution and 
giving businesses increased access to other member state markets, it is not fulfilling its full 
potential to contribute to the realisation of the single market.  In order to do that it must first 
establish what franchising is.  It does this by reference to franchising’s basic architecture, its 
historical development, its rationale and its contextualisation, differentiating it from other 
business models and identifying why franchisors and franchisees are attracted to franchising 
and are prepared to accept the inherent consequential risks.  It then benchmarks the 
contribution of franchising in the EU against its contribution in the USA and Australia and 
concludes that it is not fulfilling its potential in the EU. 
The second objective is to establish whether the regulatory environment in the EU is in any 
way responsible for this under achievement of franchising in the single market.  It seeks to 
establish that regulation of franchising in some form is required and considers the difficulties 
encountered by member states in seeking to regulate it.  It does this by considering the 
differing approaches of EU member states to constructing franchising’s contractual 
environment, its impact on the risks to which franchisors and franchisees are exposed and the 
commercial drivers that attract them to franchising.  It considers the impact of the self 
regulatory system in the EU and then considers both the lack of homogeneity between the 
legal eco-systems that comprise the regulatory environment within the EU and the failure of 
those legal eco-systems to re-enforce the economic drivers that attract franchisors and 
franchisees to franchising or to reduce the inherent consequential risk.  It analyses the nature 
of these shortcomings and the difficulties they impose upon franchising. 
The third objective of this thesis is to consider how the regulatory environment in the EU can 
be re-engineered to enable franchising to better fulfil its potential in the EU.  It proposes that 
this should be done by re-engineering the regulatory environment so that it imposes a 
harmonised approach across the EU which aims to accentuate the impact of three commercial 
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imperatives;  promoting market confidence, pre-contractual hygiene and imposing a 
mandatory taxonomy of rights and obligations on to the franchise relationship. 
The harmonisation of laws within the EU has always been difficult.  This thesis considers 
whether the trend amongst some academics and the EU “technocracy” to advocate the 
abandonment of the traditional methods of achieving this (Directives and Regulations) in 
favour of a European Civil Code is an appropriate way in which to re-engineer the regulatory 
environment for franchising.   
In achieving these three objectives, this thesis will analyse, compare and criticise the 
solutions to the difficulties identified that have been proposed by academics and NGOs.  It is 
then anticipated that a solution, both logically sound and politically acceptable, will emerge. 
It will be the author’s contention that the heterogeneous approach of member states to 
protecting franchisees is at odds with the political and economic desirability of encouraging 
the use of franchising in the single market.  It is suggested that the solution will be based 
upon accentuating the impact of three commercial imperatives upon the legal eco-systems in 
the EU.  These are the need to re-enforce market confidence, the need to ensure an 
appropriate level of pre-contractual hygiene and the need to impose a mandatory taxonomy of 
rights and obligations upon the franchise relationship.  A draft EU Franchise Directive is 
proposed in Appendix 1. 
This thesis will explore whether and how such a new regulatory environment could solve the 
problems under consideration, and how it could be implemented on an EU wide basis. This 
will involve analysis of the contractual architecture, economic drivers, commercial interests 
and, most importantly,  the EU member state and other legal eco-systems. 
This thesis aims only at providing a feasible theoretical tool in order to address the use of 
franchising in cross boarder trade within the European Union. It does not purport to provide 
technical or empirical guidelines concerning how to test such a theoretical tool. 
1.4 Methodology, Sources and Limitations 
In developing the arguments and recommendations set out in the thesis, the work had to draw 
upon several economic, technical and social propositions, all of which serve as a theoretical 
justificatory basis. However, the recommendations made within the thesis have, at all the 
times, been primarily inspired and influenced by the inherent trends that exist within statutory 
law (franchise specific laws and other laws that impact upon franchising) and case law . The 
theoretical tools of economics merely provide the explanatory basis of the law. 
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An applied comparative law approach is deemed appropriate68 for analysing and interpreting 
the existing international, regional and national laws. Accordingly, the analysis adopted in the 
thesis is based on three main sources of reference: 
1. Legislative statutes and reported judicial decisions from various jurisdictions: 
References to statutes69 and judicial decisions from the jurisdictions of several 
countries have been made. However, due to the superfluity of referencing every 
country’s national law70, the thesis has concentrated on the law of countries 
which have a mature franchise law, which have offered considerable legal 
thought and jurisprudence to franchising, and which also distinctly advocate 
different approaches to the solution. These countries are the UK, Germany, 
France, the USA and Australia. References have also been made to the sources of 
European Union Law. Furthermore, passing references have also been made, 
mostly by way of footnotes, to the relevant law in Spain, Italy, Belgium, Sweden, 
Romania, Latvia and Estonia ( all of which are members of the EU and have 
franchise specific laws) and other countries outside of the EU which have 
franchise specific laws. . 
2. Legal literature, legislative reports and consultation documents: A wide range of 
public sources were consulted in the writing of this work. Legal literature, 
commentaries, treatises, committee reports, legislative reports and consultation 
documents from the various jurisdictions have all been relied upon as basis of 
comparison and upon which recommendations can be made. Recommendations 
and measures adopted in relation to these jurisdictions have been used, where 
appropriate, to fill any apparent lacunae in the existing law. 
3. Empirical research: seven different pieces of empirical research have been 
undertaken to test propositions raised in this thesis.  These include analysis of 
franchise agreements used by franchisors in the EU, disputes between franchisors 
and their franchisees, surveys of relevant stakeholders and interviews of other 
                                                   
68 ‘Experience shows that this is best done if the author first lays out the essentials of the relevant foreign 
law, country by country, and then uses this material as basis for critical comparison, ending up with the 
conclusion about the proper policy for the law to adopt which may involve a reinterpretation of his own 
system’. In respect of applied comparative law, one should investigate how ‘a specific problem can most 
appropriately be solved under the given social and economic circumstances’. Zweigert. K and Kötz. H, 
1998, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd edition, Clarendon Press, 6, 12 
69 Citations and references to statutes which are currently in forces have been based on the official WIPO 
translations. References to repealed legislation have been based on such statutes, legal commentaries and 
treatises. 
 
70 Here sober self-restraint is in order, not so much because it is hard to take account of everything as 
because experience shows that as soon as one tries to cover a wide range of legal systems, the law of 
diminishing returns operate’. Zweigert and Kötz [1998], op.cit. 39-40. 
  25 
stakeholders.  The empirical research does not pretend to be exhaustive or 
sufficiently authoritative to form the basis for any proposal in its own right.  
However, the research does help to test the validity of certain propositions in an 
appropriate manner. 
3.1 A survey of Potential Franchisees was conducted during 2008 through 
interviews with individuals attending franchise exhibitions in London, 
Paris and Madrid who stated that they had an interest in buying a 
franchise.  The aim was to try to identify the profile of potential 
franchisees and their reasons for considering purchasing a franchise.  
The questions asked were based upon the reasons identified by 
Stanworth and Kauffman and other academic commentators referred to 
in Chapter 2.  60 potential franchisees were surveyed at the British 
Franchise Exhibition at Olympia on 4 April 2008.  60 at the Salon de 
Franchise in Paris at Porte de Versailles on 16 March 2008.  60 
potential franchisees at the Spanish Franchise exhibition at EXPO 
FRANQUICIA ’08 on 22 June 2008. 
3.2 A survey of Franchisors was conducted in four EU member states. 25 
Franchisors were interviewed in the UK,  25 in Germany, 25 in France 
and 25 in Spain. They were chosen because they are all undertaking 
business in more than one EU Member State or have stated their intent 
to do so.  The interviews were conducted by way of a mixture of face 
to face and telephone interviews.  All of the face to face interviews in 
Paris were conducted at the Salon de Franchise in Paris on 16 March 
2008.  All of the face to face interviews in Spain were conducted at 
Expofranquicia ’08 on 22 June 2008.  Some of the face to face 
interviews in the UK were conducted at the British Franchise 
Exhibition at Olympia on 4 April 2008.  All other interviews were 
conducted at a variety of meetings and through telephone interviews.  
All of the interviews with German franchisors were conducted by way 
of telephone in May 2008.  The aim of the interviews was to (1) to 
understand the risks and advantages franchisors perceive in franchising 
their business (the questions reflect the reasons proposed by academics 
such as Blair and La Fontaine cited in Chapter 2 of this thesis) and (2) 
to understand their views of the regulation of franchising in the EU. 
3.3 A survey of Franchise Lawyers was conducted.  The interviewees are 
all listed as experts in franchising in the International Who’s Who of 
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Franchising, published by Law Business Research Ltd.  An e-mail 
survey of the 25 lawyers detailed was conducted in June 2008.  This 
was to obtain the view of highly experienced and reputed, international 
franchise practitioners on issues raised by academic research, in order 
to benchmark how those issues are reflected in practice.  
3.4 A survey of Franchisees was conducted.  The sample comprised UK 
franchisees who were then running a franchised business. This survey 
of 30 franchisees was conducted through a mix of telephone and face to 
face interviews between January 2004 and April 2007.  Lack of an 
appropriate database and geographical proximity plus linguistic 
barriers meant that it was not possible to conduct a similar survey in 
any other EU member states.  In order to encourage a candid response, 
anonymity of the respondents was essential.  The aim was to 
understand the view of franchisees on self regulation and the reason 
they became franchisees.  The questions were based upon the reasons 
outlined by Stanworth and Kauffman and other academic 
commentators referred to in Chapter 2 in the thesis. 
3.5 A survey of Franchise Executives was conducted.  Members of the 
sample were all senior executives in companies that franchise in the 
EU.  They were interviewed either face to face or by telephone, 
sometimes complemented by written questions and answers.  The aim 
was to obtain a better understanding of the commercial realities of the 
issues considered in this thesis.  The Executives were interviewed by 
the author during the period March – July 2006.  
3.6 An analysis of Franchise Disputes was conducted.  40 franchise 
disputes in the UK advised upon by the law firm, Field Fisher 
Waterhouse, during the period 2006-2010 were considered.  Field 
Fisher Waterhouse is rated the UK’s leading franchise law firm by the 
Chambers Legal Directories from 2006 to 2010 and Europe’s foremost 
franchising practice in the Chambers Europe Director 2011.  Lack of an 
appropriate database meant that it was not possible to conduct a similar 
survey in any other EU member state. The term “Dispute” is not 
limited to litigation, but includes disagreements which result in the 
involvement of legal advisers by at least one side.  It is important to 
note that these grounds of dispute are those raised by the parties, not 
always proved to the satisfaction of a court.  Face to face interviews 
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were conducted with the individuals involved in the disputes. The aim 
was to understand the reason for disputes between franchisees and their 
franchisor. 
3.7 An analysis of Franchise Agreements was conducted.  The agreements 
analysed are those of franchisors doing business in the three largest 
franchise markets in the EU (the UK, Germany and France) and two 
other jurisdictions in which franchising is common (the USA and 
Australia).  The sample therefore includes agreements drafted under 
both civil and common law.  The sample includes franchises in the 
retail, service, food and hotel sectors.  It includes small scale “man in a 
van” job franchises and large scale hotel and restaurant franchises.  It 
includes franchises that require a large upfront payment and those that 
require only a modest one.  This is sufficient to give an appropriate 
understanding of the scale of investment and therefore the type of 
franchisee involved in each franchise as well as the general architecture 
of franchise agreements across different jurisdictions and commercial 
sectors. 
4. There is a paucity of reliable and up to date information about the size of 
franchising in the EU, which in itself suggests that franchising is underdeveloped 
in the EU.  The European Franchise Federation’s figures for 2009 only deal with 
18 member states and contain a number of inaccuracies and inconsistencies.  The 
most recent figures for the EU as a whole were published by Franchising Europe 
in 2005, but are incomplete and give no breakdown of how they are comprised.  
It has therefore been necessary to estimate the current turnover of franchising in 
the EU.  Three different approaches have been adopted to produce a range of 
figures from which a mid-range figure has been taken to produce an estimated 
turnover for 2009 of  €215 billion (US$300 billion).  The three approaches are as 
follows; (1) increasing the Franchise Europe 2005 figure of US$200 billion by 
the same percentage as the number of outlets are reported to have increased over 
the same period by the 2009 EFF Survey; (2) increasing the 2005 figure by the 
same percentage as the turnover of France has increased of the same period; (3) 
comparing the number of outlets in the seven EU member states that had a 
turnover of US$250.4 billion in 2009 according to the EFF figures with those in 
the other 11 member states referred to in the 2009 EFF survey and increasing the 
turnover figure by the same percentage.  None of these figures give a totally 
reliable figure.  However, they do enable a logically justifiable estimate to be 
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made. 
The subject matter at hand has been approached from the perspective of (1) the law impacting 
upon the use of franchising  as a way of doing business across European Union member state 
borders and so promoting the single market, and (2) the business efficacy of the regulatory 
environment of the EU as it relates to franchising.   
The issues relating to intellectual property and the constitutional law of the European Union 
reach beyond the scope of this thesis, and are therefore mentioned throughout the work, but 
are not deeply analysed.  Where deemed necessary, various references have been made 
to contract law, the duty of good faith, anti-trust law, commercial agency law, distribution 
law, unfair competition law, consumer protection law, employment law, private international 
law, and other member state law.  Nevertheless this study does not purport to deliver a broad 
in depth or authoritative analysis of any of these.  This study does not purport to provide a full 
and in depth analysis of German or French law. 
All German language commentaries, case law and statutes have been translated into English 
by Babette Marzheuser-Wood, Rechtanswalten and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of 
England and Wales and Vicky Reinhardt, Rechtanswalten and Solicitor of the Supreme Court 
of England and Wales.   
1.5 Terminology 
In this thesis, the terms below will be employed with the following meanings: 
“Franchising”: generally means business format franchising. When appropriate, a distinction 
will be drawn between business format franchising and other forms of franchising. 
“Franchisor”: The entity that grants the use of the brand and business format to the 
franchisees.  
“Franchisee”: The entity that is granted the use of the brand and business format by the 
franchisor.  
“Business Format Franchise”: a package of intellectual property rights relating to trade marks, 
trade name and know-how to be exploited for the resale of goods or the provision of services 
to end users.  A fuller definition is detailed in Chapter 3.  
“Business Format”: the know-how of the franchisor.  A package of non-patented practical 
information resulting from experience and testing by the franchisor, which is Secret, 
Substantial and Identified.  
“Secret”: means that the know-how, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of 
its components, is not generally known or easily assembled.  It is not limited in the narrow 
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sense that each individual component should be totally unknown or unobtainable outside of 
the franchisor’s business. 
“Substantial”: means that the know-how includes information which is of importance for the 
sale of goods or the provision of services to end users, and in particular for the presentation of 
goods for sale, the processing of goods in connection with the provision of services, methods 
of dealing with customers and administration and financial management; the know-how must 
be useful for the franchisee by being capable, at the date of conclusion of the agreement, of 
improving the competitive position of the franchisee, in particular by improvising the 
franchisee’s performance or helping it to enter a new market.  
“Identified”: means that the know-how must be described in a sufficiently comprehensive 
manner so as to make it possible to verify that it fulfils the criteria of secrecy and 
substantiality the description of the know-how can either be set out in the franchise agreement 
or recorded in the manual.  
“Manual”: means any type of written record which detailed the franchisor’s know-how.  It is 
increasingly taking an on-line form.  It is updated on a regular basis.  Copyright in the manual 
is generally reserved to the franchisor.  
“Franchise Agreement”: means an agreement whereby the franchisor grants to the franchisee, 
in exchange for direct or indirect financial consideration, the right to exploit a franchise.  
1.6 Outline of Chapters 
The thesis is divided into six Chapters. 
Chapter One – This  chapter states the thesis that although franchising makes a substantial 
contribution to the single market, it has failed to fulfil its potential in the EU.  It suggests that 
this under performance is in part due to the regulatory environment in the EU and that this 
failure can be remedied by re-engineering the Regulatory environment in the EU.   
It briefly considers the Regulatory environment in the EU and establishes the objectives and 
scope of this study. 
The methodology, sources and limitations of the thesis are detailed, terminology considered, 
the approach of each chapter outlined and existing research on the regulation of franchising in 
the EU considered. 
Chapter Two – This chapter deals with the first objective of the thesis.  It seeks to show that 
although business format franchising has developed over the centuries into a specific, distinct 
and uniform form of commercial activity that is well established in the European Union and 
can assist businesses to expand their networks within and beyond member states, so 
contributing to the further development of the Single Market, it is under contributing 
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compared to its role in the USA and Australia.  In order to understand the reasons for this 
under performance in the EU and the way in which the regulatory environment might be re-
engineered to improve franchising’s contribution to the single market, it endeavours to better 
understand what franchising is by examining both the economic and legal features of the 
architecture of franchising, distinguishing it from agency and distribution, identifying the 
tensile stresses that arise within franchising.  It deconstructs both the economic and sectoral 
contextualisation of franchising and its economic rationale and risks.  It concludes that, 
despite the impact of variable determinants such as the value of the investment required from 
franchisees and the commercial sectors in which the business operates, the architecture of 
franchising comprises six fundamental features that are always present.  These are 
independence of the parties, economic interest, use of a brand, use of a business format, 
control of the franchisee by the franchisor and assistance provided to the franchisee by the 
franchisor.  This architecture withstands the tensile stresses placed upon franchising by its 
long term and dynamic nature. 
It also suggests that those economic drivers that constitute the commercial rationale for 
franchisors using franchising as part of their business strategy are distinct from those which 
attract franchisees to buy a franchise and that the risks inherent in franchising also differ 
between the parties. 
Chapter Three – This chapter deals with the second objective of the thesis.  It considers 
whether the regulatory environment of the EU is in any way responsible for the under 
achievement of franchising in the single market.  It does this by first considering the different 
approaches of EU member states to constructing the contractual environment and whether 
that resulting contractual environment adequately supports and re-enforces the economic 
drivers in the franchise relationship and reduces its inherent consequential risks to an 
appropriate level.  The reasons for and consequences of the contractual asymmetry in the 
architecture of franchise agreements are examined.  The self regulatory environment and the 
legal regulatory environment of the EU are considered in detail as regards their support of the 
relevant economic drivers and reduction of the consequential inherent risks in the 
precontractual, contractual and termination stages of the franchise relationship. 
It suggests that the economic determinants and the interparty dynamics of the 
franchisor/franchisee relationship lead to a contractual environment that transcends sectoral 
divergence and the differing legal traditions of EU member states. This contractual 
environment tends to support and re-enforce the economic drivers that encourage franchisors 
to become involved in franchising and reduces their consequential inherent risk to a 
reasonable level.  However, although it tends to re-enforce some of the economic drivers that 
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encourage franchisees to become involved in franchising it does not re-enforce them all and it 
fails to reduce all the consequential inherent risks for franchisees to an adequate level. 
It then suggests that the regulatory environment in the EU within which franchising operates 
(which comprises a series of legal eco-systems), does not adequately protect and reinforce the 
economic attractions that drive franchisors and franchisees to become involved in franchising.  
Nor does it adequately reduce the consequential risks.  It concludes that the regulatory 
environment is therefore to some extent responsible for the under achievement of franchising 
in the EU. 
Chapter Four – This chapter considers through which catalyst the regulatory environment 
can be best re-engineered.  It considers the precedent set by commercial agency in 
harmonising member state laws and then compares and contrasts the relative advantages and 
disadvantages of some form of European Civil Code.  Having considered the proposals of the 
Amsterdam Group for a Common Frame of Reference, it proposes the adoption of a directive 
instead. It then considers the problems likely to be encountered in re-engineering the EU’s 
regulatory environment and what lessons can be learned from the USA and Australia.   
Chapter Five – This chapter deals with the third objective of the thesis.  It discusses how 
best to define franchising and what the foundations for re-engineering the regulatory 
environment should be.  It concludes that the EU’s regulatory environment should be re-
engineered in accordance with three commercial imperatives.  These are maintaining market 
confidence, ensuring pre-contractual hygiene and incorporating certain mandatory terms in 
the franchisor/franchisee relationship which will re-enforce the relative economic drivers and 
reduce the consequential inherent risks to an appropriate level. 
Maintaining market confidence leads to several proposals. The adoption of an “Exchange of 
Benefits” approach to regulation seeks to encourage companies to franchise their business in 
return for certain benefits; pre-contractual disclosure by potential franchisees, exempting 
certain types of franchise from pre-contractual disclosure and allowing franchisors to impose 
both a pricing policy and a multi channel sales strategy on their franchisees.  Pre-contractual 
hygiene leads to proposals for the education of potential franchisees about franchising, the 
need for them to take and follow quality professional advice, the imposition of a pre-
contractual disclosure regime and the prohibition of misleading or deceptive behaviour.  The 
imposition of mandatory terms on to the franchise relationship lead to the identification of 
relevant terms and the prohibition of unconscionable conduct.  It proposes a draft Franchise 
Directive (the text of which is detailed in Appendix 1) that would enable the EU Commission 
to implement these recommendations. 
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Chapter Six – This chapter summarises the conclusion of the thesis.  It concludes that this 
study proves the hypothesis that franchising has failed to fulfil its potential in the EU, that this 
is in part due to the regulatory environment and that this failure can be remedied by re-
engineering the legal eco-systems that comprise the regulatory environment in the EU by 
accentuating the impact of three commercial imperatives; market confidence, pre-contractual 
hygiene and a mandatory taxonomy of rights and obligations. 
The thesis is based on the law and materials available as of 19 February 2010. 
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Chapter 2 Deconstructing the Contextualisation, Architecture, Rationale 
and Risks of Franchising 
This chapter seeks to achieve the first objective by showing that although franchising is a 
specific, distinct and uniform type of commercial activity with a positive influence in the EU 
which stimulates economic activity by offering economic advantages to all those involved, 
improves distribution and gives business increased access to other member states, it is not 
fulfilling its full potential to contribute to the realisation of the single market.   
In order to understand the reasons for this under performance in the EU and the way in which 
the regulatory environment might be re-engineered to improve franchising’s contribution to 
the single market, it endeavours to better understand what franchising is.  It does this by 
analysing both the economic and legal features of the architecture of franchising, 
distinguishing it from agency and distribution, identifying to tensile stresses that arise within 
franchising and deconstructing the economic and sectoral contextualisation of franchising and 
its economic rationale and risks.  It concludes that, despite the impact of variable 
determinants such as the value of the investment required from franchisees and the 
commercial sectors in which the business operates, the architecture of franchising comprises 
six fundamental features that are always present.  These are independence of the parties, 
economic interest, use of a brand, use of a business format, control of the franchisee by the 
franchisor and assistance provided to the franchisee by the franchisor.  This architecture 
withstands the tensile stresses placed upon franchising by its long term and dynamic nature. 
It also suggests that those economic drivers that constitute the commercial rationale for 
franchisors using franchising as part of their business strategy are distinct from those which 
attract franchisees to buy a franchise and that the risks inherent in franchising also differ 
between the parties. 
2.1 Deconstructing the Contextualisation of Franchising 
This is critical analysis towards the first objective.  It considers the development of 
franchising as a specific, distinct and uniform commercial activity and its role in national 
economies.   
2.1.1 The Historical Contextualisation of Franchising in the EU 
Business format franchising has evolved over many centuries to what is now a distinct and 
commercially impactful way of doing business.  
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Chronology of the Historical Development of Franchising 
DATE MILESTONES 
 
The Middle Ages71 
Source of Franchising’s Historical DNA 
1215 Magna Carta “enfranchises” Barons to collect taxes until 
ended by Council of Trent in 1562 
1600 onwards “Norenkai” system of restaurant chains developed 
in Japan during the Tokugawa Shogunate72 
1700’s Need for Distribution Channels Promotes early form of 
Franchising 
“Tied House” system develops to secure the distribution of beer 
by brewers in the UK 
 Technical Demands Promote use of Primitive Forms of 
Franchising 
1800’s73 US Manufacturers such as Singer, Coca-Cola and McCormick 
adapt franchising as method of distribution 
                                                   
71 Early references to franchising include “All franchises and liberties of the bisshopericks……....deryvid 
from the crowne 1559. and Fairs, Markets and other franchises c.1630” (Oxford English Dictionary, 1933). 
The origins of franchising lie in the mercantile codes and common law of the Middle Ages when  the crown 
offered feudal lords the right to maintain civil order, determine and collect tax revenues, and make other 
special tax assessments.  The barons paid the crown a specified sum from the tax revenues collected.  In 
1562 the Council of Trent ended this system of patronage. 
72 The “Norenkai” system in Japan has existed for several hundred years. It involves a long term employee 
of a restaurant being allowed by the employer to set up an restaurant in a different location under the same 
name and using the same menu.  “Noren” is the Japanese word for the small curtain that lies across the 
entry of traditional Japanese restaurants and houses. “Kai” is the Japanese word for club or association.  
“Mai Toi” or table rent agreements have long existed in Chinese communities around the world.  These  
enable individuals to run  a small number of tables in a restaurant owned by another party. 
73 One of the earliest examples of franchising in the United States was the McCormick Harvesting Machine 
Company. This  manufacturer commissioned local agents to sell and service its machinery around 1850 
(Mendelsohn. M, 2004, The Guide to Franchising, 6th Edition, Cassell).  This gave birth to what the US 
Department of Commerce calls “traditional franchising”. The Singer Sewing Machine Company (Ibid 
Mendelsohn and  Stanworth. J and Smith. B, 1991, Barclays Guide to Franchising for Small Businesses, 
Blackwell) was another early franchise business that sprung up in the US during the 1850’s.  Agents 
working on commission demonstrated, sold, and repaired the Singer sewing machines. Both the 
McCormick and Singer franchises were after some years replaced by a company owned network.  Coca-
Cola was conceived in 1886 as a non-alcoholic alternative to “hard “ drink such as beers and spirits.  It was 
dispensed from a soda fountain  by mixing syrup with carbonated water.  It was not potable and so this 
severely limited the size of its market and growth (Felsted. A, 1993, The Corporate Paradox: Power and 
Controlin Business Franchise, Routledge, p 41). The advent of bottling technology changed  all that and the 
rights to bottle and sell Coca-Cola everywhere in the US (other than New England, Mississippi and Texas, 
where prior arrangements where in place),  were granted to two traditional franchisees – Messrs Thomas 
and Whitehead in 1899.  The franchisees were granted the rights to  make up and bottle Coca-Cola from 
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DATE MILESTONES 
 Franchising Develops as a distinct Retail Channel 
• Harper Beauty Shops (US) (1920) 
• US automobile manufacturers adopt franchise model 
1900-195074 75 • Rexell pharmacy (US) (1902) 
• Howard Johnson Ice Cream Parlours (US) (1925) 
• Pingouin Stores (France) (1930) 
 
1950s 
Classic Franchise Structures Developed in the US and a few 
expand into Europe 
• McDonalds (USA) (1955)76 
• KFC (USA) (1955)77 
• Service Master (USA) (1958) 
• IHOP (USA) (1959)78 
• Wimpy master franchisee opens in UK (1955)79 
• Service Master master franchisee opens in UK (1958) 80 
                                                                                                                                                        
syrup provided by  the franchisor  which also provided them with bottles, labels and advertising matter.  
Whitehead soon after sold out to John Thomas Lupton, after realising that he did not have sufficient capital 
to set up the bottling plants.  In due course the franchisees were granting sub franchises across the US (Ibid 
Felstred).  Pepsi-Cola followed suit and by 1910 had 280 bottlers across the USA (Ibid Felsted). US 
Department of Commerce (USDOC).  Various years, “Franchising in the Economy” ed – Kosteka. 
74 At the turn of the century, William E. Metzger of Detroit became the first franchisee of the General 
Motors Corporation.  Ford, and then other manufacturers followed suit. Similar trends developed in the 
Petroleum industry (Op cit Felsted A. – Ibid   pp 42). 
75 The first true business format franchise was created by Martha Mathilda Harper, who developed her 
network of Harper Beauty Shops at the turn of the century into over 500 shops in the USA, Canada and 
Europe by the mid-1920s.  Plitt. J. R, 2000, “Martha Matilda Harper and the American Dream: How One 
Woman Changed the Face of Modern Business,” New York: Syracuse University Press.  Other businesses 
followed suit.  Rexall drugstores began in 1902 as a co-operative of some 40 druggists organised by Louis 
Ligget who set up a company to manufacture private-label drugs which would be distributed and sold 
exclusively by these druggists under a franchise (Alan A. – Ibid  pp 42). In 1925, Howard Johnson 
established an ice cream business in Massachusetts and expanded it by franchising it to a group of 
restaurants on the East Coast.  By 1940 the first Howard Johnson Restaurant appeared, and in 1954 the first 
motor lodge opened.  The Howard Johnson franchise system has since grown internationally to over 200 
restaurants about 500 motor lodges (Alan A. – Ibid  pp 42). Hertz Car Rental and A&W Restaurants are just 
two of the businesses that began franchising in the 1920s and are still doing so (Blair. R and La fontaine. F, 
2005, “The Economics of Franchising” Cambridge University Press, p.7). 
76 Love. J. F, 2008, MacDonalds: Behind the Arches, p45 
77 Op cit, Felsted. A, p.42  
78 Ibid Felsted. A, p.42  
79 Stanworth. J and Smith. B, 1991, Barclays Guide to Franchising for Small Businesses, Blackwell 
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DATE MILESTONES 
 First Wave of Business Format Franchising Growth 
• Franchising flourishes in the USA 
1960’s • In the UK - Golden Egg Restaurants (1965); Dyno Rod 
(1966) open81 
• In Germany82 - lhr Platz (drugstore), Nordsee (fish 
restaurant) and OBI (D-I-Y Store) open 
• More US concepts begin to enter Europe 
• Regulatory problems arise in the UK83 
 Second Wave of Business Format Franchising Growth 
• First Franchise Regulation adopted – California (1971)84 
1970’s • 14 US States adopted franchise relationship laws 
• FTC Disclosure Rules implemented 
• European Franchise Federation founded (1972)85 
• French and German Franchise Associations founded 
(1973) 
                                                                                                                                                        
80 ServiceMaster, the carpet and upholstery cleaning franchise, was another American import which came to 
the UK in 1958 when Raymond Crouch bought the master licence for Europe from ServiceMaster 
Industries Inc, a Chicago based company (ibid).  Mr Softee and Lyons Maid are also credited with offering 
franchises during the 1950s (ibid).  
81 “Ihr Platz” (drugstore), “Nordsee” (fish restaurant) and “OBI” (do-it-yourself-store) were established 
82 Between 1970 and 1985, franchising grew steadily and the number of franchise systems increased from a 
mere 40 to 200.  Over the last 25 years the rate of growth has accelerated, reaching a number of some 980 
franchisees in 2009. This growth can be attributed in part to German Reunification, even though many in 
the East suffered from a lack of capital with which to invest in franchise systems (Giesler, Nauschütt, 
Franchiserecht, 2.ed. 2007, p.10-11. According to Köhler, NJW 1990, p.1689, there have been 140 
franchising systems with 7750 franchisees in 1986). 
83 Events in the UK slowed the growth of franchising in the 1960s.  The public linked franchising with 
pyramid selling, a fraudulent marketing scheme (Franchising – Adams and Jones, Franchising: Practice and 
Precedents business format franchising).  Pyramid selling involves the sale of distributorships to purchasers, 
who are encouraged with financial incentives to subdivide their distributorship to ‘sub-distributors’ and so 
on.  The system can be likened to the chain letter principle.  At one end of the chain, a door-to-door sales 
force found the unknown product very difficult to sell, while at the top of the pyramid a fortune had been 
amassed from the effective sale of multi-level distributorships rather than products. 
84 The California Franchise Investment Law (California Corporations Code, Division 5, Parts 1 through 6, 
Sections 31000 through 31516) was adopted in 1970 to be effective January 1, 1971 Code of Federal 
Regulations, Title 16, Chapter 1, Subchapter D, Part 436 (16 CFR 436), promulgated December 21, 1978, 
effective October 21, 1979 (effective date extended from July 21, 1979, 44 Federal Register 31170, May 
31, 1979).  Cited as “FTC Rule.” 
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DATE MILESTONES 
• British Franchise Association founded (1978)86 
 First Wave of Franchise Legislation Outside of USA 
• EU Franchise Block Exemption adopted (1988) 
1980’s • French “Loi Doubin” adopted (1989) 
 Second Wave of Franchise Legislation Outside of USA 
1990’s • Romania (1992) 
• Brazil (1993) 
• Russia (1997) 
• Indonesia (1997) 
• Mexico (1998) 
• Spain (1988) 
• Australia (1998) 
 Third Wave of Franchise Legislation Outside of the USA 
2000’s • Kazakhstan (2002) 
• Estonia (2002) 
• Italy (2004) 
• Belgium (2006) 
• Sweden (2006) 
• China (2006) 
• Vietnam (2007) 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
85 www.eff-franchising.com.  Its purpose has been to uphold a self-regulatory approach to good and fair 
business practice in franchising in Europe and promote franchising in Europe by protecting the Franchise 
Industry by promoting the European Code of Ethics, influencing and encouraging the development of 
Franchising in Europe, representing the interests of the Franchise industry to international organisations 
such as the European Commission, the European Parliament etc., promoting and representing the European 
Franchise industry and its members world-wide; the exchange of information and documentation between 
national Associations or Federations in Europe and in the world and serving its member Associations (the 
EFF currently represents 16 national Franchise Associations; Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Italy, the 
United Kingdom, Austria, Finland, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Germany, Slovenia, 
Greece and the Czech Republic.) 
86 The following organisations as founder members: Budget Rent-a-Car Limited, Dyno-Rod plc, Holiday 
Inns Inc, Kentucky Fried Chicken Ltd, Prontaprint Limited, ServiceMaster Limited, Wimpy International 
Limited and Zeibart Mobile Transport Service Limited (Barclays Guide to Franchising for Small 
Businesses  - Ibid). 
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Although franchising is mentioned in historical texts dating back to the Middle Ages and the 
“tied house system”87 was widely used by brewers in the UK from the mid 18th century until 
the mid 1980s88, it only really came “of age” and became a popular form of doing business in 
the EU in the early 1970s89. 
Despite its rapid growth, for a long time there remained much suspicion of franchising in the 
European establishment.  For example, in the Fraud Trials Committee 1986 Report90, Lord 
Roskill, the Chairman, described franchising as an enterprise in which “fraudsters induce 
investors to buy franchises, holding out the prospect of large returns on investment.  But once 
the payment has been made the franchise proves worthless”.  
Nevertheless, franchising has continued to grow.  In 2010 the estimated turnover of 
franchised businesses in the USA was US$868.3 billion91 and an estimated US$300 billion in 
the EU92. 
Its presence around the globe is evidenced by the waves of franchise specific legislation that 
occurred in the 1990s and the new millennium. 
Business format franchising encompasses a wide range of goods and services across many 
sectors whilst traditional franchising is evident in automobile and petroleum distribution, US 
sports franchises, such as the NFL, NHL and NBA and national infra structure with rail and 
TV franchises being granted to operators93.   
                                                   
87 The widespread availability of alcohol was causing social concern.  Legislation was introduced to restrict 
the sale of alcohol to those with licences and also to require innkeepers to improve the drinking 
environment. As a result the value of those inns with licences greatly increased.  However, those with 
licences often had insufficient funds to improve their properties and were therefore likely to go out of 
business. It was out of this economic difficulty that the tied house system developed. By granting a landlord 
a loan or leasing its own  property out to prospective landlords brewers, such as Whitbread were able to 
retain and expand the number of outlets for their beer (Ritchie. B, 1992, An Uncommon Brewer: The Story 
of Whitbread 1742-1992, James and James).  This ‘tied house’ system proved itself as an efficient business 
mechanism until the competition authorities undermined it in the 1980’s (“The Supply of Beer – A Report 
on the Supply of Beer for Retail Sale in the United Kingdom” – Mergers and Monopolies Commission). 
88 Ibid Ritchie. B, 1992, p.17 
89 When the British Franchise Association was established, followed by the French Franchise Federation 
and the European Franchise Federation. 
90 Fraud Trials (Roskill Report) HMSO, 1986 
91 Price Waterhouse Coopers 2010 Franchise Business Economic Outlook.  The International Franchise 
Association’s Educational Foundation www.franchise.org (viewed 29/12/2010) (142) European Franchise 
Federation Statistics 2010 – www.eff-franchise.com (viewed 23/12/2010) 
92 See 2.2.2 below 
93 However, whereas both forms of franchise are often considered together in the US, (so greatly inflating 
the figures for franchising E.g. US Department of Commerce.  Various Years. Franchising in the Economy, 
A Kostecka), in the EU the two forms are kept separate when considering the economic importance of 
franchising (E.g. The BFA/National Westminster Bank Survey of Franchising in the UK.  Various Years. 
BFA).  In the EU automobile distribution is dealt with separately from business format franchising from the 
legal perspective. 
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The difference between traditional and business format franchising endures today94.  
This thesis focuses upon business format franchising. 
2.1.2 The Institutional Contextualisation of Franchising in the EU 
The potential for franchising to help make the EU’s single market dream a reality for small 
and medium sized enterprises that might otherwise find entering other member states too 
daunting a prospect, has clearly been identified by the movers and shakers in the EU 
Commission95. The International Chamber of Commerce considers that “franchising has 
proved over many years to be an extremely successful commercial vehicle for the distribution 
of products and services, making a considerable contribution to growth in business sectors 
that use this type of distribution channel”96. Prominent member state politicians have hailed 
franchising as being “an important incentive for the recovery of the economy”97.  Indeed in 
Italy the government has invested over €350 million in franchising by sponsoring franchisees 
with investment grants and soft loans98.  The World Intellectual Property Organisation 
recognises franchising’s “rapid growth and success” and comments upon its ability to ensure 
that “a large and stable organisation is able to grow and develop, motivated by or indeed 
driven by the spirit of small business”99.  Yet at the same time reports of the legislature and 
political debate in member states in which franchising is well developed, condemn it as an 
enterprise in which “fraudsters induce investors to buy franchises, holding out the prospect of 
large returns on investment. But once the payment has been made the franchise proves 
worthless.”100 Others seek to “explode the myth that the franchise industry is a relatively safe 
industry in comparison with other fully fledged business.”101  Despite this difference of 
opinion however, franchising continues to grow and the International Institute for the 
Unification of Private law (UNIDROIT) has identified franchising as “playing an ever greater 
role in a wide range of national economies102 
                                                   
94 Although some believe that the difference between traditional and business format franchising is more a 
matter of degree and that although traditional franchising tends to be a simpler financial arrangement but 
there is little real difference between the two in terms of the basic legal relationship.  Dnes. A, 1992, 
Franchising: A case study approach,  Aldershot, England, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, and Klein. B, 1995, The 
Economics of Franchise Contract, Journal of Corporate Finance Volume 2:9-37. 
95 Rt Hon Sir Leon Brittan, Q.C – President of the European Commission, Abell, European Franchising 
(Vol. 1). 
96 Maria Livanos Cattaui, Secretary General of ICC on the ICC Model International Franchising Contract 
97 Senator Asciutti commenting upon bill no. 2093 of 6 March 1997 in the Italian senate stated that 
“franchising has the potential to be an important element in the recovery of the economy.” He also observed 
that “particularly during a period of sluggish economic performance, the regulation of franchising can play 
a noteworthy role in the creation of new enterprises, especially in the central and southern regions of the 
country”. 
98 Legislative Decree No. 185 of 21 April 2000 and Decree No. 295 of 28 May 2001 (Italy) 
99 WIPO, Franchising Guide 
100 Lord Roskill, Chairman of the Fraud Trials Committee 1986, Roskill Report 
101 Brian H. Donohoe (Central Ayrshire), Hansard HC vol 450 col 1493 ( 24 October 2006) 
102 UNIDROIT, Model Franchise Disclosure Law, Preamble 
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2.1.3 Sub Conclusion 
Business format franchising has developed over many years from a response to economic and 
technological developments to a distinct type of economic activity with significant economic 
impact in a number of national economies. 
2.2 The Economic Contextualisation of Franchising in the EU 
This is critical analysis towards the first objective of the thesis.  It establishes the scale of 
franchising in the EU and its contribution relative to that it makes in the USA and Australia.   
Franchising normally stimulates economic activity by improving the distribution of goods 
and/or the provision of services as they give franchisors the possibility of establishing a 
uniform network with limited investments, which may assist the entry of new competitors in 
the markets particularly in the case of SMEs.  It allows independent traders to set up outlets 
more rapidly and with a higher chain of success than if they were to set up without the 
franchisor’s experience and assistance.  Franchisors therefore have a better opportunity to 
compete with larger distribution undertakings .   
Franchising also generally allows consumers and other end users a fair share of the resulting 
benefits as they combine the advantage of a uniform network with the existence of traders 
personally interested in the efficient operation of their business.  The homogeneity of the 
network and the constant co-operation between the franchisor and the franchisees ensures the 
constant quality of the products and services.  The favourable effect of franchising on inter 
brand competition and the fact that consumers are free to deal with any franchisee in the 
network guarantees that a reasonable part of the resulting benefits will be passed on to 
consumers. 
In pursuing the goals of economic growth, job creation and consumer satisfaction, 
commercial innovation such as franchising needs to be encouraged.  Franchising can 
contribute to the establishment of a unified European Market.  It facilitates cross-frontier 
development as it is based on the leverage which an established name or idea can give a 
relatively small investment to enable the product or service involved to spread quickly, far 
and wide . 
Franchising is a commercial phenomenon particularly well suited to the challenges of the 
single market.  The combination of a franchisor’s know-how and a franchisee’s enterprise can 
boost economic activity and employment, while enlarging the range of goods and services on 
offer to the public.  Franchising makes products and services available to a wide public and 
does not stop at national frontiers policy making within the EU. 
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It is suggested that the regulatory environment in the EU should therefore support and re-
enforce the economic drivers that attract franchisors and franchisees to franchising and 
reducing the inherent consequential risks they expose themselves to. 
However, given the heterogeneous policy legacies in the EU member states as well as the 
diverse preferences of national governments and other domestic actors, a one-size-fits-all 
solution is neither politically feasible nor normatively desirable.   
2.2.1 Poor Key Data 
The first objective of this thesis is to establish that although franchising is a positive influence 
in the EU and stimulates economic activity by improving distribution and giving business 
increased access to other member state markets, it is not fulfilling its full potential to 
contribute to the realisation of the single market.  The following is critical analysis towards 
proving this objective. 
Business format franchising is “a distinct and remarkably effective method of conducting 
business activities that is particularly appropriate in current economic conditions, due mainly 
to the advantages to both parties in the contract”103.   
It is a significant part of the economy of a number of EU member states.  However, the 
economic data available is poor and incomplete.  There is no up to date uniform and complete 
set of economic data for franchising in all or even the majority of EU member states.  This in 
itself suggests that franchising is not achieving its full potential in the EU. 
According to the 2010 NatWest/BFA Franchise Survey, franchising contributed £11.8 billion 
to the UK’s GDP in 2009, an increase of £400 million from 2008.104 The same publication 
indicates that despite the economic climate, nine out of ten franchise businesses are 
profitable. The survey also states that the number of individuals employed in franchising in 
the last twelve months stands at 465,000 across a total of 34,800 franchised units in the UK. 
This means that on average each unit employs 13 people.  
The European Franchise Federation indicates that the total 2009 turnover of franchising in 
Germany was €48 billion105. A report in January 2008 by Deutsche Bank stated that the sector 
has tripled its nominal turnover in the ten preceding years.106  By comparison, Germany’s 
nominal GDP has only grown by 25% over the same period. As a result, the franchising share 
                                                   
103 The Belgian House of Representatives, 17 March 2004 Doc 51 0924/001 
104 UK: Natwest/BFA Survey 2010: http://www.thebfa.org/fpnews/natwestbfasurvey10.asp 
105 European Franchise Federation – www.eff-franchise.com (viewed 23/12/2010) 
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of GDP increased by nearly 1% to 1.6% between 1996 and 2006. This figure is likely to be 
higher now as the industry’s turnover has continued to rise. Indeed, Deutsche Bank expects 
the sector to grow until 2015 at a rate of 7% per annum to around €70 billion. Deutsche Bank 
also reported that between 1996 and 2006 the number of people working in the sector nearly 
doubled. By comparison the total workforce only increased by 4%. In its 2010 report, the 
European Franchise Federation estimates that 452,000 people are employed in 58,000 units. 
On average this means that each unit employs 7.8 people107.  
According to Guy Gras, Chairman of the French Franchise Federation, the 2008 total turnover 
of franchising in France was €47.6 billion108. The number of franchise networks in France 
have doubled over the past ten years, with steady growth of 8-10% over the last four years. In 
2009 693,194 people were employed by 51,600 units109 in France. This equates to 8.25 
people being employed per franchise unit. 
2.2.2 Estimating the Size of Franchising in the EU 
Although franchising makes a substantial contribution to the economy of the European 
Union,  in order to measure whether it is as well established as it could be and is making its 
full potential contribution to the single market, it is necessary to first of all examine how well 
developed it is in the EU member states and then to bench mark this against its development 
in the USA and Australia. 
This is critical analysis towards achieving the first objective of this thesis. 
There is a lack of full and accurate information about the scale of franchising in the whole of 
the EU.  The most recent figures published by the European Franchise Federation are in 
respect of 2009, but they only deal with 18 member states110 and the information given for 
them is incomplete111 and in places incorrect112.  There are no other recent figures for 
franchising in the EU. 
                                                   
107 ibid 
108 FFF Press Pack for the 2009 Franchise Expo in Paris. 
http://lb7.reedexpo.fr/Data/kmreed_franchise/block/F_23316ac8f1472bf8d16e0ce274b508624c124d19ed45
d.pdf the France Franchising Association excludes company owned outlets from this figure and therefore 
concluded there were only 53,002 franchised outlets in 2009 
109 ibid. The French Franchising Association excludes company owned outlets from this figure and 
therefore concluded there were only 53,002 franchised outlets in 2009. 
110 Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the UK.  Turkey is not a member 
of the EU.  However four of these (Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Germany) are estimates and the gross 
total of 11,731 is arbitrarily discounted by 15% to take into account the fact that brands that exist in several 
countries may be costed more than once in these statistics.  The figure for Turkey is given at 1,640 and so 
that must be removed.  Consequently the estimated figure of 8,330 is deemed to be unreliable.  The 
statistics do not give details of even estimated turnover for franchising.  The estimated number of 
franchised outlets in the ?? is around 405,000 but again this is unreliable as figures for Austria, Belgium, 
Czech Republic and Portugal are running 
111 For example, no turnover figures are given for 12 member states. 
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The most recent figures for franchising in the whole of the EU are from 2005.  “Franchising 
Europe” estimated that there were 5,000 franchises operating in Europe, that supported 
300,000 outlets with an estimated total turnover of US$200 billion113.  Unfortunately this 
figure is not broken down into figures for individual member states, save for the turnover 
figure for France, which is given at US$51.6 billion (€38.6 billion).  The premises made and 
data used in arriving at the estimated figure are not given.  It is therefore not particularly 
reliable, but it is the only figure available. 
In order to establish the turnover of franchising in the EU it is therefore necessary to 
extrapolate a figure based upon the EFF’s 2009 statistics and the Franchising Europe 2005 
statistics.  This paucity of current statistics about franchising in the EU of itself suggests that 
franchising may not be as well established in the single market as a whole, as it is in the 
larger member states. 
In 2009 the European Franchise Federation estimates that there were 9,971 franchises 
accounting for 405,000 outlets.   
The EFF estimates the turnover of franchising in 2009 in Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, the 
Netherlands and the UK114 at US$188.1 billion.  Add to that the French Franchise 
Federation’s figure for France (US$62.3 billion) and it totals US$250.4 billion. 
The figures below clearly suggest that franchising in the EU is underperforming when 
compared to those for the USA and Australia115. 
                                                                                                                                                        
112 The turnover figure for the UK in 2009 is given as €9.42 billion rather than the €11.8 billion given by the 
BFA 
113 Iuliana. S and Mihaela. M, 2009, "The High Impact of Franchising on Economic Affairs in Some of the 
EU Members" by Annals of Faculty of Economics, 2009, Vol.1, Issue 1, p. 251-256 (Published by the 
University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics)  
http://steconomice.uoradea.ro/anale/volume/2009/v1-international-relations-and-european-
integration/39.pdf 
114 The EFF figure wrongly put the UK’s 2009 turnover at €9.4 billion rather then £11.8 billion (€14 billion 
or US$18.7 billion) reported by the BFA. 
115  See “Price Waterhouse Coopers 2010 Franchise Business Economic Outlook” – The International 
Franchise Association’s Educational Foundation www.franchise.org (viewed 29/12/2010) and Franchise 
Council of Australia www.franchise.org (viewed 29/12/2010) 
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franchising in US 
dollars (exchange 
rate as at 23/12/10) 
The UK 62 million  2.2 trillion  £11.8 billion117  US$18.7 billion  
Germany 81.7 million 3.3 trillion €48 billion118 US$62.9 billion  
France  64.7 million 2.5 trillion €47.6 billion119  US$62.3 billon  
Italy 60.4 million 2.1 trillion €21.77 billion  US$28.5 billion  
Spain  45.9 million 1.46 trillion €24.7 billion  US$32.4 billion 
The 
Netherlands 
16.5 million 0.77 trillion €29.2 billion US$29 billion 
Portugal 10.6 million 0.2 trillion €5 billion US$6.6 billion 
Total 341.8 million 12.54 trillion - US$250.4 billion 
 
The paucity of current complete and consistent data for all 27 EU member states means that it 
is impossible to definitely state the turnover of franchising in the EU.  Nevertheless, it can be 
estimated in three ways.  All three ways lead to estimates that suggest that franchising in the 
EU is underperforming compared to the USA and Australia.   
Firstly, Franchise Europe’s 2005 figure US$200 billion can be increased by the same 
percentage as the number of outlets are reported to have increased by the 2009 EFF Survey.  
Assuming that each new outlet on average has the same turnover as the average outlet in 
2005, it is logically justifiable120.  Applying this methodology the increase of outlets from 
3,000 in 2005 to 4,000 in 2009 represents a 33.3% increase.  If the same percentage increase 
is applied to the turnover of franchising the US$200 billion figure for 2005 would become 
                                                   
116 International Monetary Fund, Ibid 
117 BFA/NatWest Survey 2010 
118 European Franchise Federation – www.eff-franchise.com (viewed 23/12/10)  
119 FFF Press Pack, Ibid 
120 However, as explained on pp 46 below this assumption is incorrect due to the differing resale prices in 
member states. 
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US$266 billion in 2009121.  This methodology produces a figure which wrongly assumes that 
retail prices are the same in all EU member states and ignores the number of outlets in a 
number of smaller member states in 2009 but it does produce a working figure. 
 2005 2009 Percentage increase 
Number of outlets 300,000 405,000 33.3% 
Turnover US$200 billion US$266 billion 33.3% 
The second way of estimating the turnover of franchising in 2009 using 2005 figures involves 
increasing the total 2005 turnover figures by the same percentage as the turnover for France 
has increased in the same period.  This assumes a uniform level of growth in all EU member 
states which is logically defensible.  The French Franchise Federation’s 2009 turnover figure 
of €47.6 billion represents an increase of €9 billion on the Franchise Europe 2005 figure of 
€38.6 billion, which is approximately a 25% increase.  If that percentage increase is applied 
to the US$200 billion figure it suggests that the turnover of franchising in the EU in 2009 
should be approximately US$250 billion.  That is more or less the same as the figure that 
EFF’s 2009 survey produces for the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and 
Portugal.  It can therefore be concluded that it is an underestimate. 
 2005 2009 Percentage increase 
Turnover in France €38.6 billion €47.6 billion c25% 
Turnover in EU US$200 billion US$250 billion 25% 
The third way of estimating the turnover of franchising in 2009 is to compare the number of 
outlets in the seven EU member states that have a turnover of US$250.4 billion according to 
the EFF figures with those in the other 11 member states referred to in the EFF’s 2009 
figures.  (For some reason no turnover figures are given for these 11 member states). 
Six of the member states that account for a turnover of US$250.4 billion account for 283,115 
outlets.  There are no outlet figures given for Portugal.  However, as Portugal’s turnover is 
approximately 25% of Italy’s, it is reasonable to assume that it may have around 25% of the 
outlets Italy has.  That would mean that the seven EU member states account for 
approximately 300,000 outlets of the 405,000 – around about 75%.  As the remaining eleven 
member states have approximately one third of the outlets of the seven EU member states 
which have a turnover of US$250.4 billion, it is reasonable to suggest that they also have a 
turnover which is roughly equivalent to one third of that figure, that is US$83.2 billion.  That 
                                                   
121 This methodology under estimates the increase in the number of outlets in the EU in 2009, as the EFF 
figures do not include all EU member states – although it does include all those in which franchising is well 
established. 
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would mean that the turnover of the 18 EU member states listed by the EFF is estimated at 
approximately US$333.6 billion. 
  Percentage of Outlets in the 11 
member states 
Number of Outlets in 18 EU 
member states in 2009 according to 
the EFF 
405,000 100% 
Less   
Estimated number of Outlets in the 
7 EU member states that had a 
turnover of US$250.4 billion in 
2009122 
Approx 300,000 c66.6% 
Number of Outlets in other 11 EU 
member states 
105,000 c33.3% 
Assuming that on average outlets turnover an equal amount, approximating the number of 
outlets in the 11 EU member states as being 33.3% of those in the 7 member states 
accounting for turnover of US$250.4 billion and applying that same percentage to turnover 
suggests a turnover figure for franchising in 2009 of US$333.6 billion. 
33.3% x US$250.4 billion = US$83.2 billion 
US$250.4 billion + US$83.2 billion = US$333.6 billion 
There is no evidence to suggest that there is any substantial franchising in the remaining 9 
member states123 and so for the purpose of this calculation it will be assumed that they 
account for no significant franchising turnover. 
However, the problem with this calculation is that it is unlikely that outlets in the 11 member 
states for which estimates are being made will be turning over the same amount as those in 
Germany, the UK and France which have a much higher cost of living124.  The most relevant 
                                                   
122 The EFF gives no number of outlets for Portugal.  This is calculated by reference to Italy.  Italy’s 
turnover is €21.77 billion.  Portugal’s turnover is €5.05 billion i.e. approximately 25% of Italy’s.  Italy has 
53,300 outlets.  If Portugal has 25% of that number, i.e. 13,325 
123 Malta, Cyprus, Finland, Norway, Slovakia, Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. 
124 The EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) (see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu) 
suggest that there is a wide range in the cost of living in the EU member states. (Framework Regulation 
1177/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 June 2003 concerning community statistics 
on income and living conditions) 
  47 
way of testing this is to consider the relative cost of a particular product sold by a franchise 
network in the EU.   
The Big Mac Index125 gives the cost of a Big Mac in a number of different EU member states.  
In the UK it costs US$3.65, in France US$3.20 and in Germany US$3.96.  The cost in the 8 
other EU member states that are not included in the 7 that had a turnover of US$250.4 billion 
are considerably lower. 
An analysis of the cost of a Big Mac in these 11 EU member states yields the following data; 
Selection of member states included in those which had a turnover of US$250.4 
billion in 2009 
EU Member State Cost of Big Mac as at 2006 in US$dollar 
The UK 3.65 
Germany 3.96 
France 3.20 
Selection of member states included in EFF outlets statistics for which no 
turnover figure is available 
EU Member State Cost of Big Mac as at 2006 in US$dollar 
Hungary 2.71 
Poland 2.10 
Czech Republic 2.67 
Slovenia 2.76 
Greece 2.40 





                                                   
125 The Big Mac index was introduced in the Economist in September 1986 and gave rise to 
“Burgernomics” (Daley, J. (2008/9/6) “Burgernomics: Why the price of a Big Mac may hold the key to 
better investment returns”.  The Independent) www.investment.com (viewed 16/1/2011) 
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These figures suggest that it is unlikely that the outlets in the 11 EU member states included 
in the 2009 EFF Statistics (but not included in the 7 member states that account for the 
US$250.4 billion turnover) have a turnover of US$83.2 billion.   
The above three methodologies produce a range of the estimated turnover of franchising in 
the EU in 2009 from US$250 billion to US$333.6 billion.  None of the figures can be 
considered to be totally accurate, but they are all the result of a logical use of the data 
available. 
It is therefore suggested that a figure somewhere in the middle of the range between 
US$333.6 billion and US$250 billion is a fair and reasonable estimate of the likely turnover 
of franchising in the EU during 2009.  Thus, these methodologies suggest that the turnover of 
franchising in the EU in 2009 can reasonably be estimated at around US$300 billion or €215 
billion126.   
Further critical analysis of the figures also suggests that franchising in the EU is heavily 
concentrated in a minority of member states. 
Those EU member states other than the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands 
and Portugal probably account for a turnover of around US$50 billion (€35 billion) at most.   
Estimated 2009 turnover of franchising in the EU  cUS$300 billion 
Less 
2009 turnover of 7 EU member states identified  US$250.4 billion 
Estimated 2009 turnover of other 20 EU member states US$49,6 billion 
This suggests that franchising is heavily focused in around a quarter of the EU member states 
which account for US$250.4 billion (€180 billion) out of a total estimated turnover of 
US$300 billion.  In other words 25% of the EU member states account for an estimated 
83.5% of franchising’s turnover in the EU. 
2.2.3 Comparing the Size of Franchising in the EU with that in the USA and Australia 
Having established the scale of franchising in the EU and that franchising is not well 
developed in the majority of EU member states, it is appropriate to benchmark its turnover in 
the EU against that in the USA and Australia.  This is critical analysis towards establishing 
the first objective of the thesis. 
                                                   
126  Exchange rate as at 12 March 2011 
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The EU has a population of around 500 million127 compared to the USA’s 310.9 million128.  
The EU’s Gross Domestic Product129 in 2010 was US$16,106,896,000,000 (16.1 trillion) 
compared to the USA’s GDP of US$14,624,184,000,000 (14.6 trillion), according to the 
International Monetary Fund130.  One might therefore expect the estimated turnover of 
franchising in the EU and the USA to be similar.  However, this is not the case.  
The estimated 405,000 franchised outlets in the EU and the generous estimated turnover of 
US$300 billion are dwarfed by the equivalent figures in the United States, where in 2010 
there were an estimated 901,093 business format franchise outlets employing 9,558,000 and 
accounting for an output of US$868.3 billion131.  
Even Australia, with a population of only 22.5 million and a GDP of US$1.2 trillion has an 
estimated franchise turnover of US$130 billion132.  








per head of 
population 
EU 500 million US$16.1 
trillion  
US$300 billion 1.86% US$600 





Australia  22.5 million  US$1.2 
trillion  
US$130 billion 10.83% US$5,777 
There are no up to date figures for the number of franchisors in the USA.  None are published 
by the IFA, which focuses instead upon the number of franchised outlets.  
The figures are very stark.  Although the USA has only 60% of the population of the EU and 
a lower GDP, franchising’s estimated turnover in the USA is considerably more than double 
that in the EU. Compared to both the USA and Australia, (both of which have sophisticated 
and well developed franchise laws), franchising in the EU is markedly underdeveloped.   
                                                   
127 International Monetary Fund.  World Economic Database, October 2010 
128 Ibid 
129 The market value of all final goods and services from a nation in a given year. 
130 International Monetary Fund, ibid 
131 “Price Waterhouse Coopers 2010 Franchise Business Economic Outlook” – The International Franchise 
Association’s Educational Foundation www.franchise.org (viewed 29/12/2010).  
132 Franchise Council of Australia www.franchise.org (viewed 29/12/2010)  
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2.2.4 Sub-conclusion 
Despite a broad range of differing attitudes to business format franchising, it has developed 
into a channel to market that makes a significant contribution to the economy of the European 
Union.  However, it is under performing in the single market relative to its contribution to 
other markets, namely the USA and Australia.  Also, with some 83.5% of franchising being 
concentrated in just 25% of the 27 member states, franchising is clearly not promoting trade 
between member states as much as it could. 
2.3 Deconstructing the Economic Rationale of Franchising – Why do people get 
involved in Franchising? 
This is critical analysis towards establishing the first objective of the thesis and showing that 
franchising does stimulate economic activity by offering advantages to those involved in it.  It 
is suggested that there are inherent economic advantages of franchising which attract 
franchisors and franchisees to become involved in it.   
2.3.1 The Economic Drivers of Franchising for Franchisors 
Businesses, other than sole traders, involve a relationship between a principal and the 
individuals he hires  to provide a service or manufacture/distribute goods – his “agents”. The 
principal delegates decision-making authority to those agents133. The interests of the principal 
and its agents do not always coincide, so there is  potential for conflict. The agent may not 
always act in the principal’s best interests134 and under performing agents are not 
uncommon135. In order to reduce the risk of a poor employee, a non-franchised business will 
need to institute a costly management system. Franchising, on the other hand, replaces much 
of the need for such a management system with powerful financial incentives, namely the 
benefit of the profits created by his/her endeavours and the risk of losing the capital that they 
have invested in the business136. Because franchising creates a better financial synergy 
between the two parties, there is less need for monitoring and a greater probability for 
maximum performance by the franchisee137. There is evidence that increased managerial 
                                                   
133 Klock. C, 2004, Franchising a Good Strategy for a company operating throughout Europe – Case Study 
Benetton, University of Abertay Dundee 
134 Jensen. M. C and Meckling. W. H, 1976, ”Theory of the Firm, Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, October, 305-360. Eisenhardt. K, 1989, Agency 
Theory: An Assessment and Review, Academy of Management Review, Volume 14, Issue 1, p.57-74.   
135 Rubin. P, 1978, “The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract”, Journal of Law 
and Economics 21, p.223-233 – Brickley. J, and Dark. F, 1987, “The Choice of Organizational Form: The 
Case of Franchising”, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 18, p. 401-420.  
136 Ibid Brickley and Dark   
137 Bradash. J. L, 1997, “Using the Plural Form in the Management of Restaurant Chains”, Administrative 
Science Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 276-303.  
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ownership improves performance138. The corollary of the franchisee’s better performance is 
improved performance by the franchisor, as the franchisor’s performance depends to a large 
extent on its franchisees’ performance. 
The relationship between principal and agent can be described or explained in mathematical 
models139.  Agents are generally assumed to be risk adverse i.e. they prefer a low but secure 
income whilst principals are risk neutral140.  Many commentators have highlighted the 
advantages of franchising a business using this “Agency Theory”141 
Another analysis proposed is that franchising is a solution to the capital, managerial and 
information constraints faced by expanding businesses142.  The so-called “Resource Scarcity 
Theory”.  It is suggested that growing businesses use franchising as a way of accessing 
capital that would otherwise be unavailable to it in a cost effective way that offers fair reward 
to the financier (the franchisee).  Support for this analysis is provided by the former president 
of Kentucky Fried Chicken, John Y. Brown, who estimated that it would have cost KFC $450 
million to establish its first 2,700 stores, an amount of capital that was not available to KCF in 
the early stages of its expansion 143. The traditional ways for new businesses to access capital 
are to either sell equity or raise a loan, although raising a loan, may not be possible in the 
early stages of a business’s development due to lack of collateral and a proven track record. 
Therefore, Franchising is often a more cost effective and realistic option 144. Indeed, 
franchisees may be able to provide capital to the franchisor at a lower cost than passive 
investors can 145. In addition to capital, franchising also provides an efficient way to obtain 
                                                   
138 Bruton. G. D, Keels. J. K and Scifres. E. L, 2002, “Corporate Restructuring and Performance: An 
Agency Theory Perspective on the Complete Buyout Cycle”, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 55, Issue 9, 
September, 709-724.  
139 Op cit, Jensen and Meckling 1976, 305-360. 
140 Williamson. O and Masten. S. E, 1999, The Economics of Transaction Costs Cheltenham, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd 
141 E.g. Dourma. S and Schreuder H, 2002, Economic Approach to Organisation, 3rd ed. Edinburgh, 
Pearson Education – Brousseau. E and Glachant. J-M, 2002, The Economics of Contracts: Theory and 
Application 1st ed. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
- Brickley. A, Dark. F and Weisbach. M, 1991, “An Agency Perspective on Franchising of Financial 
Management Spring”, Volume 20, Issue 1   
142 Oxenfeldt. A. R and Kelly. A. O, 1968, “Will Successful Systems Ultimately Become Wholly-Owned 
Chains?”, Journal of Retailing, Volume 44, Issue 49, p.69-83  
 Norton. S, 1988, An Empirical Look at Franchising as an Organizational Form, Journal of Business, 
Volume 61 Issue 2, p.197-218 – Carney. M and Gedajlovic. E, 1991, “Vertical Integration in Franchise 
Systems: Agency Theory and Resources Explanations”, Strategic Management Journal, Volume 12, p. 607-
629 – Shane. S. A, 1996, “Hybrid Organizational Arrangements and Their Implications for Firm Growth 
and Survival: A Study of New Franchisors”, Academy of Management Journal, Volume. 39, No. 1, pp. 
216-234  
143 Tikoo. S, 1996, “Assessing the Franchise Option”, Business Horizons, May-June. p.78-82 
144 Dant. R. P and Kaufmann. P. J, 2003, “Structural and Strategic Dynamics in Franchising”, Journal of 
Retailing, Volume 79, Issue 2, p. 63-75.  
145 Combs. J. G and Kitchen. D. J, 1999, “Explaining Interfirm Cooperation and Performance: Toward a 
Reconciliation of Predictions from the Resource-Based View and Organizational Economics”, Strategic 
Management Journal, 20, 867-888.  
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the managerial expertise needed to grow the business. Because a franchisee puts a significant 
amount of her/his assets and time into her/his unit, she/he is likely to purchase a franchise 
only if she/he is confident in her/his managerial abilities 146.  
Several commentators stress the fact that franchising facilitates much more rapid growth for 
companies147, suggesting that franchisors have used franchising to secure a large market share 
much more rapidly than they otherwise could achieve148.  The reason for this is largely the so-
called “Penrose Effect”, that is managerial capacities pose a static limit to a firm’s expansion 
and rapid recruitment of staff raises operating costs.  Franchising is a device that circumvents 
this constraint by externalising the management functions to the franchisee149. 
Thus franchising addresses the adverse selection problem of firms hiring managers who may 
overstate their qualifications to secure employment. On the international front franchising 
also allows a firm to leverage the local market knowledge of its franchisees as it expands into 
new geographic areas150.  Thus the “Resource Scarcity” school of thought suggests that low 
cost capital, motivated managerial expertise, and better local market knowledge are three key 
resources that should reduce a franchisor’s overall risk and have a significant positive impact 
on a franchisor’s financial performance. 
A third hypothesis is “Value Creation” or “Transaction Cost”.  Aliouche, and  Schlentrich 
suggest, the real value of franchising to a business is the improvement in business 
performance due to its choice of growing through franchising instead of growing through its 
own means151. Their study of  the US restaurant sector over the ten year period 1993-2002, 
suggests that  US public restaurant franchisors have created more value than their non-
franchising competitors in that they have a higher propensity to create market value and 
economic value than non-franchisors and generate on average higher added value than  non-
franchisors152. 
Commentators also suggest that other economic factors that cause businesses to franchise 
their business model are based upon its ability to give smaller, less well capitalised businesses 
                                                   
146 Op cit, Shane, S. A, p. 216-234  
147 Barrow. C, 1989, Franchising, in: P. Burns and J. Dewhurst, eds, small business and entrepreneurship 
(Macmillan London) and Thompson. R. S, 1994, “The Franchise Life Cycle and the Penrose Effect”, 
Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation 24, p.207-218.  Noath - Holland 
148 Hall. P and Dixon. R, 1988, Franchising, Pitman, London 
149 Op cit, Thompson, RS 
150 Minkler. L. P, 1990, An Empirical Analysis of a Firm’s Decision to Franchise, Economic Letters, 34, 
77-82.  
151 Does franchising create value? An analysis of the financial performance of us public restaurant firms  
Aliouche, and  Schlentrich, Working Paper No. 2005-02 presented at the 19th Annual Conference of the 
International Society of Franchising, London, England, May 20-22, 2005 
152 Also see Pilat. D, 1997, Regulation and Performance in the Distribution Sector: OECD Economics 
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access to some of the commercial advantages enjoyed by their larger, better capitalised 
competitors.  These include lower costs through bulk purchasing, economies of scale, new 
product development and advertising campaigns153.  Its ability to combine the chains’ 
comparative advantages in creating brand recognition and capturing economies of scale with 
the local entrepreneur’s local knowledge and commercial drive is seen as a key element in 
franchising’s success and attractiveness to growing business154.  This leads to a conclusion 
that the capacity of franchising to harness the effort of a central entity, the franchisor, and a 
number or local entrepreneurs, the franchisees explains much of franchising’s prevalence and 
popularity as a way of organising certain economic activities155. 
All three of these analyses are cogent and in practice combine to produce a powerful reason 
for businesses choosing franchising. A survey of 25 franchisors in the UK, Germany, France 
and Spain156 supported the theories with the majority of the sample surveyed identifying 
elements of the Agency theory, Resource Scarcity theory and the Transaction Cost theory 
together with other economic drivers as the reasons that they franchised their businesses. 
2.3.2 The Economic Drivers of Franchising for Franchisees 
Whilst some franchisees become substantial multi-unit operators or operate high investment 
businesses such as hotels, most franchisees are small, family owned and family run 
businesses157.  All franchisees, regardless of their size are attracted to franchising by certain 
common factors. 
Regardless of the scale and type of the franchisee, research suggests that the economic 
reasons for a franchisee buying a franchise include access to a national brand158, franchisor 
support159 such as ongoing operational assistance, marketing/advertising and bulk purchasing, 
use of a proven business format160 (that is continually developed) and independence161.  All of 
which, regardless of the franchisee’s size, increase its chances of success compared to those 
of an independent start up business. 
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The BFA states that one reason that franchisees buy a franchise is that 95% of franchises are 
in profit after 5 years compared to only 45% of other independent small firms. The other 
reason given is that franchisors are benevolent business partners with 86% of franchisees are 
satisfied with their franchisor relationship162. The European Franchise Federation163 agrees 
with this analysis.  Mendelsohn also agrees and adds improved product sourcing, advertising 
and marketing and increased access to funding as the banks tend to regard franchisees as 
lower risk than independent operators164.   
There are clear economic reasons for franchisees investing in a franchise, but it must be borne 
in mind that “non-institutional” franchisees (i.e. individuals rather than corporations) are also 
subject to a “large number of situational, personality and economic correlates…. likely to 
influence their perceptions”165. 
The situational, personality and economic correlatives referred to by researchers include a 
desire to own and operate one’s own business and lack of other attractive options (for 
example redundancy)166. 
There is much support for the belief that the franchisee has the incentive of owning his own 
business with the additional benefit of continuing assistance from the franchisor167.  The 
franchisee is an independent businessman operating within the framework and structure of the 
franchise system.  This provides the opportunity to the franchisee though hard work and effort 
to maximize the return from his business and the value of his investment168. 
In order to test the persuasiveness of the commercial advantage and proprietorship theories a 
selection of 30 UK franchisees representing eight different franchises were surveyed169 as part 
of this thesis.  The responses suggest that both theories detailed above are correct as they are 
cited by all members of the sample as reasons that they bought a franchise. 
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2.3.3 Sub-conclusion 
There are inherent advantages which attract franchisors and franchisees to franchising.  
Franchisors are attracted by the access to quality management resource, capital and economic 
advantages such as access to volume discount and economies of sale.  Franchisees are 
attracted to enhanced chances of commercial success. 
2.4 Deconstructing the Risks Inherent in Franchising 
This is critical analysis towards establishing the first objective of the thesis and better defines 
and places into perspective the advantages that franchising offers to the economy by 
identifying the risks that it gives rise to. It is suggested that there are inherent and different 
risks which the franchisor and franchisee are exposed to as a consequence of their 
involvement in franchising.   
2.4.1 Inherent Risks in Franchising to which  the Franchisor is Exposed 
It is suggested that both parties to a franchise agreement expose themselves to certain risks 
that are inherent in franchising.  The risks to which the franchisor is exposed are different to 
those to which the franchisor is exposed. 
The agency theory identifies the risks of franchising as including “information asymmetry” 
and “moral hazard”.    
Information asymmetry means that it is impossible for both parties to observe all of the 
relevant information they need for the decision making process and so the franchisee is able 
to behave opportunistically in a manner that the franchisor would deem inappropriate170.  
Moral hazard is the influence of the environment on the franchisee’s willingness to work 
effectively171.  “Free Riding”, where the franchisee does not behave in accordance with the 
rules of the franchise, is therefore a risk172. 
Certainly the degree of risk involved for the franchisor can be substantial. It is disclosing all 
of its business know-how to an independent party that is also permitted to use the 
Franchisor’s brand. In doing so it is opening the brand to potential abuse by another and 
creating an extremely effective future competitor which after the expiry of the franchise 
agreement and any post termination restrictive covenants will be able to freely compete with 
the franchisor and its other franchisees in a manner that no other competitor can. 
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Recent research in the US173 suggests that “due to the public good nature of the franchise 
trademark, franchisees have an incentive to shirk by providing a sub-optimal level service 
since they do not bear the full cost of any resulting deterioration of the trademark’s value”174. 
Research into franchise disputes in the UK175 underlines the risk of “Free Riding” by some 
franchisees who seek to compete with their franchisor during the term of the franchise 
agreement and fail to meet their other contractual obligations by under performing.  These 
failings risk damaging the franchisor’s brand. 
UK, German, French and Spanish franchisors176 were asked how significant various risks 
resulting from their entering into the franchise relationship were to them.  Their responses 
seem to add further support to the belief that information asymmetry and moral hazard are the 
main risks to franchisors.  These areas of very significant risk were identified as competition 
from franchisees during the term of the franchise agreement,177 competition from franchisees 
after the term of the franchise agreement,178 underpayment of monies due from franchisees,179 
franchisees not complying with the system180 and damage to the franchisor’s intellectual 
property181.  Areas of less significant risk were identified as protection of know-how from 
unauthorised use by franchisees or their agents outside of the franchise system in France and 
Spain182 and in the UK underperformance by franchisees during the term of the franchise 
agreement which has a significant impact on the brand.183  
A survey of franchise lawyers from around the world184 adds further support to the view that 
information asymmetry and moral risk are the main risks.  The responses suggest that the 
most important obligations of franchisees are to follow the system and not to compete during 
the term of the franchise.  Post-termination non competes are considered to be of moderate 
importance. 
It is important to bare in mind that the franchise relationship is not merely a bilateral  one. It 
is a multilateral relationship. This potentially changes the dynamics  of the relationship and 
creates a new and substantial risk for franchisors. As the franchise network increases, so the 
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balance of power in the franchisor/franchisee relationship can start to tip away from the 
franchisor. The changes are subtle and at first not always easy to identify, but the fact that the 
franchisees can come to account for the majority if not all of the franchisor’s income 
inevitably means that the franchisees have the potential to influence the actions of the 
franchisor. This leads to a fundamentally complex relationship and can mean that the 
franchisor comes to rely on the good working relationship it establishes with the majority of 
its more successful franchisees. 
A case in point was Domino’s Pizza UK. In 1995 it had in the order of 35 franchised outlets 
in the UK of which approximately thirty percent (30%) were owned by one franchisee185. 
When the franchisee was thwarted in its bid to purchase the failed UK master franchise, it 
took a belligerent stance against the new master franchisee making the running of the master 
franchise far more difficult than it should have been until his eventual exit in 2000. 
Franchisors are exposed to a number of risks that are inherent in franchising. 
2.4.2 Inherent Risks in Franchising to which the Franchisee is Exposed 
Some of the risk to which franchisees are exposed tends to vary depending upon their size 
and sophistication.  Less sophisticated and experienced franchisees, particularly small and 
mid sized unit franchisees, can sometimes invest substantial amounts of money into a new 
business based almost entirely upon the representations made to it by the franchisor. Not all 
such potential franchisees are experienced enough to carry out appropriate levels of pre-
contractual due diligence on their own initiative, and there is no doubt that unscrupulous 
individuals sometimes seek to use franchising as a way of taking unfair advantage of 
inexperienced potential franchisees, so depriving them of the basic benefits that they were 
hoping to enjoy from becoming a franchisee. The most important of these benefits include an 
established brand name, access to a business format that will increase their chances of 
success, and ongoing assistance and support including effective marketing/advertising, 
ongoing development of the business format and the benefits of bulk purchasing discounts. 
Other areas of risk impact on all franchisees regardless of their size and sophistication.  The 
failure of the franchisor to deliver the promised level of support, know-how or brand 
recognition can lead to system wide failure of franchisees.  The case of 24 Self Video is a 
case in point.  The franchisor made some £4 million profit whilst 15 of its 30 franchisees 
went out of business186 due to a lack of real business format and support from the franchisor 
and the tying in of overpriced poorly selected products.  The case of MGB Printing & Design 
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Ltd v KallKwik UK Ltd187 details another such failure by a franchisor to deliver the promised 
level of support and advice. 
The collapse of the Pierre Victoire Franchise188 and the Rymans and Anthena franchises189, 
which all left orphaned franchisees with no franchisor to maintain the brand or develop the 
know-how, shows the vulnerability of the franchisees to the franchisor’s commercial failure, 
so underlining the need for franchisees to conduct full pre-contractual due diligence.   
Franchisees are also susceptible to what the Klick, Kobayashi and Ribstein research190 
identifies as a tendency for franchisors to “seek to expropriate the franchisee’s investments in 
market discovery and development in markets that turn out to be particularly profitable”. That 
is territorial encroachment.  The contractual asymmetry inherent in the franchise relationship 
also adds to the risks.  Analysis of franchise disputes in the UK191 underlines the need for pre-
contractual due diligence and suggests that there is a high level of mismatch between what 
some franchisees feel they bought into as a franchisee and what they are delivered. 
The delivery of inadequate support and territorial encroachment by the franchisor also seem 
to be common causes of dispute between franchisees and their franchisor, so exposing 
franchisees to a high level of risk and supporting Klick and Kobayashi’s findings.   
As Emerson comments192 “The focus for many disputes is the aggrieved franchisee’s 
expectations, whether those expectations are based in contract terms or more general concepts 
of fairness.  At its core, the merits of a franchisee’s argument may rest on the legitimacy – the 
reasonableness – of its expectations”193. 
Franchisees are exposed to a number of risks that are inherent in franchising. 
2.4.3 Sub-conclusion 
Franchisors are exposed to threats arising from informational asymmetry and moral risk 
whilst franchisees are subject to encroachment, inadequate business formats and inadequate 
support. 
2.5 Deconstructing the Architecture of Franchising 
This is critical analysis towards the first objective of this thesis and seeks to establish that 
franchising is a specific, distinct and uniform commercial activity within the EU. 
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It is suggested that the architecture of franchising comprises several distinct features 
(economic interest, independence, the business format, the brand, control by the franchisor 
and ongoing support of the franchisee by the franchisor) and can therefore be differentiated 
from both commercial agency and distribution.  The architecture needs to withstand a number 
of tensile stresses that result from the long term nature of the franchise relationship.   
It is suggested that the fact that franchising is used in a wide variety of commercial sectors 
and that although the balance of economic power between franchisor and franchisee can vary 
substantially from franchise to franchise, it does not materially impact upon the fundamental 
features of the architecture of the franchise relationship. 
2.5.1 An Economic Perspective of the Architecture of Franchising 
This is critical analysis towards the first objective of the thesis and seeks to identify the 
specific, distinct and uniform economic elements of franchising. 
Franchising is a long established commercial strategy that has evolved over the years and is 
represented by some 9,971 different systems in the EU194.  
Some economic based explanations of franchising, such as that offered by Housden195, add 
little to our understanding of it as they are so general that they include other third party 
contractual relationships, such as commercial agency and distributorship. Rather than define 
franchising they identify the basic characteristics of a third party commercial arrangement.   
Franchising can be seen as “a contractual bond of interest in which an organisation, the 
franchisor, which has developed a pattern or formula for the manufacture and/or sale of a 
product or service, extends to other firms, the franchisees, the right to carry on the business, 
subject to a number of restrictions and controls. In almost all cases of significance, the 
franchisee operates using the franchisor’s name as a trade name.”196 This suggests that the 
elemental parts of franchising are a format, a brand, restrictions and control. 
Thompson takes a different approach and focuses primarily upon the independence of the 
parties and their respective assets, suggesting that franchising is “an organisational form 
which combines the decentralised ownership of physical assets with centralised brand name 
ownership and provision of operational know-how197.” 
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Rubin also focuses on decentralisation describing franchising as a system that “partitions 
decisions between two legally independent but economically linked entities … and allocates 
to each the appropriate level of residual claims.  The franchisee alone makes decisions 
regarding local operating policies such as location, pricing, hours of service and hiring.  And 
the franchisee bears the residual claims from these decisions – the net profit of the unit after 
expenses”198. This decentralisation point is well made and is consistently present in all 
franchising relationships but its failure to consider other elements is disappointing. 
Gerstenhaber’s view of franchising echoes part of Thompson’s analysis and focuses instead 
upon the key role of the business format as “a system leasing arrangement under which the 
franchisee acquires from the franchisor the licence to duplicate the franchisor’s existing and 
successful system of providing a product/service to the end user” 199.  However, it does not 
refer to the use of a brand or autonomy of the parties. Nevertheless, it captures much of the 
commercial essence of the franchising relationship – the replication of the franchisor’s 
business “blue print” by the franchisee and reflects those elements that are important to those 
in business who utilise the franchise model. In doing so it identifies another fundamental 
element of the franchise relationship. 
The Franchising Council of Australia (FCA) definition of franchising200 fails to identify the 
business format as a fundamental element and focuses instead on the use of the brand and the 
independence of the parties.  The importance of the brand is echoed in many other analyses 
including that of both the International Franchise Association201 and the European Franchise 
Federation.  Like Rubin, the IFA focuses upon the independence of the parties, but also 
indentifies the brand and the formal as being of elemental importance.  However, it also 
suggests a further element – the ongoing support of the franchisor202.  The European 
Franchise Federation (“the EFF”), also focuses on the brand, the business format, the 
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independence of the parties and ongoing support by the Franchisor, but also adds control by 
the Franchisor.203   
Blair and La Fontaine bring all of those elements together in their explanation of franchising 
but also expressly state an element which is implied in all of the other definitions – economic 
interest.  They suggest that “the franchisor maintains ownership over the trade name and 
marks and …. develops a complete “recipe” to run each outlet.  It then licences the right to 
operate under the central trade name and business format in a given market for a certain 
period of time to individuals or small firms in exchange for various fees.  The ownership 
stake of the franchisee in current and future profit leads him to put significant effort into the 
outlet.  At the same time, the ongoing fees he pays to the franchisor ensure that the latter has 
incentives to maintain the value of the brand by, amongst other things, screening and 
monitoring the franchisees and keep abreast of market trends.”204  It amounts to a synthesis of 
the various elements identified by other sources into a balanced compound that identifies the 
brand, the business format, independence, ongoing support to the franchisee by the 
franchisor, the economic interests of both parties and the control and enforcement of the 
brand standards by the franchisor.   
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2.5.2 A Legal Perspective of the Architecture of Franchising 
This is critical analysis towards the first objective of the thesis and seeks to establishes that 
the fundamental legal architecture of franchising throughout the EU is specific, distinct and 
uniform. 
Whereas an economic analysis of franchising focuses upon how the parties organise their 
economic interests, a legal analysis is more concerned with the rights and obligations they 
allocate to each other in the relationship.  There is a continuum of control and independence 
which is interpreted in different ways in different jurisdictions to define what amounts to 
franchising. However, this different approach to analysing franchising ultimately leads to the 
identification of the same key elements. 
2.5.2.1 Independence, the Brand and Economic Interest 
Some legal definitions are extremely wide and barely distinguish franchising from other third 
party relationships such as distributorship and commercial agency.  For example, the UK’s 
Financial Services Act205 describes franchising as “arrangements under which a person earns 
profits or income by exploiting a right conferred by the arrangements to use a trade name or 
design or other intellectual property or the goodwill attached to it....”.   It identifies only the 
independence, brand and economic interest as elemental parts of franchising. 
The “Community of Interest” approach used in the US in states such as Wisconsin206 and 
New Jersey207 identifies the same three elements.  It defines a “franchise” as an agreement 
between two or more persons in which (1) the franchisee is granted the right to engage in the 
business of offering or distributing goods or services using the franchisor’s trade name or 
marks, (2) the franchisor and franchisee share a community of interest in the marketing of the 
goods or services, and (3) the franchisee pays a franchise fee. 
“Community of interest” generally means a continuing financial interest between the parties 
in the operation of the franchisee’s business or the resale of the franchisor’s products.  The 
Wisconsin statute explicitly defines a community of interest as a “continuing financial 
interest between the grantor and the grantee in either the operation of the dealership business 
or the marketing of such goods or services.”208  However, the 1987 Ziegler decision by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court209 lists 10 factors that should be considered in determining whether 
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a community of interest exists210.  Although the primary factor in this equation is 
interdependence (which generally arises when the franchisee invests heavily in the franchise 
business such that its economic health hinges on the continuation of that business), other 
elements include the franchisor’s control of the franchisee. 
The now defunct Block Exemption Regulation for Franchise Agreements, (which was 
adopted by the European Commission on 30 November 1988211 and exempted franchise 
agreements which came within its bounds from Article 81 of the Treaty of Rome) focused 
only on the vertical restraints in the franchise agreements.  It therefore identified know-how 
(the format) and the brand as the key elements defining a franchise as “a package of industrial 
or intellectual property rights relating to trademarks, tradenames, shop signs, utility models, 
designs, copyrights, know-how or patents, to be exploited for the resale of goods or provision 
of services to end users”.  
                                                   
210 These factors include: (1) the duration of the parties’ relationship; (2) the extent and nature of the 
parties’ obligations; (3) the percentage of time or revenue devoted to the grantor’s products or services; (4) 
the percentage of the grantee’s gross proceeds or profits derived from the grantor’s products or services; (5) 
the extent and nature of the grantee’s territory; (6) the use of the grantor’s trademarks or logos; (7) the 
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  64 
2.5.2.2 Business Format, Control and Assistance 
The importance of the brand, the business format and economic independence are also 
identified in the other approach to defining franchising commonly found in the US.  The so-
called “Marketing Plan” or “Prescribed System” approach.  This is more successful than the 
Community of Interest approach in distinguishing franchising from other third party 
relationships.  Its influence is evident in all of the other 26 countries212 that have a franchise 
law which defines franchising and the work of numerous legal commentators213. 
The Marketing Plan Approach deals with not only the business format, the brand and 
economic interest but also the issues of “control and assistance”.  It therefore distinguishes 
franchising from other third party relationships.  
The State of California’s franchise legislation was the USA’s first franchise law when it was 
introduced in 1970.214 It adopts the Marketing Plan Approach, defining a franchise as a 
contract or agreement, either express or implied, whether oral or written, between two or 
more persons by which: 
“1. a franchisee is granted the right to engage in the business of offering, selling or 
distributing goods or services under a marketing plan or system prescribed in 
substantial part by a franchisor; 
2. the operation of the franchisee’s business pursuant to such plan or system is 
substantially associated with the franchisor’s trademark, service mark, trade name, 
logo type, advertising or other commercial symbol designating the franchisor or its 
affiliate; and 
3. the franchisee is required to pay, directly or indirectly, a franchisee fee.” 
It involves a symbiotic relationship between two legally independently owned businesses 
based upon the use of a brand and a business format with which it is closely associated.  Each 
has its own differing rights and obligations.  Franchisees can only succeed when the system 
as a whole succeeds.  Franchisors therefore have to provide a system, a brand and support.   
                                                   
212 There are 28 other countries with franchise laws but two of them – France and Belgium do not seek to 
define franchising. 
213 Op cit Mendelsohn (p. 2) adopts a marketing plan approach and suggests that franchising consists of four 
elements and must exhibit eight different features: The four basic elements are the ownership by the 
franchisor of a trademark, an idea, a secret process, a patent or a specialised piece of equipment and the 
goodwill and know-how associated with it; the grant of a licence by the franchisor to the franchisor 
permitting to exploit these elements; the imposition of controls relating to the operation of the franchisees 
and the payment of a fee to the franchisor by the franchisee. The basic features Mendelsohn believes must 
be present are a written contract;  a successful business format which is identified with a brand name which 
may be a trademark, service mark and/or trade name; training; on-going support; use of the franchisors’ 
brand by the Franchisor; a substantial capital investment by the franchisee into its own independent 
business. 
214 Cal. Corp. Code Section 31005(a)(1). 
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The Franchisor’s success depends upon operating a successful network of franchisees.  
Franchisees must therefore diligently follow the franchise system.  However, what is implicit 
in this is that whilst franchisor and franchisee have a common interest in the brand being 
successful what they own and therefore care about is different.  The franchisee is focused on 
maximising the profits of its outlets.  The franchisor is focused on the profits of the overall 
chain.  Those two objectives, whilst broadly similar are not the same, and they do not always 
imply the same desired behaviour.  Control by the franchisor is a key element in the 
relationship.  This dichotomy is at the heart of franchising.  It is what the franchise agreement 
attempts to reconcile in a mutually satisfactory manner.  It is what a regulatory regime must 
seek to deal with.  
The Federal Trade Commission Franchise Rule’s definition takes a similar approach as do215 
other US states. 
Section 4(1) of the Australian Franchise Code216 also focuses upon the brand, the business 
format, control, assistance and the economic interests of the parties. 
                                                   
215 FTC Rule Section 436.1(h) – See Appendix 10. 
216 The Trade Practices (Industry Codes-Franchising) Regulations (1998). 
It defines a franchise agreement as an agreement: 
“(b)  in which a person (the franchisor) grants to another person (the franchisee) the right to carry on the 
business of offering, supplying or distributing goods or services in Australia under a system or marketing 
plan substantially determined, controlled or suggested by the franchisor or an associate of the franchisor; 
and  
(c)  under which the operation of the business will be substantially or materially associated with a trade 
mark, advertising or a commercial symbol: 
(i)  owned, used or licensed by the franchisor or an associate of the franchisor; or 
(ii)  specified by the franchisor or an associate of the franchisor; and 
(d)  under which, before starting any business or continuing the business, the franchisee must pay or 
agree to pay to the franchisor or an associate of the franchisor an amount including, for example: 
(i) an initial capital investment fee; or 
(ii) a payment for goods or services; or 
(iii) a fee based on a percentage of gross or net income whether or not called a royalty or franchise 
service fee; or 
(iv) a training fee or training school fee; but excluding 
(v) payments for goods or services at or below  their wholesale price; or 
(vi) repayment by the franchisee of a loan from the franchisor ;or 
(vii) payment for the wholesale price of goods taken on consignment; or 
(viii) payment of market value for purchase or lease of real property, fixtures, equipment or supplies 
needed to start business or to continue business under the franchise agreement.” 
The definition then goes on the state that a transfer, renewal or extension of a franchise agreement and 
motor vehicle dealerships (The Trade Practices (Industry Codes-Franchising) Regulations (1998)) are 
included within the definition. A list of other relationships, such as employer/employee, landlord and tenant 
and co-operatives are excluded from the definition (Trade Practices (Industry Codes-Franchising) 
Regulations Section 4(3)). Certain limited types of franchise agreements are also exempted from the Code 
(Trade Practices (Industry Codes-Franchising) Regulations Section 5 - The two main types of exempted 
franchise agreement are  where the franchisor is resident outside Australia and only grants one franchise or 
master franchise to be operated in Australia.  The other main exemption is “fractional franchises” where the 
franchise agreement is for goods or services substantially the same as those previously supplied by the 
franchisee and the sales under the franchise are likely to provide no more than 20% of the franchisee’s gross 
turnover).  
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In the EU Member States franchise laws217, there is a marked lack of homogeneity in the 
definition of franchising.  Although France218 and Belgium219 have franchise laws, both have 
declined to define franchising.   
Italy’s definition of franchising focuses on the brand and other intellectual property rights, 
commercial assistance and the economic interests of the parties.  Although it does not 
expressly deal a business format or with control220, these are implied by the reference to 
intellectual property rights, which includes know-how.  
Spanish law221 focuses only upon the business format and fails to identify the brand, 
control/support or the economic interest of the parties.   
The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law222 has drafted a definition which 
follows the Marketing Plan approach referring to a business format (prescribed system), the 
brand, assistance and control, independence and the economic interests of the parties.  
Interestingly, despite providing a fairly well rounded definition of franchising it has not been 
adopted by any of the legislators which have sought to define franchising. 
2.5.2.3 Other Perspectives 
In Germany, some legal commentators take a somewhat different approach to examining the 
architecture of franchising.  They focus upon how the different elements of the franchise 
agreement might determine how they should be dealt with by German law.  Instead of 
identifying independence, the brand, economic interest, the business format, control and 
assistance as key elements in the legal architecture of franchising, they suggest that it can be 
viewed in a number of different ways.  It can be seen as a licence of intellectual property to 
the franchisee, the provision of business services by the franchisee to the franchisor, the 
provision of support by the franchisor to the franchisee, the sale of goods to the franchisee or 
even the leasing of real estate to the franchisee by the franchisor in some cases.  Franchise 
agreements are therefore compared to these other agreement types. Namely service 
agreements, licences, stakeholder agreements and “mixed” agreements.  
Some consider that the franchisee’s duty to promote the franchisor’s goods and services are 
the predominant elements of franchise agreements.  They therefore classify them strictly as 
                                                   
217 It also informs members of the legislature in member states when discussing franchising.  Malcolm 
Wicks (Minister of Energy), Hansard HC vol 450 col 1493 (24 October 2006) 
218 Law No. 89-1008 31 December 1989, French Commercial Code Article L.300-3 
219 “Law relative to pre-contractual information in the framework of agreements of commercial partnership” 
adopted on 19 December 2005, modified on 27 December 2005 
220 Law of 6 May 2004, No. 129 Article 1.1 – See Appendix 9. 
221 Article 62 of Act 7/1996.  An activity which “is carried out by virtue of an agreement or contract by 
which a company, known as the franchisor, grants to another, known as a franchisee, the rights to exploit its 
own system of commercialisation of products or services”. 
222 UNIDROIT, Model Franchise Disclosure Law, Article 2 – See Appendix 9. 
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business management contracts similar to agency agreements223. Although it is true that in 
most franchises, the franchisee’s duty to promote the goods and/or services of the franchisor 
will be one of the main obligations under the franchise agreement the simple classification as 
a business management contract underestimates the importance of the other obligations which 
are central to the franchise agreement such as the licence of the intellectual property rights.  
Others see franchise agreements as simple licence agreements224 (Rechtspacht), as the transfer 
of know-how and licensing of the trade mark and business format are key elements of the 
franchise relationship. However, this view fails to take into account the other key elements of 
franchising – particularly the support provided by the franchisor and the franchisee’s 
obligation to perform under the brand225. Franchisees, as opposed to licensees, are not mere 
beneficiaries226, but have extensive duties under the franchise agreements in particular 
regarding promoting the goods and/or services of the franchisor under the trade name and the 
trade marks of the franchisor. 
Other commentators compare franchise agreements with shareholders’ agreements227. There 
are two main flaws with this classification. Firstly, most franchise systems are characterised 
by a strict hierarchy and control by the franchisor. The franchisor directs, through guidelines, 
the operations manual and so on how the franchise business should be operated.  Shareholders 
on the other hand even if they have different rights under the shareholders’ agreement, tend to 
(co-) operate on the same level. It is also questionable if the intention to make a profit is 
sufficient to conclude that a franchisor and a franchisee share a common purpose, as both 
parties try to achieve this by very different means and have conflicting interests 228.  The 
simple aim to make a profit is a common feature in all commercial contracts. 
The preferred view229 is that franchise agreements are mixed contracts230 that contain a 
mixture of elements found in other forms of agreements231 (Mischvertrag or 
Typenkombinationsvertrag).  There are five basic different types of agreement felt it to be 
relevant; 
(i) business management contracts (Geschäftsbesorgungsvertrag); the main 
feature of which is the obligation of the agent or manager to pursue a 
                                                   
223 Emmerich, JuS 95, 761, 763. 
224 Skaupy, NJW 1992, 1785, 1789 
225 Vergl. etwa Flohr, Franchsievertrag, 3. Auflage 2006, S. 73 Nr. 5; S. 118 Nr. 1 
226 Martinek in Martinek/Semler, §4 Rn. 44 
227 Giesler, in Giesler/Nachschűtt, Franchiserecht, 2. Auflage 2007, Chapter 5, Rn. 82 
228 Ibid, Rn. 84 
229 BGH, Judgment dated 03.10.1984 – VIII ZR 118/83, NJW 1985, 1894, 1895 
230 BGH NJW 1985, 1894, 1895; OLG Hamm, Urteil vom 13.03.2000 = NZG 2000 1169; 
231 OLG München, Urteil v. 26.06.2002 = BB 2002, 2521; OLG Frankfurt a.M., Urteil vom 27.09. 1994 - 
11 U (Kart.) 30/94 = NJWE-WettbR 1996, 142, Stadler in Jauernig, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 13. Auflage 
2009, § 311, Rn 30  
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commercial activity for the financial benefit and in the financial interest of the 
principal232. The franchisee’s duty to promote the franchisor’s goods and 
services under the franchisor’s trade name and trademark, and the franchisor’s 
obligations to support and assist the franchisee in the operation of its business, 
such as are seen as obligations which are characteristic of business 
management contracts;  
(ii) service agreements; services as are provided under the franchise agreement 
without them being directly for the financial benefit or the financial interest of 
the other party, such as conducting training sessions for the franchisees, or to 
develop new goods and/or services or to continue to further develop the 
franchise concept; 
(iii) lease agreements; when the franchisor also acts as landlord of the franchisee 
and makes the premises available to the franchisee by way of lease or sub-
lease or leases equipment to the franchisee;  
(iv) licence agreements; in respect of the use of the trademark, the know-how and 
the franchise concept; and 
(v) depending on the nature of the franchise in question also contracts for the sale 
of goods if the franchisee agreement contains an obligation on the franchisee 
to purchase goods and/or equipment from the franchisor. 
How many and to what extent these different agreement types are reflected in the franchise 
agreement will depend on the underlying franchise concept and the requirements of the 
parties. Although the German approach has some similarities with the other approaches 
discussed in that it identifies the brand and assistance by the franchisor as key elements.  It 
suggests an implied reluctance to recognise franchising as a specific, distinct and uniform 
business model and fails to identify the importance of the business format, independence, 
economic interest or control of the franchisee by the franchisor.  It is suggested that such an 
approach is incomplete.  It fails to identify key elements of the franchise relationship and is 
perhaps too constrained by its desire to place franchising into the German legal system’s 
existing taxonomy of third party relationships.   
                                                   
232 This is also the reason why the agency compensation upon termination is applied by analogy to franchise 
agreements. 
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2.5.3 Architectural Features that Distinguish Franchising from Distribution and 
Commercial Agency 
This is critical analysis to establishing the first objective of the thesis and seeks to establish 
that the specific, distinct and uniform fundamental elements of franchising distinguish it from 
both distribution andcommercial agency. 
Some academics seem oblivious to the fundamental difference between franchising on the 
one hand and commercial agency and distributorship on the other233.  They certainly have a 
number of characteristics in common.  They are third party relationships that involve a 
“principal” and an “agent”.  They all come within Housden’s234 ill informed definition of 
franchising as “a right to do or use something which is granted by one party to another for a 
consideration”, but from there onwards fundamental differences between these three channels 
to market emerge.  Franchising consists of a brand, control and assistance by the franchisor, a 
business format, independence  and economic interest.  The use of a brand, independence, 
some level of control and possibly even assistance and economic interest can sometimes be 
found in both commercial agency and distribution.  A business format, can not.   
Commercial agency and franchising both “generally bring together a strong party (the 
principal) and a weaker party (the agent/franchisee).  Both parties are consistently, before, 
during and after the collaboration, in this unequal position with each other”235.  This 
perception of an imbalance of economic bargaining strength between the parties is what 
seems to persuade academics236 and some Courts237 that franchising and commercial agency 
are the same thing.  However, although there can be some overlap in certain circumstances, 
the two are quite distinct. 
A commercial agency is defined as “a self employed intermediary who has continuing 
authority to negotiate the sale or purchase of goods on behalf of another person (“the 
Principal”) or to negotiate and conclude the sale or purchase of goods on behalf of and in the 
name of the Principal”238. 
The key elements are independence and the power to negotiate sale and purchases for, on 
behalf of or in the name of the Principal. 
                                                   
233 The Amsterdam Team – ibid 
234 Housden.J, 1986, Franchising and other Business Relationships in Hotel and Catering Services, 
Heinemann. 
235 The Belgian House of Representatives, 28 Jan 2004 – draft parliamentary bill relating to Franchise 
Agreements (lodged by Mme t. Pieters – Doc 510747/0001 
236 E.G. the Amsterdam Team 
237 BGH Judgment of 12 Nov. 1986 I ZR 209/84 (“Aquella”) 
238 Commercial Agents (Current Directive) Regulations 1993. 
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Franchisees are independent and certainly have the right to negotiate sales and purchases 
under the brand.  However, that is fundamentally different from negotiating for or on behalf 
of the Principal.  Franchisees are inevitably obliged under the terms of a franchise agreement 
to give notice to the public that it is an independently owned and operated business operating 
under licence from the franchisor239.  Further, franchisees generally sell goods or services on 
their own behalf under the brand, not on behalf of the franchisor.  Franchisees generally own 
the goods they sell.  It is of course possible for franchisees to sell goods or services to be 
provided by the franchisor (e.g. a travel agency franchise, such as TUI or Thomas Cook).  
However, there are some other fundamental differences between a franchise and a 
commercial agency.  The franchise is run in accordance with a business format.  A 
commercial agency is not.  Further, although a Principal will give some low level assistance 
and assert a low level of control over the agent, a franchisor will deliver a higher level of 
assistance and assert a substantially greater level of control over the use of the brand and the 
business format. 
Commercial agency is concerned with the legal process by which the title of goods or 
services are passed to purchasers by the agent.  Franchising is more concerned with the 
manner in which they are sold – that is the business format.  It is theoretically possible that a 
franchise involves a commercial agreement by which the way in which the title to goods is 
passed from one party to the other and then to the consumer amounts to commercial agency.  
But despite this theoretical co-existence, the two are fundamentally different. 
Distribution is also different to franchising.  It is where “one party agrees with the other to 
supply certain goods for resale within the whole or a defined area of the common market”240. 
It covers a broad spectrum of commercial practices.  They range from “straight distribution” 
to “selective distribution”.  Straight distribution involves nothing more than the wholesale of 
goods by the manufacturer to an independent party which sells those goods in such manner at 
its sole discretion it deems appropriate.  Selective distribution arrangements impose 
qualitative requirements upon the environment in which the goods are sold. 
The differences between straight distribution arrangements and franchising are stark.  Straight 
distribution involves no use of the brand, no control or assistance and no business format. 
Selective distribution is far more like franchising.  It involves the use of the brand, and a 
certain level of control.  However, it rarely involves assistance from the principal and, most 
fundamentally, there is no business format.  Business format is the franchisor’s know-how of 
how to run the business, its “blue print” for success. 
                                                   
239 This is certainly the case in the sample franchise agreements 
240 Reg 1983/83.26 O.J.Eur Com. (No L173) 
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The perception that the Principal and the Franchisor both have a much stronger bargaining 
position that the distributor and franchisee again persuades some commentators and courts 
that distribution and franchising are the same thing.  Again this perception does not accord 
with reality. For example, the toy shop Hamley’s franchisee in India, “Reliance”, is many 
times larger than Hamleys.  Likewise Fortnum & Masons and its distributor in Japan, 
Mitsukoshi. 
Selective distribution can at times look like franchising at a superficial level, but the 
assistance provided by the franchisor and its provision of a business format are the key 
difference. 
Franchising is a flexible commercial tool used by a wide variety of companies in a large 
range of sectors.  Although some academics, legislators and courts struggle to differentiate it 
from distribution and commercial agency, franchising is a fundamentally different species of 
third party commercial relationship. 
Franchising is a specific, distinct and uniform type of commercial activity which is 
fundamentally different to commercial agency and distribution because only franchising 
comprises the fundamental elements of independence, economic interest, a business format, a 
brand, control and assistance. 
2.5.4 The Tensile Stresses that the Architecture of Franchise Agreements needs to 
withstand 
This is critical analysis towards the first objective of the thesis and establishes that the 
specific, distinct and uniform nature of franchising is, in part due to the fact that the 
relationship between a franchisor and its franchisees is of a fluid and dynamic nature and 
changes with the passage of time, thereby challenging the franchise agreement241. 
The architecture of the franchise agreement has to withstand the tensile stresses that result 
from these on-going changes.  The franchise relationship changes firstly as the foundations of 
the franchisor/franchisee dynamics harden through commercial interaction between the two 
and secondly as the structural elements of the relationship expand and contract in response to 
environmental changes. 
Some compare the relationship to that between a parent and child242. During the initial period 
the franchisee is relatively “helpless”, as the young infant is heavily reliant on the parent, so 
is the franchisee reliant upon the franchisor. As the franchisee gains more experience and 
                                                   
241 Gudel. P, 1998, “Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of Exchange”, Buffalo Law Review, Vol 
46, p 763 and Leichtling. A, 1994, Why Burger King Cannot Have Its Own Way with Its Franchisees, 
University of Miami Law Review,Vol. 48, p671 
242 Seid. M and Thomas. D, 2006, Franchising for Dummies, 2nd edition, Wiley Publishing, p.22 
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confidence it adopts an attitude similar to that of the adolescent child. It rebels, it no longer 
feels that the franchisor gets everything right. It pushes the boundaries of the relationship to 
test it to the full. Disputes and arguments are common often forcing both parties to re-
evaluate the relationship in a forthright and sometimes final manner. However, as the 
franchisee further matures into adulthood it begins to see the value of the relationship with the 
franchisor and establishes a mature and mutually beneficial rapport with it – one that is 
substantially different from that it enjoyed in its “infancy” and “adolescence” 
The only way that the franchise agreement can accommodate these changes and at the same 
time seek to balance the interests of itself and all the franchisees is to allow the franchisor to 
unilaterally make changes.  However, that leaves the relationship open to potential abuse.   
An analysis of franchise disputes in the UK243 tends to support this hypothesis and suggests 
that most franchise disputes occur after the first two years of the franchise244 when the 
relationship has moved into its juvenile stage.  The disputes considered were due to the 
franchisee allegedly seeking to compete with the franchisor during the term of the franchise 
agreement245, alleged failure by the franchisor to provide the appropriate level of support to 
the franchisee as provided for in the franchise agreement246, alleged under performance or 
other breach of the franchise agreement by the franchisee247 and alleged misrepresentation by 
the franchisor during the recruitment process.248 However the research cannot establish how 
justified these allegations were and very few franchise disputes end up in the courts with a 
public judgment249.  It is possible that there is an element of franchisees wanting to use the 
franchisor as a scapegoat, and blame it for their own shortcomings or as a justification for 
their own breaches.” 
The franchise relationship’s ongoing nature differentiates it from “one-off” transactions such 
as the sale of goods, which are “discrete transactions …. of short duration, involving limited 
personal interactions and with precise party measurements of easily measured objects of 
exchange”.250 Franchise relationships are fundamentally different. They are relational and are 
characterised by “long duration, personal involvement by the parties and the exchange, at 
                                                   
243 Appendix 7. Note: these are the grounds of dispute raised by the parties, not those proved. 
244 Appendix 7. 90% of the sample. 
245 70% of the sample. 
246 60% of the sample. 
247 40% of the sample. 
248 85% of the sample. 
249 During the period 2004-2008, Field Fisher Waterhouse consistently rated by Chambers Legal Directory 
during that period as the leading franchise legal practice in the UK, only handled four franchise disputes 
that ended in a judgment by the courts or an arbitrator ChipsAway 2; LighterLife 1, Dream Doors 1.  All 
other disputes were settled before judgment was given. 
250 Op cit Gudel, p. 763. 
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least in party, of things difficult to monetize or otherwise measure”.251  As a result 
“obligations are not frozen in an initial bargain.  They evolve over time and circumstances 
change. The object of contracting is to establish and define a co-operative relationship, not 
merely to allocate risk”252. This means that “parties are obliged to behave in a way that 
promotes the relationship, and ….. is consistent with the needs and expectations of both 
parties”253.  This change introduces tensile stresses into the franchisor/franchisee relationship. 
However, franchise agreements do not evolve or change over the years as the franchise 
system develops. They are static documents fixed for a term of years.  They require mutual 
performance over a number of years and therefore do not always define the parties’ full 
obligations.  They need a degree of flexibility to accommodate these tensile stresses.  Because 
of their longevity and the multilateral nature of franchising they inevitably vest the Franchisor 
with an amount of discretion as to how the rights and obligations of both parties will be 
performed.  
How the franchisor exercises its discretion will inevitably impact upon the franchisees’ 
operation of its business. “In making discretionary decisions, franchisors can extract value 
from the franchisees in many ways, such as granting additional franchises in close proximity, 
raising the price of goods sold to franchisees, increasing rent on the franchisees locations, 
increasing inventory and growth requirements, as well as increasing advertising funds. 
Conflicts invariably arise when the franchisee perceives the franchisor’s exercise of discretion 
to be unfair”.254   
2.5.5 The Impact of Sectoral Contextualisation upon the Architecture of Franchising 
This is critical analysis towards the first objective of the thesis and endeavours to establish 
that despite the differing nature of the sectors in which franchising is used, it is a specific, 
distinct and uniform type of commercial activity and as a result sectoral differences do not 
impact upon its architecture.  
Despite the tendency of trade associations and commentators to speak of the “Franchise 
Industry” and the “Franchise Sector”, it is not a business sector in its own right.  Rather, it is a 
strategic tool that is adopted by businesses in a large variety of different business sectors as 
part of their market channel strategies.  
The 2010 edition of the Franchise Directory255, the leading directory of the UK franchise 
sector, provides a panorama of the types of businesses that have franchised themselves in the 
                                                   
251 Ibid. 
252 Op cit Leichtling, p. 671. 
253 Leichtling quoting Parritt at 717. 
254 Whitner, Brito, Spandorf, paper at ABA Franchising Forum Oct. 2007. 
255 British Franchise Directory and Guide 2010, 26th edition. 
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UK.  It lists 12 different categories of franchises in the United Kingdom256.  Ten of the 
categories cover services, two cover goods and one covers food. The reason that this totals 13 
rather than 12 is that one category (Catering and Hotels) covers both service and food.  The 
IFA’s PWC 2010 Franchise Economic Outlook Report257 suggests a similar spread of 
franchising in the USA. 
There is a wide range of commentary on the use of franchising in various sectors.  It is “very 
successful in the food distribution market and the manufacturing and DIY and also the car 
maintenance, travel agency, hotels and hair dressing business sectors” according to one bill 
placed before the Belgian Parliament258, whilst Blair and La Fontaine259 observe that in the 
US franchising “dominates retailing” in the US and has a strong representation in a broad 
range of sectors, particularly the restaurant sector. 
Adams and Prichard Jones260 suggest that it is important to consider the different types of 
franchising that exist and identify the basic elements of each type. They believe that there are 
essentially two basic types of business format franchising261, namely goods and service 
franchises. They suggest that, from an economic point of view, goods franchises can be 
divided into three sub categories262 and that all service franchises have one thing in common 
with each other – there is only one market level.  This analysis seems to omit one common 
form of franchising. The type of franchise which consumers in the EU are probably most 
familiar with – food franchises.  Whether they are family restaurants, take aways or home 
delivery businesses, all food franchises are a hybrid between goods franchises and service 
franchises and cannot properly be classified as either.  However, regardless of the omission of 
the restaurant sector in their analysis, the main issue is that they do not conclude that the 
architecture of franchises in each of these sectors vary from each other in any fundamental 
manner and their subsequent analysis of the franchise agreement makes no suggestion that 
this is the case. 
Analysis of a sample of 25 franchise agreements from the UK, Germany, France, the USA 
and Australia was undertaken to examine whether or not sectoral contextualisation of 
                                                   
256  Ibid p68: 1. Property and maintenance services, home improvements; 2. Catering, Hotels; 3. Cleaning 
and renovation Services; 4. Commercial services; 5. Direct selling, distribution etc.; 6. Domestic, personal, 
health and fitness, caring and pet services; 7. Employment agencies, executive search, management 
consultancy, training and teaching; 8. Estate agents, mortgage brokers etc.; Parcel and courier services; 
10. Printing, copying, graphic design; 11. Retailing; 12. Vehicle services 
257 Op cit PWC.  It lists the Automotive, Commercial and Residential Services, Quick Service Restaurants, 
Table/Full Service Restaurants, Retail Food, Lodging, Real Estate, Retail Products and Services and 
Personal Services. 
258 The Belgian House of Representatives, 28 Jan 2004 – Development [Doc 510747/001] 
259 Op cit Blair and La Fontaine. F, p.8 
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franchising does have any impact upon its fundamental elements263.  The sample comprises 
franchises in 5 sectors.  The food/restaurant sector, the retail sector, the hotel/leisure sector, 
the services sector and car rental sector as detailed in the following table: 
Categorisation of Sample by Sectors  
 
 Australia  UK  Germany  France  USA 
Hotel 1 1 1 1 1 
Car Rental 0 1 1 0 1 
Retail 1 1 2 2 1 
Others Services 2 1 0 1 1 
Food/Restaurant 1 1 1 1 1 
Total 5 5 5 5 5 
 
The sample agreements all identify independence, economic interest, the brand, the business 
format, control of the franchisee by the franchisor and the provision of assistance by the 
franchisor to the franchisee, as features of the franchises’ architecture regardless of the sector 
in which they operate. 
Sectoral contextualisation therefore does not impact the fundamental features of the 
architecture of franchising. 
2.5.6 The Impact of Economic Contextualisation upon the Architecture of Franchising 
This is critical analysis towards the first objective and seeks to establish that although value 
of the investment required from the Franchisee inevitably defines the type of franchisee 
attracted to each franchise system, franchising remains a specific, distinct and uniform type of 
commercial activity and as a result the scale of economic investment required does not 
change the fundamental features of its architecture.   
The investment required to buy into a franchise immediately disqualifies those franchisees 
who cannot access sufficient capital.  This in turn has a substantial impact upon the nature of 
the relationship between the franchisor and its franchisees particularly in terms of the ability 
of the franchisee to negotiate the commercial terms of the franchise264.  For example, whilst a 
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franchisee of a hotel concept such as Ramada265 will be investing several millions of pounds 
in bricks and mortar and fit out costs for each hotel, and may pay the franchisor to operate the 
hotels through a management agreement, a franchisee for a contract cleaning business such as 
Jani-King266 needs to find only a few hundred pounds and is able to pay that by way of 
instalments over the life of the franchise agreement.   
From a commercial point of view, the difference between such a sophisticated hotel 
“investment” franchisee and a contract cleaning “job” franchisee could not be bigger.  One is 
typically sophisticated, experienced in the ways of business, and wealthy looking for 
substantial returns on its capital investment.  The other is doing little more than buying 
himself a job of manual labour that will secure him a modest level of ongoing income for the 
life of the franchise. Between these two extremes there is a broad spectrum of franchisees 
varying from the seasoned businessman who is buying a franchise to add to his portfolio, to 
the former teacher or bank manager who has decided to enter the commercial world in their 
middle years.  These differences inevitably impact upon the franchisor/franchisee relationship 
and US franchise law exempts large and/or sophisticated franchisees from the requirement for 
pre-contractual disclosure,267  but do not impact upon the technical legal components of the 
contractual relationship268. 
Some commentators have focused upon this disparity in the balance of economic power 
between franchisors and different types of franchisee to categorise franchising.  The 
categorisation of franchise systems according to the balance of power and alignment of 
interests between the parties was first developed by Martinek in the 1980s and has since been 
further modified269. This approach categorises franchise agreements into two basic types; 
subordination and partnership franchising.  It then suggests a further subdivision in respect of 
partnership franchising. 
The analysis suggests that so called “Subordination Franchising” exists where there is a 
hierarchical relationship between franchisor and franchisee and that the cooperation between 
the parties is limited to the distribution of the goods and/or services on a vertical level. As 
such it resembles other distribution arrangements and is “the further development and 
refinement of the classic authorised dealer model”270. A franchised outlet is distinguished 
from an authorised dealership due to its look and feel which is identical to those of the 
corporate outlets of the franchisor. The cooperation between the parties is limited to the 
                                                   
265 See Appendix 8 
266 ibid 
267 See Chapters 4 and 5 below. 
268 See section 3.4 below 
269Martinek. ibid ss 18 Rn 18ff 
270 Ibid § 4 Rn. 52 
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franchisor making available to the subordinate franchisee the necessary know-how and 
providing the services set out in the franchise agreement271. The franchisee itself becomes an 
instrument of the franchisor in its distribution system272.  
The counter-point to Subordination Franchising is so-called “Partnership Franchising”, which 
according to Martinek can be divided further into three sub-categories – “Co-ordination 
Franchising”, “Coalition Franchising” and “Confederation Franchising”.  In “Partnership 
Franchising” there is more of an economic balance between the franchisor and its franchisees. 
“Co-ordination Franchising” is characterised as a uniform exchange agreement between the 
franchisor and its franchisees who are considered equal partners273.  The franchisees are not 
mere instruments of the franchisor who carry out their commercial activity mainly for the 
benefit and in the interest of the franchisor. They act in their own interests using the franchise 
model. Opposing interests between the franchisor and franchisees are co-ordinated and a 
common marketing strategy for the products and/or services is developed.274 The franchisee 
uses the franchise concept for its own benefit without being subjected to the directions of the 
franchisor.  Big ticket franchises such as hotel franchise systems are co-ordination franchises, 
according to Martinek. 
“Coalition Franchising”, according to Martinek, is characterised by a balance of power and 
both parties not only sharing a common interest (making a profit by exploiting the franchise 
concept), but also a common purpose in that both the franchisor and franchisee take on the 
mutual obligation to optimise the distribution of the goods and/or services of the franchised 
outlets on the basis of a system specific marketing concept275. As this mutual duty of 
optimisation is considered as the overarching purpose of the franchise agreement, they are 
seen as transcending mere obligations of a common purpose and the franchisor and franchisee 
are deemed to form a very primitive form of company276. 
“Confederation Franchising” goes one step further than coalition franchising. The balance of 
power is marked and the common purpose is extended from a bilateral relationship between 
franchisor and franchisee to a multi lateral relationship between the franchisor and all 
franchisees in the network. The suggestion is that some sort of unwritten umbrella agreement 
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272 For that reason, Martinek considers the business management element in these type of franchise 
relationships to be predominant with additional service agreement elements and, depending on the type of 
franchise sales contract, lease agreement, licence agreement and know-how transfer elements. This means 
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275 Ibid § 4 Rn. 69 
276 Ibid § 4 Rn. 68 
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amongst all participants is concluded277. The overarching purpose of this hypothesised 
umbrella agreement covers everyone in the network and comprises of the increase in the 
goodwill of the products and/or services and competitiveness of the franchise system, the 
exploitation of group purchasing opportunities and the breakdown of the market into different 
segments for each participant. This manifests itself in the “optimisation of the intercompany 
cooperation in all areas which are relevant for the distribution (of the goods and/or services) 
for the benefit of all”278. The group interests in confederation franchising systems form the 
core of the franchise that all participants undertake to develop. 
Whilst it is clearly correct that (largely as a result of the size of the investment the franchisee 
makes) there are variances in the degree of hierarchy in franchise systems, these do not 
impact upon the key architectural features of franchising already identified, namely the duty 
of the franchisor to support the franchisee, its ability/right to control the franchisee, the brand, 
the business format, independence and economic interest. 
Using Martinek’s analysis, the 25 franchises considered in this thesis279 based upon the 
commercial reality of the relationship between franchisor and franchisee could be categorised 
as follows: 
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Partnership Franchises  
Australia   Choice Hotels  
BB’s Coffee & Muffins  
Bartercard 
Cash Converters 
Expense Reduction Analyst  
USA Coverall Intercontinental Hotels 
National Car Rental 
Dominos Pizza 
Snap on Tools 
UK Jani King Costa Coffee 
Hertz 
Ramada 
Kall Kwik  
German Eisman Applebees 
Starwood Hotels 
Hertz 
Polo Ralph Lauren  
France  Arteria  Ibis 
Yves Rocher 
Pronuptia  
La Bôte a Pizza  
Based upon the commercial reality of the relationship, the distinction between subordinated 
and partnership franchises reflects the investment required.  Low investment franchises are 
subordinated franchises.  All others are partnership franchises. 
 













Australia  - - Cash 
Converter 
Choice Hotels  













France  - - Yves Rocher 
Pronuptia  




The identification of confederation franchises based upon the commercial reality of the 
relationship is relatively straight forward and reflects a high investment.  Identifying co-
ordination and coalition franchises is far more problematic and is impossible to do with the 
sample agreements considered, or indeed, on the information available, on the commercial 
reality of the relationship. 
The conclusion which is drawn from this is that Martinek’s categorisation of subordinated 
and partnership franchises can be justified based upon the commercial reality of the 
relationship.  It reflects low investment franchises on the one hand and medium, substantial 
and high investment franchises on the other.  The categorisation of high investment franchises 
as confederation franchises is sustainable based upon the commercial reality of the 
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relationship.  However the categorisation of other partnership franchises as co-ordination and 
coalition franchises is not borne out by the commercial reality of the relationship entitled by 
the sample agreements considered. 
More importantly though, regardless of how the agreements can be categorised using 
Martinek’s approach, such categorisation was not reflected in the actual agreements 
themselves.  The distinction between subordinated and partnership franchises is to some small 
extent reflected in the agreements considered.  The Jani-King and Coverall agreements were 
distinctly more controlling than the other agreements in the sample.  However, the distinction 
between Co-ordinated, Coalition and Confederation franchises was not reflected in the 
sample agreements considered at all. 
All of the agreements considered, regardless how Martinek would categorise them, have the 
same basic legal architectural features. 
Martinek’s analysis therefore seems somewhat contrived and is certainly not supported by an 
analysis of the sample franchise agreements.  None of the agreements in the sample give any 
hint of the mutuality that is characteristic of Coalition Franchising let alone the over-arching 
purpose imposed on the franchisor and all of its franchisees which is supposed to be found in 
Confederation Franchising.  The differences suggested between Subordination Franchises and 
Co-ordination Franchises may in some circumstances be similar to the “de facto” commercial 
relationship between economically stronger franchisees and their franchisors on the one hand 
and economically weaker franchisees and their franchisors on the other but they do not 
impact upon the basic architectural features of franchising; independence, economic interest, 
business format, brand, control and assistance. 
2.5.7 Sub-Conclusion 
The most complete and succinct economic and legal views seem to agree that the architecture 
of franchising exhibits six key features, namely; independence of parties; use of a brand; use 
of a business format; control of the franchisee by the franchisor; assistance supplied to the 
franchisee by the franchisor and economic interest.  It is distinct from agency and 
distribution, the main difference being the business format and the ongoing support.  The long 
term nature of the franchise relationship means that the architecture of franchise agreements 
need to withstand a number of tensile stresses.  This results in franchisors having an 
unusually high level of discretion, which can in turn lead to abuse. 
It is therefore submitted that the economic and sectoral contexualisation of franchising does 
not impact upon the basic architectural features of the franchise relationship; independence, 
economic interest, business format, brand, control and assistance. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has established that although franchising is a specific, distinct and uniform type 
of commercial activity with a positive influence in the EU and which stimulates economic 
activity by offering economic advantage to all those involved, improving distribution and 
giving business increased access to other member states, it is not fulfilling its potential to 
contribute to the realisation of the single market. 
Business format franchising is the latest incarnation of a long established business 
structure280.  Its importance is acknowledged by a wide range of institutions281 and it has 
emerged as an important vehicle for entrepreneurship that appeals to large corporations and 
small businesses alike.  The 9,971 or so franchise networks operating in the EU and the 
405,000 or so outlets make a substantial contribution to the GDP of a number of member 
states,  with a roughly estimated total turnover of €215 billion (US$300 billion)282.  It has 
great potential to stimulate economic activity within the EU by improving the distribution of 
goods and/or services within and between member states.  However, it is over concentrated in 
a small number of EU member states283 and a comparison with the size of franchising in the 
USA and Australia suggests that its potential to contribute to the single market and promote 
trade between member states is far from being fulfilled at present284.  An estimated 83.5% of 
its turnover being concentrated in only 25% of the member states. 
The economic drivers that lead franchisors and franchisees to become involved in franchising 
and the consequential inherent risk differ285.   
Improved access to both appropriately qualified managerial resource and capital (the Agency, 
Resource Scarcity and Transaction Cost theories) and other economic drivers such as bulk 
purchasing, economies of scale and enhanced product development explain why businesses 
use franchising as part of their commercial strategy. A number of economic incentives 
resulting in an increased chance of success (such as access to a proven format, a nationally 
recognised brand, ongoing support, economies of scale and so on) supported by various 
situational, personality and economic correlatives explain the attraction of franchising to 
franchisees.  
There are a number of different risks inherent in franchising for franchisors and 
franchisees286. Franchisors are exposed to risks arising from information asymmetry and 
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moral hazard (such as underpayment, in term competition, abuse of the franchisor’s brand and 
non compliance with the business format).  Whilst franchisees are exposed to the risk of 
misrepresentation, encroachment, poor quality business formats and inadequate support. 
Franchising is a symbiotic relationship between two legally independent businesses that is 
used in a wide range of sectors and on a broad spectrum of scale and value which can be 
differentiated from commercial agency and distribution.  The architecture of franchising 
comprises six basic features;  Independence of the parties involved, economic interest, a 
business format, a brand, control of the franchisee by the franchisor and the provision of 
assistance to the franchisee by the franchisor.  It is distinct from agency and distribution, the 
main difference being the business format and the ongoing support. These features are not 
impacted by either economic or sectoral contextualisation287.  The legal architecture is 
uniform regardless of the legal system in which the franchise operates288. 
Despite the differing nature of the sectors in which franchising is used these differences do 
not impact upon the architecture of franchising.  Likewise although the value of investment 
required from franchisees inevitably defines the type of franchisee attracted to each franchise 
system, the resulting differences in economic bargaining power does not change the 
fundamental architectural features of franchising289. 
This architecture is subjected to tensile stresses as a result of the long term and ever changing 
nature of the franchise relationship.  In order to withstand these stresses the franchise 
agreements give the franchisor a degree of flexibility that can result in abuse of the 
franchisee290. 
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Chapter 3 Does the Contractual and Regulatory Environment Support 
and Promote Franchising? 
In the previous chapter, the first objective of the thesis has been achieved.  It has been 
established that although franchising is a specific, distinct and uniform type of commercial 
activity with a positive influence in the EU and which stimulates economic activity by 
offering economic advantages to all those involved, improving distribution and giving 
business increased access to other member states, it is relatively underdeveloped in the EU 
and is not fulfilling its potential to contribute to the realisation of the single market. 
The economic drivers that draw franchisors to franchising are its ability to enable them to 
access higher quality resource for its business (Agency theory), access capital and greater 
management resource (Resource Scarcity theory) and decrease overheads, economies of scale 
and so on to enable them to compete more effectively (Transaction Cost theory). The 
economic drivers which attract franchisees to franchising are access to a known brand, 
franchisor support and assistance, use of a proven format, economies of scale and 
independence.  There are also personality and economic correlatives that have an impact.  
The consequential risks assumed by franchisors are moral hazard and information asymmetry.  
The consequential risks assumed by franchisees are inaccurate pre-contractual representations 
by the franchisor, encroachment, a poor business format and provision of inadequate support. 
This chapter seeks to achieve the second objective of the thesis.   
It seeks to establish whether the regulatory environment in the EU is in any way responsible 
for this under achievement of franchising in the single market.  It will consider whether or not 
franchising needs to be regulated and the difficulties experienced by those member states that 
have sought to do so.  It will do this by considering the differing approaches of EU member 
states to constructing franchising’s contractual environment and its impact on the risks to 
which franchisors and franchisees are exposed.  It considers the impact of the self regulatory 
system in the EU and then considers the lack of homogeneity between the legal eco-systems 
that comprise the regulatory environment within the EU and the failure of those legal eco-
systems to re-enforce the economic drivers that attract franchisors and franchisees to 
franchising or to reduce the inherent consequential risk.   
It is submitted that franchising does need regulating and that the economic determinants and 
the interparty dynamics of the franchisor/franchisee relationship lead to a contractual 
environment that transcends sectoral divergence and the differing legal traditions of EU 
member states. This contractual environment tends to support and re-enforce the economic 
drivers that encourage franchisors to become involved in franchising and reduces their 
consequential inherent risk to a reasonable level.  However, although it tends to re-enforce 
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some of the economic drivers that encourage franchisees to become involved in franchising it 
does not re-enforce them all and it fails to reduce all the consequential inherent risks for 
franchisees to an adequate level. 
It is also submitted that the regulatory environment in the EU within which franchising 
operates (which comprises a series of legal eco-systems), does not adequately protect and 
reinforce the economic attractions that drive franchisors and franchisees to become involved 
in franchising.  Nor does it adequately reduce the consequential risks.  It is therefore to some 
extent responsible for the under achievement of franchising in the EU. 
3.1 The Difficulties Experienced in Seeking to Regulate Franchising in the EU 
This is critical analysis towards the second objective.  It seeks to identify the nature of the 
current regulatory environment in the EU and the reasons for it.   
Those intimately involved in franchising in the EU exhibit differing approaches to the 
regulation of franchising. Franchise trade associations in some member states291 have fought 
long and hard to have franchise specific laws enacted in their jurisdictions. At the same time, 
in other member states, such trade associations have expended a great deal of time, energy 
and money to ensure that franchise laws are not enacted in their jurisdiction292. This is despite 
all such trade associations being members of the European Franchise Federation and therefore 
supposedly sharing a common view of how franchising should be regulated293.  
The regulation of franchising on a purely national level in certain EU member states has 
created barriers which restrict the ability of franchisors to freely expand from one member 
state to another294.   
There is a wide divergence of opinion and even conflict as to the form and approach that 
those laws take.  
A degree of political cynicism towards franchising is noticeable in the EU.  It seems that 
franchising is “big enough” for its regulation to make an impact in the public consciousness 
but not important enough to matter to the government concerned if that regulation is not as 
positive or as appropriate as it might be. It has been treated as a political plaything. A 
palliative to potentially troublesome politicians who, although outside of the political 
mainstream, have the potential to create irritating diversions for the main players295.  It took 
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seven years and eight bills in Italy296, twenty four years and five bills in Belgium297 and 
nineteen years and twelve bills in Sweden298 to produce a franchise law. 
                                                   
296 In Italy, there was a seven year battle involving eight separate bills proposing a franchise law. The 
President, a gaggle of the Italian parliaments’ numerous political parties (particularly the Communist and 
the Left Democratic parties) the Italian Franchise Association, the FIF Confeserienti (the National 
Association of Traders), the Commission for Constitutional Affairs and the Italian Justice Commission were 
all actively involved in the process. (A) Resolution of July 24th 2000: (B) Bill of law no. 19 of 30th May, 
2001 from Senators: MACONI, GROSSO, PASQUINI and PIATTI; (C) Bill of law no. 25 of 30th May 2001 from 
Senator: ASCIUTTI ;(D)  Bill of law no. 103 of 6th June 2001 from Senators: MARINO, MUZIO and  
PAGLIARULO; (E)  Bill of law no. 842 of 14th November 2001 from Senator: COSTA; (F) Bill of law no. 95 
of 30th May 2001 from Deputies: GAMBINI and others;(G) Bill of law no. 1523 of 24th August 2001 from 
Deputies: MAZZOCCHI and others; (H) Bill of law no. 4702 of 13th February 2004 from Deputies: 
PERROTTA. 
297 On 4th February 1982 (Wetsvoorstel tot regeling van de franchise overeenkomst, zitting 1981-1982, 4 
February 1982, Parl. Doc. 90, no.1) a proposal was made which focused on regulating the franchise 
relationship rather than pre-contractual disclosure and was rather cumbersome.  It proposed that franchising 
be regulated by a Public Commission, which would approve franchisor’s standard agreements. All 
modifications agreed with the franchisee had to be approved by the Commission. The Commission would 
have had the ability to require franchisors to prove to it that they had the necessary financial and technical 
means to guarantee the normal performance of the agreement. One of the 2003 bills proposed establishment 
of a Commission of Franchise Arbitrators (the Belgian House Of Representatives, 30 Oct 2003, Clause 16) 
to deal with any disputes between franchisors and franchisees was perhaps the most unusual and eccentric 
provision. The Commission would have consisted equally of representatives from organisations protecting 
the interests of franchisees and of representatives from organisations protecting the interests of the 
franchisors. On 8 October 2003 Anne Barzin (Reform Movement member of the Belgian House of 
Representatives), Serge Van Overtveldt and Philippe Collard proposed a draft Parliamentary Bill 
“Concerning pre-contract information in relation to contracts by which one person grants to another the 
right to carry on commercial activities” (the Belgian House of Representatives, Extraordinary Session, 8 
October 2003 Doc 51 0265/001 First Sitting of 51st Parliament). The sponsors of the bill decided that the 
precedent set by the French (“Loi Doubin”, Law No. 89-1008 dated 31 December 1989) and Spanish 
(Article 62 of Act 7/1996) franchise laws should be followed in Belgium and so drafted a bill that imposed 
a pre-contractual disclosure obligation on the franchisor, failure to comply with which, would result in the 
agreement being void if the franchisee could show that the information which was not properly disclosed 
induced the franchisee to enter into the agreement (the Belgian House of Representatives, Extraordinary 
Session, 8 October 2003 Doc 51 0265/001 First Sitting of 51st Parliament). This was followed in rapid 
succession by three further draft bills. On 30 October 2003 Jan Peeters (International Socialist Party 
member of the Belgian House of Representatives) and Jean-Marc Delizée (Socialist Party member of the 
Belgian House of Representatives) proposed (The House of Representatives, 30 October 2003, Draft 
Parliamentary Bill concerning regulations governing the grant of franchise – Second Sitting of 51st 
Parliament) a draft Parliamentary Bill “Concerning Regulations Governing the Grant of Franchise” (The 
Belgian House Of Representatives, 30 Oct 2003, Extraordinary Session 2003, Introduction to Draft 
parliament Bill – Summary).  The proponents took the view that franchisors usually offer franchises on a 
“take it or leave it basis” and that there is a clear imbalance between the rights and obligations of the 
franchisor compared with those of the franchisees (The Belgian House Of Representatives, 30 Oct 2003, 
Extraordinary Session 2003, Introduction to Draft parliament Bill – Summary). They therefore proposed 
that franchises need to be specifically regulated, particularly in relation to pre-contractual disclosure, 
transfer of the agreement, the nullity of certain clauses, the franchisor’s right of pre-emption, the duration of 
the contract and the manner in which the contract is terminated. They also proposed a dispute resolution 
procedure. On 28 January 2004 Mme Trees Pieters (Christian Democrat Party member of the Belgian 
House of Representatives) proposed a draft Parliamentary Bill relating to franchise agreements (The 
Belgian House of Representatives, 28 Jan 2004 – Summary Doc 51 0747/001 Second sitting of 51st 
Parliament), which praised franchising as a form of distribution of goods in wide and successful use, but 
saw it is a relationship between a stronger party, the franchisor and a substantially weaker one, the 
franchisee. She therefore proposed to bring in “a number of clear and flexible provisions to correct the 
imbalance in the contractual relationship, and to introduce minimum trading protection for the franchisee 
without adversely affecting the development of this system of distribution” which include pre-contractual 
disclosure and the imposition of mandatory terms in the franchise agreement (The Belgian House of 
Representatives, 28 Jan 2004 – Summary Doc 51 0747/001 Second sitting of 51st Parliament). On 17 March 
2004 Alain Mathot (Socialist Party member of the Belgian House of Representatives), Jean-Marc Delizée 
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Even when governments do become involved in the regulation of franchising a degree of 
cynicism is evident  For example when the “Rainbow coalition”299 in Belgium introduced a 
draft bill into Parliament in 2001 it was proposed, at least in part, because the vast majority of 
franchisors present in Belgium are not Belgian and so any protection afforded to franchisees 
was seen as having little political risk and being a potentially populist move.300 
3.2 The Need to Regulate Franchising in the EU - Abuse, Sharp Practice and 
Failure  
This is critical analysis towards the second objective of the thesis and seeks to show that it is 
necessary to regulate franchising in the EU. 
The growth of franchising seems to have brought with it a degree of sharp practice, abuse and 
commercial failure that has lead the authorities in some member states to conclude that 
specific regulation was required. 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Sophie Pécriaux (all three members of Socialist Party Member of the Belgian House of 
Representatives) proposed a draft Parliamentary Bill “Regulating Franchise Agreements with a View to 
Improving Commercial Practices in this Sector” (The Belgian House of Representatives, 17 March 2004 
Doc 51 0924/001 Second sitting of 51st Parliament). The sponsors of the bill declared that franchisors offer 
their franchises on a “take it or leave it “basis and that there is a clear imbalance between the rights and 
obligations of the respective parties. They therefore proposed that franchise agreements should be regulated 
as regards pre-contractual disclosure, the void effect of certain provisions, the franchisor’s right of pre-
emption, the period of the franchise agreement and the manner in which it can be terminated (The Belgian 
House of Representatives, 17 March 2004 Doc 51 0924/001 Second sitting of 51st Parliament– Summary). 
298 A Swedish franchise law was first mooted in a public report in 1987.  Statens offentliga utredningar 
(SOU) 1987:17 “Franchising”. However it was another 19 years before it was adopted by the Swedish 
parliament. It was largely the result of the dogged determination of a particular MP who during that period 
was able to ensure that no less than 12 bills proposing a franchise law were presented to the parliament and 
several public reports made. The mandate of the 1987 public report was to survey the extent of franchising 
in Sweden, and describe and analyse the advantages and drawbacks of franchising. Against this background 
the report considered the need for and possible content of a specific law on franchising. The areas of law 
focused on in the resulting report, were labour law, contract law, competition law, intellectual property and 
consumer law.  The report proposed a definition of franchising and took the view that franchise agreements 
are often characterized by being one-sided, and consequently include clauses which might be considered to 
be unfair. However the overall conclusion of the report was that franchise agreements should be subject to 
general law of contract rather than franchise specific regulations.  Nevertheless, the report did suggest a 
mandatory notice period of one year upon termination of the agreement by the franchisor, save in the case 
where the grounds for termination were misrepresentation by the franchisee. The report suggested that in 
order to protect consumers franchisees and franchisors should be obliged to notify the public that their 
business was part of a franchise and that employees of franchisees should have the right to negotiate 
directly with the employer’s organisation to which the franchisor was connected.  Following the 
Government’s decision to dismiss the 1987 Report, a series of private member’s Bills were proposed by Mr 
Stig Gustafson, which called for a new government study on the need for legislation to protect the weak 
franchisees, were raised in Parliament between 1992 and 2003 (Lagutskottets (LU): 1992/93:LU2, 
1998/99:LU7, 2000/01:LU17, 2001/02:LU12, 2002/03:LU4 and 2003/04:LU7). However, these private 
member’s Bills were all rejected by Parliament. 
299 A coalition of the Liberals, Socialists and Greens 
300 Pascal Hollander, “Possible Legislative Developments: Is Belgium Doomed to Become a Hell for 
Franchisors?”, International Journal of Franchising and Distribution Law, Vol. 3, Issue 1, pp. 47-51. 
  88 
There are many examples of abuse, sharp practice and failure in franchising in EU member 
states.  In the UK, in 2007 there was an uproar in the press301 about the Self Video 24 
franchise.  Fifteen of the thirty franchisees were forced to cease trading due to their poor 
financial performance caused by lack of any support from the Franchisor, whilst the 
franchisor itself made an alleged £2 million profit302.  Labour MP Brian Donohoe raised the 
matter in Commons stating that it was “a myth” that investing in a franchise was safe303.  The 
collapse of the Pierre Victoire restaurant chain in 1998 was another example of a franchise 
chain going into receivership, leaving 104 franchisees in dire financial straits304.  Likewise the 
collapse of the Pentos Group Plc – franchisor of the Athena and Rymans retail brands305. 
In Germany there has also been a number of franchise failures.  For example, Foto Quelle, a 
mail order business with more than 1,000 franchises failed due to poor management; the 
master franchisee of Hooters in Berlin, Bradenburg, North Rhine Westfalia and Hesse (Wings 
of Germany) was declared bankrupt in 2006.  In 2007 Kindervilla (children’s nurseries) was 
declared bankrupt, resulting in criminal proceedings in 2009 due to 20 franchisees having lost 
around €150,000 each; and Zwo24, a dry cleaning business failed in 2004 due to over 
ambitious expansion. The restaurant Wienerwald failed three different times.  In 1982 with 
1,600 restaurants due to over aggressive expansion; in 2003 due to adverse market conditions 
and in 2007 due to insufficient capitalisation.  It is currently being relaunched for a fourth 
time306.   
In France, Law n° 89-1008 of December 31, 1989 was adopted due to the proliferation of 
abuse, sharp practice and commercial failure in franchising.  Franchisors such as the Letter 
Station (which embezzled funds from some sixty franchisees in 1985), took advantage of 
franchising’s growing popularity, whilst several legitimate franchise such as VO 9, Allo-
Video, Dermo Vital, Climat de France, Plein Pot, La Taste, Relais Bleus, La Sweaterie and 
Sporteus307 failed.  These incidents seriously damaged the public image of franchising and led 
the authorities to consider regulating franchise agreements. 
A similar record of abuse308 led to the adoption of the Spanish franchise law309.  It was a 
                                                   
301 The Mirror – Penman and Sommerlad “Fleeced by 24 Self Video Franchise” September 13 2007 
302 ibid 
303  Hansard HC Vol 450 Col 1493 (24 October 2006) 
304 Scotland on Sunday 23 May 2010 
305 Franchise World Feb/March 1994 
306 Marzheuser-Wood, B, 2009 “Franchising in Germany”, EfN Conference (London) 
307 Celeya. M, 2007, “Good Faith & Franchising under French Law”, EfN Conference (Paris). 
308 A number of so-called “empty franchises” (fraudulent schemes to extract money from unsuspecting 
individuals) SAP Valencia of 21 May 1993 (AC\1993\1024). 
309 Act 7/1996, 15 January 1996 regarding Retail Commerce Planning (the “LRCP”), as later developed by 
Royal Decree 2485/1998, 13 November 1998, as updated by Royal Decree 419/2006 of 7 April 2006 which 
came into effect on 17 May 2006. 
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record of abuse that also led to the regulation of franchising in Italy.  Although there was no 
particular big scandal or case of abuse which made the headlines. Many small players on the 
market were granting “franchises” without having any significant formula, brand, trademark, 
know-how or business format for the franchisee and without providing the potential 
franchisee with the information necessary to take an informed decision about the advantages 
of joining the franchisor’s network310. 
The much publicised dispute over the Singer Sewing Machines company’s termination of its 
franchisees led to the suggestion that franchising be specifically regulated being raised in the 
Swedish Parliament for the first time in its 1982/83 session311. 
Franchising is therefore subject to abuse, sharp practice and failure and so needs to be 
regulated. 
3.3 Analysis of the Contractual Environment 
3.3.1 The Differing Approaches of EU Member States to constructing the Contractual 
Environment 
This is critical analysis towards the second objective and suggests that the differing 
approaches of EU member states has no substantial impact on the basic elements of 
franchising’s contractual environment.   
It is suggested that the fundamental economic and relational elements of franchising mean 
that despite the different approach that civil and common law jurisdictions take to the drafting 
of commercial contracts, franchise agreements exhibit a common contractual architecture that 
transcends these differences and creates a uniform contractual environment for franchising in 
the EU. 
3.3.1.1 An Analysis of Franchise Specific Laws in the EU 
This is critical analysis towards the second objective of this thesis. 
The heterogeneous nature of the regulatory environment is contributed to by the franchise 
specific laws of eight EU member states.  These will not all be considered in detail in this 
study.  However, it is important to explain and contrast their content to establish the lack of 
any common approach amongst them. 
                                                   
310 Interview with Prof. Aldo Frignani, Professor, University of Turin (March 2009). 
311 An attempt to obtain compensation for them under Sweden’s protectionist employment laws failed.  
However, the lawyer who represented the franchisees , Mr Stig Gustafsson soon after entered the Swedish 
parliament as an MP, and spurred on by his failure to obtain compensation for the franchisees, dedicated 
himself to introducing a franchise regulation that would deliver the protection that he had failed to obtain 
for them under the employment law.  After 21 years of campaigning by Mr Gustafsson, the Swedish 
parliament adopted a franchise specific law (Statens offentliga utredningar (SOU) 1987:17 “Franchising”). 
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Although France provided initial momentum to the move towards franchise specific laws in 
the EU, its approach has not been copied wholesale by any of the other member states. This 
may well be because although the French law predates the other EU member state franchise 
regulations by some years, many of those member states began considering the need for such 
a law several years before the Loi Doubin was enacted312.  Each member state has taken a 
markedly different approach. Six of the member state franchise focused laws are concerned 
with precontractual disclosure. Two member states require the franchise agreement and the 
other relevant documents to be registered.  One of the member states (Belgium) follows the 
French example and does not mention the word franchising.  The two laws that do not require 
precontractual disclosure are more concerned with trying to define a franchise and the rights 
and obligations it gives rise to.  These eight laws are outlined in the table below. 
A draft franchise law was also considered in Greece in 2006 and 2007 but was dropped in 
2008 because of a lack of governmental interest. 
 
                                                   
312 The first Franchise Law Bill introduced into the Belgian Parliament dates back to 1982 and that in 
Sweden to 1987. 
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EU Member 
State 





Documentation on a 
Public Register 
Comments 
France Law No 89-1008 dated 31 
December 1989 (the Loi 
Doubin).  New Article 330 
of Civil Code. 
20 days before 
executing contract 
n/a n/a It does not refer to 
franchising but to 
“any person who 
places a commercial 
name, a trade mark or 
sign at the disposal of 
another person in 
consideration for an 
undertaking of 
exclusivity or quasi-
exclusivity for the 
exercise of his 
business”. 
Spain Article 62 of Act 7/1996 
and Royal Decree 
2485/1998 
20 days before 
executing contract 
n/a Yes, at regional or 
central registries 
 
Italy Law No 129 – 6 May 2004 30 days before Details of the n/a A full copy of the 
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EU Member 
State 





Documentation on a 
Public Register 
Comments 
executing contract following must be 
provided; 
- Fees due 
- Investment requested 
- Territory 
- Details of know-how 
- Services to be 









replaces the need for a 
summary of the 
agreement’s terms. 
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EU Member 
State 









(2) The concept must 
be tested and the 
results disclosed to the 
franchisee 
Sweden The Disclosure Act 2006 
(2006:484) 
14 days before 
executing contract  
n/a n/a  
Belgium Law Governing Pre-
Contractual Information 
Within the Framework of 
Commercial Partnership 
Agreements – 19 
December 2005, modified 
27 December 2005 
(Doc:51 1687/006) 
One month before 
executing contract 
n/a n/a It does not refer to 
franchising but to 
“commercial 
partnership” 
Romania Ordinance 52/1997 as 
modified by Law No. 
No time specified Must specify n/a  
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EU Member 
State 





Documentation on a 
Public Register 
Comments 
79/1998 - object of agreement 
- rights and 
obligations of parties 
- term 
- termination 
- financial provision 
Estonia Law of Obligations Act 
2002 Section 375-378 
n/a - duty of good faith 




Lithuania Civil Code Article 6.766-
6.779 (200) 
n/a - duty of good faith 
- automatic transfer of 
franchise to 
franchisee’s heir in the 
event of death 
Yes, but it can be 
contacted out of 
(although this results 
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EU Member 
State 





Documentation on a 
Public Register 
Comments 
- franchisor can be 
held liable for claims 
against franchisee 
regarding the quality 
of goods or services 
supplied 
- automatic right of 
renewal 
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In order to meaningfully consider whether the fundamental economic and relational elements 
of franchising mean that despite the different approach of civil and common law jurisdictions 
take to the drafting of commercial contracts, franchise agreements exhibit a common 
contractual architecture that transcends these differences and creates a uniform contractual 
environment for franchising, the architecture of a sample of 25 franchise agreements was 
analysed.  In order to avoid any jurisdiction specific issues the sample comprises the 
agreements of 5 UK franchisors, 5 German franchisors, 5 French franchisors, 5 US 
franchisors and 5 Australian franchisors313.  These are all agreements of franchisors 
established in the EU and doing or seeking to do business in more than one EU member state.  
In order to avoid any distortion due to focusing upon a particular sector franchises in the 
retail, commercial and personal services, food/restaurant, contract cleaning, renovation 
services, printing, car rental and hotel sectors were included.  In order to avoid any distortion 
due to the type of franchisee involved or the level of capital investment required a broad 
selection was included ranging from low budget contract cleaning businesses (minimum 
investment of £500)314 to large hotel businesses requiring an investment of many millions of 
pounds315. 
It is submitted that the sample will evidence a distinct difference between those franchise 
agreements drafted for use in civil jurisdictions and those drafted in common law 
jurisdictions, but that they will exhibit a common architecture and address common issues.   
3.3.1.2 Contrasting the Civil and Common Law Approaches 
This is critical analysis towards the second objective of this thesis. 
The civil law agreements considered for this thesis were all shorter than their common law 
counterparts.  The civil law agreements range between 15 and 30 single spaced A4 pages 
whereas the common law agreements range between 60 and 90 single spaced A4 pages. 
Whilst all of the agreements considered address generally the same commercial issues, the 
common law agreements go into far more detail on technical legal issues.   
It has been suggested that common law agreements are generally more verbose than civil law 
agreements not because common law agreements address more issues but because in common 
law countries the drafting style of contracts is heavily influenced by the drafting style of 
                                                   
313 See Appendix 8 
314 Jani-King 
315 Intercontinental 
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statutes and the tendency of the courts to interpret contracts and statutes in a literal manner316.  
As a consequence, contracts are very detailed because the parties try to take into account all 
possible events that may occur in the future and lay down an adequate contractual discipline 
to deal with them. This seems to be borne out by the sample. 
By contrast, it has been suggested that in civil jurisdictions the codes are usually “general and 
abstract” as they state general principles concerning relevant subjects which are designed to 
prevail over the will of the parties and then add specific rules which are to be applied in those 
cases where nothing has been stated by the parties.  As a result, civil law franchise 
agreements are brief and concise and the parties rely on relevant statutory provisions317.  
Again, this seems to be borne out by the sample. 
Other explanations, in addition to the impact of substantive law, include a tradition of 
succinctness in legal drafting in civil jurisdictions, and the limitations imposed by civil 
procedure318.  Article 242 of the German Civil Code, which imposes a general duty of good 
faith on the parties to a contract, is cited as an example of why civil law agreements do not 
need to be as detailed as their common law counterparts319. 
The application by analogy of the rules applying to “type-contracts”, such as commercial 
agency to franchise agreements is another reason for the brevity of the civil law franchise 
agreements in the sample. 
3.3.1.3 Differentiating Features of the Civil Law Approach 
This is critical analysis towards the second objective of this thesis. 
Unlike common law, civil law distinguishes between those contracts that are of a recognised 
type of agreement (“type-contracts” or “nominate” contracts) and those that are not320.  The 
reason for this difference is mainly a historical one and the type-contracts are those which 
were most common at the time the civil codes were drafted.  The belief being that as and 
when any new types of contracts become more common the rules applying to type-contracts 
could be applied to them by analogy as and when appropriate.  If this proved to be inadequate 
then specific laws could be adopted for them321. 
                                                   
316 Frignani. A, 1996, “Some Basic Differences Between the Common Law and Civil Law Approach” – IBA-
IFA 13th Annual Seminar on International Franchising 
317  Ibid 
318 Hill. C and King. C, 2004, “How Do German Contracts do as much with Fewer Words?”, Chicago – 
Kent Law Review, Vol 79-889 
319 Whittaker. S & Zimmerman. R, 2000, “Good Faith in European Contract Law”, Cambridge University 
Press 
320 For example, the German Civil Code inter alia categories the following types of agreement, Business 
Management Agreements, Service Agreements, Lease Agreements and Licence Agreements. 
321 Op cit Frignani, A. 1996 
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The crucial point for this thesis is that the european civil codes do not usually have franchise 
specific laws or type-contracts322.  Franchise agreements are atypical or inominate agreements 
(innomé in French)323. General contract law and, where deemed appropriate, by analogy the 
law applicable to other “type-contracts” or “nominate contracts” are applied to them, for 
example commercial agency and consumer law324. 
Civil law comprises mandatory and non-mandatory rules.  The function of the “non-
mandatory rules” is to replace the silence of the parties on specific issues but they can be 
opted out of by the parties.  They are essentially template or precedent terms that are deemed 
generally appropriate to a specific type of contract.  This means that the parties need only deal 
with the specific issues arising in a particular contract. 
Mandatory rules cannot be avoided by the parties and include general concepts or principles 
such as public policy and good faith.  The incorporation into a contract of terms that conflict 
with mandatory rules will be void as may be the entire agreement.  Void clauses may be 
replaced by corresponding mandatory rules. 
Civil codes usually list terms which are considered to be essential elements of type-contracts, 
the lack of which invalidates the agreement.  They also usually list other terms which are felt 
to be a natural consequence of a certain type of contract, but which can be opted out of. 
Civil codes distinguish between contracts for exchange (such as sale of goods) and contracts 
for co-operation (or adhesion325) (such as franchising). Contracts of exchange are usually 
type-contracts, whereas generally contracts for co-operation are not, as is the case with 
franchise agreements.  As a result contracts for exchange tend to be shorter than contracts for 
co-operation. Franchise agreements, being contracts for co-operation which are not type-
contracts are therefore generally longer than other civil agreements326. 
Civil courts are generally more comfortable interpreting legal rules than the will of the parties 
and so prefer to apply mandatory and non mandatory rules by analogy and general concepts 
such as good faith327 to franchising agreements.  
                                                   
322 The exceptions are Lithuania, Estonia and Romania, all of which specifically refer to franchise 
agreements in their civil code and list mandatory, non mandatory and essential terms for them. 
323 Clément, 1994, p.13; Michel Jéol, conclusions to the decisions of the Assemblée Plénière de la Cour de 
Cassation of 1 December 1995, D. jur., 1996, p. 13 ff; Leloup, 2004, p.11. 
324 In Spanish law there are four key decision of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) about franchising  
STS 27 September 1996, RJ 1996\6646; 4 March 1997, RJ 1997\1642, 30 April 1998, RJ 1998\3456 and 21 
October 1005, Id Cendoj 28079110012005100801 
They recognise franchise agreements as an innominate atypical agreement, the norms of which are framed 
by analogy and characterise franchising in the same manner as to ECJ’s judgment in Pronuptia. 
325 Le Tourneau, 2003. “Le Contrat de franchisage” Litec, Paris. Bueno Diaz, O. 2007 “Franchising in 
European Contract Law”: pp 43 Sellier, European law publishing 
326 Op cit Frignani, A 1996 
327 Op cit Fignani, A 1996 
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3.3.1.4 Common Key Features   
This is critical analysis towards the second objective of this thesis. 
An analysis of the sample agreements leads one to conclude that franchise agreements, be 
they civil or common law agreements, and regardless of the economic and sectoral 
contextualisation exhibit certain common key features. 
Olson, Weinberg and Spencer328 suggest that  
“although there is no “cookie cutter” approach to drafting a franchise agreement …. 
there are key provisions commonly found in franchise agreements, regardless of 
industry or business …. (although) …. every industry, business and relationship has 
unique considerations and each consideration may affect and alter those provisions”. 
They identify key terms to include the grant, the financial terms (including targets and 
product ties), the term and renewal, the franchisors obligations, the franchisees obligations, 
confidentiality, restrictive covenants/non competition, transfer of the business, termination. 
The Encyclopaedia of Forms and Precedents329 identifies the same key common terms in 
franchise agreements. 
Analysis of the sample agreements suggests that these key terms are indeed found in all 
franchise agreements as they are in all those comprising the sample.  Some agreements in the 
sample present targets and product ties separately from other financial terms.  Others combine 
confidentiality with restrictive covenants and provisions about the manual.  However these 
are a matter of form rather than substantive content.   
One can therefore conclude that regardless of whether agreements are drafted in the civil or 
common law idiom and despite economic and sectoral contextualisation franchise agreements 
comprise certain key terms. 
3.3.1.5 Sub-Conclusion 
Despite clear and substantial differences between the civil and common law approaches to 
drafting commercial contracts, franchise agreements exhibit a uniform architecture. 
                                                   
328 (2010) The Annotated Franchise Agreement.  American Bar Association 33rd Annual Forum on 
Franchising pp1. 
329 Butterworths Encyclopaedia of Forms and Precedents (2003) Vol 16(4).  Franchising, Agency and 
Distribution Fifth Edition.  Ed. Millet 96 
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3.3.2 Analysis of the Contractual Environment as regards the Economic Drivers 
This is critical analysis to the second objective.  It seeks to show that the contractual 
environment of franchising has a differing impact on the economic drivers that attract 
franchisees to franchising and those that attract franchisors.   
It is suggested that the contractual environment created by the architecture of franchise 
agreements generally protects the economic drivers that attract franchisors to franchising.  It 
also protects many (but not all) of the economic drivers that attract franchisees to franchising.  
Considering each of the key features of the architecture of a franchise agreement in turn 
within the context of those agreements comprising the sample, one is able to extrapolate upon 
the adequacy of the contractual environment in supporting and re-enforcing the economic 
drivers in the franchisor/franchisee relationship. 
3.3.2.1 The Grant 
The franchisee is granted the right to use the franchisor’s business format (know-how) and 
trade marks.  These are two of the key elements of a franchise.  The integrity of this 
intellectual property is fundamental to the relationship.  If the franchisor does not have the 
right to licence the franchisee to use it, if it infringes the rights of others or is insufficient or 
otherwise unfit for the intended purpose, the franchisee will be deprived of the main benefit 
of the transaction.  However, only two (2) of the agreements in the sample warranted their 
ownership of the trade mark, and none warranted the validity of them or their ownership of or 
the effectiveness of the know-how.   
The rights granted are often, but not always, restricted to either a specific area or a stated 
location330.  They can either be exclusive or non exclusive331. The territory is usually a 
geographical area that allows a planned approach to exploitation of the franchise.   
“Encroachment” on the franchisee’s business by franchisors has been identified as a 
substantial problem332.  However, it is not always fully prohibited by the agreement.  The 
franchisor’s placement of a new company-owned or franchised unit too close to an existing 
one has emerged  
“to be one of the most vexing, emotional and yet least understood franchising 
problems in mature markets such as the US”333.   
                                                   
330 18 of the 25 agreements 
331 13 of the 25 agreements were exclusive 
332 Purvin, R, 1994, “The Franchise Fraud” ,The American Association of Franchisees and Dealers, 129 
333 Barkoff. R and Garner. W, 1994, “Encroachment: The Thorn in Every Successful Franchis or’s Side”: 
Annual Forum on Franchising. American Bar Association. 
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The grant of geographical exclusivity to franchisees is aimed at preventing this.  In the 
sample, just over half of the franchisors grant geographical exclusivity of some kind.  The 
others have no geographical protection at all – probably for good commercial reasons such as 
the prevalence of national, non-geocentric, accounts in the customer base.  Encroachment is 
usually considered to exist  
“If a franchisor develops, or grants to a franchisee the right to develop, a new outlet or 
location which sells essentially the same goods or services under the same trademark, 
service mark, trade name, logotype or other commercial symbol as an existing 
franchisee and the new outlet or location is in unreasonable proximity to the existing 
franchisee’s outlet or location and has an adverse effect on the gross sales of the 
existing franchisee’s outlet or location, the existing adversely affected franchisee has 
a cause of action for monetary damages…”334.   
Deliberate cannibalisation of a franchisee’s business by the franchisor is clearly 
inappropriate.  However encroachment is sometimes the unintended consequence of the 
franchisor embracing new technologies in an endeavour to maintain and increase the 
business’ competiveness for the ultimate benefit of not only itself but also its franchise 
network.  For example, the advent of the worldwide web has meant that encroachment can be 
by way of a multi-channel approach to the market.  The impact on the franchisee’s business 
of this electronic intra brand competition is regulated by only 60% of the agreements in the 
sample335, so raising a potential concern over the violation of the franchisees’ business 
interests through “non-traditional” encroachment.  Encroachment is an issue which many of 
the agreements in the sample fail to deal with in an appropriate manner. 
3.3.2.2 Term and renewal 
All of the agreements in the sample were granted for a period of between five and ten years.  
A conditional right of renewal is often included 336.  The franchisee must be confident that it 
will be able to amortise its investment in the franchise and make a reasonable return within 
the initial term.  It was not possible to judge whether or not the terms granted by the franchise 
agreements in the sample allowed this.  Research in the US suggests that the vast majority of 
franchisees do seek and are allowed by the franchisor to exercise the right of renewal337. 
3.3.2.3 Targets 
                                                   
334 Iowa Code 2001 Supplement, Section 537A.10 
335 15 of the 25 agreements. 
336 21 of the 25 agreements 
337 Op cit Blair and La Fontaine F 2005, p.263 
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In order to try and ensure the optimum exploitation of the rights granted to the franchisee,  
minimum performance levels are sometimes agreed338.  Others simply place an obligation on 
the franchisee to use best or reasonable endeavours to grow the business339.   
The consequences of failure to meet the targets vary.  Termination of the agreement is the 
most common option, although there is almost always an opportunity to remedy the breach in 
some way340.  This can be “catching up” and meeting the following year’s target and/or 
paying liquidated damages to compensate the franchisor for its resulting loss of income.  It 
follows from this that the targets should be reasonable, but none of those agreements with 
targets gave any rationale for them, so it was not possible to judge whether or not they are 
reasonable. 
3.3.2.4 The Franchisor’s Obligations 
The franchisor is obliged to provide training and ongoing support to the franchisee and to 
keep it fully appraised of developments in the business format341.  This training in the 
business format and the ongoing support are key elements of a franchise.  There is sometimes 
also an obligation to supply goods or services to the franchisee342.  However, the franchisor’s 
obligations are generally minimal and the agreements usually do not go into detail343.  Several 
refer to the manual which is stated to contain details of the franchisor’s obligations344. 
Frequency of visits to the franchisee is sometimes stated345.  None of the agreements impose 
an obligation for the franchisor to provide a minimal, objective qualitative level of support to 
the franchisee. The number of days that training will be given for is often stated346.  The 
vague nature of the franchisor’s obligations and the lack of any qualitative rather than 
quantitative metric means that franchisees have no real contractual right to challenge the 
franchisor if it fails to deliver a reasonable level of support.  This lack of any objective 
measurable standard of performance in any of the agreements, means that providing that the 
franchisor delivers some support the franchisee will not be able to challenge its adequacy or 
relevance.  The ever changing nature of all businesses, particularly due to the impact of new 
technologies, means that the franchisor must be able to develop and adapt the business format 
and, as a consequence, the type of support it provides to the franchisee.  That is perhaps why 
the agreements do not detail the support to be provided.  However, the total lack of any 
                                                   
338 9 of the 25 agreements 
339 10 of the 25 agreements 
340 7 of the 11 sample agreements with targets 
341 All of the agreements in the sample imposed these obligations 
342 12 of the 25 sample agreements 
343 Only 5 of the 25 agreements go into any great level of detail about the franchisor’s obligations 
344 8 of the 25 sample agreements 
345 6 of the 25 sample agreeements 
346 15 of the 25 sample agreements 
  103 
qualitative measure in the agreements does expose the franchisee to the risk that the 
franchisor provides it with inadequate support. 
An example of the problems that this lack of appropriate support by the franchisor can create 
are illustrated by the case of MGB Printing and Design Ltd v KallKwik UK Ltd347.  In this 
case the franchisee was obliged in the franchise agreement to provide the franchisee “from 
time to time with advice, know-how and guidance.”  The court ruled that there was a duty of 
care which meant that the franchisor was obliged to exercise reasonable skill and care in 
providing such know-how and advice, which the franchisor had breached.  This failure to 
deliver an appropriate level of skill and care was evident throughout the franchise causing a 
further 92 franchisees in the franchisor’s Kall Kwik and Prontaprint businesses to threaten 
proceedings on the same grounds as their fellow franchisee, Mr Bibby348. 
The long term nature of the franchise agreement and the need to accommodate the resulting 
tensile stresses within the franchise relationship are discussed in Chapter 2.  They result in the 
franchisor having a good deal of flexibility although this is markedly less so in the German 
sample.  This is due to the impact of the German law of good faith.  This flexibility can be 
misused by franchisors and as a result the contractual environment does not adequately 
reduce the risks to franchisees or support the economic drivers that attract them to 
franchising. 
3.3.2.5 The Franchisee’s Obligations  
By contrast to those of the franchisor, the obligations of the franchisee are generally 
voluminous and include use of the know-how and the brand, following the franchisor’s 
system and meeting brand standards.  This control is a fundamental element of the franchise.  
In order to ensure this as far as possible, the franchise agreement goes into detail on issues 
such as use of the trade marks, staff training and operational procedures. Common law 
agreements go into more detail than those from civil jurisdictions. 
The strength of franchise systems typically does not lie in the absolute quality of the products 
or services offered.  Instead it resides largely in the capacity of the franchised chain to offer a 
uniform product at a reasonably uniform price.  Quality and service variation have external 
effects that damage other franchisees as well as the franchisor and this creates tension 
between the franchisor and individual franchisees.  The individual franchisee’s incentives are 
not aligned with those of the franchisor and other franchisees.   
                                                   
347 QBD – 31 March 2010 – [2010] EWHC 624 (QB) 
348 www.printweek.com/news/1040784/kall-kwikfranchisees-continue-legal-against-against-ODC viewed 
13/11/2010 
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“The profit-maximising behaviour of an individual can have adverse external effects 
on the franchisor and other franchisees”.349   
These provisions of the franchise agreement are designed to remove or at least mitigate the 
fundamental incentive issue because franchisees care more about the profits of their own 
outlet while the franchisor cares more about the profits of the system as a whole.  The 
provisions also provide for the franchisor’s right to monitor the performance of the franchise 
through regular inspections, audits and so on. 
The manual, which is expressly incorporated in the agreement, also imposes innumerable 
operational obligations on the franchisee and details the franchisor’s know-how.  The 
copyright in both the original and translated manual is stated to vest in the franchisor350. 
3.3.2.6 Confidentiality 
A franchisor must disclose a considerable amount of confidential information (the business 
format) to each of its franchisees.  The franchise agreements prevent the franchisee from 
disclosing the confidential information or using it to compete with the franchisor351. These 
restrictions endure for the duration of the franchise and thereafter. A number of EU member 
states also impose a duty of confidentiality upon both parties to the franchise agreement352, so 
further re-enforcing this point. 
3.3.2.7 Non-competition 
Franchise agreements forbid franchisees to compete with the franchisor during the term of the 
agreement353 and for a limited period with a limited geographical area thereafter354. The post-
termination restrictions are limited by law in all EU member states. This clause is essential to 
protect the integrity of the franchisor’s business. 
3.3.2.8 Transfer of the Franchisee’s Business 
Franchise agreements usually allow the franchisee to sell its business to a third party that has 
been previously approved by the franchisor, subject to the franchisor’s pre-emptive right to 
purchase the franchisees’ business on the same terms as the bona fide third party offer 
                                                   
349 Op cit Blair R and La Fontaine F. 2005, p.118.  See also Op cit Caves R and Murphy W 1976 and Klein. 
B, 1980, “Transaction Cost Determinants of Unfair Contractual Arrangements” American Economic 
Review, p.356-362 
350 19 of the 25 sample agreements 
351 These terms are in all 25 sample agreements 
352 E.g. Article 18 of the German Unfair Competition Act and BGB Sections 675(1), 611 and 241(2) 
353 All of the agreements in the sample 
354 22 of the agreements in the sample.  The two exceptions in the sample were hotel franchises, where the 
franchisee still retains the hotel at the end of the franchise and needs to be able to operate it under another 
brand. 
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(provided this right is exercised within a reasonable time)355. This is necessary to enable 
franchisees to realise a “capital profit” on their investment whilst at the same time enabling 
the franchisor to ensure the quality of its franchisees.  The pre-emptive right is necessary to 
enable the franchisor to retain control (which is an essential element of a franchise). 
3.3.2.9 Product or Service Tie 
There is often a product or service tie which obliges the franchisee to purchase specific 
brands and/or purchase goods or products from the franchisor or approved suppliers356.  The 
justification for such a tie is that it helps to ensure product consistency across the network.  It 
can relate to goods that are sold on without modification (e.g. ice cream in a Baskins-Robbins 
franchise) or ingredients that are used to make the final product (e.g. the dough in a Domino’s 
Pizza).  Such a provision could, of course, be abused to deliver additional inflated income 
streams to the franchisor.  Likewise the products or services supplied could be of a poor 
standard and so be problematic. However only a small number of the agreements in the 
sample provided for redress in such circumstances357.  It is possible that some franchisors 
supply such goods or services under its standard terms and conditions which do provide for 
such redress, but the sample did not enable this to be considered. 
3.3.2.10 Goodwill 
Goodwill survives a defunct business358 and under the terms of common law franchise 
agreements it is stated to accrue to the franchisor359 not the franchisee.   However, this is not 
the case in the civil law agreements, which are silent on the issue.  This is presumably 
because most civil law jurisdictions, follow the German lead and take the view that goodwill 
accrues to the franchisee by way of analogy to the position as regards commercial agents. 
3.3.2.11 Termination 
The franchise agreements give the Franchisor the express right to terminate the franchise 
agreement for breach.  A distinction is often made between a remediable and irremediable 
breach, with the right for the franchisee to remedy remediable breaches. The franchisee is not 
given any express right to terminate the agreement (although this does not impact upon its 
right to do so under the law of contract).  The civil law agreements tend to have less 
draconian rights of termination. 
                                                   
355 23 out of the 25 sample agreements 
356 12 out of the 25 sample agreements 
357 8 of the 12 agreements that had a ??? 
358  In Ad-Lib Club Ltd v Granville [1971] 2 All ER 300, [1972] RPC 673 goodwill sufficient to found an action of 
passing off was held to survive a well known nightclub by some years. 
359  Usually there will be an express team requiring the franchisee to hold the goodwill as bare trustee for the franchisor, 
but, even in the absence of such a term, it would appear that the goodwill accrues to the franchisor: see J H Coles Pty 
Ltd v Need [1934] AC 82, PC. 
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3.3.2.12 Sub-conclusion 
The uniform architecture of franchise agreements comprises provisions detailing the grant 
made by the franchisor to the franchisee, the term and renewal, targets, the obligations of both 
parties, confidentiality, non competition, transfer, product and services ties, good will and 
termination.   
The asymmetry between the obligations of the franchisor and those of the franchisee is 
necessary because of the multi-lateral nature of franchising and because of the dynamic and 
changing nature of business360.  The Franchisor must be able to protect the integrity of the 
brand not only for its own benefit but also for that of its franchisees.  If a franchisee 
prejudices the brand it damages not only the business of the franchisor, but also the business 
of the other franchisees.  The franchisor must therefore be able to take immediate and 
effective action against any franchisee that is not following the franchise system.  In order to 
make this possible the franchisee’s obligations must be clearly detailed in the agreement.  
Franchisees should act in the best interests of the franchise as a whole – meaning the 
franchisees as a group – rather than their individual best interests.   
The contractual environment in the EU supports the economic drivers that encourage 
franchisors to become involved in franchising.  It does not adequately support all of the 
economic drivers that encourage franchisees to become involved in franchising. It provides 
for a brand, a format and support but it does not impose a qualitative measure for the format 
or assistance provided. 
3.3.3 Analysis of the Contractual Environment as regards Risk 
This is critical analysis towards the second objective of the thesis.  It suggests that the 
contractual environment created by the architecture of franchise agreements generally reduces 
the inherent risks for franchisors but is less successful in reducing them for franchisees. 
3.3.3.1 Risks to the Franchisor 
The franchisor is exposed to information asymmetry and moral hazard potentially resulting in 
“free riding”361.  It is suggested that these are reduced to an appropriate level by the 
contractual environment. The franchisor is also subjected to abuse of its intellectual property 
and non payment of fees.  These are generally dealt with in a satisfactory manner by the 
contractual environment. 
In order to reduce the impact of “free riding” and information asymmetry the franchise 
agreements in the sample impose an obligation on the franchisee to comply with the system 
                                                   
360 See section 3.4 
361 See section 2.4 above 
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and grant the franchisor the right to audit their business for compliance.  Non-compliance can 
lead to termination by the franchisor.  This is clearly a strong incentive for franchisees to 
follow the system.  Any fetter on the right to terminate is problematic in that it reduces the 
effectiveness of the incentive362. 
A prohibition on in-term competition by the franchisee reduces that particular risk for the 
franchisor.  However, although a prohibition on using the franchisor’s trade secrets after the 
term of the agreement helps to prevent competition from former franchisees a permanent 
prohibition on competing without using the franchisor’s trade secrets is restricted to a short 
period only.  This is due to a general prohibition on long term restrictive covenants in EU 
member states.  Indeed in some member states post term restrictive covenants are only 
permissible if the franchisee is paid compensation363. 
The franchise agreement generally gives robust protection to the franchisor’s intellectual 
property. However, the franchisor’s ownership of goodwill which is clearly stated in common 
law franchise agreements is contrary to the law in some member states such as Germany, 
Austria and Greece and so is not included in the German agreements in the sample364. 
The agreement incentivises the franchisees to pay monies due to the franchisor by way of the 
imposition of interest on late payments and a right to terminate the agreement in the event of 
non payment.   
When franchisors were asked which obligations were important in protecting their business 
from franchise abuse there was general agreement that they were non competition by 
franchisees during the agreement365; non competition for a reasonable period after 
termination366, no challenge of the franchisor’s intellectual property by franchisee’s367; 
franchisees being obliged to follow the system368  and payment of monies due to the 
franchisor369. 
The majority of franchise lawyers surveyed370 felt that following the franchisor’s system371, 
not challenging the franchisor’s intellectual property rights372 and not competing with the 
                                                   
362 Several member states do impose fetters on the franchisor’s right to terminate e.g. Germany 
363 Germany – see section 3.8 
364 See section 3.5.4 below 
365 UK – 80% of sample; Germany – 72% of sample; France – 80% of sample but only 47% in Spain where 
68% thought it to be insignificant. 
366 UK – 96%; Germany – 56%; France – 92%; Spain – 40% - in Spain 52% thought that it was 
“significant” rather than “very significant”. 
367 UK – 96%; Germany 84%; France – 80%; Spain – 100%. 
368 Germany – 84%; France – 52%; Spain – 76% only 12% of those in the UK thought it was “very 
significant” although 84% thought it was “significant”. 
369 UK – 48%; Germany 24%; France 60% and Spain none. 
370 Appendix 4. 
371 56% of the sample 
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franchising during the term of the franchise agreement373 were the most important restrictions 
that should be placed on the franchisor374. 
This is similar to the results of other research.  For example, according to Pratt375, of the 129 
franchisors that he questioned, the majority felt that being involved in a competing business, 
passing on confidential information, non payment of fees under declaration of turnover and 
encouraging other franchisees to take action against the franchisor, were the issues on which 
they were willing to litigate. 
So, the agreements in the sample, (unsurprisingly, as they are all drafted by the franchisor), 
suggest that the contractual environment does reduce the risk of being involved in franchising 
for the franchisor to an appropriate level, providing member state law does not fetter the 
contractual rights in any way. 
3.3.3.2 Risks to the Franchisees 
Franchisees are exposed to inappropriate pre-contractual representations, brand failure, 
inadequate business formats, encroachment and poor quality support.  It is suggested that 
these are not reduced to an adequate level by the contractual environment.   
None of the franchise agreements in the sample gave contractually binding effect to pre-
contractual representations made to the franchise.  Franchisees are therefore obliged to rely 
on non-contractual remedies if they have entered into the franchise agreement on the basis of 
incorrect information.  Indeed many of the agreements in the sample376 expressly excluded 
liability for at least some of the pre-contractual representations made by the franchisor to the 
franchisee.  These are mostly common law agreements377.  This inability to rely on 
representations made to the franchisee during the sales process does nothing to reduce the 
risks imposed on them. 
                                                                                                                                                        
372 20% of the sample 
373 16% of the sample 
374 48% of the sample felt that not competing with the franchisor during the term was the second most 
important obligation, 24% that it was following the franchisor’s system and 20% that it was not challenging 
the franchisor’s intellectual property. 56% of the sample felt that not competing with the franchisor for a 
reasonable period after the end of the agreement was the third most important obligation, 28% felt that it 
was non competition with the franchisor during the term and 20% that it was not challenging the 
franchisor’s intellectual property. 36% felt that not challenging the franchisor’s intellectual property was the 
fourth most important obligation, 20% that it was following the franchisor’s system, 16% that it was not 
competing after the term and 8% not competing during the term. 12% felt that non competition for a 
reasonable period after the term was the fifth most important obligation and 4% not challenging the 
franchisor’s intellectual property rights. 
375 Pratt, Franchise World Dec/Jan 2007, p. 9. 
376 15 
377 12 of the 15 agreements are from common law jurisdictions 
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All of the agreements clearly state the extent of the rights granted to the franchisee as regards 
duration, and territory.  However, only some378 of them (regardless of whether the grant is 
exclusive), restrict the franchisor from using multi-channel strategies to exploit the market in 
competition with the franchisee. Encroachment is not adequately dealt with in many 
agreements. In the fast changing era of multi-channel marketing and electronic commerce, it 
is perhaps reasonable that the franchisor does not restrict its long term ability to exploit the 
market in ways that it is not yet familiar with.  Indeed such a restriction could have an 
extremely damaging impact on its business and that of the franchise network as a whole.  
However, there is clearly an opportunity here for unethical or opportunistic franchisors to 
take advantage of the franchisee.  This encroachment issue is not dealt with adequately in the 
franchise agreement. 
The obligation of the franchisor to provide support to the franchisee during the term of the 
agreement is stated in all agreements in the sample, however, none of them give any detail 
about the extent or quality of that support.  The support provided to the franchisees by the 
franchisor is a fundamental part of the communal relationship between the parties.  That is 
why the obligation to support the franchisee is imposed on the franchisor.  However, none of 
the agreements in the sample impose a set standard for the support or go into detail about 
what the support entails.  This is because franchise agreements are long term agreements and 
(as detailed in Chapter 2 above) during that term market, economic and technological changes 
can mean that the franchisor will need to further develop and adapt its concept, making the 
level and type of support that needs to be delivered to its franchisees change379.  However, no 
such obligation was found in any agreement in the sample.  This means that franchisees can 
find it very difficult to hold the franchisor to a set standard of support.  If the franchisor fails 
to provide the franchisee with use of the brand, access to the know-how, or any support all the 
agreements in the sample permit the franchisee to terminate the agreement. However, none of 
the agreements give that right to the franchisee if the franchisor greatly reduces the level of 
support it delivers to the franchisee, even if that reduced level of support is clearly 
inadequate.  Unethical and opportunistic franchisors could take advantage of the lack of any 
qualitative provision in the agreement and decrease the support given merely to increase its 
own margins. 
The franchisor generally has broad discretion to take decisions that have an impact upon the 
franchise at its sole discretion in the common law agreements and the French agreements.  
                                                   
378  15 
379 See section 2.5.4 
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Only the German agreements caveat the franchisor’s discretion with an obligation of 
reasonableness.  This exposes franchisees to the risk of exploitation by the franchisor. 
The franchisee’s ability to sell on its rights, subject to the franchisor’s pre-emption rights 
found in many agreements in the sample merely balances the rights of both franchisor and 
franchisee. 
The tying of franchisees to purchase certain goods and/or services from the franchisor or 
approved third parties present unethical or opportunistic franchisors the opportunity of selling 
over priced and substandard products to a captive market.   
“Buying into a franchise system with an unproven product, an unknown trademark 
and/or an untested operating system may constitute the only “catastrophe” necessary 
to cause (franchisees) to lose (their) entire live savings … Investing in a franchise 
enterprise that provides little support but takes much in the way of royalties, fees and 
other charges can ensure failure rather than success”380. 
The franchise agreements in the sample suggest that the contractual environment does not 
adequately reduce the risks of franchising for franchisees, largely due to the long term nature 
of the relationship and the dynamic and changing nature of the markets in which the 
franchised business operates. 
3.3.3.3 Sub-conclusion 
The contractual environment in the EU reduces the consequential risk inherent for the 
franchisor to a reasonable level although it is still exposed to “free riding” by franchisees.  
However, it does not do so for the franchisee, which is exposed to inappropriate 
precontractual representations, brand failure, inadequate business formats, encroachment and 
poor quality support. 
3.4 Analysis of the Self Regulatory Environment  
This is critical analysis to the second objective of the thesis and suggests that the self-
regulatory environment in the EU does not adequately support the economic drivers or reduce 
the consequential risks inherent in the franchisor/franchisee relationship.   
There can be no doubt that  
“a healthy franchising sector requires adequate and appropriate infrastructure”381  
and that  
                                                   
380 Op cit Purvin, R 1994, p.4 
381“Franchise Sector Regulation: The Australian Experience” Andrew Terry The EMNet-Conference on 
"Economics and Management of Franchising Networks" Vienna, Austria, June 26-28, 2003. 
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“central to this infrastructure is the legal environment in which franchising operates 
an environment providing for the orderly development of franchising for the benefit 
of franchisors, franchisees and the wider community”382 383. 
The big question is how such an environment can be best achieved within the EU. 
Self regulation as a way of regulating commerce has been subject to severe criticism from 
lawyers and other social scientists384.  As Alistair Darling, then the UK government minister 
with responsibility for the financial services, stated one of  
“the problem(s) with self-regulation is the public’s perception that trade interest 
dominates which is extremely damaging”385.   
Certainly the Australian experiment with the self regulation of franchising between 1993 and 
1996 does not inspire confidence in it and supports the view that  
“it can prevent abuses by “dishonest franchisors” only to a very limited extent and (its 
main) purpose is to prevent the interference of the regulator in the sector”386 387.   
However others argue that when there is market failure, private law remedies are inadequate 
or too costly and self regulation is a better/cheaper option, self regulation can be in the public 
interest388.  As a result, in the past bills designed to regulate franchising in both Belgium and 
Sweden have been defeated389. The abuse, sharp practice and commercial failure in 
                                                   
382 Ibid. 
383  See Appendix 3.  The vast majority of franchisors surveyed believe that complete transparency in the 
recruitment process avoids most of the problems that franchisors face with their franchisors. 
384 Ogus, A, 1995, “Rethinking Self Regulation”,  Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
385 Steward. E, The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse- The Financial Services Authority and its Statutory 
Objectives, BLR Vol. 22 Number 11 pp. 258-261. 
386 The Belgian House of Representatives, 17 March 2004 Doc 51 0924/001 Second sitting of 51st 
Parliament - Draft Parliamentary Bill regulating franchise agreements with a view to improving commercial 
practices in this sector (lodged by MM Alain Mathot and Jean-Marc Delizée and Mme Sophie Pécriaux). 
387 Despite being declared by the Australian government on its launch as the most progressive 
industry/government franchising initiative undertaken in the world  the Australian self regulatory code 
proved to be a failure and “Within a year of its commencement concerns were being raised about its 
effectiveness” (Schacht, Creating a better business environment: a package for Australian small business, 
21 December 1995, p 3) and after only 14 months the Australian government initiated an independent 
investigation into it. The Gardini Report was released to the public in March 1995. It estimated that 
approximately 40% to 50% of franchisors had not registered under the Code and concluded that it was 
unlikely that more than 70% of franchisors ever would. It also concluded that a significant number of those 
franchisors that did not register failed to provide adequate pre-contractual disclosure, to offer a cooling off 
period or observe the standards of conduct contained in the code. The Code was also found to not have been 
successful at dealing with serious franchise disputes (The Gardini Report to Senator the Hon. Chris Schacht 
on the effectiveness of the self-regulatory framework, March 1995). The report concluded that “a system of 
mandatory self-regulation or co-regulation” was necessary and recommended “……specific franchising 
legislation providing for compulsory registration of franchisors and compliance with codes of practice 
…The legislation should provide for adequate disclosure documentation, the establishment of appropriate 
independent code administration bodies, and dispute resolution procedures…” 
388 Op cit Ogus A. 1995 and Breyer. S, 1982, “Regulation and Its Reform”, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press  
389 See section 4.5 
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franchising can certainly be ascribed to a degree of failure in the market.  Private legal 
remedies are without doubt beyond the reach of smaller franchisees on the basis of cost.  Self 
regulation does offer a cheaper and more focused alternative.  In addition it can be argued that 
self regulation gives access to a greater degree of expertise and technical knowledge390 and so 
can provide a more targeted and commercially appropriate result.   
3.4.1 The Determinants of the Self Regulatory Environment 
The self regulation of franchising in the EU is implemented through the European Franchise 
Federation and its 16 member state franchise associations.  The European Franchise 
Federation’s Code of Ethics has been adopted by all of its member associations (with a 
number of small differences). It provides a useful benchmark for prospective franchisees 
when seeking to evaluate a particular franchisor’s behaviour. It also helps franchisors to 
understand best practice and so increases the chance that franchisors will conduct themselves 
in an ethical and fair manner. In that sense the Code is extremely important. 
The Code of Ethics requires franchisors who are members of the national franchise 
associations to follow best practice. They must disclose to their potential franchisees, 
information concerning the franchise concept, the people with decision-making power in the 
system’s head office, the Franchise offer, outlook on profitability (if available), the Franchise 
contract (including all standardised attachments), information on membership of professional 
association and information on other distribution channels of the franchise products or 
services391.   
3.4.2 The Self Regulatory Environment’s Relationship with the Legal Regulatory 
Environment 
The British Franchise Association392 claims credit for establishing the current “favourable 
regulatory climate for franchising”393, asserting that the European Commission is satisfied 
with the EFF and its member association’s self regulatory arrangements based on the EFF’s 
Code of Ethics – although it acknowledges that this needs to be “actively managed”.  It 
believes that  
                                                   
390 Cane. P, 1987, “Self Regulation and Judicial Review”, 6. Civil Justice Q. p.324, 328-33 
391 a) Branches, wholesale trade, specialist trade, mail order, internet sales etc 
     b) Sales to corporate clients and large customers through the franchisor. . 
392 The British Franchise Association (“BFA”) asserts that it is “the largest and most successful franchise 
association in Europe”392. With 350 franchisor members, 115 affiliate (non franchisor) members and 
reserves of over £1 million392, it is the biggest franchise association in the EU. It is therefore an appropriate 
and very accessible case study both of the issues facing franchise associations in the EU and the current and 
potential effectiveness of the self regulation of franchising by national franchise associations in the EU. 
393 One Vision, 2008 – Strategic Option for the Association’s Future, p. 29. 
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“Regulation is not just about ivory towers and idiots making up rules”394,  
and that over the past 10 years it has  
“successfully prevented several misguided attempts to regulate franchising which 
would have seriously damaged franchising throughout the common market”395.   
That is an exaggerated claim, but there certainly is a substantial body of opinion that firmly 
believes that  
“only the versatility of a self-regulatory regime will enable franchising to grow in a 
manner that strongly encourages ethical practice.  Laws can only seek to offer redress 
to those wronged.  Ethical practice however prevents them being wronged in the first 
place”396.  
Market forces are deemed to be the best means of ensuring that franchising’s needs are met. It 
is believed that the shackles of legal regulation will inevitably retard the commercial 
development and success of franchising because of its inevitably cumbersome and 
commercially divisive nature.  
An appropriate self-regulatory regime is thought to be able to prevent rather than cure 
problems by promoting ethical franchising, with caveat emptor still applying throughout. The 
problem here is that the difference between ethical and non-ethical franchising  
“is not always apparent until too late and then often at great expense to the 
franchisee”397.   
3.4.3 The Key Elements of the Self Regulatory Environment 
An analysis of the self-regulatory regime of the franchising sector in the EU suggests that it 
focuses upon pre-contractual disclosure, the resolution of disputes between franchisors and 
their franchisees, the enforcement of best practice and education.  The BFA, as Europe’s 
largest and most influential franchise association, offers a useful case study.  It believes that it 
can “self regulate” franchising by promoting best practice and endeavouring to deal with 
disputes between franchisors and their franchisees.   
3.4.3.1 Disclosure 
Appropriate disclosure requirements could reduce some of the risks of pre-contractual 
misrepresentation and inadequacy of the business format and support.  However, the BFA is 
against set form regulation disclosure on the grounds of adequacy, cost and complexity. 
                                                   
394 Franchise World, Feb/Mar 2007, p. 16-18. 
395 Sir Bernard Ingham, BFA Annual Convention, 2005 
396 Brian Smart, Director General of the BFA speaking at the BFA Annual Conference 2005. 
397 Broadhurst. N, Franchise World Aug/Sept 2004, pp 26-30.  
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It believes that  
“a franchisor’s obligation to disclose to a potential franchisee should not be limited by 
a list of items in a statute. It should be determined by the facts of a particular set of 
circumstances”398.  
The BFA has therefore not followed the lead of the French and Italian associations and 
recognised that there is a legitimate role for statutory regulation of disclosure. It believes that 
disclosure laws only limit a franchisor’s duty to disclose to what in some circumstances may 
be an inappropriately low level claiming that in France the Loi Doubin  
“operates to the benefit of franchisors who can “prove” through the disclosure 
document that they told an aggrieved franchisee what they were statutorily obliged to 
tell them”399.   
As a result the BFA has failed to impose even a low level of mandatory standard form pre-
contractual disclosure on its membership.  It also comments that franchisors face substantial 
financial and administrative burdens due to legislation400.  However, the Director General of 
the BFA insists that his organisation has never set itself against disclosure, only disclosure 
that is too complex to be effective.401    
The benefits of precontractual disclosure are clear even to the BFA’s membership402. 
However, despite these being “dangerous times for franchising”403, it is not on the BFA’s 
agenda.  As a result many of the risks to which franchisees are exposed are not adequately 
reduced.   
3.4.3.2 Enforcement of Best Practice 
Best practice could, in theory, create a self regulatory environment that supports the economic 
drivers and reduces the consequential risks inherent in franchising.  However, without 
rigorous enforcement of them the credibility of the BFA as an efficient agent of self 
regulation is limited. The BFA’s record to date does not inspire confidence404. 
                                                   
398 Brian Smart in interview with the author 18 September 2008. 
399 One Vision, 2008 – Strategic Option for the Association’s Future, p. 29.  
400 Quoting the initial cost to franchisors in the USA of complying with the disclosure law as more than 
$25,000 with an annual updating cost of $5,000. 
401 Brian Smart in interview with the author 18 September 2008. 
402 At the 1996 BFA Annual Convention the majority of attendees voted decisively in favour of the BFA 
adopting a mandatory set form disclosure document for its members. 
403 Brian Smart, The British Franchise Association’s Director-General – Franchise World, Feb/Mar 2007, 
pp. 16-18. 
404 In 2007 it expelled 3 members for breach of its Code of Ethics – more than in the previous ten years put 
together (Brian Smart, Director-General of the British Franchise Association speaking at the BFA’s Annual 
General Meeting on 6 December 2007 at the Hyatt Regency Hotel, Birmingham). In 2008 it expelled one 
member (Duckett, Franchise World, Feb/Mar 2008, p. 8). However, these four franchises are apparently 
still trading and the BFA will not name them or the grounds for their expulsion, presumably for fear of legal 
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3.4.3.3 Dispute Resolution 
If it is to be able to support the economic drivers and reduce the consequential inherent risk, 
an effective and obviously impartial dispute resolution procedure is essential for a self 
regulatory regime. The BFA’s current “franchisee-friendly, three-tiered dispute handling 
procedures, offering a choice of conciliation, mediation and arbitration”405 is the jewel in its 
self regulatory crown. 
However, its success is somewhat limited406. The vast majority of UK franchisees surveyed 
stated that they did not trust the impartiality of the BFA’s dispute resolution procedure407 and 
stated a preference for litigation over BFA arbitration408.  In any event, it is limited to disputes 
in which the Code of Ethics is alleged to have been breached.  
However, most franchisees were willing to use the conciliation and mediation procedure409. 
Franchisors that have used the procedures have mixed views and experiences.  When 
interviewed, one stated  
“I am always willing to use the conciliation and mediation services offered by the 
BFA as they are not binding and only increase the chance of avoiding serious conflict 
with a franchisee”410. 
The BFA’s dispute resolution procedure is a mixed success. The conciliation and mediation 
services are seen as having a role in dispute resolution, although the arbitration has in effect 
been abandoned and in any event is restricted in the type of dispute it can consider. 
3.4.3.4 Education 
Educating franchisors and potential franchisees should enable the regulatory environment to 
better support the economic drivers and reduce the consequential inherent risk in franchising.  
                                                                                                                                                        
action (It is understood that the grounds for expulsion were complaints by their franchisees and their 
financial standing). Whether or not their expulsion will discourage potential franchisees from investing in 
one of their franchises is doubtful as it is unlikely that they will know about it and if they do, it will depend 
upon the potential franchisees’ due diligence and the value they perceive in BFA membership. Thus self 
regulation’s focus on best practice does not create an environment which supports the economic drivers and 
reduces the risks inherent in franchising. 
405 Franchise World Dec/Jan 2003, p. 11. 
406 The arbitration system has only been used six times and fell into disuse after one of the arbitrators 
(Gordon Harris, a partner in the law firm Wragge & Co.) was successfully sued for negligence by a 
franchisor, Pirtek, in respect of a case that he arbitrated on under the BFA scheme. 
407 Appendix 5 - 87% of the franchisees surveyed did not trust its impartiality and 7% did not know. 
408 Ibid 89 of the 160 franchisees surveyed would rather use litigation to settle disputes with their franchisor 
and 40 did not know. 
409 Ibid 101 of the 160 franchisees surveyed were willing to use the conciliation and mediation procedures, 
43 did not know and only 16 were not willing to use them. The mediation and conciliation procedure is 
used around 10 times a year (Brian Smart in interview with the author 18 September 2008). This is 
acknowledged by the BFA to be in large part to the insistence of the English courts that the parties try to 
settle disputes before litigating them (The Woolfe Reforms –26th April 1999, new Civil Procedure Rules 
for England & Wales). 
410 Steve Mills, CEO of MRI Limited.  Interview with author April 2005. 
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In order to do so, educational programmes must ensure that potential franchisees fully 
understand what they will be buying into and the need to take and follow appropriate advice. 
The BFA’s educational initiatives include its website411, a host of hard copy publications, 
several series of ongoing seminars and a presence at the franchise exhibitions in London, 
Birmingham, Manchester and Glasgow. It also co-sponsors with the National Westminster 
Bank Plc, an annual survey of the franchise industry in the UK. The importance of this role is 
underlined by “One Vision 2008” but the limited impact of its “Proud to Franchise” initiative 
in the same year underlines the difficulties involved. 
Educating franchisors to act for the greater good of franchising is always going to be a 
difficult and never ending task. The BFA is seeking to meet his challenge and broaden its 
funding base through its “One Vision” Strategy,412  but its failure to gather momentum 
suggests that this will do little to reduce the risks inherent in franchising or support its 
economic drivers. 
3.4.4 Failings in the Self Regulatory Environment 
Whatever the self regulatory environment might aspire to its prospects of success are 
compromised by a number of fundamental difficulties.  The problems that self regulation 
encounters are conflict of interest, finance, enforcement of their decisions, competition from 
other self-regulatory bodies and an inability to have any impact on non-members.  The BFA 
again offers a useful case study. 
3.4.4.1 Conflict of Interest 
Franchise associations primarily exist to protect and promote the interests of their 
members413. Promoting franchising itself is very much a secondary role for them.  There is a 
clear conflict of interest.  
This is well illustrated by the BFA.  For the first 24 years of its existence, there was not even 
a suggestion that franchisees should be involved in the BFA414. It saw itself as a trade body or 
                                                   
411 www.bfa.org  
412 One Vision, 2008 – Strategic Option for the Association’s Future.   
413 E.g. see the German Franchise Association (DFV)’s home page www.dfv-franchise.com which 
addresses itself entirely to franchisors and their interests rather than franchising as a whole and states that 
its main duties include supporting franchise systems in establishing themselves in the German market. 
414 The BFA members are all franchisors.414 To become a member, a franchisor has to be accredited. In 
2008, 59 new members were admitted (compared to 55 in 2007), 10 applications were rejected (compared 
to 31 in 2007) and 1 member was “managed out” or terminated (compared to 3 in 2007). BFA affiliates 
comprise professionals involved in franchising such as lawyers and bankers. They also have to be 
“accredited”. The inter-relationship of all these parties and franchisees was explained by the current 
Director General, Brian Smart, at the BFA’s 2008 Conference (at the Savill Court Hotel, Ingleton Green, 
Windsor on 3-4 July 2008) as being “a matrix of mutual contribution and benefit underpinned by money, 
standards and business”. 
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pressure group, the sole function of which was to further the interests of its members. This 
has seriously undermined its stance on self regulation415.   
The Director-General has expressed his confidence that  
“there is a great deal to gain from the combined force of franchisees and franchisors 
for the protection and promotion of franchising”416. 
However, effective self-regulation of franchising is far from straightforward.   
“In order to secure in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, a legislative and 
regulatory environment for ethical franchising which encourages its profitable 
quest”417,  
the BFA must be  
“and be recognised as, the authoritative voice of business format franchising in the 
UK, representing its ethical franchise community, in particular its franchisors, 
franchisees and professional advisors”418.   
The BFA faces several difficult challenges in achieving this. The first is encouraging a 
number of franchisees to invest time in the BFA for the greater good of franchising in a truly 
representative way, rather than merely to promote their own parochial interests. The second is 
                                                   
415 It was the experienced eye of Sir Bernard Ingham which, in 2002, saw this lack of franchisee 
involvement as a serious flaw that undermined the BFA’s claim to represent the interests of franchising 
rather than franchisors. He championed the creation of a Franchisee Forum. This Franchisee Forum has 
taken two different forms during its short life. In its first form it was based upon individual membership and 
the second upon delegate members from franchise networks. The Forum was launched in a blaze of 
publicity in October 2002 when it “held its first historic solo meeting” (Franchise World Dec/Jan 2003, p. 
11). It is currently made up of 11 franchisees from the systems of the franchisors who serve on the BFA 
policy board (by contrast the French Franchise Federation admitted franchisees to its main board, causing 
some franchisors to resign from the organisation). Shortly after the Forum’s initial meeting, The BFA’s 
Director General stated that “We will in the future look to franchisees for input and support when it comes 
to the protection of good franchising in the face of any clumsy attempts at legislation” (Franchise World 
Dec/Jan 2003, p.11). These good intentions suggested a real intent for the BFA to move from being a 
franchisor pressure group to an association that more genuinely represents the interests of all of those 
involved in franchising. The Franchise Forum’s first task was to assist in considering whether franchise 
brokers can have a legitimate and ethical role to play in the sale of franchises. The BFA’s decision to 
consult over such an important matter was hailed as “a significant step in (the BFA’s) endeavour to 
embrace franchisees and thus become truly representative of the franchise sector as a whole, rather than 
only that of the most powerful partner in the franchise relationship.” 
416 However, despite these good intentions, the initial impetus was lost and seven years on there is no 
evidence to suggest that the Franchisee Forum has had any substantial impact upon the BFA.  Indeed, the 
BFA President has confessed that “We have still not found the mechanism by which we can tap the energies 
of franchisees and are thrashing around trying to understand how to involve them” (at the BFA 2008 
Conference). The association’s initiative did not capture the hearts and minds of its franchisor members. 
The cynical view of the majority of its members was perhaps well illustrated by one member of the BFA 
Board, who, speaking on a no-name basis, expressed the view that the Franchisee Forum “is only a bit of 
window dressing to give the impression that the BFA represents franchising rather than franchisors” (BFA 
Annual Conference 2008, interview with the author).   
417 One Vision, 2008 – Strategic Option for the Association’s Future, p. 5.   
418 ibid.   
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the simple economic fact of life that the BFA relies on funding from franchisors for its 
survival. If it does anything which a significant number of its franchisor members disagree 
with, it risks losing their funding and potentially ceasing to exist.  The BFA cannot justify a 
claim that it is the voice of franchising until franchisees are a fully integrated part of it with 
something approaching the same amount of influence as franchisors. This would be a 
tremendous change, which it is doubtful that many franchisors will have an appetite for it.  Of 
all the EU national franchise associations419 only France actively involves franchisees in any 
meaningful way420.  No other national franchise association in the EU purports to involve 
franchisees. 
3.4.4.2 Enforcement of Decisions 
The BFA’s existence and position of influence over franchisors is fragile and is not in any 
way guaranteed. As the Director General of the BFA once said, its role is  
“rather like treading on egg shells”421.  
As a consequence it rarely exercises its right to expel members due to their failure to comply 
with its Code of Ethics422. 
3.4.4.3 Finance 
In order to give self regulation any chance of success the franchise association must be 
properly financed.  Finance is a big issue for the BFA423. Without an appropriate level of 
funding it is powerless to do anything. Its sole source of income is its membership.  Members 
pay a single fee regardless of their size424. Whilst this prevents those with “deep pockets” 
from dominating the association it limits the overall income to what the smallest member can 
                                                   
419 The Franchise associations that are members of the EFF are those in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, 
Bulgaria, Spain, Italy, Slovenia, Romania, Portugal, Poland, The Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, France, 
The Czech Republic, Belgium, Austria, Hungary and the UK. Many were founded in the 1970s (the BFA, 
the Spanish Franchise Association, the German Franchise Association, the French Franchise Federation). 
Others are far more recent (e.g. the Romanian Franchise Association was established in 2006). 
420 Since early 2008 it has appointed 2 franchisees to its Board of Directors. All of its member networks (as 
it refers to franchise systems) are invited to nominate franchisee candidates and the franchisors then elect 2 
of the short list to the board. This initiative was controversial and led to at least one franchisor resigning 
from the FFF (Brian Smart in interview with author on 18 September 2008). 
421 SOAS, London University, IPL Seminar, 1998. 
422  See pp [50] 9.4.1 above 
423 In the 2008 Annual Report it showed turnover to be down 5% on 2007 to £1.25 million, with 
administrative costs of £885,280 (down 8% in 2007) and a profit of £141,344 (up 18.9% on 2007).  
Reserves were £1.02 million. 
424 Unlike the French Franchise Federation which generates far higher membership fees by changing 
members based upon the size of their networks. 
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afford425.  Without strong finances the ability of the BFA is limited in what it can do to 
educate and regulate its members.  
3.4.4.4 Impact on Non Members 
The EFF estimates that there are 9,971 franchise brands in Europe426. Although the European 
Franchise Federation and its 16 member state franchise associations seek to self regulate 
franchising in the EU, they represent less than 1,577 franchised brands427, which is less than 
16% of the franchises in the EU428.  The remaining 8,300 or so franchised brands429 have 
nothing to do with the EFF or its member state national franchise associations. 
This inability to regulate non-BFA members undermines the credibility of the BFA’s Director 
General, Brian Smart’s view that  
“we have got a robust (self) regulatory framework (sic!), that can defend your way of 
doing business in the public domain.”430   
The Australian experience clearly shows that a voluntary regime lacking any means of 
compelling compliance, will always be preaching to the converted.  The unarguable paradox 
is that those franchisors who most need to be regulated are the ones who are least likely to 
comply with a voluntary code. The BFA believes that by establishing itself as the authority on 
what is “good” and what is “bad” franchising, it can place “bad” franchisors at a substantial 
commercial disadvantage by directing potential franchisees only to “good” franchisors.  It 
may well be that its influence could become such that it does make franchise recruitment 
more difficult for franchisors that do not meet its standards. However, between there and 
schemes that are clearly criminal, there remains a grey area in which non BFA member 
franchisors, free of the restrictions imposed by the BFA, might take advantage of naïve or 
inexperienced potential franchisees. The BFA believes that most such abusive schemes are 
either large but short lived or very small and so have minimal impact431, although it lacks any 
empirical evidence to justify this belief. That may or may not be so, but it is cold comfort to 
the franchisees who suffer and does little to inspire confidence in self-regulation. 
3.4.4.5 Competition Between Self Regulatory Bodies 
                                                   
425 In order to facilitate a more representative approach the BFA is considering restructuring itself and has 
suggested four alternatives to its members, each of which will have an impact on its finances, although two 
years on , no change has been agreed by its members.   One Vision, 2008 – ibid.   
426 European Franchise Federation Statistics 2009 – www.eff-franchise.com (viewed 23/12/2010) 
427 It has a membership of 19 national franchise associations in all. The Spanish Association is not a 
member as it is not a “not for profit” organisation. 7 EU member states do not have a franchise association. 
The Swiss, Croatian and Turkish associations are members of the EFF but are obviously not EU 
associations. The EFF therefore represents 16 national associations in the EU. 
428 The aggregate membership is approximately 1,577. See Appendix 12. 
429 Section 2.2.  There is great uncertainty about the number of franchises in the EU. 
430 Franchise World, Feb/Mar 2007, pp. 16-18. 
431 Brian Smart, Director General of the BFA in interview with the author 18 September 2008. 
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Another problem with self regulation of franchising in the EU is that there is no limit to the 
number (or control of the integrity) of associations that purport to regulate the sector. The 
national franchise associations in the EU vary in size, resource and professionalism. Some, 
such as the BFA, owe their origins to franchisors coming together to protect and promote 
their best interests and have become increasingly sophisticated and well resourced over the 
years. Others, such as the Bulgarian Franchise Association are still in their very early days. A 
number, like the Danish and Greek Franchise Associations were started by professional 
advisers seeking to use the association to promote their services to franchisors.   
The Spanish Franchise Association, although long established and comparatively well 
resourced is actively involved in running exhibitions and trade missions and so is deemed not 
to be a “not for profit” organisation and is therefore not allowed to join the EFF. 
In Germany, the Franchise Association was decimated when many of its members deserted it 
to join the Co-Operatives Association, which boasts large influential members such as TUI. 
The European Franchise Federation is a somewhat uneven mix in terms of size, influence, 
resources and outlook and cannot claim to fully represent either franchising or franchisors 
even in all those member states in which franchising is most prevalent. This has resulted in 
occasional anarchy amongst the various franchise associations432.  
This lack of order amongst the organisations that would self regulate franchising does not 
stop there. Periodically other, self appointed, would be self regulatory organisations pop up, 
such as the European Franchise Committee433.   
3.4.5 Sub-conclusion 
The self regulatory environment does not effectively support or re-enforce the drivers that 
attract either franchisors or franchisees to franchising.  Neither does it reduce the 
consequential inherent risks for either party. 
The self regulatory environment in the EU is marked by a complete lack of homogeneity, the 
lack of a clear or consistent approach to enforcement, a significant conflict of interest 
                                                   
432 For example, in 2006 the BFA “managed to secure the resignation of the full board of the EFF” and 
appoint a replacement board and Chairman so that it was fit to “take us forward into the renegotiation of the 
EC block exemption regulation next year” (Franchise World, Feb/Mar 2008, p. 29). In 2007, the EFF and 
the World Franchise Council, had a bitter dispute because the WFC wanted to grant direct membership to 
franchisors and so compete with national franchise associations in the EU. 
433This UK based “Pretender” declares that its primary mission is “to promote fair franchising, franchise 
broker and dealer practices, to promote trade and exemplary trade practices and to provide members with 
programs, training courses, workshops, services and products which enhance their ability to conduct their 
individual businesses and careers with competence and integrity”. It goes on to state that it advocates 
beneficial legislation and legal doctrines” and promotes ethical franchising. It also boasts a “franchising Bill 
of Rights”. It invites membership from other organisations but gives no details of who its members are.  
www.efcommittee.eu, this site no longer exists, so further suggesting the transient nature of the 
organisation. 
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between the interests of franchisors and franchising as a whole and an inability to have any 
influence whatsoever on nearly 80% of franchise chains in the EU, as they are not members 
of the national franchise associations. 
3.5 Analysis of the Legal Regulatory Environment  
This is critical analysis to the second objective of the thesis.  It suggests that although 
individual member state law can create a national regulatory environment that to some degree 
supports the economic drivers and reduces the consequential risk inherent in the 
franchisor/franchisee relationship, the hetereogenous nature of the legal regulatory 
environment in the EU makes it difficult for it to do so adequately on an EU wide basis. 
The disparity between franchising in the EU and franchising in both the USA and Australia is 
marked.  A mixture of economic, cultural and historical factors probably account for much of 
this relative underdevelopment of franchising in the EU and its over concentration in the five 
largest economies.  However, it is also, in part, be due to the failure of the regulatory 
environment in the EU to support franchising and its expansion across member state 
boundaries.  
Most academic commentators agree that franchising has emerged as an important vehicle for 
entrepreneurship434 which, whilst endorsed as a way for large firms to become nimble and 
more responsive to customers435, retains its appeal as the preferred method for small 
businesses to grow436.   
The heterogeneity found in the legal eco-systems constituting the regulatory environment 
substantially impacts upon franchising within the EU.  It is detrimental to both the protection 
available to franchisors and franchisees vis-à-vis each other and to the security of commercial 
transactions.  This heterogeneity amounts to a technical barrier to trade. It means that the 
regulatory environment in the EU does not support and re-enforce the economic drivers that 
attract franchisors and franchisees to franchising.  It substantially inhibits the conclusion and 
operation of franchise agreements where franchisor and franchisee are established in different 
member states. 
In order to encourage business to use franchising for interstate trade, the trade in goods and 
services between member states should be carried on under conditions which are similar to 
those of a single market and this necessitates the approximation of the legal systems of the 
                                                   
434 Michael. S, 1996, “To franchise or not to franchise: An analysis of decision rights and organisational 
form shares”, Journal of Business Venturing, Volume 11, p.57-71 
435 Matusky. G, 1990, The Competitive Edge: How franchisees are teaching corporate elephants to dance, 
Success (September), p.58-66 
436 Huber. J, 1992,  Franchising puts small business in the fast lane, Entrepreneur (January), p.117-123 
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member states to the extent required for the proper functioning of franchising in the common 
market. 
An analysis of the legal regulatory environment of franchising in all 29 countries that have 
franchise specific laws437, suggests that it comprises four different legal “eco-systems”.  Anti-
trust438; foreign trade/investment439; the franchisor/franchisee relationship440 and hybrids441. 
The EU legal regulatory environment of franchising comprises several legal “eco-systems”.  
Those created by franchise specific laws442 which focus on the franchisor/franchisee 
relationship and those created by eight distinct other types of EU member state law, each of 
which is interpreted according to the legal traditions of the relevant jurisdiction. These are 
good faith; misrepresentation; anti trust; consumer protection; employment; commercial 
agency; restrictive covenants; and breach of contract. Their impact on franchising is 
considered below in three parts.  First the pre-contractual relationship, then the contractual 
relationship and finally the termination of the relationship. 
3.5.1 The Pre-Contractual Relationship – Franchise Specific Disclosure Laws 
                                                   
437 Australia, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Estonia, France, Georgia, Italy, 
Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Romania, Russia, South Korea, 
South Africa, Spain,  
Sweden, Taiwan, Ukraine, USA, Venezuela, Vietnam 
438 Anti-trust regulations are aimed at preventing restraint of trade and generally focus upon classical 
competition law issues such as tying, full line forcing, retail price maintenance, exclusivity and so on. These 
are found in Japan (Japan Fair Trade Commission Guidelines, April 2002 – These provide for disclosure 
and offer guidance on vertical restraints) and Venezuela (The Venezuelan Pro-Competition Agency’s 
Guidelines for the Evaluation of Franchise Agreements, January 7, 2000 – These are based upon the 
previous EU Franchise Block Exemption from 4087/88). The EU has this type of regulation in the form of 
Article 81 of the Treaty of Rome and the Vertical Restraints Block Exemption. 
439 Foreign trade/investment regulations are typical of developing markets with either a protectionist 
economic policy or distinct political aims, such as the distribution of wealth. These are found in China, 
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Korea, Malaysia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Barbados and Vietnam. 
Typically they seek to regulate the entry into their domestic market of foreign business systems that escape 
the restraints placed upon direct foreign investment. Clearly the EU would not want to adopt this type of 
law as it is contrary to its general approach to free trade. 
440 Pure franchise regulations focus upon areas of potential abuse in franchising, namely pre-contractual 
disclosure and the in-term relationship between the franchisor and its franchisees. These are generally 
symptomatic of more developed markets and are found in the USA, Australia, Canada, Brazil, Taiwan, 
Georgia and Mexico. They have much in common with the franchise laws of France, Spain, Italy, Belgium 
and Sweden. The laws of the USA and Australia are of particular relevance. Some of these pure franchise 
regulations have their roots in consumer protection law (.E.g. the California Franchise Investment Law 
(1970) (Cal. Corp. Code Sections 31000 to 31516). 
441 Some countries have adopted laws which are hybrid in form in that they are best placed in one category 
but also show characteristics of another . Two examples are Malaysia and China, both have foreign 
trade/investment franchise laws with a strong element of pure franchise regulation in them. Croatia defines 
franchise agreements but does not regulate them (Croatian Regulation on block exemption granted to 
certain categories of vertical agreements, Article 3(6)). The South African Consumer Protection Act 2009, 
which will come into force in 2010, is a hybrid between anti-trust regulations (it prevents or limits full-line 
forcing) and pure franchise regulations (focusing on pre-contractual disclosure) (Eugen Honey, partner, 
Bowman Gilfillan Attorneys, 17 February 2009). 
442 In eight EU member states; France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Sweden, Romania, Estonia and Lithuania 
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This is critical analysis to the second objective of the thesis and suggests that the franchise 
specific pre-contractual regulatory environment in the EU fails to both adequately re-enforce 
the economic drivers that attract franchisors and franchisees to franchising and to reduce the 
inherent consequential risk to an appropriate level. 
3.5.1.1 The Architecture of the Franchise Specific Laws 
It is suggested that the regulatory environment in the EU offers a lack of homogeneous pre-
contractual protection for franchisees against inadequate pre-contractual disclosure on an EU 
wide basis and so does not adequately support the economic drivers that attract franchisees to 
franchising or reduce the consequential risks they assume.  The drivers that attract franchisors 
to franchising  are supported, although the risks they assume are not reduced. 
An analysis of the French443 disclosure laws and those in Spain444, Italy445, Belgium446, 
Sweden447 and Romania448 shows that franchisors are obliged to make disclosure to potential 
franchisees about information in eight distinct areas, a set number of days before the franchise 
agreement is entered into449.  There is no real norm in these six EU member states or in any of 
the other 21 non EU jurisdictions that impose a disclosure obligation on the franchisor450, but 
certain common themes do exist.  
                                                   
443 Law No. 89 – 1008 dated 31 December 1989. L330-3C. 
444 Article 62 of Act 7/1996. 
445 Law of 6 May 2994, No. 129. 
446 Law of 19 December 2005 (modified 27 December 2005) governing pre-contractual information in the 
framework of agreements of Commercial Partnerships. 
447 The Disclosure Act 2006. 
448 Government Ordnance 52/1997 as approved and modified by Law 79/1998. 
449 Spain: A disclosure document must be issued to the potential franchisee “at least twenty days prior to 
signature of the franchise agreement or pre-agreement, or payment by the future franchisee to the franchisor 
of any consideration”.  
Italy: The Italian franchise law requires that at least 30 days before the date of execution of the franchise 
contract, the franchisor must deliver to the franchisee a copy of the contract 
France: 20 days before signature of the agreement 
Belgium: Disclosure must be made at least one month before closing 
Sweden: The Swedish Disclosure Act 2006 requires the franchisor to disclose to potential franchisees in 
writing, within a reasonable period of time before closing, such information on the nature of the agreement 
and such other information which, according to the circumstances, may be required. A reasonable period of 
time is considered to be at least 14 days. 
Romania: The Romanian law is the least burdensome of all the EU member state disclosure laws and  fails 
to state a time at which disclosure must be made. 
 
450 The time at which disclosure must be given tends to range between 10 and 30 days before signing 
although this does vary in some jurisdictions. In Brazil the offering circular must be delivered to a 
prospective franchisee at least 10 days prior to the execution of a franchise agreement. Malaysia and 
Taiwan opt for the same period, whilst Korea requires only 5 days and other countries require longer. The 
Canadian states all require 14 days, Vietnam 15 days, China 20 days (South Africa is proposing the same 
time) and Mexico a rather excessive 30 days. Japan and Indonesia lay down no minimum period of time. 
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The Eight Elements of the Franchise Specific Pre-contractual Regulatory Environment in the EU 
Constituent elements of the Pre-Contractual disclosure Requirements of Franchise Specific Laws in the EU 
 Corporate 
Information 

















France452  ?453 ? ? ?454 ? ? ? ? 
Spain  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?455 ?456 
Italy  ?457 ?458 ? ? ?459 ? ?460 ? 
                                                   
451 This includes a list of the networks’ outlets, the ‘chain’ of franchisees, the name and address of each franchisee in the network  
452 Only applies if there is exclusivity or quasi-exclusivity  
453 It requires details of the franchisor company and its directors, banking references, the main stages in the development of the company and the network; the professional 
experience of the managers and the financial details for the previous two years.  
454 The French law also requires details of any potential competitors linked to the franchisor in the area 
455 Spain is the only member state with a franchise specific law that does not require a copy of the franchise agreement to accompany the disclosure document  
456 The Spanish Royal Decree requires disclosure of a “general description of the sector of activity of the franchise” (Royal Decree 2485/1998 Article 3) which is interpreted 
by local practitioners as an obligation to define “the market conditions of the franchise network” (American Bar Association (ABA Book) 2002, workshop 9, p.139). 
457 The Italian law requires that all relevant corporate information relating to the franchisor that is not detailed in the franchise agreement including, when requested by the 
franchisee, the franchisor’s balance sheets for the three previous financial years.   
458 The Belgium law goes further and requires details of all intellectual property. Article 4 para 1 1° of the Law Governing Pre-contractual Information Within the Framework 
of Commercial Partnership Agreements. See Appendix 10. 
459 The Italian law imposes a duty of ‘loyalty, fairness and good faith’ in relation to earning claims  
460 In Italy a copy of the franchise agreement must accompany the disclosure document  
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 Corporate 
Information 

















Belgium ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?461 
Sweden  ? ? ? ? ? ? ?462 ? 
Romania  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Estonia  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Lithuania  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Key  
? - required  
? - not required  
                                                   
461 The Belgian law  requires forecasts as to the current state of both the local and national market. This applies to all franchisors seeking to do business in Belgium, even if 
they are based elsewhere and the agreement is not subject to Belgian law. The disclosure must include information on “the market in which the activities are carried out”, as 
well as on “the market share of the sector” “from both a general and a local point of view”.  It also requires disclosure of details of the amortisation of the franchisees’ 
investment.  This is a heavy burden to impose on the Franchisor. 
462 The Swedish law requires details of all tied goods and services  
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Consequences of failure to comply with franchise specific pre-contractual disclosure requirement in EU 
 
 Consequences of failure to comply Right of action  Burden of proof  
France  • Invalidity  
• Financial penalty 
• Damages  
Franchisee can file suit for declaration of 
invalidity and damages within 5 years  
Defective consent must be established  
Spain • Invalidity  
• Financial penalty 
• Damages 
Franchisee can file suit for declaration of 
invalidity and damages  
Defective consent must be established  
Italy • Invalidity  
• Damages 
Franchisee can file suit for declaration of 
voidness and damages  
Deliberate non-disclosure and defective 
consent. 
 
Belgium • Invalidity  Franchisee can file suit for declaration of 
voidness within 2 years.  Can sue for 
damages  
Strict liability  
Sweden  • Specific performance  Franchisee can apply to Swedish market 
court for order of specific performance  
Strict liability 
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 Consequences of failure to comply Right of action  Burden of proof  
Romania  • Damages  Franchisee can sue for damages  Defective consent 
 
Note: Breach of franchise laws outside the EU generally lead to rescission and/or the imposition of fines.  In the Canadian provinces of Alberta, 
Ontario, Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick a failure to give the required disclosure results in the prospective franchisee can rescind the 
franchise agreement by giving notice to the franchisor the earlier of either 60 days after receiving the disclosure document or no later than 2 years after 
the franchise is granted (Alberta Franchises Act Section 13, The Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure) 6(1) and (2); The Prince Edward Island 
Franchises Act Chapter 36 Bill 43 Section 6(1); The New Brunswick Franchises Act s 6(1)). If there is a misrepresentation in the disclosure document 
as a result of which the franchisee suffers a loss the franchisee has a right of action in damages against the franchisor and/or every person who signed 
the disclosure document (Alberta Franchises Act Section 13, The Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure) 6(1) and (2); The Prince Edward Island 
Franchises Act Chapter 36 Bill 43 Section 6(1); The New Brunswick Franchises Act s 6(1)). A franchisee is deemed to have relied upon any 
information detailed in the disclosure document (Alberta Franchises Act Section 13, The Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure) 6(1) and (2); The 
Prince Edward Island Franchises Act Chapter 36 Bill 43 Section 6(1); The New Brunswick Franchises Act s 6(1)).   
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3.5.1.2 A Comparison of the Basic Elements 
As can be seen in the above tables, there are eight basic elements that create the franchise 
specific pre-contractual regulatory environment in the EU, although their precise details and 
the consequences of non compliance vary between each of the member states.  The French 
Loi Doubin, as the first EU franchise specific law is perhaps the most influential463.  The 
other five member state laws are generally similar, but notably unlike the French law, do not 
require exclusivity or quasi-exclusivity. 
All of the disclosure laws have a general sweep-up provision. Under the French law the 
information disclosed must be “sincere” and permit the other party to “contract in full 
knowledge of the facts”464. The combination of these two requirements places a heavy burden 
on the discloser, because false information can be “sincere” if the error was made in good 
faith, but would not permit a contract to be made “in full knowledge of the facts”. 
The vague nature of the terms such as “sincere” introduces an element of uncertainty which 
can only be reduced by giving as much information as possible465.  The requirement to 
present information on “the general (and local) state of the market for the products or services 
which are the subject of the contract, and the prospects for development of this market” can 
be particularly problematic. It requires details of the market in which both the franchisee and 
its competitors are operating rather than simply the state of the franchisor’s business.  
Although Article L.330-3 of the French Commercial Code is a domestic public policy law 
and therefore generally applies to all exclusive and quasi-exclusive agreements concerning a 
franchise that will be performed in France, a decision of the Paris Court of Appeals has held 
that the disclosure obligation under the Loi Doubin does not apply to international franchise 
agreements that are not governed by French law466. 
                                                   
463 In the case of an exclusive or quasi-exclusive agreement it requires disclosure, 21 days before signing, 
details of the franchisor company and its directors, bankers references, the main stages in the development 
of the company and the network; the professional experience of the managers and the financial details for 
the previous two years; details of its trade marks; a summary of the contractual terms of the agreement; 
details of the network and a market analysis. 
464 Article 1(1). 
465 Olivier Gast, Chapter on Law and Practice in the European Community in Abell, European Franchising, 
p. 611. 
466 Paris Court of Appeals, 30 November, 2001, JCPE no. 3, 2002, p.29.  Contrast the Swedish disclosure 
obligation which applies to foreign franchisors entering the Swedish market even if the agreement is not 
subject to Swedish law. 
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As regards enforcement of the law, the French courts of appeal have taken two different 
tracks as to the manner in which the disclosure law is to be applied467.  Some took the view 
that mere compliance by the franchisor with the legal requirement was enough to render the 
agreement null and void468 whilst other courts held that such non compliance can only lead to 
annulment of the contract if it gives rise to defective consent on the part of the franchisee469.  
The Cours de Cassation opted for the second, subjective approach in 1997 and 1998,470 so 
Article 330-3 is to be interpreted according to the doctrine of defective consent, which 
provides that the courts should focus on the validity of consent rather than compliance with 
technical formalities471.  The burden of proof lies with the franchisee472.  A similar approach 
has been adopted in Spain, Italy and Romania.  Non compliance with either the obligation of 
utmost good faith or to provide full information may lead to both criminal and civil sanctions 
in France. Article 2 of the implementing Decree imposes a penalty in Class 5 for failure to 
provide the required information (currently a fine of between €1,500 and €3,000 and/or 
between ten days’ and one month’s imprisonment). Article 2(2) prescribes the enhanced 
penalties in Class 5 for a second or subsequent offence (in this case a fine of between €6,000 
and €12,000)473.  A claim for damages for failure to make pre-contractual disclosure cannot 
be based on contractual grounds. As a franchisor may only be liable in tort Article 1382 of the 
Code Civil applies which sets out that any claims from damages are time-barred after 5 years 
from the time that the claimant knew or should have known about the damage474. 
There is little case law on the criminal sanctions for failure to comply with article L. 330-3. 
One suspects that the main reason is that the statute of limitations limits the period during 
                                                   
467 Marot. Y, 1999, “Prolongements de l’arrêt de la Chambre Commerciale du 10 Fevrier 1998 sur 
l’information pre-contractuelle en matière de contrat de franchise.  Receuil Dalloz, Chron. p431 in Bueno 
Diaz O. 2005 “Franchising in European Contract Law” Sellier. European Law Publishers pp67 
468 Based on Article 6 of the Civil Code which provides that parties cannot deviate from a mandatory rule.  
See, for example, CA Paris 7 April 1993, D. somm, p75, obs D. Ferrier. 
469 A subjective approach based upon the franchisee’s “actual knowledge”.  For example, see C.A Colmar 9 
March 1990, D. 1990, somm, p 232 ff., obs J-J Burst. 
470 Cass. com. 2 December 1997, D. 1998, somm., p334, obs D Ferrier and Cass. Comm 10 February 1998, 
D. 1998, somm, p334. Cass. Com. 10 Feb 1998, Bull. Civ. IV No. 81 confirmed by Cass Com, 7 July 2004 
No. 02-15950. 
471 Article 1109 
472 Cass. Com. 7 July 2004 No. 02-15950. 
473 Article R.25 of the Criminal Code. 
474 The Spanish courts follow the French lead and focus on a subjective test based on the general doctrine of 
defective consent (Bueno Diaz, O. 2005 “Franchising in European Contract Law”.  Sellier – European Law 
Publishers. pp86).  Although the Spanish franchise law does not list the civil effects of the failure to make 
proper pre-contractual disclosure, it is possible that if a court considered the missing (or false) information 
to be fundamental (i.e. information that is essential for the franchisee to form its consent), the franchise 
agreement could be declared null and void (SAP Barcelona de 21 de septiembre de 2004 (AC\2004\1952)). 
If the missing information was not fundamental to the decision whether or not to enter into the franchise 
agreement, the agreement would not be declared null and void, but it would be still voidable. It therefore 
largely depends on the type of information that is missing in order to determine the impact on the validity of 
the contract. 
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which action can be taken to only one year.  Providing information that is deliberately 
misleading will amount to fraud under Article 405 of the Criminal Code.  
Unlike the other EU member states with franchise focused laws, Spain and Lithuania seek to 
reduce a mismatch of expectation between franchisor and franchisee (and so reduce the risk 
to franchisees), by requiring registration of appropriate documentation on public registers. 
This is fairly common in non EU jurisdictions such as China475, Russia476, Indonesia477, 
Malaysia478, Moldova479 and 14 of the States in the USA480, but it is doubtful whether it is 
successful in reducing the risks to which franchisees are exposed. 
3.5.1.3 Sub-Conclusion 
The franchise specific pre-contractual regulatory environment in the EU seeks in six member 
states to reduce to risks to which franchisees are exposed by ensuring that they have sufficient 
information to allow them to take a view of the adequacy of the business format, the support 
delivered by the franchisor to its franchisees and the franchisor’s historical approach to 
encroachment.  Its success in reducing those risks is dependent on the franchisee carefully 
considering the information it receives, particularly the feedback from existing franchisees 
                                                   
475 Franchisors who sell franchises in China need to file MOFCOM together with, amongst other things, a 
sample franchise contract and the index of the Franchising Operation Manual. An application has to be 
made within 15 days after the execution of the franchise agreement (Article 8 of the Administration 
Regulations and Article 5 of Administration Rules on Commercial Franchise Filing—Decree of Ministry of 
Commerce 2007 (No 15)). 
476 In Russia, franchise agreement must be registered with the tax authorities which maintain the register of 
Commercial Concessions in order to be valid against third parties (Russian Civil Code Part II Chapter 54 
Articles 1028(2)). 
477 Uniquely, in Indonesia, the franchise law provides that the franchisee rather than the franchisor must 
register the franchise agreement and disclosure statement at the Ministry of Trade within 30 days of the 
effective date of the franchise agreements (Regulation of the Minister of trade No 12/M-DAG/PER/3/2006 
dated 29 March 2006, which revoked The Provisions on and Procedure for the Implementation of 
Franchised Business Registration (Decree of the Minister of Industry and Trade No. 259/MPP/Kep/7/1997, 
dated July 30, 1997) Chapter III, Article 11.1). Failure to register resulted in the revocation of the 
franchisee's trade license (Regulation of the Minister of trade No 12/M-DAG/PER/3/2006 dated 29 March 
2006, which revoked The Provisions on and Procedure for the Implementation of Franchised Business 
Registration (Decree of the Minister of Industry and Trade No. 259/MPP/Kep/7/1997, dated July 30, 1997) 
Chapter VI Article 22). Franchise licenses between a foreign franchisor and a master franchisee are 
registered. 
478 In Malaysia both the franchisor and the franchisee are required to become involved in the registration 
process. The franchise agreement, the letter of intent (which has replaced the disclosure document 
originally provided for), the operations manual, the training manual, a copy of the latest audited accounts 
and financial statements, and other documents must be registered with the Registrar of Franchises (The 
Franchise Act 1998 Part II Section 6(1)).  The franchisee of a foreign franchisor must also register itself 
(The Franchise Act 1998 Part VIII Section 55). The problem here is that approval can take up to six 
months so delaying the franchisor’s ability to franchise considerably.   
479 In Moldova the franchise agreement must be registered with the State Agency for the Protection of 
Industrial Property (Article 9(4) of the ) Moldovan Law on Franchising No. 1335  dated 1.1.1997 provides: 
“The franchise agreement is registered with the State Agency for the Protection of Industrial Property”) but 
do not as “The franchise agreement is considered to be valid from the day it is signed or form the day 
determined by the parties” (Article 9(3) ) Moldovan Law on Franchising). The validity of the franchise 
agreement does not depend on its registration with the Agency. 
480 See section 4.6 
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and is comprised by the inevitable fact of life that the franchisor’s historical conduct may not 
be indicative of its future behaviour.  The lack of homogeneity of approach to franchise 
specific laws between the different EU member states substantially dilutes its impact on cross 
border franchising.  The lack of any uniform approach to pre-contractual disclosure further 
weakens the impact of franchise specific laws. 
They do not seek to reduce the risks of informational asymmetry and moral risk to which the 
franchisor is exposed.  Some regulatory regimes seek to redress this imbalance by imposing a 
duty of pre-contractual disclosure on the potential franchisee481 but that is not part of the pan 
EU pre-contractual regulatory environment. 
The economic drivers which attract franchisors into franchising and those that attract 
franchisees to it are neither supported nor eroded in any particular way by the pre-contractual 
disclosure franchise specific regulatory environment in the EU. 
3.5.2 The Pre-Contractual Relationship – Other Laws 
This is critical analysis to the second objective of the thesis and suggests that the non-
franchise specific pre-contractual regulatory environment in the EU fails to both adequately 
re-enforce the economic drivers that attract franchisors and franchisees to franchising and to 
reduce the inherent consequential risk to an appropriate level. 
It suggests that in some member states other laws impact upon the pre-contractual regulatory 
environment in a manner that reduces some of the risks to franchisees that are inherent in 
their relationship with the franchisor.  However, the lack of a homogenous approach 
throughout the EU substantially limits the impact of these on cross border franchising in the 
EU.  These laws do not reduce the risks to which the franchisor is exposed.  Neither do they 
support the economic drivers that encourage the franchisor or the franchisee to become 
involved in franchising. 
Five key elements can be identified  in the pre-contractual regulatory environment.  Some are 
evident in all EU member states, whilst others exist in only a handful of them.   
The most universal element is the obligation placed on franchisors not to mis-represent their 
franchise to potential franchisees. A related, but less common element, which is found in 
Germany and those member states over which it has historically had influence, is the 
                                                   
481 In Vietnam not only does the franchisor have to disclose information to the franchisee, but so does the 
franchisee to the franchisor. In order to assist a franchisor when deciding to grant commercial rights, Article 
9 of the Commercial Law provides that, upon receiving a reasonable request from the franchisor  the 
franchisee is under an obligation to supply the franchisor with information about itself  The earlier Chinese 
franchise law (the Measures for the Regulation of Commercial Franchises issued by the Ministry of 
Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, December 31, 2004, Chapter III Article 9) also provided for 
this but it was dropped (without any explanation) from the most recent Chinese statute. 
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obligation placed on the franchisor to disclose relevant information to the potential 
franchisee. The three other elements comprise an extra contractual obligation of 
confidentiality placed on franchisees and potential franchisees, obligations imposed on the 
franchisor to enter into an agreement with a potential franchisee if negotiations pass a certain 
point and a right for franchisees and a right, in certain circumstances, to withdraw from the 
contract within a specific time. 
3.5.2.1 The First Element – A Duty Not to Misrepresent Facts 
The concept of misrepresentation can be divided into two different categories. An obligation 
not to make false representations and a positive obligation to actively disclose certain facts.  
The common law maxim of caveat emptor, buyer beware, applies in principle in both law and 
equity to all bargains struck under English and Scottish law.482 It applies to the purchase of 
specific things, upon which the buyer can and usually does exercise his own judgment. It 
applies also whenever the buyer voluntarily chooses what he buys and whenever, by usage or 
otherwise, it is a term of the contract express or implied that the buyer shall not rely on the 
skill or judgment of the seller. 
However, if the potential franchisee relies on the judgement, knowledge and information (i.e. 
the representations) of the franchisor the maxim Caveat Emptor does not apply483.  If the 
franchisor’s representations are incorrect or misleading they can give the franchisee grounds 
for action against it.  In some ways misrepresentation can be seen as the common law 
equivalent to a very limited form of pre-contractual duty of good faith.  Indeed 
misrepresentation appears in various forms in certain civil jurisdictions as a part of the 
general pre-contractual duty of care or good faith484. 
Although in general terms, there is no positive legal obligation of franchisors under common 
law to disclose anything about the franchise to a potential franchisee, the commercial reality 
is that the franchisor makes the franchisee aware of the characteristics of the franchise 
system485 and discloses relevant information to potential franchisees so they are aware of 
what is involved in the running of the franchise.  There is a general contractual principle that 
one must avoid making misrepresentations which induce a party to enter into a contract486.  In 
some circumstances silence can amount to a misrepresentation.  If the franchisor breaches this 
                                                   
482 Wallis v Russell [1902] 2 IR 585 at 615. 
483 Jones v Just (1867-68) L.R. 3 Q.B. 197. 
484 See Chapter 7 pp. 103- 108 above. 
485 The Encyclopaedia of Forms and Precedents, Fifth edition, 2003 reissue, V 16(4) Agency and 
Distribution, 44 [111]. 
486 Professor Beale. H (General editor), 2002, Chitty on Contracts, 28th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 6-001. 
  133 
principle the contract will be voidable and the franchisee can rescind the contract and in some 
circumstances, claim damages.   
There are 3 differing types of misrepresentation in English and Scottish law. Fraudulent487, 
negligent488 and innocent489 misrepresentations all give rise to slightly different 
consequences.   
A misrepresentation is a false statement of past or existing fact given by a franchisor to a 
franchisee which induces the franchisee into a contract.  It must be a statement of fact, past or 
present, and not merely a statement of opinion, an intention as these only show that the 
opinion or intention is held by the person expressing it490.  A mere statement of opinion which 
proves to have been unfounded will not be treated as a misrepresentation491.  However, a 
statement of opinion or intention that is not honestly held by the franchisor492, or could not 
reasonably be held by it given his knowledge of the facts, may be regarded as a statement of 
fact and may constitute a misrepresentation493.  It is also the case that a statement of the 
intentions of a third party is a statement of fact and can constitute a misrepresentation as 
above494.   
The prohibition on mis-selling franchises in the United Kingdom is based on an implied 
representation that there are reasonable grounds for holding an opinion, even if that opinion is 
honestly held495. Mere “advertising puff” does not amount to a representation of fact496. The 
overall principle is that statements are not treated as representations where, having regard to 
all the circumstances, it is unreasonable for the franchisee to rely on the franchisor’s 
statements rather than his own judgement497. 
The distinction between fact and opinion has become much less important since Esso 
Petroleum Ltd v Mardon498.  Esso granted “solus agreements” to licensees.  It offered a 
forecast of the probable sales of a petrol station, based on an estimated throughput of petrol, 
to a prospective franchisee. The estimate was produced before Esso was made aware that the 
local authority would not give permission for the pumps to front onto the main road and the 
                                                   
487 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App Cas 337. 
488 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 575; Misrepresentation Act 1967 
(England). 
489 Misrepresentation Act 1967 s.2(2). 
490 Strachan & Henshaw Ltd v Stein Industrie (UK) Ltd (No 2) (1997) 87 BLR 52. 
491 Hummingbird Motors Ltd v Hobbs [1986] RTR 276. 
492 Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459. 
493 Chitty on Contracts, 6-005; Economides v Commercial Union Assurance Co plc [1998] QB 587; Smith v 
Land and House Property Corp (1884) 28 ChD 7. 
494 Smelter Corp of Ireland Ltd v O’Driscoll [1977] IR 305. 
495 Brown v Raphael [1958] Ch 636. 
496 Dimmock v Hallett (1866) 2 Ch App 21. 
497 Harlingdon and Leinster Enterprises Ltd v Christopher Hull Fine Art Ltd [1991] 1 QB 564. 
498 [1976] QB 801. 
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station was built backwards, Esso failed to adjust the estimate. The franchisee did all it could 
in attempting to reach the projected throughput but never managed to even reach half of the 
estimate provided by Esso. The difference was attributable to the positioning of the pumps at 
the station.  The forecast was held to be a warranty which had been breached and a negligent 
misrepresentation by Esso as they “had special knowledge and skill.….[and] much more 
experience and expertise at their disposal…..to make a forecast”499 than the franchisee.  Even 
the loss sustained under a second re-negotiated contract was held to be attributable to the 
original misrepresentation as it resulted from an attempt of the franchisee to mitigate its 
losses.500 
In certain circumstances representations may be implied and, if false, lead to an effective 
misrepresentation.  This becomes an issue when, considering all the circumstances, it has 
been impliedly represented by the conduct of the franchisor that there exists some state of 
facts different from the truth501. There is no legal duty on the franchisor to disclose material 
facts to the franchisee, however dishonest such non-disclosure may be. However, if a 
franchisor makes a statement which is literally true but is misleading because of other facts 
that have been omitted it can give rise to an action for misrepresentation by partial-
disclosure502. The same is true where there has been a change of circumstances that makes a 
previously made statement false, the initial statement is regarded as a continuing 
representation. In this situation, if the franchisor knows of the change in the facts, there will 
be a misrepresentation if it fails to disclose it to the potential franchisee503. There is 
conflicting case law as to whether this duty to disclose applies to a change in the intention of 
the franchisor504, but it appears likely that it does. In a situation where a statement was made 
innocently but falsely and later the franchisor discovers the true facts, failure to alert the 
franchisee changes the innocent misrepresentation to a fraudulent misrepresentation505. 
A franchisor will not be held liable for a misrepresentation unless it is material in the sense 
that it induces the franchisee into the contract. Therefore the franchisee must rely on the 
statement made to him. If it relies upon its own judgement or investigation the franchisor will 
not be liable506. However, the franchisor will not escape liability merely by inviting the 
                                                   
499 Per Lord Denning in Esso Petroleum Ltd v Mardon [1976] QB 801. 
500 See also Le Grove v Deatker, Current Law Cases January 21, 1980 [1981] C.L.Y. 31.u, Stephen Frank 
Fallon v Shell (UK) Ltd [2000] All ER (D) 2287 and Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1997] 1 
IBCLC 131. 
501 Spice Girls Ltd v Aprilia World Service BV [2002] EWCA Civ 15. 
502 Nottingham Patent Brick and Tile Co v Butler (1886) 16 QBD 778. 
503 With v O’Flanagan [1936] Ch 575. 
504 Compare Traill v Baring (1864) 4 De GJ&Sm 318 and Ray v Sempers [1974] AC 370 with Wales v 
Wadham [1977] 1 WLR 199. 
505 Davies v London Provincial Marine Insurance Co (1878) L.R. 8 Ch. D. 469. 
506 Attwood v Small (1839) 6 Cl & Fin 523n. 
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franchisee to discover the truth if the invitation is rejected and the statement is still relied 
upon507. It is not necessary for the representation to be the sole reason for the franchisee 
entering into the contract. If it is actively present in the mind of the franchisee when entering 
the contract then it is material in inducing him to enter the franchise agreement508. 
In some circumstances the franchisor may be deemed to be under a duty of care to comply 
with the pre-contractual representations it makes to potential franchisees509. 
In the UK any attempt by the franchisor to escape or limit its liability for misrepresentation 
must satisfy the requirements of reasonableness as set out in the Unfair Contract Terms Act 
1977510.  In order to satisfy the reasonableness test, the franchisor511 must prove that the term 
is a “fair and reasonable one to be included having regard to the circumstances which were, or 
ought reasonably to have been, known to or in the contemplation of the parties when the 
contract was made”512.  Fraudulent misrepresentation cannot be excluded513.   
The use of entire agreement and non reliance clauses to exclude liability for misrepresentation 
is not always successful514 and it is the evidence as a whole, including any such non-reliance 
clause, that will show will win the day515. A non-reliance clause will not serve its purpose 
unless the franchisor can show that he entered the contract with the belief that the franchisee 
did not rely on the representations516. 
The English courts have recognised the efficacy of no reliance clauses in franchise 
agreements.  For example, in the case of Fleet Mobile Tyres Ltd v Stone & Another517 the 
High Court Judge held that, whilst a no reliance clause does not guarantee complete 
protection, the franchisee's task of proving that he did, in fact, rely on a pre-contractual 
statement in the face of a clear statement in the agreement that he did not, is made very much 
more difficult. However, the recent case of Quest 4 Finance Limited v John Maxfield and 
Others518 shows that a misrepresentation claim will not always be defeated by a no reliance 
clause. Although the Quest case did not relate to a franchise agreement, the principles will 
apply to any commercial contract. In Quest, the court held that the Claimant could not rely on 
a no reliance clause to defend itself from a misrepresentation claim when the terms of the 
                                                   
507 Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 Ch D 1. 
508 Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459. 
509 MGB Printing & Design Ltd v KallKwik UK Ltd QBD – 31 March 2010 – [2010] EWHC 624 (QB) 
510 S.11 (1). 
511 Misrepresentation Act 1967 s.3. 
512 Unfair Contract Terms Act s.11 (1). 
513 Thomas Witter Ltd v TBP Industries Ltd [1992] 2 All ER 573. 
514 ibid 
515 Cremdean v Nash (1977) 244 EG 547. 
516 Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 317. 
517 [2006] EWHC 1947. 
518 [2007] EWHC 2313. 
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contract entered into clearly contradicted information given in the Claimant's brochure and 
the Defendant showed that he had relied on the statements in the brochure. 
In MGB Printing & Design Ltd v KallKwik UK Ltd519 it was established that the franchisor 
owed the franchisee a duty of care because of the proximate nature of the relationship and the 
foreseeability of damage.  This duty of care extended to precontractual representations and 
the clauses excluding contractual liability for misrepresentation did not exclude tortuous 
liability. 
A misrepresentation by the franchisor renders the franchise agreement voidable ab initio by 
the franchisee. Depending on the type of misrepresentation the franchisee may also claim 
damages. In fraudulent misrepresentation cases the franchisee may be able to recover all 
direct loss which can be shown to have resulted from the false statement. This is without 
regard for the usual requirements of remoteness that the loss be reasonably foreseeable or in 
reasonable contemplation of the parties520. 
It is not only the common law jurisdictions of England, Scotland, Ireland and Cyprus that rely 
upon the concept of misrepresentation to regulate the pre-contractual relationship.   
As franchise agreements are regarded as “atypical” agreements, German statutory law does 
not specifically provide for misrepresentation in franchising and so the general statutory 
provisions of the German Civil Code and the German Commercial Code apply. Intentional 
misrepresentation can trigger claims for contractual521 and other damages522, tort claims523, 
the right to rescission524 and criminal charges525.  
Misrepresentation by the franchisor is regarded as a breach of the franchisor’s duty to take 
into account the rights, legal interests and other interests of the franchisee526 when negotiating 
a contract, resulting in the franchisor’s liability for damages if the misrepresentation resulted 
in defective consent and resulted in damage to the franchisee. This (contractual/pre-
contractual) liability applies regardless of whether the misrepresentation has been negligent or 
fraudulent. 
The quantum of the claim is determined by Art. 249 BGB: The franchisor must place the 
franchisee into the position that would have existed if the misrepresentation had not occurred. 
                                                   
519 Ibid 
520 Doyle v Olby (ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 QB 158; Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank NA [1997] 
AC 254; Clef Aquitaine SARL v Laporte Materials (Barrow) Ltd [2000] 3 All ER 493. 
521 (Art. 280 sec. 1, 241 sec. 2, 311 sec. 2 BGB) 
522 The Unfair Competition Act (UWG) 
523 Art. 823 sec. 2 BGB 
524 Art. 123 sec. 1, Art. 124 BGB 
525 Art. 263 German Criminal Code – fraud) 
526 Articles 241 sec. 2, 311 sec. 2 BGB 
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In some cases, this includes loss of profit (e.g. if the franchisee gave up employment in order 
to enter into the franchise contract)527. Contributory negligence of the franchisee is taken into 
consideration. Such contributory negligence can be assumed if the franchisee has specific 
business experience and fails to evaluate the information provided by the franchisor 
accordingly.  
Alternatively, the franchisee can choose to rescind the contract which eventually may result 
in higher payments by the franchisor528.  
The burden of proof that the information provided has been true and accurate, rests with the 
franchisor. This reversal of the burden of proof is due to the superior knowledge of the 
franchisor529.  
A franchisee has a right to rescind the contract if the fraudulent misrepresentation caused the 
franchisee to enter into the franchise contract. Fraudulent intention can be assumed if the 
franchisor is aware that the information provided by him may be wrong and fails to inform 
the franchisor about the uncertainty, if the franchisor knows, or suspects, that the incorrect 
information is being relied upon by the franchisee when deciding whether or not to enter into 
the contract530. The right of rescission531 does not depend upon the franchisee suffering 
damages. 
Rescission has to be claimed within one year commencing at the time the franchisee 
discovers the misrepresentation532. 
Rescission renders the franchise agreement void. As a consequence, the franchisee can claim 
for reversal of the transaction according to the law of unjust enrichment533. The rescission has 
no effect on single sale contracts for goods which the franchisee made during the franchise 
period534. 
The franchisor may also be liable for damages535.  It may also be a criminal offence536 if the 
franchisor (i) intended to cause an error, (ii) intended to obtain for himself or a third party an 
unlawful material benefit, and (iii) caused damage to the franchisee’s property/assets. Fraud 
requires the franchisor to intend to obtain an unlawful material damage and a pecuniary 
                                                   
527 Giesler, Nauschütt, Franchiserecht, 2.ed. 2007, p.368 (Rn 54a). 
528 Ibid. 
529  Ibid. 
530 Palandt, BGB, 69.ed. 2010, § 123 Rn 11. 
531 Ibid 
532 Art. 124 BGB 
533 Art. 812 sec. 1 BGB 
534 Giesler, Nauschütt, Franchiserecht, 2.ed. 2007, p.506 (Rn 251). 
535 Articles 823 sec. 2 BGB 
536 Article 263 sec. 1 of the German Criminal Code 
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detriment on the side of the franchisee537.  It is punished by a term of imprisonment of up to 
five years or a fine.  
If the misrepresentation is regarded as “misleading advertising”, the franchisor may be liable 
for damages538 regardless of whether the misrepresentation is intended or negligent.  
Untrue/overstated information is regarded as being misleading if it addresses issues such as 
the essential characteristics of the goods or services; the reason for purchase; the nature, 
attributes or rights of the entrepreneur; any statement or symbol in relation to direct or 
indirect sponsorship; the need for a service, part, replacement or repair; compliance with a 
code of conduct; the rights of consumers. 
Misrepresentation can be about facts or future prospects539 and the courts have found the 
following examples in respect of franchising540. False statement of franchisor that there is a 
high number of successful franchisees541; misinformation about the market success of the 
franchise system to date542; false statement of franchisor that there are already customers 
existing in the specific trading area543; wrong information about presumably needed capital 
resources544; and providing exorbitant turnover statistics and describing them as a 
conservative estimate545. 
Many of the EU member states take the same general approach to misrepresentation546. 
                                                   
537 Palandt, BGB, 69.ed. 2010, § 123 Rn 2. 
538 Articles 5, 3, 9 of the German Unfair Competition Act 
539 Note that the franchisee is still bearing the risk of future prospects not proving true; C.f. Giesler, 
Nauschütt, Franchiserecht, 2.ed. 2007, p.358 (Rn 45). 
540 C.f. Giesler, Nauschütt, Franchiserecht, 2.ed. 2007, p.338 (Rn 23d). 
541 OLG München, judgement from 13.11.1987 – 8 U 2207/87. 
542 OLG Hamburg, judgement from 17.04.1996 – 5 U 137/95 (not published). 
543 LG München, judgement from 31.07.2001 – 4 O 21318 (not published). 
544 LG Hannover, judgement from 12.12.1995 – 14 O 267/94 (not published). 
545 OLG München, judgement from 16.09.1993 – 6 U 5495/92; NJW 1994, 667ff. 
546 In Malta an essential element of a valid contract is consent, and it is clear that a contract is not valid if 
the consent of one of the contracting parties is procured through the provision of incorrect information 
(Article 974 of the Maltese Civil Code). Latvia also relies upon it together with concepts of fraud and 
deceptive practices which give the franchisee the right to either claim cancellation of the franchise 
agreement (Article 1461 of the Latvian Civil Law ) or sue for damages (Article 1779 of the Latvian Civil 
Law; the Latvian parliament intend to change their approach and adopt a franchise specific law that will 
require franchisors to give their potential franchisees prior disclosure of the nature of the franchise, 
evidence of the validity of the rights to be granted, details of the franchise networks and details of the terms 
of the franchise agreement, particularly the financial terms). In Estonia a right of action for 
misrepresentation is available to franchisees under the Civil Code Act Chapter 7 of the Law of Obligations 
Act, which provides that a person who entered into a transaction based on fraudulent misrepresentation may 
rescind the contract. If the contract is not yet concluded, then a claim against a fraudulent franchisor can be 
made under the Law of Obligations Act. This provides that persons who engage in pre-contractual 
negotiations, or other preparations for entering into a contract, shall take reasonable account of the other’s 
interests and rights (Section 14 subsection 1 of the Law of Obligations Act). The second sentence of the 
same subsection states that the information exchanged by the persons, in the course of preparation for 
entering into the contract, shall be accurate. If one of these rules is not followed by the franchisor, then the 
franchisee has the right to claim for damages (Section 14 (1) of the Law of Obligations Act. In Slovenia, the 
duty of good faith exists but only applies in the event that the franchisor has made a misrepresentation and 
provided misleading or inaccurate information to the potential franchisee. In which case, the franchisee can 
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Misrepresentation can help to reduce the risk that franchisees are induced to enter into a 
franchise on the back of false or inaccurate representations by the franchisor that it will be 
able to deliver those economic drivers that the franchisee is looking for from a franchise.  In 
theory it can offer franchisors similar protection. 
3.5.2.2 The Second Element – A Duty to Positively Disclose Relevant Facts 
Whereas all EU member states prohibit misrepresentation in the sense that a party may not 
make false or misleading statements which may entice the other party to enter into a contract, 
only some civil jurisdictions go further and require a contractual party to make active pre-
contractual disclosure. 
In Germany547, once contractual negotiations commence a pre-contractual relationship of trust 
is immediately established. This imposes on the parties a pre-contractual duty of care in 
providing pre-contractual disclosure to each other. The statutory foundation of this obligation, 
according to some commentators and case law, can be found in Article 242 BGB548.  Both the 
Franchisor and Franchisee are under a duty to provide such information to each other as is 
reasonably necessary to enable the other party to make an informed decision as to whether or 
not they enter into the franchise agreement with the other party (“culpa in contrahendo”). The 
doctrine of “culpa in contrahendo  means that the franchisor has to provide and prepare site 
studies, profit and turnover forecasts and other financial information. This burden is 
particularly heavy for foreign franchisors who have no knowledge of the German market and 
have no experience of running a business there. There are several examples of foreign 
franchisors with no knowledge or experience of the German market giving their German 
developer or master franchisee  such information as they had about the franchise business’s 
performance outside of Germany  and  subsequently finding that this has resulted in them 
                                                                                                                                                        
rescind from the contract within one year from learning of the misrepresentation and can also claim 
damages for any loss suffered (Article 7 of the Slovenian Civil Code). Despite its civil law system there is 
no express duty of good faith in Denmark and misrepresentation or fraud must be established (Law no 781 
of 26.08.1996).  Bulgaria also embraces the concept of misrepresentation (The Bulgarian Obligations and 
Contracts Act 275 of 22.11.1950).  In Finnish law (Unfair Business Practices Act (1061/78)) for example, 
the Unfair Business Practices Act prohibits, “the use of false and misleading expressions concerning one’s 
own business operations or those of another party if the said expression is likely to affect the demand for or 
supply of a product or harm the business of another” (Section 2 of the Unfair Business Practices Act 
(1061/78)).  The Court can prohibit an ongoing misrepresentation and impose a conditional fine. Fraudulent 
misrepresentation gives rise to the right to rescind the entire agreement (Hanna-Maija Elo, ‘Finland’ in: 
Getting the deal through – Franchise 2008, p. 36 para.17).  In addition to the Unfair Business Practices Act, 
a franchisee may also claim damages under the Tort Liability Act as a result of the unlawful behaviour by 
the franchisor (which includes misrepresentation). In order to prove the claim the franchisee will have to 
show that it has suffered loss as a result of the actions taken by the franchisor (Hanna-Maija Elo, ‘Finland’ 
in: Getting the deal through – Franchise 2008, p. 36 para.17). 
547 Article 311 BGB. 
548  For commentary see Farnsworth. E. A, 1994, “Good Faith in Contract Performance” pp 172, Good 
Faith and Fault in Contract Law, edited Beatson and Friedman – Clarendon Paperbacks.  See judgements 
of 2 January 1920, RGZ 97, 326 and 1 March 1928 RGZ 120, 351 
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falling foul of the culpa in contrahendo doctrine549. Even if the franchisee is an experienced 
business person, the Franchisor is under an obligation to provide information regarding the 
details of the franchise system550. Technically disclosure should also be the other way round 
(e.g. where the franchisee withholds important information)551, but in practice of course it is 
the franchisor’s duty that usually becomes the basis of a dispute. 
The franchisor has to provide all available information regarding the profitability of its 
franchise system552. It is not considered sufficient for the franchisee to have had the 
opportunity to visit other businesses within the system in order to gain his/her own 
impression. It has also been regarded as a breach of the disclosure obligations to provide a 
misleading quote regarding the number of franchises that have failed within the contractual 
territory.  
Breach of the duty of disclosure will lead to a cause of action against the franchisor. The 
franchisee will have the right to withdraw from the contract and claim damages in a sum 
equal to all expenses incurred in performing the contract (subject to the deduction of 
profits)553. However, the franchisee cannot claim for loss of the profit that it would have made 
had the contract continued554.  Generally speaking a franchisee who has suffered a loss can 
demand to be restored to the position he would have been in if the breach had not occurred.  
                                                   
549 For example, the US family restaurant franchise Applebee’s. 
550 Giesler, Franchiseverträge, Rn. 206. 
551 Palandt BGB, § 311 Rn. 20. 
552 OLG Muenchen NJW 1994, S. 667ff; Braun NJW 1995, S. 504, 505. The plaintiff claimed for refund of 
the franchise license fee. The agent of the franchisor had provided untrue information on revenue and profit 
and assured that the figures were accurate and proven. In the materials provided it was stated that a 
"cautious" profit expectation would be between 8,000 and 15,000 DM/month. The plaintiff entered into the 
franchise contract without having conducted own research or calculations before conclusion of the contract. 
He rented a salesroom, bought two cars for delivery services and paid a franchise fee of 22,800 DM. Nine 
months after the conclusion of the franchise contract, the franchisee cancelled the Franchise Agreement and 
claimed for damages (franchise fees, price of cars). The defendant argued that a certain amount must be 
deducted from the damages as the plaintiff failed to assess the information on its own. The judges dismissed 
this notion, arguing that if one assures that certain figures are proven and accurate the other party can rely 
on such assurance. There are two key lines in the judgment: (i) that a franchisor must provide true and 
comprehensive information on the profitability of a system, and (ii) the franchisee's claim must not be 
reduced because of contributory negligence when the franchisee (thoughtlessly/frivolously) trusts in the 
statements of the franchisor without conducting own research.  
553 BGH NJW 1981, S. 1673ff; Schulze, in: Schulze/Dörner/Ebert, BGB Kommentar, 5th edition 2007,  § 
311 Rn. 20 and Flohr, BB 2006, pp. 389, 392.  A German municipality issued an invitation to tender for 
building a gym by a general contractor. The plaintiff, a general contractor, instructed an architect to prepare 
the tender. After the architect had been finished his work, but before the official opening date of the tender, 
the municipality (the defendant) withdrew the invitation. The plaintiff claimed for reimbursement of the 
costs of the architect. The Federal Court of Justice confirmed the judgment of first instance, cancelling the 
judgment of the court of appeals. Even though the court found that there has been a pre-contractual 
relationship resulting fiduciary duties of both parties, the court negated that there has been a loss on the 
plaintiff's side, as he would have incurred costs for the architect even if the invitation to tender had not been 
cancelled. Even in case the invitation had not been cancelled, the plaintiff would not have been sure that his 
effort would have resulted in the acceptance of his tender. 
554 Schulze, in: Schulze/Dörner/Ebert, BGB Kommentar, 5th edition 2007, § 311 Rn. 20 and Flohr, BB 
2006, pp. 389, 392. 
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Normally the franchisee will argue that it would not have entered into the contract if it had 
been aware of the full facts.  He will ask for his money back and for rescission of the contract. 
The duty of pre-contractual disclosure starts at the point where the franchisor and the 
potential franchisee meet for the first time and the franchisor presents his franchise system in 
detail555. This can happen, for example, through an advertisement, information material or 
participation in a fair. It is the franchisor’s responsibility to ensure that the information it 
presents reflects the truth and that it has released all necessary information556. However, 
Section 311 (3) of the Civil Code provides that the franchisee’s right to claim for damages is 
not only against the franchisor, but also against any third parties, who have established a 
fiduciary relationship with the franchisee, and hence influenced the franchisee’s conduct 
during the contract negotiations and his/her decision to enter into the contract. In particular, 
managers of franchise brokers, can be liable personally in damages. 
Theoretically the obligation could apply to franchisees but it is the more experienced party 
(here the franchisor) that is under an obligation to make available information to the less 
experienced party (usually the franchisee). In case of a violation of the duty to make pre-
contractual disclosure, the franchisee can either claim damages or rescind from the contract 
provided that the franchisee can prove that entering into the agreement lead to a loss. The 
ordinary limitation period for claim based on culpa in contrahendo is 3 years557. This is a 
distinct right from the right of rescission which arises in the case of a right to rescind from the 
contract due to fraudulent misrepresentation. If the right to rescind is to be based on 
fraudulent misrepresentation alone without proof of damages, then this right has to be 
exercised within one year following the discovery of the fraudulent misrepresentation 558. 
                                                   
555 Giesler, Franchiseverträge, Rn. 207. 
556 OLG Muenchen NJW 1994, S. 667ff. 
557 Sections 195, 199 of the German Civil Code. 
558 OGH 19.01.1989, WBl 1989, 131; Liebscher/Petsche, Frachchising in Österreich (2. Auflage 2002), S. 
112.  Flohr, Franchise-Vertrag, S. 10.  The defendant claimed, by way of counterclaim, that the plaintiff, 
although having agreed to non-compete in the area of the Franchise business, has had a third party opening 
up another franchise in the area. The defendant claimed that, because of that, the revenue that has been 
expected has never been achieved. However, the non-compete agreement, as well as the extent of the 
fiduciary duty of the Franchisor, was irrelevant to the decision as the shop of the third party had been in 
another district of the city, miles away from the defendant's premises and thus neither covered by the non-
compete, nor by a (possible) fiduciary duty. This is an Austrian case. The court, although it had been 
considering the question whether the Franchisor's fiduciary duty would prohibit the Franchisor from 
allowing for another franchise close the the Franchisee's premise (and showed some sympathy for that 
position) has eventually not decided upon the question as it was irrelevant for the case at hand. The 
judgment did not address the fiduciary duty of the Franchisee, but the one of the Franchisor. 
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Similar duties to make full disclosure are found in other civil law jurisdictions such as 
Estonia559, Greece560, Hungary561, the Netherlands562, Portugal563, Lithuania564, Slovakia565, 
Austria566 and the Czech Republic567.  A slightly lesser duty is found in Estonia568. 
                                                   
559 In Estonia general pre-contractual disclosure requirements are found in section 14 of the Law of 
Obligations Act and they apply to franchise contracts. The main rule of disclosure is enacted in subsection 2 
of section 14, which provides that persons who engage in pre-contractual negotiations or other preparations 
for entering into a contract shall inform the other party of all circumstances which are of essential interest to 
the other party of the contract, taking into account its purpose. However, there is no obligation to inform the 
other party of circumstances which it could not reasonably be expected to be informed of. 
560 There is a strong German influence on Greek law, so unsurprisingly, parties in Greece must act in 
accordance with the requirements of good faith and business ethics (Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code 
and Yanos Gramatidis, Chapter on Greece in Mendelsohn, The International Encyclopaedia of Franchising 
Law, p. 6). During the pre-contractual period, the franchisor is required to provide data on comparable 
activities in its system and a full set of information on how much the prospective franchisee will have to 
financially contribute. However, it is up to the franchisee to draw conclusions on the prospects of entering 
and trading on the market and to evaluate the reputation of the franchisor’s business. If prospective 
franchisees draw the wrong conclusions based on the correct information, the franchisor will not be liable. 
However, if the franchisor deliberately makes a misrepresentation, it will be liable (Yanos Gramatidis, 
Chapter on Greece in Mendelsohn, The International Encyclopaedia of Franchising Law, p. 20). A party 
which has been misled, threatened or defrauded by the other contractual party may seek the annulment of 
the contract and/or compensation under the conditions provided (Articles 140, 147 and 150 of the Greek 
Civil Code). The conclusion of the agreement must not be a result of mistake, threat or fraud (Articles 140, 
147 and 150 of the Greek Civil Code). 
561 Hungarian law also imposes strict control over the pre-contractual relationships in accordance with good 
faith principles (Section 206 of the Hungarian Civil Code). It requires the parties to act reasonably and 
imposes a duty of disclosure on both franchisor and franchisee (Section 206(4) of the Hungarian Civil 
Code). If the franchisor fails to disclose information which is relevant to the agreement, the franchisee who 
enters into a contract can challenge the disclosure within one year after misdisclosure comes to light in 
writing. If the challenge is successful the agreement can be treated as null and void “ab inito” and the 
parties are put back into the position they were in before entering into the contract (Section 210, 235-237 of 
the Hungarian Civil Code). Alternately, the agreement can be affirmed and damages opted for (Section 339 
of the Hungarian Civil Code). 
562 In Dutch law the pre-contractual relationship is also governed by the principle of good faith, or 
reasonableness and fairness (Article 6:248 sub 1 of the Dutch Civil Code). A party may annul an agreement 
if the agreement was concluded on the basis of incorrect understandings (provided that certain conditions 
are met) (Article 6:228 of the Dutch Civil Code). The parties are obliged to take reasonable steps to ensure 
that an agreement is not entered into by mistake (Supreme Court of 15 November 1957 (NJ 1958, 67 
(Baris/Riezenkamp)). Although the principle of reasonableness and fairness does not mean that the 
franchisor is always obliged to provide the franchisee with a projection of the franchise’s financial 
performance, in some circumstances such an obligation may arise (LJN: AD7329, C00/118HR 
(Paalman/Lampenier). Parties are entitled to assume that the information which has been provided by the 
other party is correct and so any forecasts provided by the franchisor should be based on a thorough market- 
and location research which was carried out with due care (E.g. 18 June 1999, Prg 1999, 5211 (Schouten 
Fashion B.V./Brown Fashion B.V.) and 14 April 1998, Prg 1998/4976 (Aviti/Kinderparadijs).  
563 In Portugal, the parties must act in good faith during their negotiations and have to provide all and any 
necessary information prior to the execution of a franchise agreement although, there is no law which 
clearly states what needs to be disclosed (See Article 762 of the Portuguese Civil Code). No false or 
misleading information about the franchisor’s business or those of its franchisees should be submitted to 
potential franchisees (Santos Cruz/Krupenski, IBA Legal Practice Division International Franchising 
Committee Newsletter, May 2007, p. 24). As in Germany, the culpa in contrahendo doctrine means that 
non-compliance with the general rules on disclosure will lead to liability (“Outline of franchise issues in 
Portugal”, questionnaire with answers provided by Jose Alves Do Carmo, associate, Barrocas Sarmento 
Neves). 
564 The Lithuanian Civil Code imposes a duty to disclose certain information based on the general duty of 
good faith during contract negotiations (Lithuanian Civil Code Article 6.163(1)). It states in very general 
terms that all parties to the negotiation must disclose to each other the information they possess, which is 
essential for the conclusion of the contract (Lithuanian Civil Code Article 6.163(4)). 
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However, pre-contractual disclosure of material facts is not required in all civil 
jurisdictions569.  In the common law jurisdictions of England, Scotland, Ireland and Cyprus 
there is no duty to make pre-contractual disclosure. 
This positive obligation to disclose reduces the risks to which franchisees are exposed.  It 
does not reduce the risks to which franchisors are exposed and imposes a substantial burden 
upon them.  It could support the drivers that attract franchisees to franchising but will not 
support those that attract franchisors to it. 
3.5.2.3 The Third Element - The Right to Withdraw 
The application of consumer protection law to franchising means that in some member states 
franchisees are entitled to a “cooling-off period” after signing a franchise agreement.   
Many consumer rights such as product liability, are regulated at EU level570, resulting in a 
harmonised approach throughout the EU member states.   
                                                                                                                                                        
565 Slovakian law arrives at a similar position via a different route. Section 43 of the Slovakian Civil Code 
obliges the parties to resolve anything which could possibly result in a dispute at a later stage in advance. 
The parties therefore need to disclose certain facts before entering into a contract. Misrepresentation, 
whether intentional or unintentional, means that the innocent party has a right to rescind from the contract if 
it has relied on the false information while making the decision to enter into the agreement (Section 40a and 
49a of the Slovakian Civil Code). 
566 Although it is not explicitly provided for under Austrian law (Petsche. A, Riegler. S and Theiss. W, 
2004, “Franchising in Austria”, International Journal of Franchising, Volume 2, Issue 3), it is historically 
accepted that franchisors have a similar duty of disclosure under the doctrine of “culpa in contrahendo” 
(Ibid Petsche, Riegler and Theiss, p. 3. doctrine derives from §918AGBG). The disclosure duty of the 
franchisee is limited to properly answering the questions asked by the franchisor. This means that the 
franchisor is carrying a considerably greater disclosure duty. The franchisor must provide the franchisee 
with appropriate information in particular regarding market opportunities, sales forecasts and profitability 
calculations. If the franchisor provides faulty or insufficient information it may be liable under the doctrine 
of culpa in contrahendo (OGH 19.01.1989 WBl 1989, 131; Petsche, Riegler and Theiss, 2004, p. 10, p. 5). 
However there are limits to the scope of this duty of pre-contractual information. In one decision the highest 
Austrian civil court decided that a franchisor does not have to provide a prospective franchisee with a 
detailed market survey before giving an estimate regarding the turnover (OGH 19.01.1989, WBl 1989, 
131). Failure to comply with these disclosure obligations entitles the franchisee to damages caused by the 
disclosure or the lack of it (This entitlement is based on the concept of culpa in contrahendo which derives 
from § 918 AGBG).  
567 Whilst there are no express good faith pre-contractual duties of disclosure, under Czech law, if a 
franchisor causes damage to its franchisees by intentionally withholding relevant information, it will be 
unethical and render it liable for any resulting damages (Section 424 of the Czech Civil Code). This 
amounts to an indirect positive duty to disclose. Failure to disclose relevant information to potential 
franchisees may amount to misrepresentation inducing them to enter into the franchise contract (Section 49 
(a) of the Czech Civil Code) and so entitling them to challenge the validity of the franchise agreement.  
568 In Estonia (Section 94 subsection 3 of the General Part of the Estonian Civil Code Act –June 1994 and 
Section 14(2) of the Law of Obligation Act), on the other hand, the prohibition on misrepresentation is 
closely linked to a duty to take reasonable account of the other’s interests and rights. Consequently a 
franchisor must inform a potential franchisee of all circumstances that are of essential interest to the 
potential franchisee.  Although there is no obligation to inform the other party of any circumstances of 
which they could not reasonably expect to be informed this is still significantly different to an obligation 
not to make false representations. 
569 For example, “Poland” – “Franchising” - Getting the Deal Through, 2008 ed. Zeidman P. 
570 Council Directive 85/374/EEC on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions of member states concerning liability for defective products [1985] OJ L 210 7.8.1985. 
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In some EU jurisdictions, such as Germany, franchising has triggered a debate over exactly 
what a consumer is, resulting in franchisees enjoying protection that was not originally 
intended for them.   
Germany, treats individual franchisees as consumers if they are entering into substantial 
financial commitments. Franchisees that start a business for the first time are treated as if they 
were consumers.  Consequently they have, and must be notified of, cooling off rights in 
accordance with the consumer protection legislation in Germany571. 
A consumer may withdraw from a contract within 2 weeks of its execution572  if it contains a 
long-term purchasing commitment.  Section 507 of the Civil Code extends the cooling off 
right to individual franchisees setting up a new business for the first time (but not companies) 
if they fall below a €50,000 threshold. This means that a start-up franchisee enjoys protection 
if the value of the long-term purchase commitment does not exceed this amount during the 
life of the franchise agreement573. If this threshold is exceeded then the franchisee will lose its 
right of withdrawal. 
The franchisee has to be notified in writing by the franchisor of his rights of withdrawal 
including  its commencement date, its 2 week duration, the fact that timely dispatch of the 
withdrawal notice will suffice to comply with the withdrawal period, the required form and 
content of the withdrawal notice and the name and address of the recipient of the withdrawal 
notice. If notification of the franchisee’s withdrawal right is provided after conclusion of the 
contract, the withdrawal period is extended to one month574. The period does not commence 
until the day after the franchisee is notified of his/her right of withdrawal. If the instruction is 
not provided in a clear manner, the withdrawal period is extended to six months.  If no notice 
of the right of withdrawal is given, the right becomes a perpetual one575. 
Some German commentators576 suggest that the €50,000 threshold is not appropriate in the 
context of a franchise relationship. It is argued that the a small franchisee whose long-term 
purchase commitment may very well exceed €50,000 is not any less vulnerable than a 
franchisee where the value of the purchase commitment does not exceed the threshold figure. 
The basis for this argument is a decision by the German Supreme Court in connection with 
                                                   
571 Until 31.12.2001 cooling off rights were governed by the Consumer Credit Act (VerbrKrG). As of 
01.01.2002 the Act has been incorporated in the Civil Code. However, court decisions dealing with the 
former Consumer Credit Act are still referred to. The Consumer Credit Act was the national implementation 
of Council Directive 87/102/EEC. 
572 Section 505 (1), 355 of the Civil Code BGH NJW 2003 S. 1932ff. 
573 Palandt BGB, § 507 Rn. 7. 
574 Section 355 (2) of the Civil Code 
575 Section 355 (3) of the Civil Code Timmerbeil NJW 2003, S.569, 570. 
576 Section 505, 355 Giesler, Franchisevertraege 2. Auflage 2002, Rn. 131 with further references; Palandt 
BGB, § 507 Rn. 7; Möller, in: Beck Online Commentary BGB (Bamberger/Roth), § 507 Rn. 8; other 
opinion Schürnbrand, in: Münchener Kommentar BGB, 5th edition 2007, § 507 Rn. 7. 
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the former German Consumer Credit Act577 a franchisee has the right of withdrawal 
irrespective of the amount of the purchasing agreement578.   
However, a ruling of the ECJ makes clear that German application of consumer legislation to 
franchising cannot be imposed on other EU member states579. The Italian Consumer Code580 
provides, amongst other things, that a consumer is a “natural person … acting for purposes 
which are outside his/her trade, business or profession”581 and a professional is a “natural or 
legal person … acting for purposes related to its trade, business or profession, ….”582.  In the 
case of Francesco Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl583, a German franchisee sought a declaration 
from a German court against an Italian franchisor that the agreement between them was void, 
despite the fact that it was subject to the jurisdiction of the Italian courts.  The Claimant 
invoked Article 14 of the Brussels Convention 1968, which states that if a consumer files an 
action against a contractual counterparty, the court in the Claimants’ domicile has 
jurisdiction.  The franchisee claimed that it was a consumer as it was not carrying on the 
business when the contract was concluded.  The ECJ held that whilst reference must be made 
to the contractual party’s position and type and aim of the contract, “a plaintiff that concluded 
a contract with a view to pursuing a trade or profession … in the future, may not be regarded 
as a consumer”. 
The application of consumer protection legislation can substantially reduce the risks that 
franchisees expose themselves to in entering into a franchise.  However, the way in which 
such legislation is applied to franchising varies from member state to member state, so 
reducing its impact on cross border franchising, as illustrated by the Francesco Benincasa v 
Dentalkit Srl case.  Not only does it not reduce the risks that franchisors take on when 
franchising their business, but it increases them in some member states by over protecting 
franchisees. 
However, Germany is not the only member state that applies consumer protection legislation 
to impose a cooling off period in franchising.  In the UK, Franchisors which extend credit 
and/or hire out goods or equipment to non-corporate franchisees must comply with the 
                                                   
577 BGH NJW 1995, S. 722, 724 (“Ceiling Doctor”).  
578 Austria follows the German lead in applying Consumer law to individual franchisees (Section 1 
subsection 3 of the Austrian Consumer Protection Act, (“Konsumentenschutzgesetz”, in short “KSchG”)) .  
A Franchisee that is a founder of a new business will enjoy the same protection as a consumer 
(Liebscher/Petsche, Franchising in Österreich, p. 77), including a right of withdrawal (Austrian Consumer 
Protection Act S.1 553), however, if an existing business is restructured or enlarged the consumer law will 
not apply (OGH 21.01.1981 SZ 54/10.)  
579 Case C-269/95 Francesco Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl [1997] ECR I-3767 
580 Legislative Decree 206/2005. 
581 Article 3. 
582 Article 3. 
583 Ibid. 
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Consumer Credit Act 2006. This act is complex and wide ranging.  It allows the courts a wide 
discretion to re-write credit agreements that are "unfair" to non-corporate franchisees.  
Franchisors must be licensed, the franchise and other agreements must comply with the 
complex set form prescribed by the law and they must be executed in accordance with very 
specific requirements which include a “cooling-off” period for the franchisee. Franchisors 
must also send out annual statements to their franchisees for all "fixed sum" credit - this 
includes hire purchase and conditional sale agreements.   
The UK’s Fair Trading Act 1996584 also impacts upon franchising and seeks to prevent 
consumers joining multi-tier trading schemes and imposes a complex procedure on 
recruitment.  It generally prohibits consumers selling on to other consumers further down the 
pyramid and making a mark up on the goods.  It aims to prevent the lower tiers being stuck 
with over priced stock that they cannot sell on to end users.  Any franchise that has more than 
two levels in the UK must comply with the Act’s provisions 585 Exemptions are granted586 for 
those franchisors (and others) who operate single-tier schemes and for pyramids in which all 
the parties trading in the UK are registered for VAT587.  Franchisees in non excluded schemes 
that do not comply with the detailed requirements of the act are free to leave the franchise at 
will without restriction. 
3.5.2.4 The Fourth Element – Confidentiality 
A number of EU member states impose a duty of confidentiality on potential franchisees as 
the “quid pro quo” for the franchisor having to make disclosure to it588.  English law imposes 
no duty of confidentiality and it is an entirely contractual matter.   
Article 18 of German Unfair Competition Act imposes a duty of confidentiality upon 
potential franchisees and prohibits the use of samples and technical guidelines supplied by the 
franchisor to compete with it or their disclosure to third parties. 
                                                   
584 As amended by the Trading Schemes Act 1996 and the Trading Schemes (Exclusion) Regulations 1997 
SI 1997/31. 
585 The Trading Schemes (Exclusions) Regulations 1997 SI 1997/31 Regulation 3. 
586 The Fair Trading Act 1973 s.188 (6)(b) and the Trading Schemes (Exclusions) Regulations 1997 SI 
1997/31 Regulation 3. 
587 The aim being to protect small franchisees whose turnover is below the VAT threshold. 
588 In Hungary a duty is placed on the franchisee as the quid pro quo for the franchisor’s duty of the 
disclosure and is regulated by the Civil Code (Section 81 of the Hungarian Civil Code). In the Czech 
Republic all information disclosed is protected by the Civil Code (S.271 Czech Commercial Code Skrdlik, 
WiRO 2005, p369). The Polish Code imposes a similar obligation (Polish Civil Code 72¹ § 1 KC) as does 
the Lithuanian Civil Code (Lithuanian Civil Code Article 6.164(1)), the Slovenian Code (Slovenian Civil 
Code Article 1040Z), the Slovakian Commercial Code (Slovak Commercial Code, Section 271) and the 
Estonian Code (Estonian Law of Obligations Act Section 14(4).  In Belgium both parties are placed under a 
duty of confidentiality as regards information that they obtain “with a view to entering into a [franchise] 
agreement, and may not use the information, either directly or indirectly, other than for the purposes of the 
commercial partnership agreement to be entered into” (Article 6 of the Law governing pre-contractual 
information within the framework of commercial partnership agreements). 
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This element potentially reduces the risks to which franchisors are exposed by the 
heterogeneous nature of the approach taken by member states reduces its impact substantially.  
It does not reduce the risks to which franchisees are exposed.  Nor does it support the 
economic drivers that attract franchisors and franchisees to franchising. 
3.5.2.5 The Fifth Element - Obligation to Execute an Agreement 
Some jurisdictions penalise the franchisor if, once negotiations with a potential franchisee 
have developed, the franchisor does not grant it a franchise. 
German law has developed rules regarding good faith in negotiations, with the Courts 
consistently holding that a late withdrawal from negotiations without good cause and 
frustration of reliance investment will entail liability589. 
In France, Courts consider that an agreement has been formed once the parties have reached 
an agreement on essential points590.  Based upon the concept of a duty of good faith 
commentators591 suggest that French law has used tort law to establish that the parties are 
subject to a duty to negotiate in good faith592 but  
“once the negotiations have reached a mature stage the parties are subject to a 
contractual obligation ….to continue to negotiate in good faith.  This obligation is 
sometimes express, but most often implicit in the structure of the preliminary dealings 
…. the obligation strengthens as negotiations proceeds.  Its extent grows: it makes 
one party furnish information to the other, it prevents his putting up unacceptable 
proposals with the aim of ….causing a break-off of negotiations, or of merely 
pretending to negotiate seriously, while in fact he has decided to deal with a 
competitor, it compels him to work towards the reaching of a definite decision within 
a reasonable period”593.  
The essential points vary from one contract to another, but in the context of franchising, 
essential points are generally the provision of the trademark, the transfer of know-how and 
the financial arrangements. As the franchisor usually provides a potential franchisee with a 
draft of the franchise agreement as part of its pre-contractual disclosure without an express 
statement by the franchisor that the information provided is only for discussion purposes and 
                                                   
589 (1) Keutner. G, 1990, “Reliance, Promissary Estoppel and Culpa in Contrahendo: A Comparative 
Analysis”, 10 Tel-Aviv U Stud in Law 79 and (2) Beatson. J and Friedmann. D, 1994, “From Classical to 
Modern Contract Law” in “Good Faith and Fault and Contract Law” p.38 Clarendon Paperbacks 
590 E.g. Cass req., 1 December 1885, Grands arrêts, no. 146. 
591 Cohen. N, 1994, “Pre-Contractual Duties: Two Freedoms and the Contract to Negotiate in Good Faith 
and Fault in Contract Law” ed. Beatson and Friedmann, pp 38 Clarendon Paperbacks. 
592 Cass. Com, 20 March 1972, JCP 1973.2.17543 Ghestin, J, Traité de Droit Civil, Les Obligations (2nd 
Edition 1988) no 228, p 252. 
593 Jauffiet-Spinosi, C, 1989, “The Domain of Contract – French Report” in “Contract Law Today: Anglo-
French Comparisons” D Harris and D Tallon (eds) pp 113, 131 
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that an agreement will not be formed until the express acceptance of the franchisor, the 
franchise agreement could be deemed to be concluded if the franchisee agrees to the proposed 
terms. 
If negotiations are terminated wrongfully, the party terminating the agreement may be held 
liable594. Generally, the more advanced the negotiations are, the more difficult it will be for 
franchisors to terminate negotiations without incurring liability as the more the negotiations 
progress, the more the other party’s confidence that an agreement will be reached, is 
protected595. The French courts take the view that the damage corresponds to the costs 
incurred during the negotiations and sometimes even the lost chance of entering into an 
agreement with another party is taken into consideration. Under recent case law however, a 
party has been refused a claim of compensation for the loss of the chance to obtain revenue 
from another agreement that it did not enter into596. Once an agreement is concluded, it is the 
franchisor’s duty to perform the agreement. If the franchisor fails to do so, the franchisee can 
claim damages under Article 1142 of the Civil Code, but cannot require specific performance. 
Both claims for damages are claims in tort and subject to Articles 1382 and 1383 of the Civil 
Code.  Some of the other EU member states take a similar approach597. 
3.5.2.6 Sub-Conclusion 
Non franchise specific laws impact upon the pre-contractual regulatory environment in the 
EU in five distinct ways.  They impose a duty not to misrepresent facts, an obligation to 
disclose relevant information to potential franchisees, an extra contractual obligation to 
disclose relevant information to potential franchisees, an extra contractual obligation of 
confidentiality, an obligation to enter into the franchise agreement once negotiations have 
passed a certain point and a right to withdraw from the contract within a limited time period.  
Each member state takes a different approach to each of these issues resulting in the lack of 
any homogenous approach.  This in turn substantially weakens their impact upon cross border 
franchising within the EU and creates a technical barrier to franchising between EU member 
states. 
                                                   
594 Cass. com., 26 November 2003, Bull. civ IV, no. 186. 
595 Cass. 1re civ., 14 June 2000, no. 98-17494. 
596 Cass. com., 26 November 2003, Bull. civ. IV, no. 186. 
597 In the Netherlands if the franchisor unreasonably breaks off negotiations for a franchise agreement, he 
can, depending on the phase of the negotiations, be held liable in damages to the other party or even be 
obliged to enter continue negotiations with the other party (Article 6: 248 Dutch Civil Code (Article 6: 248 
Dutch Civil Code). When considering such a case the courts consider: (i) the extent and manner in which 
the party that broke off negotiations gave rise to such legitimate expectation, (ii) the terminating party’s 
justified interests; and (iii) any unforeseen circumstances that arose during the course of the negotiations 
(Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), in its decision of 18 June 1982, NJ 1983/723 (Plas-Valburg)). A similar 
approach is found in Hungary, where such failure may lead to an award of damages (Section 6 of the 
Hungarian Civil Code). 
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3.5.3 The Ongoing Franchisor/Franchisee Relationship 
This is critical analysis to the second objective of the thesis and suggests that the regulatory 
environment in the EU fails to both adequately re-enforce the economic drivers that attract 
the parties to franchising and to reduce the inherent consequential risk to an appropriate level. 
It suggests that the legal environment as it impacts upon the ongoing franchisor/franchisee 
relationship does not adequately support and re-enforce the economic drivers that attract 
franchisors to franchising.  Nor does it adequately reduce the consequential inherent risks to 
franchisors.  It does reduce the risks to which franchisees are exposed and support some of 
the economic drivers that attract them to franchising in some member states.  However, the 
lack of an homogeneous approach in all member states substantially reduces its impact on 
cross border franchising in the EU.  
The relevant legal regulatory environment comprises the duty of good faith, anti-trust, unfair 
competition and consumer law.   
Neither the UK, Germany nor France have specific laws that impact upon the 
franchisor/franchisee relationship.  Although franchise laws in non EU jurisdictions, for 
example Indonesia598, Malaysia599, Russia600, Ukraine601, Georgia602 and Vietnam603, 
                                                   
598 In Indonesia, a franchise agreement must contain the following (Regulation of the Minister of trade No 
12/M-DAG/PER/3/2006 dated 29 March 2006, which revoked The Provisions on and Procedure for the 
Implementation of Franchised Business Registration (Decree of the Minister of Industry and Trade No. 
259/MPP/Kep/7/1997, dated July 30, 1997) Chapter II, Article 7.1): the name, address and domicile of the 
company of each party; the name and position of each party authorized to sign the agreement; the name and 
type of right over intellectual property, invention or a unique business characteristic, for example a 
management system, a selling or display method or a distribution method which constitutes a special 
characteristic which is the object of a franchise; the rights and obligations of each party and the aid and 
facility given to a franchisee; the marketing area; the period of the agreement and the method of and the 
requirements for the extension of the agreement; the method for settling a dispute; mutually agreed basic 
provisions which may result in the termination or expiration of an agreement; compensation in the event of 
agreement termination; the procedure for the payment of compensation; the use of domestically produced 
goods or materials produced and supplied by small scale enterprises; nurturing guidance and training for 
franchises. 
599 Malaysia simply prohibits discrimination between franchisees in respect of the charges offered or made 
for franchise fees, royalties, goods, services, equipment, rentals or advertising services if such 
discrimination will cause competitive harm to a franchisee who competes with a franchisee who receives 
the benefit of the discrimination, unless it can be objectively justified (the Franchise Act 1998 Part III 
Section 20.It also requires that termination must be for good cause), be by written notice, and offer an 
opportunity to remedy a breach (The Franchise Act 1998 Part IV Section 30(1)) cited as cause for 
termination must be given. A franchisor refusing to renew or extend a franchise at the end of its term must 
compensate the franchisee if it does not waive the post termination restrictive covenants or give the 
franchisee six months prior notice of the termination or non-renewal (The Franchise Act 1998 Part IV 
Section 32). 
600 In Russia the law lays down the rights and obligations of both parties to the agreement by merely stating 
the essential elements of the franchise relationship (Russian Civil Code Part II Chapter 54 Articles 1030 to 
1033). Somewhat unusually it does grant a right of renewal to franchisees properly performing their 
agreements (Russian Civil Code Part II Chapter 54 Article 1035). There is some case law on this point 
which suggests that the requirement can be circumvented in some circumstances (Decision of the Federal 
Arbitrazh Court of East-Siberian District  (FAS VSO decision)  of 16.10.2003, Case No. NA19-3914/03-
13-FO2-3459/03-C2). However, it permits termination of a franchise agreement upon six months' notice by 
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commonly regulate the contents of franchise agreements, only 4 of the EU member states 
(Italy, Romania, Lithuania and Estonia) have franchise focused laws which do so.  
Despite occasional passing suggestions that an EU relationship law for franchising would be 
appropriate one has never been seriously considered604.  
The Romanian, Lithuanian, Estonian and Italian605 laws all specify core terms that must be in 
a franchise agreement, all of which are found in all of the sample franchise agreements 
considered above606  Only the Lithuanian Code imposes certain minimum provisions which 
were not found in any of the sample agreements considered above607.   
                                                                                                                                                        
either party (Russian Civil Code Part II Chapter 54 Article 1035). It also surprisingly provides that transfer 
of a franchise agreement to another franchisee does not constitute cause for termination (Russian Civil 
Code Part II Chapter 54 Article 1037). 
601 In the Ukraine the law (Civil Code Chapter 76 Articles 1115 to1129) imposes statutory liability of the 
franchisor for defective products sold by the franchisee. This is symptomatic of Socialist legal traditions 
and is also found in (Latvia and Estonian) franchise law. 
602 The Georgian Civil Code (Adopted on 26 June 1997, Book Three, Special Part, Title One, Chapter 
Seven (Articles 607-614)) specifies the obligations of the parties including confidentiality and the liability 
of the Franchisor.  
603 In Vietnam early termination is possible in accordance with the conditions set out in Article 16 of the 
Decree. Article 16 provides that amongst other things a franchisee has the right to unilaterally terminate the 
franchise agreement if the franchisor breaches its obligations specified under Article 287 of the Commercial 
Law.  
604 For example, There was a proposal by the Austrian Standards Institute to the European Committee for 
Standardisation to overcome this inconsistency by drafting a set of European standards for franchising, 
focusing on terminology and market practices.  The European Committee for Standardisation develops 
voluntary European standards which are national standards in each of its 30 member countries, which 
comprise all 27 EU member states, Norway, Switzerland and Iceland 
(www.cen.eu/cenorm/members/national+members/members.asp.). The Austrian Standards Institute 
suggested that the lack of qualitative guidelines for franchising has led to the failure of numerous franchise 
systems and claims that the legal framework of franchising in Europe is underdeveloped (Project to 
Standardise Franchising Terminology and Marketing Practices , Frignani. A and Mendelsohn. M, 2009, 
“Project to Standardise Franchising Terminology and Marketing Practices”, International Journal of 
Franchising Law, Volume 7, Issue 2, 200 p. 27).  However, it produced no evidence to support these claims 
and seems to have been ignored by the Committee for Standardisation. 
This is probably because European standards are designed for technical processes and products rather than 
business formats.  The wide spectrum of commercial structures that come within the term franchising and 
the differing sectors in which they are applied all militate against there being any meaningful common 
standards.  This is the problem faced by the national franchise associations. 
605 The Italian Franchise law provides that in case of disputes, before filing suit or commencing arbitration, 
the parties must undertake to seek conciliation in accordance with the rules of the local chamber of 
commerce (Law of 6 May 2004, No. 129 Article 7).  Similar provisions are found in some non EU 
jurisdictions such as Canada and Korea (In Canada the New Brunswick Franchises Act is the first of the 
provincial statutes to provide for a comprehensive dispute resolution mechanism (S.8(1) of the New 
Brunswick Franchises Act 2007 (June 26th)).  The Korean franchise law also provides for a dispute 
resolution mechanism and establishes a Franchise Transaction Dispute Mediation Committee (Korean Act 
on Fairness in Franchise Transactions Chapter IV)). 
606 Article 4(1) of the Romanian Ordinance specifies the issues that must be dealt with by the franchise 
agreement (Articles 4(1), 4(2) and (3) respectively; Herzfeld & Rubin (Romania) S.R.L., Romania’s New 
Franchising Law in “The Romanian Digest”) and states the general principle that the franchise agreement 
must define, free of any ambiguity, the obligations and liabilities of each of the parties. It does not impose 
minimal terms.  There is no standard form prescribed for franchise agreements. Article 5 of the Ordinance 
states that a franchise agreement must be in writing and contain clauses in respect to the object of the 
contract; the rights and obligations of the parties; the financial conditions; the term of the contract; and the 
modification, prolongation or termination of the contract. Article 6(1) of the Ordinance provides a list of 
general principles that a franchise agreement must include concerning term, renewal, termination, transfer 
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3.5.3.1 The Duty of Good Faith  
The duty of good faith has a substantial impact upon the economic drivers and consequential 
inherent risks in the ongoing franchisor/franchisee relationship.  It seeks to deliver a degree of 
equilibrium to the inherent tension within the franchise relationship between the desire of 
both parties to obtain the best commercial deal for themselves and a need to have a good 
ongoing commercial relationship based upon a modicum of mutual trust.  It exists in  many of 
EU member states but not all, and even in those jurisdictions that do acknowledge a duty of 
good faith it is frequently interpreted in different ways. 
Good faith  
“lacks a fixed meaning, because it is loose and amorphous”608  
and some see it as  
“an elusive term best left to lawyers and judges to define over a period of time as 
circumstances require”609.  
                                                                                                                                                        
and the franchisor’s pre-emptive rights on a transfer. The Lithuanian Civil Code also requires certain 
contractual terms to be detailed in the franchise agreement (Lithuanian Civil Code Articles 6.769, 6.770(1), 
6.771), all of which are found in the sample franchise agreements, although  some of them, such as the 
provision of ongoing assistance can be contracted out of (Lithuanian Civil Code Article 6.770(2)). The 
Estonian law of Obligations (Section 375 Chapter 19) takes a similar approach to the Romanian law and 
requires franchise agreements to address certain issues, all of which are found in the sample franchise 
agreements (Section 376-378 of the Law of Obligations Act).  It does not impose minimal terms. The 
Italian law requires that all franchise agreements must specify (Law of 6 May 2004, No. 129 Article 3.3) 
the exact amount of the franchising fee and of the franchisee’s investment; the method of payment of 
royalties and the determination of a possible minimum turnover to be guaranteed by the franchisee; an exact 
identification of the exclusive territory granted to the franchisee, if any; a description of the know-how; a 
description of the services to be provided by the franchisor, such as technical and commercial assistance, 
planning and training and; the contractual conditions relevant to the renewal, termination and the 
transferability of the contract. 
607 It grants franchisees an automatic right of renewal if they are not in breach. The only exception is if the 
franchisor undertakes not to enter into a franchise agreement with another franchisee in the same territory 
within the next three years (Lithuanian Civil Code Article 6.774(1) and (2)). If the franchisor wishes to 
enter into an agreement with another franchisee in the same territory before the three year term has passed, 
the franchisor must either offer the existing franchisee renewal of the contract on equivalent terms, or 
compensate the existing franchisee for its loss connected to the expiration of the contract (Lithuanian Civil 
Code Article 6.774(2)).  It also provides that in the event of death of either franchisor (unlikely as mostly 
corporations) or franchisee, its rights and obligations under the franchise agreement will be transferred to its 
heir, provided that the latter is an entrepreneur and continues to undertake an entrepreneurial activity within 
six months from the date of inheritance, failing which the agreement will be terminated. Its most 
noteworthy, and inappropriate, provisions relate to the franchisor’s liability. A franchisor can be held liable 
for claims against the franchisee with respect to the quality of goods (works, services) sold by the 
franchisee under the franchise agreement (Lithuanian Civil Code Article 6.773(1)). The franchisor is also 
jointly and severally liable for any faults in goods manufactured by the franchisee under the franchise 
agreement (Lithuanian Civil Code Article 6.773(2)). These provisions undermine the fundamental concept 
of the franchisee’s independence.   
608 Juenger. F. K, 1995, “Listening To Law Professors Talk About Good Faith: Some Afterthoughts”, 
Tulane Law Review, Vol. 69, pp. 1253-1254. 
609 Powers. J, 1999, “Defining the Indefinable: Good Faith and the United Nations Convention on the 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods”, Journal of Law and Commerce, Vol. 18, p. 333. 
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There are generally considered to be three main “families” of law in Europe610; German, 
French and English.  Each take a different approach to the concept of good faith611.  These 
each have a different impact upon the economic drivers and consequential risks associated 
with franchising. 
3.5.3.1.1 English Law 
As Bingham, LJ. commented612  
“in many civil law systems, and perhaps in most legal systems outside of the common 
law world, the law of obligations recognises and enforces an overriding principle that 
in making and carrying out  contracts parties should act in good faith. This does not 
simply mean that they should not deceive each other, a principle which any legal 
system must recognise; its effect is perhaps most aptly conveyed by such 
metaphorical colloquialisms as “playing fair”, “coming clean” or “putting one’s cards 
face down on the table”.  It is in essence a principle of fair and open dealing”. 
Although civil law systems all adopt the principle of good faith based upon the Roman 
concept of “bona fides”613, they interpret it in a variety of ways. Common law theory, takes a 
far more literal approach to contracts using classical interpretive tools such as “plain 
meaning”. However although it has  
“little room for a notion as malleable as the implied covenant of good faith”614,  
common law abhors certain acts such as misrepresentation that amount to breaches of good 
faith.  
In contrast to the civil law jurisdictions in the EU and English law has always been reluctant 
to adopt an overriding principle of good faith, although there are elements of it to be found in 
certain aspects of it, such as the concept of equity and the dictates of EU Directives.  
There has been much debate whether good faith is the behaviour of one who acts with a  
“pure heart and empty head”615  
or merely the  
“prudence and causation of a reasonable man”616. 
                                                   
610 Op cit Whittaker and Zimmermann, p.48  
611 Ibid 
612 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stilleto Visual Programmes Ltd [1988] 1 All E.R. 384 at 352 (CA). 
613 Litvinoff. S, 1997, “Good Faith”, Tulane Law Review, Vol. 71, p.1645, 1652-53. 
614 Van Alstine. M. P, 1999, “Of Textualism Party Autonomy and Good Faith”, William and Mary Law 
Review, Vol. 40, Nr. 4, p.1223-1312. 
615 Sir John Lawson  v Weston 170 ER 640 (K.B. 1801) per Lord Kenyon. 
616 Gill v Cubitt (1824) 3 B. & C. 466, 107 ER 806. 
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However, the English courts seem to agree that,  
“the concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant to 
the adversarial position of the parties when involved in negotiations.”617  
and that it is  
“as unworkable in practice as it is inherently inconsistent with the position of a 
negotiating party.”618 
Nevertheless, although English law has not committed itself to any such overriding 
principle619 it has  
“developed piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of 
unfairness,”620  
which amount to a species of good faith.  In other words, the law is suffused with good faith 
but does not use it as a general legal basis for intervention621. 
The common law rules of mistake, misrepresentation and duress all require the fairness and 
honesty that are indicative of a general duty of good faith. The principles of equity are  also 
similar to the concept of good faith. Their origins lie in the jurisdiction of the Chancellor who 
would grant remedies to mitigate the harshness and rigidity of the common law.622 The rules 
of promissory estoppel, specific performance, injunctions, consideration, undue influence and 
more recently the notion of unconscionable bargains623 all focus on the need for honesty and 
fairness and so have all led to a whittling away of the common law principles. Therefore, in 
certain circumstances equity works almost as much as a corrective instrument as the principle 
of good faith does in civil jurisdictions.  It can take a restrictive, adaptive and collateral 
approach624.   
The courts have also seriously interfered with the express terms of contracts as regards 
exclusion and exemption clauses625, whilst statutes, such as the Partnership Act 1890 and the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 also impose good faith principles.  
                                                   
617 LORD ACKNER in Walford v. Miles [1992] 1 All ER 453 at 460. 
618 Ibid at 461. 
619 The doctrine of “Uberrima Fides” in insurance contracts and the concept of good faith in partnership and 
agency are notable exceptions. 
620 Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd [1988] 2 WLR 615 per Bingham LJ at 
621. 
621 Op cit Whittaker and Zimmerman 
622 Halsbury’s Laws of England, Contract Vol. 9 No. 612. 
623 Hughes v Metropolitan Rly Co (1877) 2 App Cas 439; Cross v Cross (1983) 4 FLR 235; Stiff v Cassell 
(1856) 2 Kay & J. 279; Maythorn v Palmer (1864) 11 Jur NS 230; Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] AC 
932; Credit Lyonnaise Bank Nederland NV v Burch [1997] 1 All ER 144, CA. 
624 See section 3.5.3.1.2 below 
625 Halsbury’s Laws of England, Contract Vol. 9 No. 614. 
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The case of Fleet Mobile Tyres Limited v Stone and Another (trading as Tyre 20)626 shows 
how in franchise disputes although English law will not imply into a franchise agreement, an 
obligation on a franchisor to act fairly or reasonably towards their franchisees, the courts can 
look beyond the strict wording of a franchise agreement and utilise less known legal 
principles in order to protect what the court considers to be the “innocent” party. 
The impact of the European Union upon English law must also  not be dismissed.  It means 
that the continental notion of good faith now impacts on discrete local legislation. The 
Uniform Law of International Sales Act 1967, the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) 
Regulations 1993 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 all contain 
provisions of the concept of good faith.   
It should perhaps not come as a surprise then that the Law Commission indicated in 1999 that 
it was considering a commercial code that would force English lawyers and judges to think 
about general legal principles such as good faith627.  Whether such a code ever sees the light 
of day however, remains to be seen.  
As regards franchising, perhaps the biggest difference between the civil concept of good faith 
and the common law defacto implementation of such a duty is that common law does not 
relieve franchisees from responsibility for their own actions. 
The common law use of good faith does not have a significant impact upon the 
franchisor/franchisee relationship and does not significantly support the economic drivers that 
attract franchisors and franchisees to franchising or reduce the consequential risks to which 
they are exposed. 
Over time, legislation has reduced common law’s inherent sympathies towards “laissez-faire” 
in commerce, to such an extent that one should acknowledge the existence of a loose and 
implied form of good faith in those EU member states that have a common law system.  A 
good example of the equivalent of a duty of good faith being inferred into a franchise 
agreement under English law is provided by two cases.  In MGB Printing v Kall Kwik628 the 
court implied an obligation on the franchisor to ensure that it provided services to the 
franchisee using reasonable skill and care on the basis of “business efficacy”.  In Stream 
                                                   
626 (2006) EWCA Civ 1209 Fleet Mobile Tyres Limited v Stone and Another (trading as Tyre 20) 
The House of Lords refused an application by the franchisor, Fleet Mobile Tyres, to appeal against a 
controversial decision by the Court of Appeal which allowed a franchisee to terminate its franchise 
agreement following a forced re-branding by the franchisor. Deducting more than the agreed 6% from the 
franchisee and changing its brand focus were such fundamental breaches in the opinion of the Court of 
Appeal that they entitled the franchisee to terminate. 
627 Law Commission Report No. 259 “The Law Commission Seventh Programme of Law Reform” June 16, 
1999 at Paras 1.12-1.16. 
628 2010 EWHC 624 para 43 
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Healthcare v Pitman629 the court ruled that services should be provided to the franchisee by 
the franchisor when reasonably required or requested. 
Section 13 of the UK’s Sales of Goods Act can also be applied to reach a similar result, as it 
provides that services must be supplied with reasonable care and skill.   
3.5.3.1.2 The German Approach to Good Faith   
In Germany, the concept of good faith is extremely sophisticated and far reaching.  It has 
“been used as a convenient legislative peg on which to place a whole raft of developments by 
German courts to deal with perceived problems either technical or social…. It remains a 
‘general principle” of German contract law …. but its effects have been worked out and 
elaborately classified into particular categories (known as Fallgrupen)”630. 
Each category takes a markedly different approach.  In order to understand how these various 
interpretations of the duty of good faith work together one commentator has broken them 
down into three different approaches631, “collateral”, “restrictive” and “adaptive”. This 
categorisation is subjective. More often than not a particular provision contains elements of 
two or three different approaches. A black and white categorisation is usually not possible. 
Most jurisdictions follow the “restrictive approach” to a certain extent, whereas the “collateral 
approach” is primarily confined to pre-contractual disclosure and most heavily used in 
countries which have a long standing tradition of protecting the weaker party. An Adaptive 
approach is the least common and tends to be used in the circumstances in which the English 
law concept of “frustration” of contract would be applied.  There is an important distinction 
between “Treu und Glauben” (objective good faith) and “gutter Glaube” (subjective good 
faith) which has to do with knowledge.  Treu und Glauben has become an “open” norm and 
although not a legal rule with specific requirements takes shape in the way it is applied632. 
3.5.3.1.2.1 The Collateral Approach to Good Faith under German Law 
In Germany, Article 311 BGB takes a “Collateral Approach”.  It imposes totally new 
obligations on the parties to the agreement and in doing so can reduce the risks to which both 
the franchisor and franchisee is exposed. 
In Germany, the franchisor has certain continuing implied obligations633 which include 
advising, instructing and supervising the franchisee. The franchisor also has a fiduciary duty 
to refrain from interfering in the franchisee’s business, especially if the franchisor is active 
                                                   
629 Ibid, para 55 
630 Whittaker, The ‘Draft Common Frame of Reference’ - An Assessment, Commissioned by Ministry of 
Justice, Appendix II p. 138. 
631 Kroppholler, Studienkommentar BGB, 10th edition 2007, § 242 Rn. 1. 
632 Hesselink (n.35) 289 
633 See above under 1. Introduction; BAG 30.05.1978, BB 1979, 325. 
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himself in the same market area634.  Thus encroachment and the adequacy of support are dealt 
with. 
The Franchisee’s main duty of good faith and fair dealing is to pay the royalty and other fees 
to the Franchisor.  In return he receives access to the Franchisor’s know-how, trademark 
equipment and so forth. Usually the Franchisee will be obliged to purchase certain kinds of 
products from the Franchisor. Even without a non-compete clause the business secrets of the 
Franchisor will be protected by the Franchisee’s fiduciary duties to the Franchisor635. 
Accordingly the risks to which the franchisor is exposed are reduced. 
3.5.3.1.2.2 The Restrictive Approach to Good Faith under German Law 
The duty of Treu und Glauben636 takes a “Restrictive Approach” to the concept of good faith. 
It requires that a franchisor is  
“bound to perform its obligations according to the requirements of good faith, 
ordinary usage being taken into consideration”637.  
It seeks to restrict the ability of parties to the agreement to exercise their agreed contractual 
rights in an unreasonable manner. 
This means that the franchisor must exercise its discretion reasonably for it to be considered 
valid by the German Courts. It can be a substantial fetter on the ability of the franchisor to act 
in the best interests of the franchise network as a whole rather than an individual franchisee. 
What may seem to be reasonable in the context of a bilateral relationship between the 
franchisor and a particular franchisee may be totally unreasonable in the context of a 
multilateral relationship between the franchisor and all of its franchisees. 
Article 138 BGB, provides that a legal transaction which offends good morals (“contra bonas 
mores”) is void. It seeks to adjust the terms agreed by the parties to the agreement to new and 
unforeseen  circumstances that arise so if the franchisor exploits the predicament, 
inexperience, lack of judgment or considerable (economic) weakness of the franchisee or 
gains a financial benefit which is clearly disproportionate to its performance the agreement 
will be void. Agreements which breach the duty of Treu und Glauben in Article 242 of the 
German Civil Code are therefore void under Article 138. This is clearly far from the English 
concept of “Caveat Emptor” and the freedom of the parties to negotiate the contractual terms 
                                                   
634 Op cit Petsche, Riegler and Theiss, 2004, p.3, 4. 
635 BGH, WBl 1989, 131. 
636 Article 242 of the German Civil Code (“BGB”). 
637 Raymond. Y, 1994, Sourcebook on German Law, 1st edition, Routledge Cavendish, p.304-305 
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of their relationship is thus limited638. The German courts have ruled that the following did 
not comply with the principle of good faith and fair dealing: Lack of consideration639; if the 
franchisor’s obligations are merely discretionary;640 if the franchise system is based on 
pyramid selling or multilevel marketing systems;641 if the franchisee is obliged to buy 
overpriced goods or and excessive amount of them;642 or provisions providing the 
franchisor’s access to the franchisee’s accounts twice a month (on the basis that this unduly 
restricts the franchisee’s entrepreneurial freedom)643; 
3.5.3.2.3 The Adaptive Approach to Good Faith under German Law 
The prime example of the “adaptive approach” is Section 313 BGB which stipulates that if 
circumstances upon which a contract was based change substantially after the conclusion of 
the contract and if the parties would not have concluded the contract or would have done so 
on different terms if they had foreseen the change, adaptation of the contract can be claimed if 
a party cannot reasonably be expected to continue to be bound by the contract in its unaltered 
form. German courts will only make very limited use of the adaptive powers under this 
provision in situations in which the English courts might apply the concept of “frustration”. It 
is used to save a contractual relationship rather than to invoke termination from the 
beginning. This has the potential to re-enforce the economic drivers that attract both 
franchisors and franchisees to franchising and reduce the consequential risks. 
The German concept of good faith has a substantial impact upon the franchisor/franchisee 
relationship and, as is evident from the above, reduces the risks to which both franchisor and 
franchisee are exposed and re-enforce the economic drivers that attract franchisees to 
franchising. 
3.5.3.1.3 The French Approach to Good Faith (“Bonne Foi”) 
The restrictive, adaptive and collateral approaches to a duty of good faith can be found in 
differing combinations and degrees in most of the civil jurisdictions in the EU despite the fact 
that some of them have a very different historical perspective and approach to the concept of 
good faith. 
                                                   
638 But see the decision in Fleet Mobile Tyres Limited v Stone and Another (Trading as Tyre20) (2006) 
EWCA Civ 1209 which shows that the English Courts will not always implement the strict letter of a 
franchise agreement. 
639 LG Paderborn NJW-RR 1987,S, 672f; LG Karlsruhe NJW-RR 1989, S. 822f. 
640 BGH NJW-RR 2000, 1159ff. 
641 OLG Muenchen NJW 1986, S.1880ff. 
642 Giesler, Franchiseverträge, Rn. 60. 
643 Giesler, ibid, Rn. 62. 
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In France, although the general concept of good faith or bonne foi is found in Article 1134 of 
the French Civil Code, until the last quarter of the twentieth century it was substantially 
limited by the judicial view that  
“if a person says something it is fair”644.   
Since the late part of the last century, the doctrine has become controversial amongst French 
lawyers645. Increasingly the legal profession seems to be advocating that it should be more 
interventionist and less “liberal” to ensure more “socially” appropriate outcomes, although 
some feel that this interferes too much with contractual freedom646. Other provisions of 
French law also contain notions of good faith647.  The ascendency of the interventionist 
school is evidenced by the fact that although the wording of the provision only requires good 
faith in the performance of the contract648, French courts have extended this obligation to 
impose a duty of good faith at the earlier stages of pre-contractual negotiations649, the 
formation of the contract650 and even its termination.651  
The notion of good faith has also been used by the French courts, in “restrictive” and 
“adaptive” and “Collateral” manners, to import morality and justice into contracts commonly 
by way of interpretation and implied terms. 
Although no judge can award an injured party more than the law allows under the contract, it 
is possible to prevent a party from exercising the fullest rights which the law would otherwise 
permit him to do. The French Courts have taken a “restrictive approach” and held that a party 
who has acted in bad faith cannot require the other party to perform the contract as if nothing 
had happened or claim damages652. French courts have the power to terminate the contract 
when requested by the victim of the unfair behaviour653. In addition, a French court can 
                                                   
644 (“Qui dit Contractuel dit juste”) Whittaker, The ‘Draft Common Frame of Reference’ -  An Assessment, 
Appendix II p 139. 
645 See Flour. J and Aubert. J, 1994, “Les obligations, L’acte juridique” 6th edition, p.289-90 and Demogue. 
R, 1931, “Traité des obligations en general.9 
646 Whittaker, The ‘Draft Common Frame of Reference’ -  An Assessment , Appendix II p. 139 and 
Mazeaud, “La politique contractuelle de la Cour de Cassation” in Libres Propos sur les Sources du Droit – 
Mélanges en l’honneur de Philippe Jestaz (Dalloz-Sirey, Paris, 2006) p. 371. 
647  Article 1135 of the Civil Code, Articles111-1 and 113-3 of the Consumer Code and Article 330 of the 
Civil Code. 
648 See www.legifrance.gouv.fr for a translation by Georges ROUHETTE, Professor of Law, with the 
assistance of Dr Anne ROUHETTE-BERTON, Assistant Professor of English. 
649 Cass. com. 26 November 2003, Bull. civ. IV, No. 186, (Manoukian case). 
650 Cass. com. 4 February 2004, no. 00-21.319: Juris-Data no. 2004-022354; D.2005, p.151 – In this case 
the franchisor was held liable for failure to provide pre-contractual information necessary to allow the 
franchisee to enter into the contract with full knowledge of the facts. 
651 Cass. com. 11 July 1978, no. 76-13752; Cass. com, 23 Mai 2000, no. 97-10553 – A franchisor may 
refuse to renew the franchise agreement, but should not let the franchisee believe that the agreement will be 
renewed whereby inducing him to make investments in the franchise. 
652 Cass 1re ch. civ., 16 February 1999 no 96-21997, Bull. Civ. I no. 52 p.34. 
653 Benabent. A, Les contrats spéciaux civils commerciaux, Ed, 2008, no 456, p.202. 
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prevent the breaching party from relying on a limitation or exclusion of liability clause when 
it acts in a deceptive manner654. A restrictive approach was taken by the courts when an open 
price term to be determined by the franchisor was deemed enforceable under French law only 
so long as it is proportional655.   
An “adaptive approach” to the concept of good faith comes into play when there is a change 
in circumstance which prevent a distributor from being competitive. The French duty of good 
faith requires the supplier in these circumstances to renegotiate the terms of the contract in 
order to allow it to be competitive656.  A more recent case raised an important doctrinal debate 
around a possible duty of “solidarity” between the parties, (suggesting an adaptive approach 
to good faith) but the French Supreme Court failed to clearly state its position on the 
question657. One party claimed that good faith imposed an obligation to renegotiate, when a 
change in circumstances significantly altered the initial balance of the contract. The Supreme 
Court rejected the claim on the basis that the imbalance already existed when the contract was 
formed, so failing to clarify whether or not the courts have the power to vary the terms of a 
contract in such circumstances. 
There are no cases which suggest that the concept of bonne foi can be applied to prevent 
encroachment by the franchisor.   
The French courts have also considered adopting a collateral approach to the duty of good 
faith. From the formation of the contract until the end of the contract, a franchisor has the 
continuing duty to support its franchisees with commercial and technical assistance658. A lack 
of advice and support during the start-up period can lead to the termination of the 
agreement.659 The level of support which needs to be provided depends on the needs of each 
franchisee and therefore needs to be adapted. 660  
The French concept of good faith has a substantial impact upon the franchisor/franchisee 
relationship and, as is evident from the above, reduces the risks to which both franchisors and 
franchisee are exposed and re-enforce the economic drivers that attract franchisees to 
franchising. 
3.5.3.1.4 Comparison of the Different Concepts of Good Faith 
                                                   
654 Cass. com., 3 April 2001 n o 98-21233, Bull. civ. IV, no. 70. 
655 Cass. ass. plen. 1er December 1995 no. 91-19.653, Bulletin 1995 A. P. N° 8 p. 15. 
656 Cass. com. 3 November 1992 CCC. 1993 no. 45 in a fuel supply agreement; Cass com. 24 November 
1998, RTD civ. 1999, 98 in a commercial agency contract. 
657 Cass. 1re civ., 16 March 2004, n° 01-15.804, D. 2004, p. 1754. 
658 Philippe le Tourneau, les contacts de franchisage, 2e édition, Litec 2007, no. 89. 
659 CA. de Reims, 8 November 2000, no. 2000-152146, SARL L’âge d’or expansion. 
660 CA. de Douai, 2e ch., 6 September 2007, no. RG: 06/177, Phildar-Le Donnant, D. 2007, p. 2303. 
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The German and French law of good faith supports the economic drivers that encourage 
franchisees to become involved in franchising and reduce the risks to which both franchisees 
and franchisors are exposed.  However, the lack of a homogenous approach in other member 
states greatly reduces the impact on cross border franchising in the EU. 
Different jurisdictions have different ideas about what good faith is and the existence of a 
general doctrine of good faith does not guarantee a particular outcome.  The German 
approach is influential in those jurisdictions in which it has a historical connection such as 
Greece661 and Austria662 and is also gaining influence over certain jurisdictions that were 
previously more influenced by French law, such as Italy663 and the Netherlands664. 
The French Civil Code has historically been the most influential civil code in Europe.  
Belgium was formerly directly subject to the French Civil Code but, perhaps due to German 
influence, has relied more on Article 1134 than the French665. 
The Spanish Civil Code Article 1258 provides that contracts give rise not only to obligations 
to accomplish what has been expressly agreed but also the results that are in accordance with 
good faith, custom and the law. Whilst Article 7, inter alia, provides that rights must be 
exercised in conformity with the requirements of good faith. 
Whittaker and Zimmerman observe that the relationship between member state laws are 
changing666.  While Italian reports cite French decisions they also show the influence of the 
                                                   
661 The Greek Civil Code (Article 288) in a verbatim translation of 242 BGB.  Also, Article 200 of the 
Greek Civil Code reflects 157 BGB.  The terms of the franchise agreement must not unduly restrict the 
freedom of the franchisee or allow the franchisor to exploit the need or inexperience of the franchisee to 
obtain for himself or a third person benefits which are clearly disproportionate to the franchisor’s 
obligations (Article 179 of the Greek Civil Code). To do so would be contrary to public policy (Articles 174 
and 178 of the Greek Civil Code).  The parties must also act towards one another with loyalty, fairness and 
good faith (Article 281 of the Greek Civil Code). The franchisee may not assign its obligations to a third 
party (Article 715 of the Greek Civil Code) and must provide the franchisor with information about its 
business (Article 718 of the Greek Civil Code). The franchisor has a general obligation to assist the 
franchisee in the exercise of its activities and supply him with documents, brochures and other information 
in order to enable him to promote the franchise system (F.I.C. of Salonica 1671/71, JCL (1972) 52). In 
return, the franchisee has to pay the fees and royalties agreed and has a duty of confidentiality which 
continues after the termination of the agreement (Articles 200 and 288 of the Greek Civil Code as well as 
Law 146/14 on unfair competition). In the absence of a specific provision to the contrary in the franchise 
agreement, the franchisee is under an obligation not to compete with his franchisor during the duration of 
the agreement (Article 919 of the Civil Code F.I.C. of Athens 11486/80 JCL (1981) 50, 131). 
662 Although the Austrian Civil Code does not refer to “Treu und Glauben” it does refer to honest business 
usage which is used to determine the circumstances under which a contract has been concluded (ABGB § 
863) and how they should be interpreted (ABGB § 914).  The Austrian Supreme Court has used these two 
rules as a route to asserting that “Treu und Glauben” and reliance on honest business usage are ethical 
principles which are so generally acknowledged that they may be applied without having been included in 
the Civil Code.  There are subtle differences to the BGB 242 (Whittaker. S and Zimmerman. R, 2000, 
“Good Faith in European Contract Law” CSICL Cambridge University Press pp 51). 
663 Ibid p.53 
664 The old Dutch Civil Code reflected Article 1134 of the French Civil Code.  However, the new Civil 
Code (Articles 6:248; 6:258 and 6.2) shows more of a German influence and has been described as “the 
culmination of the statutory career of the concept of good faith”. 
665 Op cit, Whittaker. S and Zimmerman. R, 2000,  p.52 
  161 
German doctrine of good faith.  Belgian law often differs from French law despite its 
common historical roots.  Dutch law has abandoned French law for German influences and 
Austrian law, whilst mostly following German law nevertheless differs from it in some 
aspects of good faith. 
Although some jurisdictions, such as Poland667, the Czech Republic668, Finland669, Malta670, 
Bulgaria671 and Portugal672 follow the German lead as regards good faith, others, such as 
                                                                                                                                                        
666 In the Netherlands, all contracts must be construed and performed in good faith (Article 6: 248 Dutch 
Civil Code (the rules of reasonableness and fairness (redelijkheid en billijkheid))). However, a contractual 
provision of a franchise contract will only be set aside on the basis of ‘good faith’ in limited situations. For 
example, if the provision concerned is manifestly not in accordance with the character of the franchise 
contract, or if the franchisee could not be aware of the breadth of the provision concerned. It has been 
established by case law that in certain circumstances it may be contrary to good faith to invoke an 
exclusion of liability clause (Judgment of May 19, 1967, (Supreme Court) ‘Hoge Raad’ (HR), 1967 (Dutch 
Court Reporter) ‘Nederlandse Jurisprudentie’ (NJ) No. 261; Judgment of Feb. 20, 1976, HR, 1976 NJ No. 
261; Judgment of Dec. 18, 1981, HR, 1982 NJ No. 71; Judgment of May 7, 1982, HR, 1983 NJ No. 509). 
667 Polish Civil Code Art 56. Under Polish law, Art. 56 KC imposes a duty of good faith and provides that; 
“an action produces not only those effects expressly intended by it, but also those arising from law, 
principles of community life and accepted customs”. Thus the parties to the franchise agreement are bound 
by not only the express contractual terms but also those implied by law. These obligations can be collateral, 
adaptive or restrictive.  An example of the franchisor’s collateral obligations is the requirement to provide 
the franchisee appropriate assistance both at the beginning of the relationship, in form of both initial and 
ongoing training. This obligation arises from the need to enable the franchisee to effectively exercise rights 
granted it in the franchise agreement (in particular the intellectual and/or industrial property rights). 
Without the franchisor’s appropriate advice and guidance the franchisee would not be able to put the 
contractual provisions into effect (Bagan-Kurluta, Umowa franchisingu Monografie prawnicze, p. 77, 79). 
Revealing or taking advantage of the Franchisor’s trade secrets or obtaining them from an unauthorised 
person, if it may harm or endanger the entrepreneur’s interest, is deemed to be an act of unfair competition 
(Art 11 § 1 ZNKU). Breach of this duty of confidentiality entitles the franchisor (Art. 18 ZNKU) “to end 
the infringement and to prohibit further violation; to eliminate the consequences of the infringement by 
requiring the infringer to make an appropriate public declaration or declarations; pay damages according to 
general compensation rules and account for any profits made according to general unjustified enrichment 
rules.” Breach can lead to imposition of a fine or a custodial sentence of up to two years imprisonment (Art. 
23 ZNKU).  Damages are limited to the actual loss directly resulting from the unsuccessful continued 
negotiations (Article 72¹ § 1 KC). The Polish Act Against Unfair Competition (ZNKU (Ustawa o 
zwalczczaniu nieuczciwej knokurencji) may also apply. 
668 Czech Civil Code Art 6-228(1). In the Czech Republic the doctrine of good faith means that a 
contractual obligation is enforceable only to the extent that it does not conflict with “principles of fair 
dealing”.  Given the lack of precedence in franchise matters, judges have wide discretion in defining 
whether or not a term is fair (Marc. P and Theiss. W, 2004, “Franchising in the Czech Republic”, 
International Journal of Franchising Law, Volume 2, Issue 6 , p.25-34, 27). 
669 Section 1 the Finnish Unfair Business Practices Act (1978). In Finland, the duty of good faith is well 
protected. Section 36 of the Contracts Act (228/1929) imposes a duty of good faith and states that unfair 
contract terms may be adjusted or set aside if their application lead to an unfair result. The rest of the 
contract may also be adjusted or declared terminated under this provision, if it is unfair to enforce the rest of 
the contract after the adjustment of a contract term (Section 36 of the Contracts Act (228/1929). The Act on 
Regulating the Contract Terms between Entrepreneurs (Section 38 of the Act on Regulating Contract Terms 
between Entrepreneurs (1062/1993)) provides that the use of an unfair contract term in contracts between 
business parties is prohibited, if one of the parties is in a weaker bargaining position and therefore needs 
protection (Hanna-Maija Elo, ‘Finland’ in: Getting the deal through – Franchise 2008, p. 37 para. 22). It is 
difficult to predict the way in which the courts will amend a contractual term to make it more reasonable 
(Petri Rinkinen, Franchising Legislation in Finland, www.franchising.fi/ukindex). In one case the courts 
declared it possible for a franchisee to terminate the franchise agreement on the grounds that the franchise 
business was no longer profitable, even though this was not a contractual ground for termination. It was 
also held to be unreasonable to charge franchising fees for a period once a franchisee had already ceased 
trading (Vaasa District Court judgment, dated 20.11.2003 in the case of Kotipizza Oy v. Ekosmart Ky). The 
Act on Regulating the Contract Terms between Entrepreneurs also prohibits unfair contract terms if one of 
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Denmark673, Latvia674 and Slovenia675 make far less use of the doctrine.  Only Romania has a 
franchise specific duty of good faith676.  No other EU member state franchise law contains 
such a provision. 
                                                                                                                                                        
the parties is in a weaker bargaining position (Hanna-Maija Elo, ‘Finland’ in: Getting the deal through – 
Franchise 2008, p. 37 para. 22). Unfair terms will be adjusted in accordance with the general rules of 
adjustment under the Contracts Act (Riitta Ahonen “Unconscionability and adjustment of unfair contract 
terms”, (Master’s thesis, University of Joensuu 2004) p.9) by the Market Court (Section 1(1).3 of the 
Market Court Act and Section 2(3) of the Act on Certain Proceedings before the Market Court) by way of 
an injunction and a conditional fine (Hanna-Maija Elo, ‘Finland’ in: Getting the deal through – Franchise 
2008, p. 37 para. 22). 
670 Maltese Civil Code Article 993. See Chapter 8 p. 151. 
671 Bulgarian law recognises a duty of good faith, which only has an impact on the ongoing franchise 
relationship. The parties to a franchise agreement or any other commercial agreement for that matter owe 
each other a duty of good faith when exercising their rights under the agreement. In addition, although the 
parties may freely determine the content of the franchise agreement and the parties’ obligations, a contract 
may not contravene the mandatory provisions of law and the duty of good faith. Article 26 (1) of the 
Bulgarian Obligations and Contracts Act stipulates that a contract which contravenes or circumvents the 
law as well as a contract which infringes the duty of good faith shall be null and void. This means that 
Bulgarian law recognises a restrictive approach to good faith as well as possibly an adaptive approach. 
672 In Portugal, the ongoing relationship between franchisor and franchisee is governed by general contract 
law particularly the principal of good faith (Article 762 of the Portuguese Civil Code). This requires 
honesty of intention, the absence of malice, the absence of a desire to defraud or to seek an unconscionable 
advantage and a duty to supply to the franchisee all the information and cooperation which is needed for the 
performance of the agreement and discharge of the obligations by and of the other parties (“Outline of 
franchise issues in Portugal”, questionnaire with answers provided by Jose Alves Do Carmo, associate, 
Barrocas Sarmento Neves). 
673 The general starting point in Danish law is the principle of freedom of contract, but this general rule has 
been restricted over time, notably by the Danish Contracts Act (Law no 781 of 26.08.1996). The most 
important provision in relation to franchise agreements is Section 36, which provides that a contract may be 
found entirely or partly void if it, or specific clauses in it, are found to be “unfair” to one of the parties. 
Although this duty of good faith is very rarely applied by the courts to contracts between business partners. 
It is an assessment based on the facts in each individual case. It may therefore be applied to modify the 
franchise agreement (Christensen. L. A, 2008, Franchising in Denmark, International Franchising, Kluwer 
Law International, p. 9).  For example, although a franchise agreement may prohibit or restrict the right to 
transfer the franchise, the combination of an unusually long notice period and a prohibition against 
transferring the franchise may be considered unfair and, hence, be set aside (Sondergaard, Franchising in 
Denmark, p. 10). 
674 Latvian Civil Code Art. 14.  Section 14 of the Latvian Civil law regulating leases is not restricted to real 
estate but also applies to franchise agreements (Article 2113 of the Latvian Civil Law).  The franchisor is 
responsible for the quality of the rights granted to the franchisee (Article 2135 of the Latvian Civil Law). 
The franchisee is required to use the rights of the lease “wisely and with care” (Article 2150 of the Latvian 
Civil Law) and has to exercise them according to the purpose of the intended agreement (Article 2151 of 
the Latvian Civil Law). This is interpreted widely, and includes preserving the franchise’s distinct image. It 
means that the franchisor has the right to ensure that the franchisee complies with the franchisor’s business 
and marketing concept (“Legal framework of franchising development in Latvia” on the website www. 
franchising%20.lv/new_site/lt/legislation_latvia. html.) There is a general duty to fulfil all responsibilities 
and rights in good faith (Article 1 of the Latvian Civil Law). 
675 Article 5 of the Slovenian Civil Code.  See Chapter 8 p.154 
676 Article 3 of the Romanian Ordinance provides that a franchise agreement must include the principle of 
fairness, stating that it must reflect the interests of the members of the franchise network, as well as protect 
the franchisor’s interests. This idea of fairness is further reflected in Article 7 of the Ordinance, under 
which the franchisor, in case of breach, has to notify the franchisee in writing of the breach and grant him a 
reasonable time to remedy the contravention of the franchise agreement (The Canadian Provinces, China, 
Korea and  Malaysia impose a duty of good faith  on both the franchisor and the franchisee which impacts 
upon what the franchisor is permitted to do during the relationship. In Canada all franchise agreements 
impose upon the parties a duty of fair dealing in its performance and enforcement (Alberta Franchise Act 
Section 7, The Arthur Wishart Act ( Franchise Disclosure) 3(1); The Prince Edward Island Franchises Act  
Chapter 36 Bill 43 s.3; The New Brunswick Franchises Act s 3). In Korea, both parties to a franchise 
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Given the quasi-fiduciary and long term nature of the relationship between a franchisor and 
its franchisee, the flexibility of some form of duty of good faith may be appropriate.  
However, this needs to be tempered by a degree of commercially appropriate certainty.  The 
wide range of ways in which the doctrine currently manifests itself in the EU and the 
resulting lack of certainty means that it can have a negative impact on franchising between 
member states. 
3.5.3.2 The Regulation of Vertical Restraints 
It is submitted that EU law’s focus on the public interest when regulating the vertical 
restraints found in the franchisor/franchisee relationship means that it undermines the 
economic drivers that attract franchisors to franchising but it does potentially support some of 
the economic drivers that attract franchisees to franchising.  It does nothing to reduce the 
consequential inherent risks to franchisors or franchisees. 
All relevant EU member state anti-trust law is based on the concepts contained in Article 101 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (formerly Article 81 of the 
Treaty of Rome). Like all competition law it seeks inter alia to regulate vertical relationships 
to ensure that they do not contain terms which are against the public interest. 
Article 101(1) of the TFEU prohibits: 
‘…. all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition 
within the common market …’677. 
These include attempts to directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices, sharing markets 
or sources of supply and applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties, thus placing them at a competitive disadvantage. 
A franchise agreement incorporating measures restricting the ability of franchisees to trade 
freely potentially falls foul of Article 101(1).  If an agreement falls foul of Article 101(1), 
Article 101(2) provides that the agreement will be void and that the parties may be subject to 
a substantial fine.  The English decision in the Crehan case678 makes it clear that if a 
franchisee suffers loss as a result of his franchise agreement breaching Article 101(1) of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
transaction must exercise good faith in the performance of their duties and enumerates several specific 
franchisor and franchisee duties (Fair Franchise Transactions Act, Chapter II Article 4). In Malaysia both 
the franchisor and the franchisee are under a duty of good faith to each other and must “act in an honest and 
lawful manner” and “endeavour to pursue the best franchise business practice of the time and place” (The 
Franchise Act 1998 Part IV Section 29 (1)).  
677 See the EC Treaty Article 81(1). 
678 Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan [2002] QB 507, [2001] All ER (EC) 886. 
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Treaty of Rome, the franchisor may, as well as being liable for a fine, also be liable in 
damages to the franchisee.   
The ECJ in Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v Pronuptia De Paris Irmgard Schiligalis undertook 
the first detailed analysis of the application of Article 101 to franchise agreements679.  
It found that restrictions intended to protect the franchisor's know-how and to maintain the 
identity and reputation of the franchise network are not incompatible with Article 101(1)680, 
in so far as they are 'indispensable' to achieving such protection. However, restrictions 
causing the division of markets between the franchisor and franchisee or between franchisees 
constitute an infringement of Article 101(1) as could attempts at price-fixing. Essentially the 
court's decision in Pronuptia drew a line between those clauses which it deemed to be 
necessary for the maintenance of the identity and reputation of the franchise network and for 
the protection of IP rights and know-how, and those clauses which it deemed to be prima 
facie anti-competitive such as those aimed at retail price maintenance. The court required 
Pronuptia to remove a clause requiring the franchisee not to harm the brand image of the 
franchisor by its pricing level681.   
There are five decisions which have been instrumental in developing the attitude of both the 
ECJ and the Commission to certain provisions common to franchise agreements. These are 
the Pronuptia case discussed above, Yves Rocher682, Computerland683, Servicemaster684 and 
Charles Jourdan685. Each involved a franchise agreement notified to the Commission under 
Article 101(3). The Commission took positive views of exclusivity, some forms of territorial 
restraints and post term restrictions. 
However, retail price maintenance was not viewed favourably. In both Pronuptia and Yves 
Rocher there were clauses inserted into the agreement, at the Commission's request, allowing 
the franchisees to set their own retail prices. This is consistent with the ECJ's and 
Commission's general attitude to price-fixing, which will normally lose an agreement the 
benefit of the exemption under Article 101(3) from the prohibition in Article 101(1). In 
Pronuptia itself, the ECJ held that the fact that the franchisor had suggested prices to the 
franchisee would not in itself constitute a restriction upon competition, subject to the proviso 
                                                   
679 Case 161/84 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v Pronuptia De Paris Irmgard Schillgallis, [1986] ECR 353, 
[1986] 1 CMLR 414. 
680 Case 161/84 Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v Pronuptia De Paris Irmgard Schillgallis, [1986] ECR 353, 
[1986] 1 CMLR 414, paras 16, 17. 
681 ibid, para. 12(c). 
682 Case C-126/91 Schutzverband Gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft v Yves Rocher GmbH, [1993] E.C.R. I-
2361. 
683 Computerland Europe SA Franchise Agreements, Re, Case IV/32.034, [1989] 4 CMLR 259. 
684Servicemaster,OJ [1988] L332/38, [1989] 4 CMLR 581. 
685 Charles Jourdan, OJ [1989] L35/31, [1989] 4 CMLR 591. 
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that there had not been a concerted practice between franchisor and franchisee, or between the 
franchisees themselves as to the imposition of such prices.   
If a franchise agreement prima facie contravenes Article 101(1), it may be able to take 
advantage of three exemptions. Firstly, Article 101(3) provides that the prohibition contained 
in Article 101(1) does not apply to agreements, decisions or concerted practices which 
contribute to improving production or distribution of goods, or promoting technical or 
economic progress whilst allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit and not 
imposing unnecessary restrictions (i.e. restrictions unnecessary to the attainment of the above 
objectives) or otherwise enabling the parties to eliminate their competition to a substantial 
degree. 
Secondly, under the ‘de minimis’ principle an agreement will only infringe Article 101(1) if it 
has an ‘appreciable’ effect on trade686. The 1997 Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance 
(the “Notice”)687 provides guidance on how parties are to evaluate whether their activities are 
having an appreciable effect on trade. Paragraph 9 sets out qualitative thresholds in relation to 
the aggregate market share of those involved. Article 101(1) will not apply to vertical 
agreements where the aggregate market share of participating undertakings is less than 15% 
of the relevant market.688 
Even if an agreement contains price fixing or territorial restrictions it will not necessarily lose 
the benefit of the exemption if the parties’ aggregate market share does not exceed the 
relevant threshold. The Commission will not take action in these instances unless national 
authorities urge it to do so689. 
Thirdly, there is the Vertical Restraints Block Exemption690. Article 2 provides that Article 
101(1) does not apply to “agreements or concerted practices” entered into by undertakings 
operating and different levels of the production or distribution chain. Key points to note about 
the application of the Regulation are the exemption is only available to suppliers with a 
market share of less than 30%; it applies to both exclusive and non-exclusive arrangements; 
services and goods are included; multi-party agreements are covered; some vertical 
                                                   
686 The ‘de minimus’ principle was first introduced by the ECJ in the case of Völk v Établissements 
Vervaecke Sprl, case 5/69 [1969] ECR 295. 
687 Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not fall within the meaning of Article 85 (1) of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community OJ [1997] C 372/13. 
688 Commission Notice (EC) on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict 
competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (de minimis) OJ 
(2001/C 368/07). 
689 Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not fall within the meaning of Article 85 (1) of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community OJ [1997] C 372/13. 
690 Commission Regulation (EC) No 330/2010 on the application of Article 101(1) of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices OJ L 
102.23.4.2010 p1-7 
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agreements between competitors at the same level will be exempt and suppliers may impose 
maximum price restrictions on buyers (but not minimum price restrictions). 
Franchising itself is not expressly mentioned in the Regulation, but franchise agreements are 
covered by the Regulation as they are vertical agreements. However, franchise and other 
vertical agreements cannot benefit from the exemption if they contain so-called ‘hard-core’ 
restrictions, as set out in Article 4 of the Regulation. These include inter alia certain territorial 
restrictions, price-fixing and restrictions on cross supply.  
Article 5 of the Regulation sets out ‘black-listed” restrictions such as non-compete clauses. 
However the inclusion of such clauses will not lose an agreement the protection of the block 
exemption altogether; as long as the offending term is deleted or modified the exemption will 
still be applicable to the remainder of the agreement. Exclusive territories are not permitted, 
although a location clause is allowed. Franchisees must be free to actively promote their sales 
to end users wherever they are located. According to the Commission's current guidelines691 
on the application of the block exemption, the area outside which mobile outlets may operate 
can also be restricted692. During the term, non-compete clauses of more than five years are not 
permitted unless the franchisor is the landlord of the franchisee693. This will often not be the 
case. At the same time the Guidelines on the block exemption provide that a non-compete 
clause relating to the goods or services supplied under the franchise agreements, whilst not 
exempted under the block exemption will not be caught by Article 101(1) as long as the 
franchisor is not dominant in the market and the restraint is necessary `to maintain the 
common identity and reputation of the franchised network’694.. 
A post-term non-compete clause may be imposed if it relates to goods or services which 
compete with the goods or services dealt with by the franchisee under the terminated 
agreement; is limited to the premises from which the franchisee operated during the contract 
period; is indispensable to protect the franchisor's know-how; and is for a period of one year 
after termination. 
This may present a problem for some franchise agreements with terms that have post-
termination provisions that relate to a ‘territory'. If the franchisor cannot rely on the de 
minimis or small and medium-sized undertakings exemption then the post-restriction will be 
unenforceable. The franchisor will need to amend the agreement. 
                                                   
691 Commission Notice: Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ C291 / 1. 
692 Commission Notice: Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ C291/1 para 54. 
693 Commission Regulation (EC) No. 330/2010 
694 Ibid, para 200(2). 
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Franchisees may not be restricted from selling the brands of particular competing suppliers. 
Quality specifications may, however, be laid down.  
The 30% market share test applies to the franchisor's market share. The franchisor's market 
share includes connected undertakings and relates to the sales value of the contract goods or 
services, together with competing goods or services. The benefit of the exemption will not be 
lost if the 30% share rises to 35%. If the market share rises above 35% however the 
exemption will only continue to apply for one further year. These two dispensations cannot be 
combined. 
Article 7 of the Regulation enables national authorities to withdraw the benefit of the block 
exemption where the effects of the agreements are felt in particular in that Member State and 
it constitutes a discreet geographic market. Where the geographic market is wider than a 
single Member State the Commission reserves the exclusive right to withdraw the benefit of 
the exemption695. 
Antitrust laws properly regulate potentially anti-competitive aspects of franchising, although 
they can at times be over restrictive and overlook some of the pro competitive aspects of 
franchising.  EU antitrust law erodes the economic drivers that attract franchisors to 
franchising as it places franchise chains at a disadvantage compared to corporate chains. 
Resale Price Maintenance is a hardcore restriction under the Vertical Restraint Block 
Exemption696 and was ruled against in both the Pronuptia and Yves Rocher cases697. 
Agreements698.  Concerted practices having as their direct or indirect object the establishment 
of a fixed or minimum resale price or a fixed or minimum price level to be observed by the 
franchisee are not permitted. They are considered to be “per se” anti-competitive.  
Contractual provisions or concerted practices that enable the franchisor to directly establish 
the franchisee’s resale price are also forbidden. Likewise other commercial practices that may 
have the same effect are prohibited. Examples include the franchisor fixing the franchisee’s 
margin, fixing the maximum level of discount the franchisee can grant from a prescribed 
level, making the grant of rebates or reimbursement of promotional costs by the franchisor 
subject to the observance of a given price level, linking the prescribed resale price to the 
resale prices of competitors, threats, intimidation, warnings, penalties, delay or suspension of 
deliveries or contract terminations in relation to observance of a given price level. Measures 
to identify price-cutting franchisees, such as the implementation of a price monitoring system, 
                                                   
695 Commission Notice: Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ C291/1 para 77. 
696 Commission Regulation (EC) 2790/1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories 
of vertical agreements and concerted practices, Article 4(a). 
697 [1981] ) OJ L8/49. [1988] CMCR 592 
698 Technically, it is possible to justify the retail price maintenance on the grounds of efficiency under 
Article 81.3, but this has proved to be theoretical rather than practical. 
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or the obligation on retailers to report other members of the franchise network who deviate 
from the standard price level are also prohibited as are measures which may reduce the 
franchisee’s incentive to lower the resale price, such as the supplier printing a recommended 
resale price on the product or the franchisor obliging the franchisee to apply a most-favoured-
customer clause.  Thus only the provision of a list of recommended prices or maximum prices 
by the franchisor to the franchisee is permitted.  In contrast to this, those businesses which 
have sufficient financial and management resources to expand their network on a corporate, 
rather than franchised basis are free of all these restrictions. 
EU Competition law gives vertically-integrated corporate chains a monopoly of the ability to 
deliver a price promise that potentially leads to them being seen as a more consistent and 
reliable supplier and hence stronger brand than franchised brands that cannot deliver the same 
price consistency.  This in turn disadvantages not only the franchisor but also their 
franchisees and ultimately consumers. This view is supported by the Chicago School of 
antitrust’s analysis, which acknowledges that retail price maintenance has positive, consumer-
welfare enhancing aspects. In contrast to the EU’s “per se” approach, the Chicago School 
advocates an analysis of each individual retail price maintenance provision on its merits, 
under a “rule of reason” approach which assumes the practice to be permitted until proven 
otherwise. 
The OECD has also recognised that, in the specific context of franchise agreements, retail 
price maintenance can have desirable effects. In its report on “Competition Policy and 
Vertical Restraints: Franchising Agreements”699 the OECD acknowledged that although  
“vertical price restrictions are often suspected of being anticompetitive as well as 
undesirable for limiting the freedom of franchisees to set prices…., such price 
restrictions may generate the same benefits as territorial restraints”700  
which it deems to be  
“reducing intra-brand competition and giving franchisees more adequate incentives to 
provide desired levels of service, at least from a profit-maximising point of view”.  
It considers that if  
“there is enough competition from other brands and retailers, either from competing 
franchises or from non-franchised rivals, franchisees will have incentives to provide 
the best possible bundle of prices and services…”  
                                                   
699 OECD, Competition Policy and Vertical Restraints: Franchising Agreement. 
700 Ibid, p. 196. 
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It suggests that  
“by limiting intra-brand competition, and, accordingly, by increasing franchisees’ 
expected profits, territorial restrictions (and vertical price restrictions) can give 
would-be franchisees greater incentives to invest in specific skills and effectively 
enter a market… if they reduce intra-brand competition sufficiently”.  
It concludes that  
“the stricter the restriction, the more intra-brand competition is reduced, increasing 
both the incentives to exert effort and the efficiency gains obtained.”701 
It then continues by dismissing the concern that vertical price restraints may be used by 
cartels to sustain collusion, explaining that such action is less of a risk in the context of 
franchising than with more loosely organised distribution arrangements. It states  
“In the case of franchisees, price restrictions applied only to franchisees following 
relatively uniform methods of retailing are unlikely to block the development of new 
retailing methods and most likely will reduce intra-brand rather than inter-brand 
competition.”702  
It considers that  
“price restrictions may promote efficiency by improving vertical co-ordination 
between franchisor and franchisees”,  
and  
“can be an alternative to territorial restrictions for encouraging franchisees to provide 
adequate efforts and services – an alternative that does not generate double mark-up 
problems. In any case, the better the alternatives available to consumers from other 
brands and retailers, the less likely that franchise control over services will increase 
profits but reduce consumer surplus.”703   
It concludes that  
“As with territorial restrictions, price restraints can serve desirable functions most 
effectively when prices are well controlled. This supports sometimes not only 
“suggested” or “recommended” prices, accepted by some competition authorities for 
their usefulness in communicating information to consumers and franchisees, but also 
true price restrictions. Also, it should be noted that one possible anticompetitive use 
                                                   
701 Ibid. 
702 Ibid. 
703 OECD, ibid, p. 197. 
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of price control often cited – sustaining a dealer cartel – is in fact a type of horizontal 
agreement and in principle could still be controlled as such even if the “per se” ban on 
vertical price restrictions were lifted.”704 
Price (and non-price) vertical restraints are unlikely to be anti-competitive or reduce 
economic efficiency when the franchise system faces substantial upstream and downstream 
competition.  Where there is sufficient inter-brand competition, vertical price restraints within 
franchise networks should not generally raise competition concerns. Such an approach could 
be implemented without creating uncertainty or resulting in high costs of analysis or 
litigation.  The instances in which franchises face strong inter-brand competition are 
identifiable by clear criteria for example market shares of the franchise in the upstream and 
downstream markets, the concentration of players in these markets, and evidence of dynamic 
market competition such as recent entry of the franchise in question, recent entry and growth 
of other upstream suppliers, retailers or franchisors providing substitutable products, and 
substantial fluctuations in market shares705. 
The rule of reason approach to price restrictions in franchising has now been embraced by the 
US courts, which for the previous 100 years held such restrictions to be “per se” illegal706. In 
December 2006, the US Supreme Court granted review in the case of Leegin Creative 
Leather Products, Inc v. PSKS, Inc707. In this case a small manufacturer of ladies accessories 
such as handbags and shoes required that all its retailers “pledge” that they would comply 
with the pricing policy.  One of the retailers acceded to the pledge, but then discounted the 
product line and was subsequently suspended as a Leegin distributor. The brief filed by the 
FTC and the Department of Justice at the Supreme Court argued that  
“because the effects of retail price maintenance can be either anti-competitive or pro-
competitive depending on the facts in the given case, a per se rule is clearly 
inappropriate”708.  
The Supreme Court held709 that the manufacturers decision to agree with its retailer on the 
resale price of its products was no longer “per se” unlawful, and was instead subject to the 
rule of reason. 
It is interesting for present purposes to consider the arguments advanced by Leegin. In 
support of its argument it suggested that minimum resale pricing can result in pro-competitive 
                                                   
704 Ibid. 
705 OECD, ibid, p. 186. 
706 Since the 1911 US Supreme Decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co v. John D. Park & Sons Co, 220 U.S. 373 
(1911). 
707 (No. 06-480) 171 Fed. Appx. 464. 
708 Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae supporting petitioner, para. 3-4. 
709 (No. 06-480) 171 Fed. Appx. 464. 
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effects, such as: in giving retailers the incentives to provide necessary service levels; 
promoting product sales; eliminating free riding by rival retailers; and inducing capital and 
employment investments which are needed for innovation in the development of new 
products. Leegin argued that because these effects promote inter-brand competition, 
maintenance of the per se rule is inappropriate. 
Whilst it may be the case that the US legal environment is not directly analogous to that 
pertaining in the EU, the OECD and most economists and scholars recognise that retail price 
maintenance may enhance distribution efficiencies and increase competition. It is therefore 
reasonable to suggest that, in order to improve the regulation of franchising in the EU, the 
Commission should change its absolutist rule on retail price maintenance and carefully 
consider the important role which a uniform pricing policy plays in assisting franchisors 
(which as stated above, tend to be small or medium sized companies) to compete effectively 
with large integrated companies. To this end the Commission should follow the OECD’s 
suggestion for a “simple rule”, such as the block exemption, which allows franchisors to use 
retail price maintenance in certain circumstances.  
Happily the guidance notes to the latest draft of the proposed new vertical restraints block 
exemption710 suggests that the Commission may have been influenced by the OECD’s 
suggestion. 
This makes it more likely that efficiency arguments may be run with more success in 
whatever forum they are being pursued, be it the Commission, national competition 
authorities, EC or national courts, all of which have the ability to apply Article 81.3 directly.  
Indeed there have been other signs of a greater willingness on the part of the Commission and 
EC courts to look at the economic realities of retail price maintenance in a more favourable 
light.  In the Court of First Instance’s judgment in the GSK Spain case711 on the issue of 
restrictions designed to limit parallel trade in the pharmaceutical area.  The CFI annulled the 
Commission’s decision fining GSK on the grounds that the Commission had failed 
adequately to consider the specific legal and economic context of the distribution of the 
pharmaceuticals. 
Nevertheless, whatever the Commission’s view of retail price maintenance in the draft 
guidelines as expressed in the draft Vertical Restraint Block Exemption Guidelines, it remains 
an object-type restriction and therefore hard to justify. 
                                                   
710 Draft Commission Regulation on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical 
agreements and concerted practices, July 2009 – Guidelines on Vertical restraints, July 2009. 
711 Cast T – 168/1 GlaxoSmithKline v Commission, judgment 26 September 2006. 
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3.5.3.3 The Impact of Unfair Competition and Confidentiality law  
It is suggested that Unfair Competition and Confidentiality laws impact upon the economic 
drivers and consequential inherent risks in some jurisdictions but there is a lack of 
homogeneity which dilutes this impact on cross border franchising in the EU. 
In addition to a franchisee’s good faith duty not to compete with its franchisors, all 
jurisdictions recognise that as a fundamental part of the bargain between a franchisor and its 
franchisees the franchisor can, during the term of the relationship and for a period after its 
termination, require that a franchisee should refrain from competing with the franchisor  or 
misusing the franchisor’s confidential information.  In some jurisdictions such as England, it 
is a purely contractual term which can be absolute during the term of the agreement but must 
be reasonable in terms of time and scope after termination. In others such as Germany712, the 
non-compete and confidentiality obligations during the term is imposed by law as is the post 
term right to use confidential information.   
An obligation of confidentiality is imposed upon the franchisee during the term under Article 
18 of the German Unfair Competition Act. This stipulates that the use of samples, technical 
guidelines (drawings, models and templates) for the purpose of competing with the disclosing 
party is prohibited. It is also prohibited to disclose such material to third parties without 
authorisation. In case of violation, the Courts can impose a fine or give the violator a prison 
sentence of up to two years. All other confidential information is protected by the implied 
duty to protect the franchisor’s interest713 which is yet another example of the collateral 
approach to good faith.  
A number of other member states take a similar approach714.   
3.5.3.4 The Impact of Prohibited Terms  
It is suggested that the prohibition of terms by unfair contract terms provisions do tend to 
support the financial drivers that encourage franchisees to become involved in franchising 
and reduce some of the inherent consequential risks they expose themselves to. 
Although the duty of good faith has the greatest impact upon the fairness of contractual terms 
in franchise agreements, some consumer laws have a similar impact.  The Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive (1993/13/EEC) means that there is a generally common approach to unfair 
contract terms in the EU.  These provisions can apply to franchise agreements.   
                                                   
712 Article 18 of the German Unfair Competition Act 
713 Sections 675 (1), 611, 241 (2) BGB. 
714 For example Italy: Under the Italian Franchise Law franchisees and their employees are subject to a duty 
of strict confidentiality about the franchising business, during and after the term of the agreement (Law of 6 
May 2004, No. 129 Article 5.2).   
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Although there is no general legal requirement in the UK for a franchise agreement to be 
either fair or reasonable, the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (“UCTA”) provides that a 
franchisee who has signed a standard form franchise agreement can challenge a term that 
excludes or limits liability for breach of contract and the clause will only be enforceable if it 
is fair and reasonable. This will change if the Unfair Contract Terms Bill (“UCTB”) becomes 
law in the UK. It will allow individuals and micro-businesses (businesses employing 9 or 
fewer staff) to challenge any standard term of franchise agreements if the clause in question 
has not been negotiated between the parties and is not the main subject matter of the contract 
or the price715.  
In the UK franchisees also enjoy an implied term that any goods purchased from the 
franchisor are of satisfactory quality716. This implied term can be excluded by contractual 
terms provided that such exclusions are reasonable717. However, the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1977 provides that a franchisee who signs a standard form contract can challenge an 
unreasonable exclusion or limitation of its rights. 
Likewise, in Ireland, when a franchisee purchases goods from its franchisor there will be an 
implied term that they will be of satisfactory quality and fit for normal use718.  
Articles 305 – 310 of the German BGB which deal with unfair contract terms are at least 
partially applicable in an business to business relationship719 such as a franchise agreement. 
Very often the franchisee is considered to be the “weaker party”720 and is protected by the 
unfair contract terms provisions721. Over the years, the courts have developed a list of clauses 
which are null and void because they violate unfair contract terms provisions.  These 
prohibited terms include those that leave the franchisor’s contractual performance duties 
entirely to his discretion;722 restrict the entrepreneurial freedom of the franchisee unless they 
are necessary to ensure the franchisor’s corporate identity723; empower the franchisor to 
reduce the size of the franchisees territory or end its exclusivity if the franchisee is not able to 
reach a certain target and without giving the franchisee the opportunity to make up for missed 
                                                   
715 Many franchisee businesses are micro-businesses. The new law will not affect existing franchise 
agreements or franchise agreements with a total transaction value of more than £500,000 (including the 
initial franchise fee and all on going royalties). 
716 Section14 Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
717 Section 6 (3) Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. 
718 Sections 12 to 15 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 as amended by the Sale of Goods and Supply of 
Services Act 1980. 
719 Palandt BGB, Überbl. v. § 305, Rn. 11. 
720 §§ 305 to 310 BGB, formerly the German Unfair Contract Terms Act. 
721 Section 307, 308 and 309 of the Civil Code. 
722 BGH NJW-RR 2000, 1159ff; Giesler, Franchiseverträge, Rn. 111. 
723 Giesler, ibid, Rn. 108. 
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targets724; and provide the franchisor with short notice termination rights. A period of notice 
of three month is null and void725 whereas a notice period of one year or a little less is not726. 
This means that many terms that are commonly used in common law franchise agreements 
are void (and accounts for some of the “softer” language in the 5 German franchise 
agreements considered in the sample in Chapter 2 above).  Effectively the Courts “negotiate” 
for the franchisee, where the franchisee itself cannot, as failure to comply results in the 
provisions being struck out completely rather than applying a blue pencil approach. 
Sections 339, 340 of the German Civil Code permit the imposition of penalty clauses that 
take effect if a party is breach of the contract727. The penalty must not be excessive and if it is 
agreed upon in a standard form agreement (see the above) it must not be unduly burdensome 
in terms of Section 307 of the Civil Code728.  If agreed upon in standard contract terms a 
contract penalty can only apply to negligent or intentional non-performance729. A clause that 
seeks to impose an excessive penalty is void.  
Germany is not the only EU jurisdiction that takes this approach730. 
However, not all jurisdictions take this approach to franchisees.  The ECJ, in Francesco 
Benincasa v Dentalkit Sr.731, confirmed that under Italian law franchisees are self evidently 
not consumers and that they should not therefore be regulated by consumer laws.  If, as 
inexperienced individuals dealing with sophisticated corporations they require protection, 
such protection should be crafted specifically for them.  The imposition of consumer laws on 
franchising is inappropriate and risks damaging the legitimate interests of both franchisors 
and franchising as a whole. 
                                                   
724 BGH NJW 1984, S. 1182ff.; Giesler/Nauschütt, Franchisrecht, Chapter 9, Rn. 84 and 89. 
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726 Giesler, ibid, Rn. 119. 
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730 In Portugal, the Law of General Contractual Clauses (LGCC) (Decree no. 446/85 of 25 October as 
amended) also applies to all standard form contracts which have not been negotiated by the parties and 
cannot be contracted out of (Santos Cruz/Krupenski, IBA Legal Practice Division International Franchising 
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such as: exclusion to the right of compensation; or any provisions which goes against the principle of good 
faith. Clauses which do not comply with the LGCC are null and void. 
731 Case C-269/95 Francesco Benincasa v Dentalkit Srl [1997] ECR I-3767. 
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3.5.3.5 Sub-Conclusion 
The ongoing franchisor/franchisee relationship in the EU is impacted by a regularity 
environment that comprises a duty of good faith, antitrust, unfair competition and consumer 
law. 
The common law and civil law take a very different approach to the concept of good faith. 
Whereas the German and French approach is loose and amorphous based upon the Roman 
law concept of bona fides, the common law takes a for more literal approach to contracts, 
using a variety of legal tools to ensure fairness on the relationship. However, even with the 
Civil approach to the concept of good faith differences exist between member states.  The 
influence of Article 101 of the TFEU mean that all member states take a similar approach to 
the regulation of vertical restrictions within the franchisor/franchisee relationship whereas 
Unfair Competition and Confidentiality lies very substantially on a member state by member 
state basis. Unfair Contract term provisions are harmonised by the Unfair Competition Terms 
Directive. 
3.5.4 The termination of the Franchisor/Franchisee relationship 
This is critical analysis to the second objective of the thesis.  It suggests that on the 
termination of the franchisor/franchisee relationship the legal environment in the EU does not 
support any of the economic drivers that encourage franchisors to become involved in 
franchising and does not significantly reduce any of the risks that franchisors are exposed to.  
However it excessively reduces the risks to which franchisees are exposed to and over re-
enforces the economic drivers that encourage them to become involved in franchising. 
3.5.4.1 The Contractual Right to Terminate a Franchise Agreement  
Termination is the ultimate means by which both franchisor and franchisees can enforce their 
contractual rights against each other and so support the economic drivers and reduce the 
consequential inherent risk in franchising.  However, the right to terminate is regulated in a 
number of different ways in EU member states.  In the event that a party breaches the 
contractual terms of the franchise agreement, subject to the nature of the breach and the 
impact of the concept of good faith, employment law and commercial agency law, all EU 
member states allow the party not in breach to terminate the agreement and/or sue for 
damages.  
In the UK franchisees and franchisors have the right to terminate the franchise agreement if 
the other party has committed a repudiatory breach or has breached a term of the agreement 
which is of major importance.  
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Franchise agreements will commonly contain clauses preventing the franchisor competing 
with the franchisee’s business during the term of the franchise agreement. Such a condition of 
the contract would be regarded as a term of major importance.   
A repudiatory breach is one that goes to the root of the contract and shows the breaching 
party’s intention not to honour its obligations under it. When it is implied the test is whether 
the franchisor has acted in “such a way as to lead a reasonable person to the conclusion that 
he does not intend to fulfil his part of the contract”732. It must be established that the 
breaching party has made it clear beyond reasonable doubt that it no longer intends to 
perform its part of the franchise agreement, otherwise the franchisee may be in breach of the 
contract itself733. 
Following such a breach the party not in breach has the choice of whether to treat the contract 
as continuing (affirmation of contract) or to bring the contract to an end “ab initio” (as if it 
had never been in force), but it must exercise this right within a reasonable time of the breach 
or else it will be held to have affirmed the franchise agreement734. However, the party not in 
breach can take a period of time to make his mind up about what to do735. There is no 
prescribed way to accept the breach736 but it is usually done by the party not in breach 
communicating to the other party that it is terminating the contract737. A repudiatory breach 
can occur before the time for performance (an anticipatory breach). If the franchisee affirms 
the contract, such affirmation is irrevocable and the party cannot go back upon the decision 
not to terminate the contract738.   
Where there has been a breach of a term which goes to the root of the contract and amounts to 
repudiation the party not in breach may terminate the contract “ab initio”739. For the breach of 
a lesser term however, the party’s right to terminate will depend on the consequences of the 
breach740.   
If the party not in breach accepts the breach, the contract will be terminated for the future as 
from the moment the acceptance of the breach is communicated to the breaching party. The 
contract is treated as having come into existence (obligations and performance that occurred 
                                                   
732 Devlin J in Universal Cargo Carriers Corporation v Citati [1957] 2 QB 401, 436. 
733 Mersey Steel and Iron Co v Naylor, Benzen & Co (1884) 9 App Cas 434. 
734 Cox Toner (International) Ltd v Crook [1981] IRLR 443. 
735 Per Rix LJ in Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Company (no 2) [2002] EWCA Civ 889. 
736 Vitol SA v Norelf Ltd [1996] AC 800; Stocznia Gdanska SA v Latvian Shipping Company) [2001] 1 
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737 Heyman v Darwins Ltd [1942] AC 356. 
738 Bentson v Taylor Sons & Co [1893] 2 QB 274. 
739 Poussard v Spiers and Pond [1876] 1 QBD 410. 
740 Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 1 All ER 474. 
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before the breach are not affected) but that it has come to an end discharging future 
obligations741.   
Courts interpret contractual termination clauses in light of the commercial purpose that was 
intended to be served by the clause742. For a non repudiatory breach, the franchisee can only 
recover loss that is suffered at the date of termination and not future loss743. For a repudiatory 
breach, damages for future loss can be recovered744.   
Where the terms of the franchise agreement provide that the right of termination for a 
specified breach can be exercised upon notice given to the breaching party, such notice must 
be sufficiently clear and unambiguous to constitute a valid notice745.   
Breach of the franchise agreement will usually lead to an award of damages. It is possible for 
franchise agreements to provide for specific sums to be payable on the occurrence of certain 
breaches (liquidated damages). In principle such clauses are only valid746 so long as they do 
not constitute a penalty designed to enforce the offending party to compensate the innocent 
party for its loss747 and are a genuine pre-estimate of loss748. 
In Germany there is a distinction between serious and less serious breaches.  A party can 
terminate the franchise agreement without notice depending on the particular circumstances 
and an objective evaluation of the interests of the franchisor and the franchisee749. This is 
similar to the distinction between material breach of a substantial term and other breaches. 
Termination without notice is reserved for irremediable material breaches of substantial 
terms. Non payment of the franchise fee is deemed remediable and therefore requires notice 
unless the payment is more than six weeks overdue750. The period can be longer or shorter 
depending on the amount outstanding751. 
Although termination without notice is possible in some circumstances752, termination is 
rarely without some form of notice. The party in breach must be given a clear opportunity to 
                                                   
741 As per Lord Wilberforce in Johnson v Agnew [1979] 1 All ER 883 at 889. 
742 Ellis Tylin Ltd v Co-operative Retail Services Ltd [1999] BLR 205; MannaiInvestment Co Ltd v eagle 
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745 Allam & Co Ltd v Europa Poster Services Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 638. 
746 Cellulose Acetate Silk Ltd v Widnes Foundry [1933] AC 20. 
747 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co v New Garage and Motor [1915] AC 79. 
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749 Palandt BGB, 69th edition 2010, § 314 Rn. 7. 
750 KG Berlin BB 1998, S. 607ff (“Burger King”). 
751 Giesler/Nauschütt, 2nd edition 2007, Franchiseverträge, Rn. 253. 
752 Palandt BGB, §314 Rn. 7. 
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remedy the breach753. Termination must take place within a reasonable time of notice754. The 
Federal Supreme Court has ruled that two months can be reasonable755 but after eight months 
the right of termination is deemed to have been waived756. This is not dissimilar to the 
English concept of waiver. 
In France, any material breach by the franchisor may lead to the termination of the contract 
by the franchisee.  Jurisprudence provides useful examples of what amounts to a material 
breach.  Failure to enable the franchisee to use the trademark757, the transmission of specific 
know-how and the permanent provision of assistance of the franchisee are considered as 
fundamental to a franchise agreement. A material breach of one of these conditions by the 
franchisor may lead to the termination of the agreement758. 
An abusive unilateral modification of the financial conditions of the contract759, breach of the 
territorial exclusivity granted to the franchisee760 and abandonment of the concept proposed to 
the franchisee761 have also all been held to be material breaches that justify termination of the 
franchise agreement by the franchisee762. 
All jurisdictions allow termination for breach on reasonable notice763. Distinctions are made 
between material breaches of substantial terms and lesser breaches in terms of the 
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Contracts. Conc. Consom. 1994 No. 190. 
- Not passing on his know-how to the franchisee - Cass. Com. 24 May 1994 no 92-15846, Contracts. Conc. 
Consom. 1994 No. 190 
758 Paris Court of appeal, 20 May 1988, 20 ans de jurisprudence de la franchise, n° 26. 
759 Rouen Court of appeal, 13 October 1994, Jurisdata 050353. 
760 Cass. Com., 27 March 1990, Bull. Civ. IV n° 96. 
761 Paris Court of appeal, 7 June 1996, Jurisdata 022009. 
762 However, the practicalities of termination are far more mechanistic in France and as a matter of 
principle, termination must be declared by a court.  However, there are two exceptions to this principle of 
judicial termination. Firstly, the Cour de cassation has been ruling since 1998 that a party may unilaterally 
terminate the agreement "at his own risk" without going to court when the breach is such that it makes 
impossible to continue with the agreement (Cass. Civ. 1e, 13 October 1998, Bull I n° 300, p. 207). 
Secondly, a termination clause may be included in the franchise agreement stating that it can be terminated 
for breach without going to court.  
763 In Belgium the general rules for the termination of an agreement apply to franchising agreements. Fixed 
term agreements can terminate due to effluxion of time, whilst agreements of indeterminate length (which 
include fixed term agreements that have been renewed several times can only be terminated by giving 
reasonable notice. Breach of contractual terms by one of the parties entitles the other to terminate the 
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consequences of the breaches particularly the required notice period and the right to remedy 
the breach764.  
Other member states make similar distinctions765. 
                                                                                                                                                        
agreement and claim damages (Belgian Civil Code Article 1184). Only a serious breach of the franchise 
agreement will entitle the other party to immediately terminate the franchise agreement, without having to 
give a reasonable term of notice. However the parties to the agreement can provide for automatic termination 
when certain conditions or events occur (Cass., 19th April, 1979, Pas., 1979, I, 981; Court of Commerce 
Brussels, 22nd November, 1985, BRH, 1987, 120 and Court of Commerce of Neufchauteau, 10th 
December, 1985, BRH, 1987, 123). The death or bankruptcy of one of the parties will result in the 
termination of a franchise agreement as it is a contract intuita personae, unless there is a clause granting 
successors a right to continue the franchise agreement.  Greek law also requires that termination must be on 
reasonable notice, taking into account the particular circumstances.  A period of 6 to 12 months will usually 
be considered reasonable (Yanos Gramatidis, ‘Greece’ in: Getting the deal through – Franchise 2008, pp. 
46-51). In Estonia, the franchisor may terminate the contract by giving reasonable notice unless otherwise 
prescribed by the franchise agreement (Law of Obligations Act s195 subsection 3 (“ordinary termination”)). 
Termination without notice is permissible, in particular if the terminating party cannot reasonably be 
expected to continue performing the contract due to the nature of the breach (Law of Obligations Act s 196 
subsection 1 (“extraordinary termination”)). The agreement must be terminated within a reasonable time of 
the notice. In Malta, if the franchise agreement expires, the franchisor may be obliged to renew it under a 
duty of good faith (Maltese Civil Code Art 993 See Chapter 9 p. 150), if the franchisee has substantially 
invested in the franchise and has not been able to amortise that investment. In Latvia, the general principle 
of pacta sunt servanda applies to franchise agreements, i.e. the franchise agreement can be terminated by 
mutual agreement or for the reasons set out in the franchise agreement. However, an agreement may also be 
terminated unilaterally if “excessive loss” is suffered by one party (for example the price of the purchase 
(lease) is less than half of its actual value) and mala fide of the other party can be proven (Articles 2170, 
2042, 2043 of the Latvian Civil Law).  In Austria, as a Franchise Agreement is a continuing obligation it 
can be terminated “for an important reason at anytime”. No party can be forced to continue the contractual 
relationship if it has lost faith in the other party or the other party is in default (Section 918 (2) and per 
analogiam. Section 1117 and 1162 ABGB). 
764 For example, under Slovakian law (Section 345 (1) of the Slovakian Commercial Code 513/1991 
amended on 7 Jan 2002) although a fundamental breach gives rise to a right to terminate on notice, a non-
fundamental breach, entitles the party in breach to a reasonable time in which to remedy the breach. (The 
parties may deviate from these presumptions subject to there not being a substantial imbalance between 
their rights to terminate).  This distinction also usually impacts upon the rights of the party not in breach 
and the precise moment from which termination is effective (i.e. from the date of termination or ‘ab initio’).  
Likewise, as in Greece (Yanos Gramatidis, ‘Greece’ in: Getting the deal through – Franchise 2008, p. 50 
para. 24) termination for good cause can also lead to the party in breach being under an obligation to pay 
damages (Article 673 of the Greek Civil Code and Article 330 Greek of the Civil Code), although wrongful 
termination will generally result in damages (F.I.C. of Athens 401/77, JCL (1971) 200).    
765 Polish law takes a similar approach and distinguishes between termination of an agreement with effect 
from the date of termination (“Wypowiedzenie”) (cancellation) and material breach of substantial 
obligations which might give rise to repudiation of the agreement (ab initio) (“Jednostronne odstąpienie od 
umowy”; Art. 491 KC; Bagan-Kurluta, Umowa franchisingu Monografie prawnicze, p. 125) The parties can 
expressly stipulate both circumstances in which the recission is permissible (Bagan-Kurluta, Umowa 
franchisingu Monografie prawnicze, p. 128), and a period during which they have the right to rescind the 
contract (in consideration for paying an agreed amount of money) (Art. 395 KC). However, unlike English 
and Irish law, freedom of contract is limited by the principle of good faith which requires the franchisor to 
allow the franchisee an opportunity to remedy the failure. Only if the franchisee refuses to perform its 
obligations, may a franchisor terminate the franchise agreement with immediate effect (Polish Franchise 
Organisation under www.franchiseportal.pl). The right to terminate the contract for material breach cannot 
be excluded (See “Civil Law in Poland”, on the website of the Commercial Law Center Foundation of 
Poland, www.prawo.org.pl).  Estonian law recognises not only the right to terminate a contract on 
reasonable notice (Section 116, section 195 and section 196 of the Estonian Law of Obligations) (unless 
otherwise prescribed by law or the contract) (Estonian Law of Obligations Act Section 195(3) as well as the 
right to terminate for fundamental breach (What amounts to fundamental breach is listed in Section 
116(2)(1-5) of the Estonian Law of Obligations) without notice (Estonian Law of Obligations Act Section 
196(1)), although a set procedure must be followed (Estonian Law of Obligations Act Section 106). 
Termination must be within reasonable time and is effective from the date it takes place (Estonian Law of 
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3.5.4.2 The Impact of Good Faith on Termination 
The duty of good faith can limit a franchisor’s ability to terminate in some jurisdictions766.   
In Germany termination for good cause may result in the franchisor having to pay 
compensation to the terminated franchisee. If the upfront franchise fee is not just a 
contribution towards the franchisor's costs in incorporating the franchisee into the system, but 
also a fee for the know-how and goodwill of the franchise and for other ongoing costs 
incurred by the franchisor, the upfront franchise fee is partly repayable as far as there has 
been only partial consideration767.  According to the principles of good faith768, upon 
termination there is also an obligation on the franchisor to repurchase any stock the franchisee 
was contractually committed to buy from the franchisor769, unless the franchisor has 
terminated for a material breach of the franchise agreement770.   
The French concept of good faith takes a restrictive approach to the termination of a franchise 
agreement and determines that a reasonable notice period needs to be given. As a general 
rule, the longer the franchise agreement has run the longer the notice period will have to be. 
L. 442-6 I of the Commercial Code prohibits a sudden termination of a well established 
business relationship and obliges the terminating party to give sufficient notice to the other 
party in order to allow it to reorganise its activity and to find alternative solutions. Failing 
that, the terminating party may be held liable and may have to pay damages to the other party.  
Wrongful termination generally gives rise to damages.   
In the UK good faith has no impact upon termination. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Obligations Act Section 195(2)). The legal remedies available include damages (Estonian Law of 
Obligations Act Sections 115 and 127 to 140) and recission (Estonian Law of Obligations Act Section 111). 
In Denmark, the franchise agreement may be cancelled if a party is in substantial breach of the contract 
(Sondergaard, Franchising in Denmark, p. 10). There is no legislation specifically dealing with termination.  
If the question is not addressed in the franchise agreement, each of the parties may terminate the agreement 
on “ordinary” notice which is typically 3 months. 
766 In Dutch law the right to terminate for breach is subject to the principle of reasonableness and fairness 
(Article 6:248 Dutch Civil Code).  Termination contrary to good faith is null and void, although if the 
contravention of the duty of good faith is merely inadequate notice, the Court may convert the termination 
in to a valid one by altering the date on which termination would take effect. Termination can also be on 
grounds not provided for in the agreement (Article 6: 258 Dutch Civil Code) as well as breach of contract 
(Article 6: 265 Dutch Civil Code). Case law on dealers/distributorship contracts, suggests that if the 
franchisee has made important investments in the franchise which he has been unable to write off and the 
franchisor terminates only for technical reasons and is unwilling to negotiate fair termination conditions, 
the Dutch Courts might protect the franchisee against such termination (Compare Judgment of January 26, 
1989 Court of Appeal Amsterdam, 118, KG, 1989). Termination of the franchise agreement on inadequate 
notice gives rise to damages equivalent of the expected net loss of profits of the franchisee over the 
appropriate notice period.  
 
767 OLG Frankfurt NJW-RR 1995, S. 1395ff; Giesler, Franchiseverträge, Rn. 272. 
768 Section 242 of the German Civil Code. 
769 Op cit Giesler, Rn. 276. 
770 ibid. 
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3.5.4.3 The Impact of Employment Law on Termination 
Many EU jurisdictions struggle with the concept of franchising. They find it hard to reconcile 
the obligation of a franchisee to follow the franchisor’s system and directions with the 
independence of a stand alone business.  As a consequence they apply aspects of employment 
law to protect franchisees. Despite the fact that the franchisees invest in their own business 
they are deemed to be employees. This has an impact on the Franchisor’s ability to terminate 
the agreement for breach.  This is perhaps due to the fact that some jurisdictions have 
extremely strict employment laws and some employers are suspected by the Courts of using a 
veil of franchising to camouflage what is nothing more than an employment contract, and so 
escape the rigorous controls of the law. Certainly a small number of franchises do look rather 
“thin” with little or no know-how and offering little or no training and support.  However, this 
is not true of the majority of franchises. 
This underlying distrust of the description of individuals as franchisees is very evident in 
Germany, where franchisees cannot be contractually restricted more than is necessary to 
ensure the proper functioning of the franchise system771.  If the franchisee is restricted more 
than this, he/she can be viewed as an “employee in disguise”772 and so considered as an 
employee of the franchisor, placing on the franchisor all of the consequential obligations, 
particularly the liability to pay social insurance and the obligation to report all staff members 
to the Inland Revenue, health insurance funds and social security institutions. There is also an 
obligation to deduct income tax and social insurance contributions of the employee’s salary. 
This can be expensive. A franchisee is seen as an employee in terms of Section 23 of the 
German Termination Protection Act (KSchG), if the franchisee is financially dependent on 
the franchisor and in need of protection like an employee. 
Simply adhering to the corporate identity of the franchise system does not mean that the 
franchisee will be considered as an employee773.  As long as the franchisee is in control of its 
own business and can, for example, determine its sales prices, employ its own staff, sell the 
products and services for its own account and in its own name and determine its own working 
hours it will not be considered to be an employee774. 
The more the franchisee’s day to day conduct is regulated by the franchisor the more likely it 
is that the franchisee will be considered as employee. This is especially so if the franchisor is 
the only supplier/customer of the franchisee and if the franchisee has no employees of its 
                                                   
771 BGH, Beschluss vom 4.11.1998 – VIII ZB 12-98 (so-called Eismann-Entscheidung). 
772 Giesler, ibid, Rn. 165ff; Flohr, DStR 2003, 1622-1626; Skaupy, NJW 1992, pp. 1785, 1789f. 
773 Flohr, BB 2006, pp. 389, 390. 
774 Ibid. 
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own775. A franchisee can be self-employed even though the franchisee is contractually 
committed to fit out the premises according to the franchisors instructions, needs the 
permission of the franchisor to refurbish the premises, is tied to the franchisor as regards the 
goods it sells/uses in his/her business, must use the advertising material provided by the 
franchisor, must employ such numbers of individuals so as to be able to keep the business 
open during the statutory opening times. However these guidelines are not conclusive. The 
Courts always stress that each contract is individual and all circumstances of the individual 
case must be considered776. 
French law also follows the same approach as Germany.  If the franchisor interferes in the 
franchisee’s business beyond what is necessary to ensure that the proper functioning of the 
network the franchisee may be regarded as an employee especially where the degree of 
supervision is such that the franchisee appears to be subordinated to the franchisor, regardless 
of what is stipulated in the agreement777. Even where the franchisee is not subordinated to the 
franchisor the provisions of the French Employment Code may also apply778 if the 
franchisee’s business consists essentially in the sale of goods; there is a supply exclusivity or 
quasi-exclusivity to the benefit of the franchisor and the franchisee carries on his business in 
premises made available or approved by the franchisor under its conditions and prices.  If the 
franchise is deemed to be an employee, the franchisor may be prosecuted for illegal 
employment and required to pay social security contributions for the past 3 years and late 
payment penalties; the statutory minimum salary to the franchisee; holidays, overtime and 
dismissal compensation. 
A similar approach is found in several other member states such as Austria779, Finland780, the 
Netherlands781, Greece782, Sweden783, the Czech Republic784. 
                                                   
775 BGH NJW 1999, S. 218, 220 (“Eismann”). 
776 BGH NJW-RR 2003, S. 277, 280; BAG NJW 1997, 2973ff. 
777 Cass. Soc., 17 April 1991 no 88-40121, Dr. Soc. 91, p. 516. 
778 Article L. 7321-2 of the Labour Code - Cass. Soc., 4 December 2001 no 99-41265, Société France 
Acheminement, JCO G 2002, p. 1241. 
779 OGH, RdA 1980, 136.  In addition, if the Austrian Labour Law Court considers an individual franchisee 
to be a “quasi-employee” it will assume and exercise jurisdiction over disputes arising from the Franchise 
Agreement (Op cit, Petsche, Riegler and Theiss, 2004, p.3).  If a franchisee loses his ability to make 
independent business decisions it might be seen a violation of “bonos mores” and therefore void the whole 
Agreement.  
780 Finnish employment legislation can also affect the franchisor-franchisee relationship (Hanna-Maija Elo 
‘Finland’ in Getting the Deal Through – Franchise 2008, p. 37 para.22) where a single private person or 
entrepreneur enters into a franchise agreement or where the franchisee is a company but owned and run 
totally by one person. This is because the franchisor is giving orders and instructions to the franchisee and 
the latter is getting “paid” by the franchisor through the issuance of its service fees which are only paid 
back in parts to the franchisor in the form of franchise fees. 
781 In the Netherlands franchisees may be treated as employees by both the courts and the tax authorities.  
Pursuant to Article 7:610 of the Dutch Civil Code, there is a contract of employment and franchisees may 
be considered to enjoy employee protection rights, (such as protection against unfair dismissal, minimum 
wages and minimum holidays), if the franchisee has to perform the work personally, the franchisor is 
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This approach clearly reduces the franchisor’s ability to terminate for breach and so 
undermines the economic drivers that encourage it to become involved in franchising and 
does not reduce the consequential inherent risks the franchisor is subject to. 
The English and Scottish courts have not considered the case, but it is considered unlikely 
that they would see bona fide franchisees as employees. 
3.5.4.4 The Impact of Commercial Agency Law on Termination 
The EU Commercial Agency Directive785 provides that a commercial agent is a person acting 
in the name of and for the account of its principal and so clearly does not therefore apply to 
franchising. Merely labelling an agent a franchisee will not enable the principal to circumvent 
the provisions of the Directive as they focus on the form rather than the substance of the 
relationship. There are numerous examples of this786.  However, some jurisdictions go much 
further than this and apply commercial agency law to franchises by analogy as a matter of 
course. 
In Germany, if the franchise has the characteristics of an agency or distributorship, it will be 
treated accordingly. However, the courts go much further than this and use the doctrine of 
                                                                                                                                                        
obliged to pay the franchisee and there is a relationship of supervisory authority between the franchisor and 
the franchisee. Fortunately the Courts rarely take this view. However, the tax authorities apply similar 
criteria and are more inclined to assess a case on the factual circumstances than the civil law judges. It is 
therefore more likely that a franchise agreement will qualify as an employment agreement from a tax 
perspective than under employment law. The tax authorities put particular emphasis on the franchisee’s 
ability to have the work performed by someone else. In order to get confirmation that a franchise agreement 
does not qualify as an employment relationship from a tax law perspective, the franchisee can file an 
application for a Declaration of Income Tax Status (Verklaring Arbeidsrelatie (VAR)) with the Dutch tax 
authorities. A VAR will safeguard the franchisee of payment of employee insurance contributions and wage 
tax contributions.  
782 Greece takes a similar approach and under certain circumstances, a franchise may be identified as an 
employee on the basis that certain elements arising form a contract for independent services may be 
regarded as “work” and thus fall into the scope of Article 648 of the Greek Civil Code (Yanos Gramatidis, 
‘Greece’ in: Getting the deal through – Franchise 2008, pp. 46-51). 
783 Given Sweden’s strong tradition of protecting the rights of employees, it is not surprising that the 
application of employment law to franchise agreements was one of the most controversial issues in the 1987 
official report (Chapter 3 p. 41). The topic was not within the scope of the Government Report, but 
reappeared in the discussions in the Cabinet on the proposal that was to be put forward to the Parliament. 
However, the matter in question on both occasions was not whether or not a franchisee can be an employee 
but the right for employees of the franchisee to negotiate directly with the franchisor. Such a measure was 
rejected by the Ministry (Prop. 2005/06:98 pp. 18-19). He concluded that the question of employees’ 
influence arising under such similar conditions should be discussed separately (Prop. 2005/06:98 pp. 18-
19). Thus, the franchisee’s employee cannot negotiate directly with the franchisor (Lagen (1976:580) om 
medbestammande i arbetslivet. Prop. 2005/06:98 pp. 9-10).  
784 In the Czech Republic, the franchisee is considered to be a “controlled party” and so the franchisor can 
be liable for its actions (Op cit, Marc. P and Theiss. W, 2004, p.25-34) even though the franchisee is not its 
employee.784 The franchisor can avoid liability only if it can show that the action or transaction would have 
been undertaken by an independent party acting with due care (Ibid Marc and Theiss, p.25-34). 
785 Council Directive (EC) 86/653 on the Coordination of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Self-
Employed Commercial Agents [2004] OJ L 382. 
786 E.g under Danish law Act no. 272 of 2 May 1990 on Commercial Agents and Travelling Salesmen 
(“Handelsagentloven”); Op cit, Christensen, Franchising in Denmark, pp. 18-19 and in Malta Articles 49 to 
56 Commercial Code 
  184 
analogy to extend the rights of a commercial agent to franchisees. Commercial agents are 
entitled to compensation upon termination of the agency agreement787. The Federal Supreme 
Court has held that a distributor may also claim this compensation upon termination.788 
Several of the lower courts (including decisions by the Higher Regional Courts) have ruled 
that this provision can be applied by analogy to certain forms of franchise agreements too789.  
As a result, franchise agreements which integrate the franchisee into the sales organisation of 
the franchisor are likely to attract compensation claims. Such a claim must meet two basic 
criteria. Firstly, like a commercial agent, the franchisee must be obliged to leave his 
established clientele to the franchisor. Secondly the franchisor must be able to use the 
franchisee’s customer base upon the termination. If the franchisee cannot identify his clientele 
by name or address (as is usually the case with a walk-in fast food business) a market analysis 
showing that there are regular customers is necessary to support a claim790. The actual scope 
of compensation differs depending upon the average profit of the franchisee in the past and 
how far the profits are related to the established clientele that the franchisee leaves to the 
franchisor791. Compensation is limited to the average annual profit of the last five years792. A 
discount is made to the “general pulling power of the brand”. Compensation has to be 
claimed within one year of termination793. A simple letter is enough to preserve the right. 
Section 90a of the Commercial Code, that deals with an agents’ rights on termination 
regarding restrictive covenants is also applied by analogy to franchising794. 
There are many examples of commercial agency law being applied to franchising795. 
                                                   
787 Section 89b of the Commercial Code (Germany). 
788 BGH NJW 1985, S. 3076, 3077; 1983, S. 2877, 2878. 
789 LG Frankfurt am Main 10.12.1999, Az: 3/8 0 28/99 (not published); Giesler, ibid, Rn. 145; Köhler, 
NJW 1990, pp. 1689-1697, 1689; Haager, NJW 2002, pp. 1463-1475, 1471. 
790 Köhler, ibid, pp. 1689-1697, 1693. 
791 Giesler, ibid, Rn. 148. 
792 Section 89b (2) Commercial Code (Germany). 
793 Section 89b (4) Commercial Code (Germany). 
794 See below. 
795 “Aquella” (Federal Court of Justice, judgment of 12 November 1986 – I ZR 209/84 (DB 1987, p. 1039, 
1040)).  The plaintiff has been a franchisee for mobile mineral water distribution franchise “Aquella”. The 
franchise contract contained a post-contractual non-competition clause for the period of two (2) years, 
without providing for financial compensation. The plaintiff applied for the declaration that (i) the non-
competition clause is contra bonos mores, and, in the alternative, that the non-competition clause is only 
valid if the defendant pays compensation in the amount of annual earnings for two (2) years. The Federal 
Court of Justice dismissed claim (i), but approved the claim for compensation (ii). Even though the court 
clearly indicated that the provisions governing commercial agents (Art. 84ff. HGB) do not apply for 
franchise contracts automatically, the court held that the application of Art. 90a sec. 1 clause 3 German 
Commercial Code (hereinafter: HGB) is applicable by analogy in the case under consideration. Art. 90a sec. 
1 clause 3 HGB provides for a waiting allowance if a commercial agent is obliged to omit business 
activities by a non-competition clause. According to the court, the obligation to pay a waiting allowance 
would serve to ensure the agent’s costs of living for the period of time he is contractually bound to the non-
competition clause. The court pointed out that, because of the economic dominance of the franchisor, 
franchisees would often be forced to accept non-competition clauses. According to the court, the situation 
of the franchisee in this particular case was comparable to the commercial agent’s position as presumed in 
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The German approach is unsurprisingly also found in those member states which are heavily 
influenced by German law, such as Portugal796 and Austria797.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Art. 90a HGB: The defendant specified the way its marks had to be used and the routes the franchisees had 
to take. Vis-à-vis the customers the franchisee did not disclose his legal independence. For the customers, it 
did not become clear that each franchisee acted in its own name and on its own behalf. Advertising 
measures were directed and executed by the franchisor. The court stated that this would give rise to the 
assumption that the situation under consideration comes as close to the legally protected interests of a 
commercial agent that the application of Art. 90a sec. 1 clause 3 HGB by analogy must be regarded as 
necessary.  “Chain Contracts between Franchisor and Franchisee” (Federal Court of Justice, judgment of 17 
July 2007 – VIII ZR 59/01 (NJW 2002, p. 1554f)). The appellant, a former franchisee of an US car rental 
franchising system, has been sued by its German subsidiary for disclosure of information, and for cease-
and-desist from using the company’s marks after the company decided not to renew the franchise contract 
after 12 years of contractual relationship. The company gave notice of the non-renewal only two weeks 
before expiration of the contract. By way of counter-claim the appellant (franchisee) applied for (i) the 
declaration that the plaintiff and its mother company are obliged to pay all damages which have arisen out 
of the non-renewal of the franchising contract causally determined by not having granted a termination 
period of at least one year, and (ii) disclosure of all advertising allowances paid by automotive 
manufacturers and importers to the plaintiff and/or its mother company. The Federal Court of Justice 
ordered the respondents to pay damages which have arisen out of the non-renewal of the franchising 
contract without granting a termination period of six (6) months. The court held that Art. 89 HGB, 
according to which a period of cancellation of 6 months is required when the contractual relationship lasted 
for more than five years, is applicable to the franchise contract at hand. The court stated that commercial 
agency law can be applied by analogy to franchise agreements if the fundamental idea of a specific 
commercial agency law provision applies for the franchise agreement at stake because the interests of the 
franchising parties are identical to those governed by the respective commercial agency law provision.  The 
court argued that Art. 89 HGB serves to grant a protection period within which the commercial agent may 
seek a new principal, or a new field of business. Such a period would be a necessity for a franchisee, too, if 
its business operations were tailored to the sales and distribution concept of the franchisor. In the case, the 
franchisee was obliged to use the standard contract templates of the franchisor, its marks, and to employ a 
standard design for the business premises as well as for the outfit of its employees. According to the court, 
these obligations resulted in a comprehensive integration into the franchisor’s distribution system which 
would not allow for readjustment on short notice. Even though the franchising contract has been entered 
into in 1984 only for a period of three years, and subsequently been renewed for periods of two or three 
years, these “chain contracts” would have to be regarded as one contractual relationship if the terms have 
not been altered, or subject to negotiations, before the renewal has been agreed on. Thus the contract must 
be regarded as having been entered into 1984, not the date of the most recent renewal (December 1993), 
which would have resulted in a cancellation period of three (3) years.  “Beer Delivery Contract” (Federal 
Court of Justice, judgment of 15 December 1993, VIII ZR 157/92).  In the decision the Federal Court found 
that the Art. 89a HGB (termination for causes) is applicable by analogy to franchise contracts. However, as 
since 2001 Art. 314 German Civil Code provides for a general regulation, thus Art. 89a HGB has since 
become meaningless. 
796 In Portugal, the agency law also applies to franchise agreements in respect of termination and 
compensation, unless any foreign law referred to in the contract is more favourable for the franchisee 
(Article 38 of Decree No. 178/86 of 3 July as modified by Decree No. 118/93 of 13 April). This means that 
unless the foreign law offers even more protection, the Portuguese Agency Law will apply irrespective of a 
valid choice of foreign law. Where the performance of the franchisee is similar to that of an agent and the 
franchisor maintains the franchisees’ customers after the termination of the agreement, (Supreme Court of 
Justice, proc. No. 06a4416, dated 9 January 2007) franchisees are entitled to compensation upon termination 
due to their loss of good will. This view is endorsed by commentators (Antonio Pinto Monteiro, Direito 
Comercial – Contratos de Distribuicao Comercial, Coimbra, 2002, p. 163-170 and L. Miguel Pestana 
Vasconcelos, O Contrato de Franquia (Franchising), Coimbra,  2000 p. 95-98).  Compensation will be 
calculated on the basis of lost profits, lost investment opportunities and employee obligations, etc. although 
the franchisee may require that they are calculated upon the basis of the average monthly income it received 
during the preceding year multiplied by the period of the Agreement still to run. Some commentators 
suggest that if this provision applies, it will entitle franchisees to compensation upon termination of the 
Agreement, even if it was terminated for good cause and carried out in accordance with the terms of the 
Agreement. The theory is that this compensation is on account of the Franchisee’s loss of goodwill (Article 
33 of Decree 178/86 of 3 July as modified by Decree Law 118/93 of 13 April). A franchisee may also be 
able to successfully claim compensation for wrongful termination. A franchisor will only evade this 
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However, this approach can also be found in certain other member states that are not so 
heavily influenced by German law798.   
Clearly this approach substantially restricts the franchisor’s ability to terminate for breach and 
so undermines the economic drivers that attract franchisors to franchising and does not reduce 
the risks to which the franchisor is exposed. 
In France, the courts have not shown any signs of applying commercial agency law to 
franchising. 
However, in some member states, such as the UK799, it is clear that the agency regulations do 
not apply to franchising.  
                                                                                                                                                        
liability, if the contract terminates by way of effluxion of time in accordance with express notice provisions 
or if there are none, on reasonable notice (which can be between one month and a year depending upon the 
duration and ‘importance’ of the Agreement) and good cause.   
797 Austrian commercial agency law likewise applies to franchising by analogy (Section 24 (formerly 
Section 25) of the Austrian Commercial Agent Act (“Handelsvertretergesetz”, in short “HVertG”) OGH 
10.4.1991 WBl 1991, 332; OGH 5.5.1987 – Stefanel – ÖBl 1987, 152; OGH 21.10.1987 NRSp 1988/3 1; 
Liebscher/Petsche, Franchising in Österreich, p. 79) and on termination of the franchise agreement entitles 
the Franchisee to compensation in respect of the clients that it brought into the franchise system. The 
franchisee is also entitled to be reimbursed those investments he was obliged to make by the franchise 
agreement. However this claim will be limited in regard to the degree of amortisation unless it terminated 
the Agreement itself or if the Agreement was novated or transferred to a third party (Section 454 Austrian 
Trade Law (“Handelsgesetzbuch”, “HGB”)).   
798 For example, Spanish agency law (Law 12/1992, May 27th, regulating Agency Agreements complies 
with the obligations imposed on EU members states by Directive 86/653/EEC of 18 December 1986 on the 
coordination of the laws of the Member States related to self-employed commercial agents) can also be 
applied to franchising by analogy (Sections 9.1 and 10.1 of Law 12/1992, of 27 May, on the Agency 
Agreement). Franchisees can be awarded compensation for termination of their agreement based on the 
theory of unfair enrichment (Vid. STS, Sala de lo civil, Sección 1ª, 22 de marzo de 1988 (RJ 1988\224)) 
although there seems to be a distinct lack of certainty.  Although recent judgements of the Spanish Supreme 
Court (STS, Sala de lo civil, Sección 1ª, 26 de octubre de 2005 (RJ\2005\8147), STS, Sala de lo civil, 
Sección 1ª, 27 de octubre de 2005 (RJ\2005\8043), STS, Sala de lo civil, Sección 1ª, 5 de febrero de 2004 
(RJ\2004\639)) have refused to apply Section 28 (which sets out the entitlement to compensation upon 
termination) of the Agency Law by analogy, other judgements (STS, Sala de lo civil, Sección 1ª, 21 de 
noviembre de 2005 (RJ\2005\7677), STS, Sala de lo civil, Sección 1ª, 18 de marzo de 2004 (RJ\2004\2147), 
STS, Sala de lo civil, Sección 1ª, 26 de abril de 2004 (RJ\2004\2714), STS, Sala de lo civil, Sección 1ª, 20 
de mayo de 2004 (RJ\2004\2786)) have taken the contrary view. The rationale usually proposed for 
extending the compensation beyond agents to other distributors and franchisees is that: (i) all these 
agreements belong to a general category which can be called “distribution agreements”; (ii) all these 
distributors (agents, exclusive distributors and franchisees) are distributing not their own products but those 
of the principal, and (iii) they are all charged with finding new customers for the products. However, these 
common features are not present in all these agreements in equal measure, so depending on the 
circumstances of each particular case the right to compensation may or may not be recognised by the court. 
Although compensation is mandatory for agency agreements in Spain, it is optional for distribution and 
franchising agreements, due to the principle of party autonomy (Section 1255 of the Spanish Civil Code). 
Compensation may be excluded. Thus, if the right to compensation by way of analogy is recognised for 
franchisees, franchisors can expressly exclude compensation in their franchise agreement. 
799 Also Latvia and Slovakia.  Article 45 of the Latvian Commercial Law. A franchisee is considered an 
entrepreneur whose franchise is included in the franchisor’s distribution network and who is obliged with 
regard to the franchisor to sell the latter’s goods on its own behalf and at its own expense. A similar 
position exists in Slovakia where the general view seems to be that provisions concerning commercial 
agents in the Commercial Code do not apply to franchise agreements (Frolkovic. P and Biksadsky. L, 2005, 
“Franchising in Slovakia”, International Journal of Franchising Law, Volume 3, Issue 2, p. 3-11) because 
franchisees generally enter into contracts in their own names and on their own accounts.   
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3.5.4.5 Post Termination Restrictive Covenants 
In Germany, the law of commercial agency is applied by analogy.  This means that the right 
to restrict a franchisee after expiry of the franchise agreement comes at a price with the 
franchisee being entitled to compensation. The franchisee may agree to post termination non 
compete obligations for a maximum of two years after termination. In return the franchisee 
can claim compensation800 under the commercial agency laws which are applied by analogy 
as detailed above801. The obligation to pay compensation can be avoided by the franchisor if it 
waives the non compete in writing at least six months before the end of the contract period. If 
the franchisor gives less than six months notice of the waiver it is required to pay 
compensation for each month difference between the mandatory period of six months and the 
actual notice period given.802 If the franchise agreement is terminated for material breach, the 
non breaching party can waive the non-compete restriction on one month’s written notice803. 
Any contract terms excluding these rights of the franchisee are null and void804 805. 
In France, whereas courts are very strict regarding non-compete covenants binding 
employees, they take a less stringent view on non-compete undertakings by non-employees, 
notably franchisees. For such covenants to be enforceable they must be limited in time and/or 
space and the restriction must be proportionate to the legitimate interests of the franchisor806.  
It is possible that in the future, the French courts follow the German example and rule that in 
order for non-compete covenants to be enforceable against individuals the franchisor must 
pay them compensation, as is the case with employment agreements807. However, this is not 
currently the case808. In 2002, the Supreme Court ruled that a franchisee was an ongoing 
business809, which prevented the franchisee from claiming any compensation.   
                                                   
800 Section 90a (1); Baumbach/Hopt, HGB, § 90a Rn. 18. 
801 BGH NJW 1987, S. 612, 613; Flohr, 3rd edition, Franchisevertrag, p. 193; Giesler, Franchiseverträge, 
Rn. 149ff; OLG Celle, BB 2007, pp. 1862; also see above. 
802 Hopt, in: Baumbach/Hopt, HGB Kommentar, 33rd edition 2008, § 90a Rn. 23; Section 90a (2) German 
Commercial Code. 
803 Section 90a (3) Commercial Code. 
804 the right to claim for appropriate compensation according to Section 90a does not exclude the right to 
claim for compensation upon termination under Section 89b of the Commercial Code - Hopt, in: 
Baumbach/Hopt, HGB Kommentar, 33rd edition 2008, § 90a Rn. 18. 
805 In Austria, there are limits to post term termination clauses deriving from anti trust law. The Austrian 
courts generally recognise the possibility of the application of agency legislation to franchise agreements by 
analogy for situations where the franchisee has a similar position to an agent. As post-term non-competition 
provisions under Austrian agency law are null and void (§ 25 HVertG), it is possible that depending on the 
structure of the contractual arrangement under the franchise agreement, a post-term non-competition clause 
may be void for that reason. 
806 (Cass. Com., 4 January 1994 n° 92-14121, D. 1995, p. 260; Cass. Com., 16 December 1997 n° 96-
10859, Contr. Conc. Consom., March 1998, n° 39 ; Cass. Civ. 1e, 11 May 1999 n° 97-14493, Contr. Conc. 
Consom., October 1999, n° 137.) 
807 (Cass. Soc., 10 July 2002, Dr. Soc., November 2002, n° 11, p. 949) 
808 (Cass. Com., 1st July 2003, JCPE, n° 22, 27 May 2004, p. 869) 
809 (Cass. Civ. 3e, 27 March 2002, Bull. III, n° 77, p. 66) 
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The restrictions on post termination restrictive covenants detailed in the EU Vertical 
Agreements Block Exemption810, obviously have some impact, although it is greater in some 
jurisdictions than others.  
In the UK provisions in franchise agreements that limit the franchisee’s right to operate a 
competing business after the termination of the franchise agreement will be void unless they 
are reasonable811. The burden of proving that a restriction is reasonable lies with the 
franchisor who wishes to enforce the clause. If such a clause is considered unreasonable and 
it will be unenforceable, but it does not mean that the entire contract is void. The parties must 
continue to perform the other obligations under the contract812. There is debate as to whether 
unreasonable parts of a non-compete clause can be severed. However, some courts have 
achieved this effect by constructing the clause by reference to circumstances existing at the 
time the contract was made and not necessarily giving it its literal meaning813. 
The restraint imposed must be reasonable in terms of the length of time and the geographical 
area which the restraint covers. In Dyno-Rod plc and Zockoll Group Ltd v Reeve814 both a 
period of twelve months and the extent of the restriction limited to the territory the franchisee 
                                                   
810 EC Regulation No 2790/1999, OJ L 336, 29.12.1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to 
the categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices OJ L 336, 29.12.1999.  For example, the laws 
of the Czech Republic also provide that although the parties can decide the grounds on which the franchise 
agreement can be terminated, post termination restrictions must comply with the limitations set forth in the 
Vertical Restraints Block Exemption and not exceed one year after the termination of the agreement. 
Finnish law (Section 38 of the Contracts Act (228/1929)) provides that a contract which unreasonably 
prevents or restricts competition by imposing an obligation not to engage in a certain activity or not to 
conclude an employment contract with a person engaging in such activity will not bind the party which has 
accepted the obligation (Section 38 of the Contracts Act (228/1929)). General EU competition law 
principles also apply (Petri Rinkinen, Franchising Legislation in Finland, www.franchising.fi/ukindex).  In 
Greece, after the expiration or termination of the franchise agreement, a franchisee may no longer take 
advantage of the franchise system and (Section 719 of the Greek Civil Code) the franchisee’s freedom to 
compete is subject to the law on unfair competition (Article 919 of the Greek Civil Code as well as to Law 
146/14 on Unfair Competition). Covenants not to compete are prima facie valid unless they are contrary to 
public policy (Article 178 of the Greek Civil Code). They will be held admissible by the courts as long as 
the non-compete provisions may be considered reasonable and in accordance with the general principles of 
law, such as good faith, ethical behaviour and protection from the abuse of rights (Yanos Gramatidis, 
‘Greece’ in: Getting the deal through – Franchise 2008, p. 46). Since there is no definition of what is 
‘reasonable’ in this context, the courts will determine this question on a case-by-case basis. As long as a 
covenant not to compete is of limited duration and applies only to a specific restricted territory, it should 
be valid under Greek law (F.I.C. of Athens 11486/80 JCL (1981) 50, 131, F.I.C. of Athens 14284/81, JCL 
(1982) 144, F.I.C. of Heraklion 158/86, JCL (1987) 38). The franchisor, on the other hand, is under the 
obligation to purchase some products and goods back from the franchisee. The purchase price in this 
respect will be the stock value of the product. However, there is no obligation to purchase all remaining 
goods, especially a large stock of inventory (Dimitros Stefanos Kostaki, “Termination of a franchise 
agreement and adherent obligations” in Franchise Success under www.franchise-success.gr). Confidential 
information is protected in Greece by an implied duty of confidentiality which continues after the 
termination of the contract and which is based on the principles of good faith, commercial practice and the 
special nature of the franchise agreement (Articles 200 and 288 of the Greek Civil Code as well as Law 
146/14 on Unfair Competition). 
811 Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co Ltd [1894] AC 535. 
812 Wallis v Day and another [1835-42] All ER Rep 426. 
813 Littlewoods Organisation Ltd v Harris [1978] 1 All ER 1026. 
814 [1999] FSR 148. 
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was permitted to operate the franchise were considered reasonable815. In Prontaprint plc v 
Landon Litho Ltd816 a covenant not to engage in a similar business within a radius of half a 
mile for three years was held to be reasonable. Similarly in Kall-Kwik Printing (UK) Ltd v 
Bell817 a clause preventing involvement in competing businesses for a period of eighteen 
months and within a radius of 700 metres of the centre was upheld.  In the UK confidentiality 
is entirely a contractual matter. 
The nature of the franchise relationship means that it is only equitable that franchisees are 
generally obliged to restrict themselves to the franchise and not be involved in competing 
businesses. It is also appropriate for a former franchisee to be restricted from competing with 
its former franchisor for a reasonable period of time as otherwise it is inevitable that the 
franchisors’ know-how could be abused and that former franchisees will benefit from a 
“spring board” effect. 
3.5.4.6 Sub-conclusion 
The legal regulatory environment in the EU does not support any of the economic drivers that 
encourage franchisors to become involved in franchising and does not significantly reduce 
any of the risks that franchisors are exposed to.  However, it over reduces the risks to which 
franchisees are exposed and an over re-enforces the economic drivers that encourage them to 
become involved in franchising.  All member states recognise the right to terminate for 
breach, although some (e.g France) are more formulaic in how it has to be exercised than 
others.  However the duty of good faith in some member states, such as Germany over 
protects franchisees, entitling them to refunds of upfront fees on termination in some 
circumstances.  An inappropriate use of employment law in some member states can also 
over protect some franchisees.  Likewise the application by analogy of commercial agency 
law in Germany erodes the economic drivers that attract franchisors to franchising and 
excessively de-risk it for franchisees.  Post-termination restrictive covenants are an essential 
element in reducing the risks inherent in franchising for franchisors, but German law applies 
commercial agency by analogy to erode this protection. 
3.6 Empirical Research into the Regulatory Environment 
This is critical analysis to the second objective of the thesis and deals with empirical research 
undertaken for this thesis involving a selection of franchisors who are, or plan to, franchise in 
more than one EU member state. 
                                                   
815 This was also considered reasonable in the Court of Appeal in Office Overload Ltd v Gunn [1977] FSR 
39. 
816 [1987] FSR 315. 
817 [1994] FSR 674. 
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The majority of franchisors in the sample would welcome some form of EU wide franchise 
specific statutory regulation of franchising instead of a self regulatory regime or the 
application of general member state laws to franchising which many see as creating a barrier 
to inter state franchising.  They believe that the statutory regulation of franchising in France 
and Spain seems to have had no adverse impact on franchising there. 
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1. What are the main barriers to franchisors expanding into other EU member states?  Do you consider the following factors to be very 
significant, significant or insignificant barriers 
 
 VERY SIGNIFICANT SIGNIFICANT INSIGNIFICANT 






























24 (96%) 23 (92%) 22 (88%) 23 (92%) 1 (4%) 2 (8%) 3 (12%) 2 (8%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 







4 (16%) 1 (4%) 8 (32%) 17 (68%) 19 (76%) 22 (88%) 16 (64%) 2 (8%) 2 (8%) 2 (8%) 1 (4%) 6 (24%) 
Others 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
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2. What are the greatest risks that a franchisor incurs in deciding to franchise its business? 
 
 VERY SIGNIFICANT RISK SIGNIFICANT RISK INSIGNIFICANT RISK 


















term of the 
Franchise 
Agreement 





term of the 
Franchise 
Agreement 




9 (36%) 22 (88%) 24  (96%) 25 (100%) 15 (60%) 3 (12%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
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 VERY SIGNIFICANT RISK SIGNIFICANT RISK INSIGNIFICANT RISK 

























23 (92%) 23 (92%) 22 (88%) 16 (64%) 2 (8%) 2 (8%) 3 (12%) 9 (36%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
3. Why did you franchise your business?  Do you consider the following factors to have been very significant, significant or insignificant? 
 
 VERY SIGNIFICANT SIGNIFICANT INSIGNIFICANT 
 UK  Germany   France  Spain  UK  Germany  France  Spain  UK  Germany  France  Spain  
Access to 
working 
18 (72%) 18 (72%) 16 (64%) 13 (52%) 6 (24%) 4 (16%) 1 (4%) 4 (16%) 1 (4%) 3 (12%) 8 (32%) 8 (32%) 
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0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 25 (100%) 25 (100%) 25 (100%) 25 (100%) 
4. Which of the following obligations are very significant, significant or insignificant in protecting your business from franchisee abuse? 
 
 VERY SIGNIFICANT SIGNIFICANT INSIGNIFICANT 






term of the 
20 (80%) 18 (72%) 20 (80%) 1 (4%) 5 (20%) 5 (20%) 4 (16%) 8 (32%) 0 (0%) 2 (8%) 1 (4%) 17 (68%) 
   195 






















3 (12%) 21 (84%) 13 (52%) 19 (76%) 21 (84%) 3 (12%) 2 (8%) 6 (24%) 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 10 (40%) 0 (0%) 




























None         
   196 
5. Are you in favour of the Statutory Regulation of Franchising in the EU? 
 
 UK Germany France Spain 
Yes 8 (32%) 14 (56%) 24 (96%) 23 (92%) 
No 11 (44%) 6 (24%) 0 (0%) 1 (4%) 
Don’t know 6 (24%) 5 (20%) 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 
6. If franchising is regulated by law, should it be done at an EU level rather than a national level? 
 
 UK Germany France Spain 
Yes 6 (24%) 22 (88%) 24 (96%) 25 (100%) 
No 18 (72%) 2 (8%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Don’t know 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 
7. Has the statutory regulation of franchising in your country had an adverse impact upon your business? 
 
 France Spain 
Yes 0 (0%) 1 (4%) 
No 24 (96%) 23 (92%) 
Don’t know 1 (4%) 2 (8%) 
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8. Do you believe that specific statutory regulation of pre-contractual disclosure is more effective than self regulation in preventing abuse of 
franchisees? 
 
 UK Germany France Spain 
Yes 10 (40%) 13 (52%) 22 (88%) 20 (80%) 
No 11 (44%) 8 (32%) 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 
Don’t know 4 (16%) 4 (16%) 2 (8%) 4 (16%) 
9. Do you believe that the legal regulation of duties and obligations of franchisors and franchisees during the term of the franchise agreement 
would significantly reduce disputes between franchisors and franchisees? 
 
 UK Germany France Spain 
Yes 1 (4%) 14 (56%) 6 (24%) 8 (32%) 
No 24 (96%) 4 (16%) 14 (56%) 9 (36%) 
Don’t know  7 (28%) 5 (20%) 8 (32%) 
10. Do you believe that statutory regulation of franchising is more likely to improve the quality of franchising than self regulation? 
 
 UK Germany France Spain 
Yes 8 (32%) 14 (56%) 23 (92%) 21 (84%) 
No 12 (48%) 7 (28%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 
Don’t know 5 (20%) 4 (16%) 1 (4%) 4 (16%) 
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11. Do you think that statutory regulation of pre-contractual disclosure in franchising will enable disputes between franchisors and franchisees to 
be resolved in a more effective manner? 
 
 UK Germany France Spain 
Yes 22 (88%) 21 (84%) 18 (72%) 18 (72%) 
No 1 (4%) 2 (8%) 3 (12%) 6 (24%) 
Don’t know 2 (8%) 2 (8%) 4 (16%) 1 (4%) 
12. Are franchised businesses disadvantaged as compared to non-franchised businesses as regards 
(a)  Their ability to set prices in all of their outlets 
 
 UK Germany France Spain 
Yes 19 (76%) 18 (72%) 19 (76%) 18 (72%) 
No 3 (12%) 4 (16%) 5 (20%) 3 (12%) 
Don’t know 3 (12%) 3 (12%) 1 (4%) 4 (16%) 
(b) Their ability to control the franchisees use of the internet 
 
 UK Germany France Spain 
Yes 14 (56%) 14 (56%) 4 (16%) 16 (64%) 
No 8 (32%) 2 (8%) 15 (60%) 8 (32%) 
Don’t know 3 (12%) 9 (36%) 6 (24%) 1 (4%) 
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13.  In your experience if prospective franchisees are given lengthy documentation to read giving details about the franchise, its performance and 
the role of franchisees do they read it? 
  
 UK Germany France Spain 
Yes 9 (36%) 3 (12%) 6 (24%) 8 (32%) 
No 13 (52%) 13 (52%) 10 (40%) 9 (36%) 
Don’t know 3 (12%) 9 (36%) 9 (36%) 8 (32%) 
14. In your experience do the cultural and commercial differences between different national markets give rise to  different problems and issues for 
franchisors? 
 
 UK Germany France Spain 
Yes 20 (80%) 22 (88%) 13 (52%) 12 (48%) 
No 2 (8%) 2 (8%) 10 (40%) 8 (32%) 
Don’t know 3 (12%) 1 (4%) 2 (8%) 5 (20%) 
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The above results suggests that the majority of franchisors surveyed in France818, Spain819, 
Germany820 and around a third of those surveyed in the UK821 are in favour of the EU wide 
statutory regulation of franchising and felt that it would improve the quality of regulation. 
Interestingly, of those who responded to the survey in both Germany and the UK a significant 
minority had no clear opinion of whether or not it was a good idea. 
The French and Spanish respondents generally felt that statutory regulation of pre-contractual 
disclosure is more effective than self regulation in preventing abuse of franchisees822 whilst a 
small majority of German respondents823 and just over a third of UK respondents824 shared 
this view. 
It is noteworthy that none of the French franchisors surveyed and only one of the Spanish 
franchisors surveyed felt that the statutory regulation of franchising in their jurisdiction had 
adversely impacted upon their business.  
This belief in the EU wide statutory regulation of franchising is not a recent trend.  Research 
carried out back in 1991825 showed that even then the majority of franchisors surveyed in 10 
EU member states believed that franchising should be regulated by law826. The vast majority 
of these believed that any franchise specific regulation should be EU, rather than nationally, 
based827.   
Despite the national variances, research in those member states in which franchising is most 
prevalent (the UK, Germany, France and Spain) seems to suggest that the majority of 
franchisors believe that franchising should be regulated statutorily in the EU and that 
voluntary regulation does not provide an appropriate level of protection.   
Other empirical research undertaken for this study tends to support this lack of faith in self 
regulation and suggests828 that the majority of franchisees in the UK do not feel that the BFA 
represents their interests or the interests of franchising in general.  Nor do they trust the 





822 88% in France and 80% in Spain. 
823 52% 
824 40% 
825 Op cit Abell, European Franchising, p. 46 - 1,282 franchisors in 10 member states surveyed with a 
response rate of 25%. 
826 88% in Portugal; 57.6% in Spain; 85.7% in the Netherlands; 100% in Denmark; 65% in the UK; 66.7% 
in France; 69.4% in Germany and 50% in Belgium. 
827 60.4% in the UK; 70.5% in France; 84.6% in Spain; 100% in Portugal; 66.6% in Italy; 75% in Germany; 
66.6% in Denmark; 88% in the Netherlands; 90% in Belgium. 
828 Appendix 5 
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impartiality of the BFA’s dispute resolution procedure and they would rather litigate than use 
BFA arbitration. 
Further empirical research undertaken for this study involved a survey of 25 leading franchise 
lawyers829.  The results of this survey suggests that leading practitioners also believe that 
statutory regulation of franchising is more effective than self regulation and that the EU 
should regulate franchising throughout the EU in a uniform manner rather than leaving it to 
individual member states to enact their own franchise law.   
3.7 Conclusion 
The second objective of this thesis has been achieved.  It has been established that the 
regulatory environment in the EU is partly responsible for franchising’s under achievement in 
the single market.  It has established that franchising needs to be regulated830 and that the 
contractual831 and regulatory832 environment in the EU (both self regulatory833 and legal) 
within which franchising operates does not adequately protect and re-enforce the economic 
drivers that attract franchisors and franchisees to become involved in franchising.  Nor does it 
adequately reduce the consequential inherent risks834.  In some cases it over protects the 
franchisees, so increasing the risks to franchisors and eroding the economic drivers that 
attract them to franchising in the first place. 
The contractual environment tends to support and re-enforce the economic drivers that 
encourage franchisors to become involved in franchising and reduces their consequential risk 
to a reasonable level835.  However, it does not always re-enforce the economic drivers that 
encourage franchisees to become involved in franchising and it fails to reduce the 
consequential risks for franchisees adequately836. Self regulation of franchising does not 
work837.  Although the BFA sees its mandate as seeking “to deliver self-regulation 
frameworks and then (delivering) that product to prospective franchisees”838, it seems to have 
achieved little. Such intransigence gives little credibility to those advocating self-regulation. 
If the franchisor’s trade body fails to respond to its member’s request for a higher level of 
self-regulation, how can self-regulation be expected to gain the confidence of either the 
public or the legislature? Historically it has been unwilling to take steps to enforce its code of 
                                                   
829 Appendix 4. 
830 See 3.2 above 
831 See 3.3 and 3.4 above 
832 See 3.8 above 
833 See 3.6 above 
834 See 3.8 above 
835 See 3.5.1 above 
836 ibid 
837 See 3.6 above 
838 ibid 
  202 
conduct839. These are substantial flaws in the BFA’s credentials as an effective self regulatory 
body. 
The inevitable conclusion is that franchising needs to be legally regulated in the EU and that 
voluntary regulation will never be able to provide franchisees, potential franchisees or indeed 
franchisors with the level of protection that they require.  
Much is made, by those who advocate self regulation, of the difficulties and delays created by 
legal regulation. 
Self regulation of franchising in the EU is not transparent, consistent, accountable or 
proportionate.840  Even the most mature national franchise associations are struggling to make 
the change from representing the interests of franchisors to representing those of franchising.  
Even if they successfully make that change, they only account for just over a fifth of 
franchisors in the EU. Given the international nature of franchising, any self regulatory 
system must cover all 27 EU member states, and that is extremely unlikely to happen in a 
consistent manner given the current state of national franchise associations in the EU. There 
is a lack of suitably experienced, authoritative, fully representative and sufficiently resourced 
franchise associations. 
As even the Director General of the BFA admits that self regulation is “simply not viable on a 
pan EU basis”841, one is led to conclude that the self regulatory environment in the EU does 
not adequately support the economic drivers or reduce the consequential risks inherent in the 
franchisor/franchisee relationship. 
Despite clear and substantial differences between the civil and common law approaches to 
drafting commercial contracts franchise agreements exhibit a uniform architecture which 
comprises provisions detailing the grant made by the franchisor to the franchisee, the term 
and renewal, targets, the obligations of both parties, confidentiality, non competition, transfer, 
product and services ties, good will and termination842.  There is a contractual asymmetry due 
to the multi-lateral nature of the franchise relationship (each franchisor having several/many 
franchisees) and the long term, dynamic and changing nature of the franchisor/franchisee 
relationship843. 
The contractual environment in the EU supports the economic drivers that encourage 
franchisors to become involved in franchising844.  It does not adequately support all of the 
                                                   
839 Between 1997 and 2007 the BFA expelled fewer than 5 members. 
840 www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/bre/index.html, accessed 08.10.2009. 
841 Brian Smart in an interview with the author on18 September 2008. 
842 See 3.4 above 
843 ibid 
844 ibid 
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economic drivers that encourage franchisees to become involved in franchising845. It provides 
for a brand, a format and support but it does not impose a qualitative measure for the format 
or assistance provided. 
The contractual environment in the EU reduces the consequential risk inherent for the 
franchisor to a reasonable level, but it does not do so for the franchisee846. 
The self regulatory environment does not effectively support or re-enforce the drivers that 
attract either franchisors or franchisees to franchising.  Neither does it reduce the 
consequential inherent risks for either party847. 
The self regulatory environment in the EU is marked by a complete lack of homogeneity, the 
lack of a clear or consistent approach to enforcement, a significant conflict of interest 
between the interests of franchisors and franchising as a whole and an inability to have any 
influence whatsoever on nearly 80% of franchise chains in the EU, as they are not members 
of the national franchise associations848. 
The regulatory environment in the EU seeks by way of franchise specific laws in six member 
states to reduce to risks to which franchisees are exposed by ensuring that they have sufficient 
information to allow them to take a view of the adequacy of the business format and the 
support delivered by the franchisor to its franchisees and the franchisor’s historical approach 
to encroachment.  Its success in reducing those risks is dependent on the franchisee carefully 
considering the information it receives, particularly the feedback from existing franchisees 
and is comprised by the inevitable fact of life that the franchisor’s historical conduct may not 
be indicative of its future behaviour.  The lack of homogeneity of approach between the 
different EU member states further substantially dilutes its impact on cross border 
franchising.  The lack of any uniform approach to pre-contractual disclosure further weakens 
the impact of franchise specific laws849. 
They do not seek to reduce the risks of informational asymmetry and moral risk to which the 
franchisor is exposed850.  Some regulatory regimes seek to redress this imbalance by 
imposing a duty of pre-contractual disclosure on the potential franchisee851 but that is not part 
of the EU pre-contractual regulatory environment. 
                                                   
845 ibid 
846 ibid 
847 See 3.6 above 
848 ibid 
849 See 3.8 above 
850 ibid 
851 In Vietnam not only does the franchisor have to disclose information to the franchisee, but so does the 
franchisee to the franchisor. In order to assist a franchisor when deciding to grant commercial rights, Article 
9 of the Commercial Law provides that, upon receiving a reasonable request from the franchisor  the 
franchisee is under an obligation to supply the franchisor with information about itself  The earlier Chinese 
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The economic drivers which attract franchisors into franchising and those that attract 
franchisees to it are neither supported nor eroded in any particular way by the pre-contractual 
disclosure franchise specific regulatory environment in the EU852. 
Non franchise specific laws impact upon the pre-contractual regulatory environment in the 
EU in five distinct ways.  They impose a duty not to misrepresent facts853, an obligation to 
disclose relevant information to potential franchisees854, an extra contractual obligation to 
disclose relevant information to potential franchisees855, an extra contractual obligation of 
confidentiality856, an obligation to enter into the franchise agreement once negotiations have 
passed a certain point857 and a right to withdraw from the contract within a limited time 
period858.  Each member state takes a different approach to each of these issues resulting in 
the lack of any homogenous approach.  This in turn substantially weakens their impact upon 
cross border franchising within the EU and creates a technical barrier to franchising between 
EU member states859. 
The ongoing franchisor/franchisee relationship in the EU is impacted by a regulatory 
environment that comprises a duty of good faith, anti-trust, unfair competition and consumer 
law860. 
The common law and civil law takes a very different approach to the concept of good faith861. 
Whereas the German and French approach is loose and amorphous based upon the Roman 
law concept of bona fides, the common law takes a for more literal approach to contracts, 
using a variety of legal tools to ensure fairness on the relationship. However, even with the 
Civil approach to the concept of good faith differences exist between member states.  The 
influence of Article 101 of the TFEU mean that all member states take a similar approach to 
the regulation of vertical restrictions within the franchisor/franchisee relationship whereas 
Unfair Competition and Confidentiality lies very substantially on a member state by member 
state basis. Unfair Contract term provisions are harmonised by the Unfair Competition Terms 
Directive. 
                                                                                                                                                        
franchise law (the Measures for the Regulation of Commercial Franchises issued by the Ministry of 
Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, December 31, 2004, Chapter III Article 9) also provided for 
this but it was dropped (without any explanation) from the most recent Chinese statute. 
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Thus there is a complete lack of harmony between the various regimes seeking to regulate the 
franchise relationship by statute in the EU862.   Some issues, deemed worthy of specific 
regulation in certain jurisdictions outside of the EU are not dealt with at all863.  Franchisors 
embarking upon a European “roll out” of their concept must expect to encounter delays and 
costs that are a direct result of this heterogeneous approach– an artificial barrier to pan 
European expansion.  The duty of good faith has a significant impact upon the economic 
drivers that encourage franchisors and franchisees to become involved in franchising and 
reduces the consequential inherent risk.  The lack of homogeneity through the EU greatly 
dilutes this impact on cross border franchising.  The regulation of vertical restraints has an 
undermining impact upon the economic drivers that encourage franchisors to become 
involved in franchising.  
The legal regulatory environment in the EU does not support any of the economic drivers that 
encourage franchisors to become involved in franchising and does not significantly reduce 
any of the risks that franchisors are exposed to864.  However, it over reduces the risks to 
which franchisees are exposed and an over re-enforces the economic drivers that encourage 
them to become involved in franchising865.  All member states recognise the right to terminate 
for breach, although some (e.g France) are more formulaic in how it has to be exercised than 
others866.  However the duty of good faith in some member states, such as Germany over 
protects franchisees, entitling them to refunds of upfront fees on termination in some 
                                                   
862 ibid 
863  The role of third parties in franchising is not regulated by any of the EU member states.  However, there 
are examples of such regulation in other jurisdictions such as Malaysia (Malaysia governs the activities of 
Franchise Brokers "doing business as an agent or representative of a franchisor to sell a franchise to any 
person for a certain consideration but does not include any director, officer or employee of the franchisor or 
franchisee” (The Franchise Act 1998 Part I Section 4)), Korea (In Korea the law provides for the 
registration at the Fair Trade Commission of Franchise Consultants (Act on Fairness in Franchise 
Transactions Chapter III Article 28) and impose on them a duty to act “with dignity” and honesty (Act on 
Fairness in Franchise Transactions Chapter III Article 30) and can be struck off for inappropriate behaviour 
(Act on Fairness in Franchise Transactions Chapter III Article 31)) and Kazakhstan (in Kazakhstan Licence 
brokers, (those “engaged in mediation activities in the course of concluding and performance of the 
complex business license contract”) are expressly acknowledged by the  law which states that they “may act 
both on their own behalf and at their own risk, and on behalf and at the risk of the licensor, licensee or 
other subjects of franchising relations in consideration for a license broker's fee which can be payable in the 
form of a fixed single or periodic payment, fixed payments or otherwise, as provided by the contract” (Law 
on Complex Business Licence (Franchising) (Law No 330: June 24, 2002.) Chapter 3 Article 13)).  None of 
the EU member states stipulate a minimum term for franchise agreements.  However, two jurisdictions 
outside of the EU do.  In Malaysia the franchise agreement must be for a minimum period of five years 
(The Franchise Act 1998 Part III Section 25.).  In Indonesia, there is a minimum period of 5 years (The 
Provisions on and Procedure for the Implementation of Franchised Business Registration (Decree of the 
Minister of Industry and Trade No. 259/MPP/Kep/7/1997, dated July 30, 1997) Chapter II, Article 8.) and 
ten years for master franchise agreements (Cornwallis. R, 2006, “Indonesia – new franchise regulation”, 
International Journal of Franchising Law, Volume 4, Issue 3, p.5). 
864 See 3.8 above 
865 ibid 
866 ibid 
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circumstances867.  An inappropriate use of employment law in some member states can also 
over protect some franchisees868.  Likewise the application by analogy of commercial agency 
law in Germany erodes the economic drivers that attract franchisors to franchising and 
excessively de-risk it for franchisees869.  Post-termination restrictive covenants are an 
essential element in reducing the risks inherent in franchising for franchisors, but German law 
applies commercial agency by analogy to erode this protection870. 
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Chapter 4 Identifying a Catalyst to Re-engineer the Regulatory 
Environment 
The previous chapters have achieved the first and second objectives of this thesis.  They have 
established that although franchising is a specific, distinct and uniform type of commercial 
activity with a positive influence in the EU and which stimulates economic activity by 
offering economic advantages to all those involved and imposing distribution and giving 
business increased access to the other member states, it is not fulfilling its potential to 
contribute to the realisation of the single market and that the regulatory environment in the 
EU is partly responsible for this under achievement.   
This chapter provides critical analysis to achieve part of the third objective of this thesis by 
establishing what catalyst is best suited to re-engineer the EU’s regulatory environment so as 
to enable franchising to better fulfil its potential in the EU.   
It is suggested that a directive is the most appropriate catalyst to re-engineer the regulatory 
environment in the EU so that it adequately supports the economic drivers that draw 
franchisors and franchisees to franchising and reduces the consequential inherent risks in 
franchising to an appropriate level. 
4.1 Breaking Down Barriers to Trade in the EU 
This is critical analysis towards the third objective of the thesis. 
There may be disagreement about whether a self regulatory regime is more effective in 
preventing abuses than franchise specific regulations. There may also be little empirical 
evidence to prove irrefutably that franchise specific disclosure and relationship laws have 
reduced abuse, sharp practice, commercial failure or the number of franchise disputes. 
Nevertheless, the lack of a homogenous regulatory environment in the EU is a barrier to cross 
border trade.   Eight EU member states regulate franchising in distinctly different ways. There 
is also a significant difference in the way that non franchise specific laws impact upon 
franchising871.  This heterogeneity creates legal barriers to interstate trade within the EU.   
It is suggested that a regulatory environment comprising harmonized legal eco-systems in 
each member state would facilitate easier cross border franchising in the EU.  This certainly 
seems to be the view of those most actively involved in franchising in the EU on a day to day 
basis872.  The EU  
                                                   
871 See section 3.5 above 
872 A survey of franchisors and professional advisors involved in pan European franchising and interviews 
with a number of senior managers and in-house lawyers at companies actively involved in pan European 
franchising. 
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“set itself the goal of making its economy the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world” 873.   
In order to achieve this, it is clear to the Commission that it needs to create an economic 
environment which is  
“underpinned by legal certainty and security….. to address the obstacles which 
prevent businesses and consumers from making the most of the internal market”.   
It concludes that businesses  
“can operate across borders efficiently to stimulate a more competitive supply of 
goods and services”874  
and that  
“this requires a common approach”875.   
It has stated plainly that if it  
“continue(s) to accept a multiplicity of separate solutions for the same issue there is a 
risk that the uncertainty and complexity of the legal environment will undermine 
rather than enable legitimate economic activity”876.   
In other words a regulatory environment of harmonized legal eco-systems is needed to 
support the single market. 
The Belgian Parliament came to a similar conclusion in 1986 when it rejected a bill aimed at 
regulating franchising if Belgium believing that franchising was becoming more and more a 
matter of general European interest and implementing a national regulation risked 
complicating cooperation between member states877. Eight878 of the 27 EU member states 
already have franchise specific legislation creating a heterogeneous legal environment for 
franchising in the EU. The establishment of a true single market within the EU can only be 
achieved if all physical, fiscal and technical barriers are removed.879 The regulation of the 
distribution of goods or services in different ways by member states inevitably creates 
technical barriers that cannot be reconciled with the objective of creating a single market. The 
                                                   
873Mr Robert Madelin, Director General DG Health and Consumer Protection, European Commission, A 
Common Frame of Reference for a more coherent European Contract Law, Joint European Parliament and 
Commission Conference, 28 April 2004. Mr Robert Madelin, Ibid. 
874 Mr Robert Madelin, Ibid. 
875 Mr Robert Madelin, Ibid. 
876 Mr Robert Madelin, Ibid. 
877 From the answer to a Parliamentary question Mr Legnean asked on 11th April, 1986. 
878 France, Spain, Italy, Lithuania, Estonia, Belgium, Romania and Sweden. 
879 See Cecchini/Jacquemin/Catinat, The European Challenge, 1992: The Benefits of a Single Market; and 
the Single European Act 1986. 
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European Commission claims that diversity in the laws across member states leads to higher 
transaction costs for businesses which discourages consumers and businesses from engaging 
in cross-border trade and makes it especially difficult for small businesses to exploit 
economies of scale in the single market. 
The highly fragmented nature of laws within the European Union generates a need for 
harmonisation880. Although the differences between member states’ laws reflect the legal 
cultures of the various countries, they  
“threaten legal certainty and lead to high costs of legal actions; cases of dispute 
become more likely, and mostly harder to resolve too”881.   
For those involved in legal cases in foreign countries, such differences are often criticised as 
incomprehensible. These economic players would like to see the law becoming more 
compatible with the needs of the business world: simple, rapid, and predictable882.  
The lack of certainty from the combination of international, European and national laws of 
member states is particularly notable for continental lawyers who are used to the formal 
certainty of codified law. The codifications of civil law were viewed as the “ science”  of 
lawmaking. As Portalis, the principal draftsman of the French Code civil of 1804, observed:  
“Laws are not pure acts of power; they are acts of wisdom, of justice and of reason 
…. The science of the legislator consists of finding for each area those principles 
which are most beneficial to the common good”883.  
They believe that change is possible and  
“the differences between European continental legal systems and common law in 
style, method, legal culture, legal thinking and legal training are by no means 
insuperable”884. 
4.2 The Precedent of Commercial Agency 
This is critical analysis towards the third objective of the thesis. 
                                                   
880 “Quelles juridictions économiques en Europe , du règne de la diversité à un ordre européen”edited by 
Yves Chaput and Aristide Lévi, CREDA, CCIP, Editions Litec. Quote from Robert Badinter, Emeritus 
Professor at the University of Paris I in the preface to the study. 
881 “Legitimacy Conditions for a European Civil Code” Christoph U. Schmid, Florence/Munich. Here is a 
link: http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/comments/5.17.pdf 
882 “Towards a pan-European approach to commercial law” Annabelle Pando et Frédérique Perrotin (1 
October 2007) 
883 J.-E.-M. Portalis, 1988, “ Discours préliminaire sur le projet du Code civil”  in J.-E.-M. Portalis, Ecrits 
et Discours juridiques et politiques, at pp.23 and 30. 
884 See note 8. Though this is claimed by Legrand. P, 1997, “Against a European Civil Code”, Modern Law 
Review, Volume 60, 321; 
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A heterogeneous regulatory environment in the EU once existed in respect of commercial 
agency885.  Before 1986 commercial agents were protected by specific laws in a number of 
EU member states, particularly France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. The 
Commercial Agents Directive886 was introduced in order to harmonise these member state 
laws once it had been accepted by the Council of Ministers that commercial agents needed 
specific protection of their rights in relation to their principals. The possibility of each 
member state regulating agency in a different manner (as is currently the case with 
franchising) was seen as being in direct conflict with the creation of a single market within 
the European Community. It amounted to the creation of technical barriers to free trade. 
The Council of Ministers felt that it was necessary to strengthen the position of the 
commercial agent in relation to his principal. Independent commercial agents were operating 
throughout the EU across member state borders. They were seen to be in a weak position 
when dealing with their principals, although it was acknowledged that this was not always the 
case. There was evidence to suggest that commercial agents were sometimes being abused by 
their principals887. A European-wide solution was therefore felt to be appropriate.  It could not 
be left to individual member states. 
The Council of Ministers considered that the differing national laws on commercial agency 
were detrimental to the functioning of the Single Market. Their statement in the preamble to 
the Directive888 is extremely relevant to franchising. Indeed it could have been writing about 
franchising rather commercial agency. It states that,  
“the differences in national laws concerning commercial representation substantially 
affect the conditions of competition and the carrying-on of that activity within the 
Community and are detrimental both to the protection available to commercial agents 
vis-à-vis their principals and to the security of commercial transactions”.  
                                                   
885 There are some basic similarities between franchising and commercial agency. “As in the case of 
commercial agency contracts, the franchise agreement generally bring together a strong party, the principal 
or franchisor, and the weaker party, the commercial agent or franchisee. Both parties are consistently, 
before, during and after the commercial collaboration, in this unequal position with each other”.  The 
Belgian House Of Representatives, 28 Jan 2004 - Draft Parliamentary Bill Relating to Franchise 
Agreements (lodged by Mme Trees Pieters) [Doc 51 0747/001]. 
886 Council Directive (EC) 86/653 on the Coordination of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Self-
Employed Commercial Agents [2004] OJ L 382. 
887 Consumer and Competition Policy Directorate, Guidance Notes On The Commercial Agents (Council 
Directive) Regulations 1993. The Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993 (S.I. 
1993/3053 As Amended By S.I. 1993/3173). 
888 Council Directive (EC) 86/653 on the Coordination of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Self-
Employed Commercial Agents [2004] OJ L 382. 
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It continues  
“those differences are such as to inhibit substantially the conclusion and operation of 
commercial representation contracts where principal and commercial agents are 
established in different Member States; trade in goods between Member States should 
be carried on under conditions which are similar to those of a single market, and this 
necessitates approximation of the legal systems of the Member States to the extent 
required for the proper functioning of the common market; in this regard the rules 
concerning conflict of laws do not, in the matter of commercial representation, 
remove the inconsistencies referred to above, nor would they even if they were made 
uniform”.  
It therefore concludes that harmonization of member state law through a Directive is 
necessary. Exactly the same conclusion can be drawn about franchising.   This is reinforced 
by the conclusion of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
that inefficient or unduly restrictive regulation in the distribution sector (which in its study 
includes franchising) results in increased direct and indirect costs889. 
4.3 Empirical Evidence  
This is critical analysis towards the third objective of the thesis. 
A survey of legal practitioners from around the world who work in the field of franchising  
supported the suggestion that a single EU franchise law was most appropriate890. This is 
borne out by the BFA/Nat West Survey 2007 which found that legislation was seen by the 
majority of franchisors as the main barrier to international expansion891. 
Interviews with franchise lawyers experienced in cross border franchising in the EU supports 
this idea that the lack of a single EU franchise law is “a substantial problem”892 for at least 
                                                   
889 Pilat. D, 1997, “Regulation and Performance in the Distribution Sector” OECD Economics Department 
Working Paper No. 180 
890 Appendix 4 - Survey of the 25 franchise lawyers.  76% feel that franchising should be regulated on a 
pan-EU basis and 8% thought that it should not be regulated on a pan EU basis, 16% thought may be it 
should not. 
891 BFA/Nat West Survey 2007, page 20 – 53% cited foreign legislation as the most significant barrier to 
international expansion, whilst only 16% cited current EU regulations as a significant barrier. 
892 Interview with Christopher Nowak, Vice President and General Counsel, Wyndham Worldwide 
Corporation (10 March 2006). All of those franchise lawyers interviewed shared the same view.  Jane 
Colton, Vice President & Legal Counsel, Vanguard Rental GMbH (1 June 2006) stated that “the current 
form of national franchise laws in the EU makes cross border European franchising unnecessarily 
complicated. It goes against the whole rationale of the European Union increasing the cost and lead time of 
franchisors entering other EU member states.  Nunns Moodliar, General Counsel, Hertz Europe Limited 
said “Even though the EU is a single market, when Hertz do business in any of the 27 member states we 
have to undertake particular legal advice which leads to us carrying extra costs and losing time. For any 
franchisor wanting to expand within the EU, harmonisation of franchise disclosure and other law would be 
a big benefit. It will make entry into other member states quicker, cheaper and far more certain. From the 
point of view of both franchisors and franchisees clear and harmonised disclosure in all EU member states 
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some franchisors seeking to establish their businesses in several EU member states and makes 
pan European franchising far more difficult than it need be.  Although the interviews are not 
in themselves conclusive evidence of the need for a harmonised approach, they certainly 
support the evidence detailed above and are therefore worthy of consideration. 
Franchisors in the UK, Germany, France and Spain seem to feel that the extra burden 
imposed upon them by each EU member state having different franchise laws is a very 
significant barrier to their expanding into other EU member states893. A clear majority of 
those surveyed were also in favour of a pan European approach, although the majority of UK 
franchisors surveyed, reflecting their jurisdictions’ traditional antipathy to European 
legislation, felt that national legislation was more appropriate894. 
4.4 The Mechanisms Available to Harmonise EU Member State Law 
This is critical analysis towards the third objective of the thesis. 
There are seven options available for harmonising EU law895.  These are publication of non-
binding model contract rules; a binding or non-binding “tool box” for EU law makers; a 
contract law recommendation that would call on EU member states to include a European 
contract law into their national legal systems; an optional European contract law which could 
be chosen freely by consumers and businesses in their contractual relations; an EU Directive 
on the harmonisation of national law; full harmonisation using an EU Regulation and the 
creation of a European Civil Code, replacing all national law. 
                                                                                                                                                        
is essential. It should be a shop window to the business opportunity and reflect the relevant and important 
aspects of it without unnecessary clutter. I cannot understand why no one in the Commission has got around 
to the harmonisation of franchise law – both disclosure and relationship laws. It is a very tangible way of 
making the single market a reality. I am sure that if there was more harmonisation of franchise law, there 
would be a good deal more franchising, particularly at the smaller operators level. The differences between 
the law in each of the 27 EU member states are a disincentive to franchising. They particularly disadvantage 
smaller member states which are made to seem relatively unattractive to franchisors. The result is that 
franchisors entry into those smaller member states is usually delayed and sometimes abandoned altogether”.  
Roger Wilde, Managing Director, ChipsAway Limited “Why do legislators seem hell bent on making life 
so complicated for us franchisors? It’s hard enough complying with one set of laws and disclosure let alone 
potentially 27”.  Rosalynde Harrison, Head of Legal, Monsoon Limited “(the EU) really needs to sort this 
one out. There are enough legal problems with doing business in other EU member sates as it is, without the 
nightmare of having to deal with different disclosure regimes in many of them 
893 56% UK franchisors surveyed favoured EU legislation 
     60% German franchisors surveyed favoured EU legislation 
     88% French franchisors surveyed favoured EU legislation 
     83% Spanish franchisors surveyed favoured EU legislation 
894 24% UK franchisors surveyed 
     88% German franchisors surveyed 
     96% French franchisors surveyed 
     100% Spanish franchisors surveyed 
895 Commission Green Paper on policy options for progress towards a European Contract Law for 
Consumers and Businesses, 1 July 2010. 
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This thesis does not intend to consider these options in detail.  It does however make the 
observation that a regulation would not enact a franchise law that fits most easily into the 
legal environment on all 27 member states, as they vary so widely in respect of franchising896.  
All but two of the other options would have no mandatory effect.  There are therefore only 
two options that merit consideration as to which are the most appropriate to deliver a 
European franchise law.  A Directive and a European Civil Code. 
4.4.1 Directives as the way to harmonise member state law 
The EU has harmonised a number of specific sectors, such as Commercial Agency by way of 
Directives897.  Directives are legal acts which member states are required to transpose into 
national law, but are free to implement as they wish provided the end result is achieved.  
Article 288 TFEC  provides that  
‘a Directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each member state 
to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form 
and methods’.898   
Member states are under a duty to incorporate the aim of each directive into their national law 
by the given deadline. Failure to implement a directive, part implementation or incorrect 
implementation often leads to a complaint by the Commission to the European Court of 
Justice899. However it has been suggested by the European Parliament that this sectoral 
approach does not ensure the proper functioning of the internal market.  A more politically 
focused approach to the harmonisation of member state law has therefore been advocated by 
the European Parliament900. 
4.4.2 A European Civil Code as the way to harmonise member state laws 
Proponents of a codified legal system claim that it brings  
“the legal unity desired by business, lawyers and citizens alike”901.  
                                                   
896 See 3.3 above 
897 Article 249 of the Treaty Establishing the European Union 
898 Directives that have not been transposed in time, or at all, will take “direct effect’”. The doctrine of 
direct effect only applies vertically to directives. This allows individuals to rely upon the rights asserted in 
the directive against their member state, regardless of whether the directive has been implemented by such 
State, which reinforces their effectiveness. However, direct effect does not apply horizontally so individuals 
cannot assert rights against other individuals as confirmed in the case of Marshall (Marshall v Southampton 
and South West Hampshire Area Health Authority (Case 152/84) [1986] QB 401 etc.. 
899 Article 258 TFEU 
900 Resolution of 1989, OJ C 158/400 (Resolution A2-157/89); Resolution of 1994, OJ C 205/518 
(Resolution A3-0329/94) and Resolution of 2000, )J C 377/323 (Resolution B5-0228, 0229-230/2000). 
Article 1 of the EP Resolution of 1989 reads: “Requests that a start be made on the necessary preparatory 
work on drawing up a common European code of private law, the Member States being invited, having 
deliberated the matter, to state whether they wish to be involved in the planned unification”. 
901 See note 5 (p3) 
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If Europe were to adopt a civil code they argue that  
“case law and doctrine would be shifted into a new European framework where they 
could co-operate more effectively – as it were with economies of scale – something 
that ought not least to benefit the quality of law”902.  
Although European private law principles are  
“uncertain in scope, devoid of conceptual foundations, confused in their policy 
orientation and disruptive in their effects on national legal systems”,  
some academics believe that with a European code 
“the most important basic civil-law questions would be regulated uniformly to the 
advantage of businesses operating Europe-wide”903.  
As a result, in 2003 the European Commission established a “Common Frame of Reference” 
to establish  
“common principles and terminology in the area of European contract law”904.   
In 2005 the Commission engaged two main groups of academic lawyers to produce a draft 
Common Frame of Reference which comprised the “Study Group on a European Civil Code” 
(the “Study Group”) presided over by Professor Christian von Bar, and the “Research Group 
on Existing EC Private law” or “Acquis Group”905.    
The European Commission believes that contract law reform would encourage cross-border 
trading and has stated that  
"only 8% of consumers buy online from another member state,"  
and  
"in addition, 61% of cross-border sales are rejected because traders refuse to serve the 
consumer's country. This is largely due to regulatory barriers and legal uncertainty 
about the applicable rules.”906  
The European Commission’s work on European contract law, which has found a strong echo 
in the European Parliament, is therefore an important step towards opening new doors for 
businesses and helping 500 million consumers benefit from our single market907.  
                                                   
902 Summers, ZEuP 7 (1999), 201 
903 Schmind. C, 2010, “A European civil code as a building block for a European social model?”, Europen 
Law Review, Volume 35, Number 1, p.102 - 112 
904 Commission, Action Plan, at para.4.1.1 
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The Commission consulted on seven options for contract law reform in the European Union. 
The consultation process closed on 31 January 2011. The options for reform include partial 
harmonisation through an EU directive and an EU civil code as a unified replacement for 
national contract law. 
The Study Group, backed by the EU Commission, endorse the need to regulate franchising on 
a pan EU level  
“With the benefit of and from the stand point of current legal science.”908  
Its Amsterdam Group909 has therefore presented proposals that regulate commercial agency, 
distribution and franchising on a European level910. 
However, the adoption of a European Civil Code, which was announced in 2003, has raised 
much discussion about the political nature of such an initiative.  Hesselink identifies four 
areas of political function in the initiative.  The underlying ideology (autonomy or solidarity), 
the cultural conflict (National or European), Power (Levels of Governance) and the 
Symbolism of Codification (is Europe united or divided?)911. 
The technocratic approach of the Commission, appointing a group of academics to prepare a 
“Common Frame Reference”, has not abated concerns that there will be winners and losers in 
the process without the opportunity for all relevant stakeholders to have any real input912. 
In contrast to the manner in which a European Civil Code may ride rough shod over some 
member states’ legal traditions, a Directive offers a more sensitive and flexible approach to 
the regulation of franchising.  Pierre Legrand explains in his paper913 that the difficulties of a 
fully harmonised legal system under a civil code stem from sociological findings that the 
English `feel definitely uncomfortable with systems of rigid rules' and the English  
“pride themselves that many problems can be solved without formal rules”914.   
In English Law `legal development is not a matter of inducing rules, terms or institutions 
out of a number of factual situations and applying these rules, terms or institutions to new 
factual situations. Rather it is a matter of pushing outwards from within the facts 
themselves. It is a matter of moving from one res, say a public highway, to another res like 
                                                                                                                                                        
907 See: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/441 
908 http://www.sgecc.net, accessed 14 August 2009;  
909 http://ecc.uvtl.nl/ 
910 On 23 December 2008 the Commission received the final version of the academic draft CFR. 
911 Hesselink. M. W, 2004, “The Politics of a European Civil Code”, European Law Journal, Volume 10, 
No 6, p. 675-697  
912 Ibid 
913 Op cit, Legrand. P, 1997   
914 Hofstede. G, 1991, Cultures and Organisations, London, McGraw-Hill, p145 and 121 
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private property'915 .This explains the House of Lord’s opposition to a harmonised code of 
European contract law916. 
In contrast, some commentators believe that the Germans 
“have been programmed since their early childhood to feel comfortable in structured 
environments”  
and  
“look for a structure in their organizations, institutions, and relationships which 
makes events clearly interpretable and predictable”917.   
Likewise, the French believe in  
“law with sharp edges, based on suspicion, realism and pessimism which contrasts 
with English law based on custom and trust”918. 
These different legal mentalities are the result of deep-rooted differences between the three 
legal traditions embodied in case-oriented English law, rule-oriented French law, and 
concept-oriented German law919. The cultural legal differences legal are evident in the 
approach these countries take to harmonisation of EU law. England is used to dealing with 
fragmentation whereas civil law countries are more comfortable with unambiguous codified 
law and therefore are more likely to be in favour of full harmonisation.  
For Legrand “the adoption of a European Civil Code is arrogant, for it suggests that the civil 
representation of the world is more worthy than its alternative and is, in short, so superior that 
it deserves to supersede the common law's world-view”920. 
Directives are important as a method of harmonisation because they preserve the legal and 
cultural differences of member states. Walter van Gerven argues that  
“uniformity should not be an objective in itself, because it is not, of itself, a higher 
good than diversity is”.921 
The United States provides an example of a country without a civil code that is both unified, 
stable and coherent.  In the European Union’s Committee Report on the EU Consumer Rights 
Directive, Professor James P. Nehf, Professor of Law at Indiana University argues  
                                                   
915 Samuel. G, 1995, The Foundations of Legal Reasoning, Antwerp, Maklu, p.195 
916 The House of Lords EU Committee Report on “European Contract Law; the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference”, 10 June 2009. 
917 Op cit Hofstede, p.121 and 116. 
918 “Introduction generale” Siegfried (ed), Aspects de la societe francaise (Paris: LGDJ, 1954) p21. 
919 Van Gerven. W, 2008, “The Open Method of Convergence”, Juridica International, No. 1, p32-41 
920 Merryman. J, 1985, “The Civil Law Tradition”, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2nd edition, p.3 
921 Ibid. 
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“that full harmonisation is neither necessary nor desirable ….Consumer legislation in 
the U.S. varies across the states and…the consensus among consumer representatives 
(is) that a state-by-state approach (is) preferred unless there (is) a strong need for 
uniformity in a particular area of commerce”.  
This, he argues, allows for  
“a healthy degree of experimentation and an evolutionary approach to consumer 
protection nationwide. State legislatures ha(ve) been able to react more quickly to 
emerging consumer problems than the U.S. Congress. In most areas of commerce, the 
differences among state consumer laws creates few obstacles to cross-border 
transactions”922. 
There are also examples where codes have failed, in particular the failure of McGregor’s 
English Contract Code923.  This is often cited as evidence that the common law cannot be 
codified.  
To date diversity in the laws of member states has survived attempts at full harmonisation. 
This has made it possible for member states to experiment in their search for efficient and 
workable rules, in a similar way to the U.S924. 
This is one of the reasons that the General Secretariat of the European Council’s publication 
of a consolidated version of the conclusions of the Council on the setting up of a CFR 
emphasised that both the option of using the CFR to harmonise the contract law of member 
states by creating a European Civil Code and that of a CFR consisting of  complete set of 
standard terms and conditions of contract law have been rejected in favour of an optional 
“tool box” for law makers to use if and when they deem appropriate925.  The problem with 
this approach is that it is not mandatory and will therefore not deal with the fundamental 
problem of heterogeneity in the regulatory environment. 
Progressing to full harmonisation with no freedom as regards implementation would be a step 
too far.  The proposed European civil code assumes the selection and formulation of contract 
law rules is merely a technical exercise926. It fails to put into context the differences between 
                                                   
922 European Union Committee – Eighteenth Report, EU Consumer Rights Directive: getting it right. 
Chapter 3, para 55. Here you can browse the report which was ordered by the House of Lords 
to be printed 7 July 2009. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/126/12606.htm 
923 McGregor. H, 1993, Contract Code drawn up on behalf of the English Law Commission (Guiffré) 
924 Deakin. S, 2000, “Regulatory Competition Versus Harmonisation in European Company Law” (ESRC 
Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge 
Working Paper No. 163) (March 2000). 
925 The Law Societies Joint Brussels office.  October 2010.  The Brussels Office Law Reform Update 
Series: EU Civil Law. 
926 Op cit Schmid. C, 2010  
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existing national provisions and European code which would need to be bridged by 
interpretation.  
Common law systems do not formulate around rules and as Legrand argues that there is  
“much law to be found beyond the rules”.  
Consideration of human rights and social and economic depends more on judges in their 
realisation than on legislators. 
Full harmonisation through a European Civil Code would pose a clear challenge to the 
identity of member states. It would influence the moral and social values of a community and 
it would of course affect a country's legal culture927.  
There is also the question of competence with a move towards full harmonisation.  As it 
stands, EU directives leave governance with the member states’ legislators, with disputes 
handled by national courts. A shift away from directives will inevitably lead to a shift in 
power with national legislators and national judiciary losing power to Europe.  It is doubtful 
that the European judiciary would have the resources to carry the burden of a code for all 
twenty seven member states.  
4.4.3 A Directive is the most Appropriate Approach to Regulate Franchising in the EU 
Having considered the relative merits and difficulties offered by both directives and a 
European civil code, it is suggested that directives allow for a middle ground by providing 
partial harmonisation as they require member states to implement certain laws but give 
member states the freedom to choose how to implement it into their national law. This 
flexibility  
“induces individual states to enter into a `race to the top' when they would have 
otherwise have an incentive do nothing or to compete on the basis of the withdrawal 
of protective standards known as the `race to the bottom”928.  
Directives support the European single market without loosing the diversity and deep rooted 
legal culture of individual states.  
By giving member states a number of options for implementation, as well as allowing for the 
possibility that existing, self-regulatory mechanisms can be used to comply with EU-wide 
standards, harmonisation through directives actually stimulates regulatory innovation instead 
of suppressing it929. This is a strong argument in favour of the use of directives as a method 
                                                   
927 Ibid  
928 Op cit Deakin. S, 2000 “Regulatory Competition Versus Harmonisation in European Company Law”  
929 Ibid Deakin. S   
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of harmonisation, as it strikes the balance between traditional national governance and self 
regulation of member states and full harmonisation across Europe in support of the single 
market.  
Directives are therefore the preferred approach to legal harmonisation in Europe.  They allow 
member states to choose how and in which form they implement laws and Directives allow 
member states to preserve the diversity of their legal culture.  They provide a more effective 
method of harmonisation by recognising that it would be difficult to mould common law 
principles under the umbrella of a civil code.  
Further, given that the dynamics of franchising are such that it differs in its nuances in each 
jurisdiction and the commercial differences between each national market it would seem 
appropriate for a pan EU franchise law to be promulgated by way of a Directive which 
imposes minimum levels of regulation that can be fine tuned to meet any particular needs of 
each member state rather than a uniform Civil Code or Regulation. 
However, whether a new EU franchise law be imposed by way of a Directive or a European 
Civil Code, the same substantive issues as to what the law contains apply. 
4.5 Difficulties likely to be encountered  
This is critical analysis towards the third objective of the thesis. 
The European Franchise Federation and some of its member national associations will 
vigorously oppose any proposal to regulate franchising.  The BFA has been visiferous in its 
opposition to regulation930 and openly boasts that over the past 10 years it has  
“successfully prevented several misguided attempts to regulate franchising which 
would have seriously damaged franchising throughout the Common Market”931.   
Indeed, when the Chairman of the EFF suggested that the organisation might support EU 
wide regulation of franchising at a statutory level, the BFA led a palace coup to have him and 
the full board of the EFF removed932.  Any proposal to regulate franchising at an EU level is 
therefore likely to face aggressive lobbying in Brussels and elsewhere by the EFF and at least 
some of its national association members. 
                                                   
930 See 3.4.2 above 
931 Sir Bernard Ingham, Chairman of the BFA at the BFA Annual Convention, 2005 
932 Riding. B. Franchise World, Feb/March 2008 p.29 
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In Italy, Belgium and Sweden the passage of franchise laws through the respective national 
legislatures was difficult and suggests issues that may cause difficulties during the adoption 
of a Directive to regulate franchising933. 
All three jurisdictions endured long, drawn out and politically divisive debates about detailed 
aspects of the regulation of franchising in their legislatures.  It took seven years and eight bills 
in Italy, twenty four years and five bills in Belgium and nineteen years and twelve bills in 
Sweden to produce a franchise law. 
The issues that arose in Italy were agreeing a definition of franchising, too strong a franchisee 
bias in proposed bills934; an obligation for franchisors to register with the authorities935; the 
                                                   
933 In contrast the passage of the franchise laws in France, Spain, Romania, Estonia and Lithuania offers 
little guidance as to what problems these might be.  In France the only substantial amendment to the bill 
proposing the “Loi Doubin” was the inclusion in it of a requirement for certain further mandatory 
precontractual information. There was also some discussion on the length of this cooling off period, and the 
initial 10 day period in the bill was lengthened by 20 days. On December 31, 1989 the law (The Decree was 
published on April 4, 1991) was enacted with its first article becoming Article L. 330-3 of the French 
Commercial Code (French Commercial Code Article L.330-1 – See Appendix 10). In Spain the passage of 
the LRCP bill through the Senate was uneventful except for a couple of amendments. The first amendment 
proposed that bill include a definition of franchising and was made by the bill’s original proponent. It was 
accepted by the Senate without discussion. The second amendment, proposed by the socialist parliamentary 
group, unsuccessfully tried to include a further provision regarding “franchise sales”. The lack of any 
substantial debate of the Catalan proposal (either in Parliament or elsewhere) suggests that Section 62 
merely reflects the LRCP’s overall public policy, as stated in the LRCP Preamble. This provides that the 
law is intended to structure, organize and ensure the adequacy of existing legislation regulating the retail 
distribution and distribution sectors and to reduce the substantial imbalances that existed between large and 
smaller companies. Two years later, Section 62 LRCP was further developed by Royal Decree 2485/1998, 
November 13th and again in 2006 by a further Decree without debate (Royal Decree 419/2006, April 7th 
amending Royal Decree 2485/1998, November 13th regarding Retail Commerce Planning relating to the 
regulation of franchising and creating the franchisors’ register). Both the Lithuanian and Estonian laws 
passed through the legislature unnoticed as part of a general legislative preparation for their admission into 
the EU. No parliamentary debate or commentary can be found in either jurisdiction. Franchising was 
insufficiently developed in either of the Baltic States to warrant any interest from busy legislatures in the 
absence of high profile abuse or sharp practice by franchisors. The Romanian experience was similar to that 
of the Baltic States and there appears to have been no parliamentary debate about the bill at all. 
934 On 6th March 1997 Bill no. 2093 was proposed by Senator Ascuitti. Inspired by the franchise laws in 
France and Spain, it proposed both pre-contractual disclosure and the establishment of a franchisors’ 
register at the Chamber of Commerce. However the bill failed to propose a clear definition of franchising, 
making it difficult to understand the real nature of the contractual relationship to be regulated. Later the 
same year, members of the Chamber of Deputies proposed an alternative strongly pro franchisee anti-
franchisor regulation. (Bill no. 3869 of 16th June 1997) (e.g. Article 5 provided that “ the determined time of 
duration of the contract must guarantee a minimum duration  so as to allow the franchisee to depreciate its 
stocks”; Article . 6 provided “ the right for the franchisee to return the stocks and all the tangible assets at 
certain condition” and Article. 7 proposed that “ it establishes a specific regulation with regard to the 
limitations for the competition rights”.) The Bill was strongly objected to by franchisors and their trade 
body resulting in a further two bills being introduced the following year.  Senator Caponi of the Communist 
Party introduced a bill, similar to, but much briefer than bill no. 2093 (17th June 1998 Bill No. 3361).  A 
fourth bill introduced by Senator Gambini of the Left Democratic Party (Bill No. 3666 of 24 November 
1998). This was based in part upon the expired EU Franchise Block Exemption934 and contained many 
glaring errors (for example, its proposal that a post term non-compete obligation imposed upon the 
franchisee would be valid  for 3 years and conflicted with Article 3.1(c) of the EU Regulation.  This 
provision stated that the franchisee could not carry out, directly or indirectly, any competitive activity 
which might endanger the franchisor’s business for a reasonable period no longer than 1 year within the 
territory where the franchisee had exploited the franchising licence).  It attracted little support. However it 
did make an impact in one respect. It proposed that franchisors should have proven experience of 
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proposed mandatory testing period for franchises with criteria set in stone by statute; the lack 
of certainty about the need to pilot a franchise and the need for franchisees to make earning 
claims936 and give details of investment required937. 
In Belgium the problems comprised a failure to take account of the complexities of the wide 
number of sectors (including production, industry, distribution and services) that franchising 
covers; the adequacy of self regulatory regimes existing under the national codes of ethics 
were seen as offering a high level of protection for franchisees938 939; inaccurate research940; 
inappropriate fetters on the franchisor’s ability to maintain quality standards941; inappropriate 
rights of termination for franchisees942; restrictions on the franchisors right of termination943. 
                                                                                                                                                        
franchising. This proposal gained currency during the parliamentary process and eventually found its way, 
in a rather transmuted form, into the final law.  Published on May 30th, 2001 
935 The Italian Parliamentary Report published May 30th, 2001, Article 2, para 1. 
936 In July 2002, a new draft of the bill of law was presented to parliament.  It reflected some of the 
proposals of both the Italian Franchising Association and the government. In November 2002, bill no. 842 
was formally reviewed by parliament (for example, amending the definition of know-how so that it 
included the need for secrecy and substantiality and the amendment of the definition of franchising) and on 
January 14th, 2003, the Commission received governmental approval. The text was unanimously approved 
on March 25th 2003. 
937 In Italy Law no.129 was given Presidential consent on May 6th, 2004 and entered into force on May 25th 
2004.  This was followed by decree 204/2005 regarding the regulation of foreign franchises in Italy.  Law 
of 6 May 2004, No. 129 Article 6.1. 
938 From the answer to a Parliamentary question Mr. Lagneau asked on 11th April, 1986 (Andre Lombart 
and Paul van Hooghten). 
939 The effectiveness of self regulation was also cited as a reason for not having a franchise law by the 
Swedish legislators.  Parliamentary Standing Committee on Civil Legislation 1992/93; LU 
940 The 30 October Bill, which declared that it was based upon the provisions of the even then defunct EU 
Franchising Block Exemption (Commission Regulation (EEC) 4087/88 on the application of article 85(3) 
of the Treaty to categories of franchise agreements) in order “to avoid the legislation becoming too 
complex” (The Belgian House of Representatives, Extraordinary Session, 8 October 2003, Doc 51 
0265/001 Developments – Article 2) was fundamentally flawed. It was based upon the false premise that 
although from the strictly legal point of view franchisees are independent entities, “in fact from a financial 
and contractual point of view the franchisee is largely the subsidiary of the franchisor” (The Belgian House 
Of Representatives, 30 Oct 2003 - Summary page 4).  
941 One bill restricted the franchisor’s ability to maintain the quality of the franchise by restricting the 
franchisor’s ability to refuse franchisees the right to transfer the franchise agreement to a third party by 
imposing a requirement that refusal to a transfer must be on “grounds which he can objectively justify” 
(The Belgian House Of Representatives, 30 Oct 2003, Clause 7) and stated that “in case of dispute as to 
these grounds, either party may request the Commission of Franchise Arbitrators to adjudicate whether the 
grounds raised by the franchiser are objectively justified” (The Belgian House Of Representatives, 30 Oct 
2003, Clause 7). It proposed to prohibit (The Belgian House Of Representatives, 28 Jan 2004 - Article 11 
[Doc 51 0747/001]) the provision of a post term non-competition clause; a provision prohibiting the transfer 
of the franchise agreement to relatives in the first degree, or to prevent its transfer to other third parties 
when the grounds used by the franchisor are not serious and objective; any requirement for unilateral 
undertakings by the franchisee; the provision in favour of the franchisor of a right of pre-emption, the 
period for the exercise of which exceeds one month; any provision requiring the franchisee in cases where a 
right of pre-emption of the business has been agreed, to communicate the identity of the proposed purchaser 
to the franchisor; to proceed to value the business beforehand; and to include in the contract an option to 
purchase”. 
942 The proposal that the franchisor would have no right to terminate the franchise agreement for failure “to 
comply with an obligation to achieve a certain turnover or a pre-determined volume of sales or any other 
unilateral commitment by the franchisee” (The Belgian House Of Representatives, 30 Oct 2003, Clause 8.1) 
and that post-term non-compete restrictions would not be enforceable against a former franchisee unless the 
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In Sweden, the problems comprised a proposal that employees of the franchisee be allowed to 
negotiate directly with the employer’s organisation to which the franchisor was connected944. 
All of these difficulties need to be borne in mind when considering how the EU regulatory 
environment should be re-engineered. 
4.6 Lessons to be Learned from other Franchising Regimes  
This is critical analysis towards the third objective of the thesis. 
Of the 21 non-EU jurisdictions with franchise specific laws, the USA and Australia offer the 
most relevant guidance as to how franchising in the EU might be most appropriately 
regulated. The USA was the first to regulate franchising over 38 years ago and has the most 
complete franchise regulatory regime in the world, whilst Australia has hands on experience 
of trying to make self regulation of franchising work before adopting its franchising Code of 
Conduct which has legal force under the Trade Practices Act. 
They both have state and federal law and have therefore had to deal with the difficulties 
generated by the relationship between EU and member state law. The two jurisdictions have, 
however, chosen approaches that differ in a number of important aspects. Australia has dealt 
with this by, on the whole, having only federal law deal with the regulation of franchising. 
The USA has taken a different approach and exhibits a complex mix of both federal and state 
law. 
Both jurisdictions therefore offer relevant learning as regards both the form and substance of 
an EU franchise regulatory regime. 
4.6.1 The USA 
As in the EU, franchise regulation in the USA began on a state level. The first statute 
regulating franchising as we know it today was introduced in California in 1971945.  However, 
by the end of the decade, the US had wholeheartedly embraced the need to specifically 
regulate franchising. Not satisfied with Federal regulation many states adopted their own 
franchise specific regulations. The state and federal franchise laws can be divided into three 
basic types. Those that regulate the sale of franchises, those that regulate the relationship 
between the franchisor and the franchisee and those that require the registration 
documentation on public registers. Some, such as the Californian law regulate all three. 
                                                                                                                                                        
franchisor had purchased the franchisee’s business (The Belgian House Of Representatives, 30 Oct 2003, 
Clause 8.2). 
943 The Belgian House of Representatives, 17 March 2004, Doc 51 0924/001 Second sitting of 51st 
Parliament Article 8 
944 Statens offentiliga (SOU) 1987:17 “Franchising”. 
945 The California Franchise Investment Law (1970) (Cal. Corp. Code Sections 31000 to 31516). 
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The preamble of the California Franchise Investment Law946, states that its intent is 
prohibiting fraud and providing  
“each prospective franchisee with the information necessary to make an intelligent 
decision regarding franchises being offered”.  
It requires sellers to register a franchise prior to making an offer within the state and deliver 
an offering circular to the prospective franchisee. In due course 17 other states followed suit 
with an array of laws varying in reach and complexity. The FTC Rules subsequently 
introduced a federal dimension to the regulation of franchising in the USA, but the rules do 
not supersede the state laws, they merely add an extra layer of regulation. 
Disclosure laws were enacted because of a fear that small investors were not receiving 
sufficient information about their potential investment before committing themselves.947  
Those that regulate relationships and termination were adopted because of a concern that 
small businesses were being eliminated or taken over unfairly by their franchisors. The need 
for “good cause” and “just cause” were therefore introduced948. During the 1970s 14 states949 
plus Puerto Rico adopted relationship laws. These laws focus on prohibiting the termination 
or non-renewal of a franchise without good cause and prior written notice. They also deal 
with franchise transfers, impose a duty of good faith, prohibited discrimination between 
franchisees and allow individual franchisees a private right of redress through injunctive 
relief and damages. 
This complex matrix of regulation imposes a substantial burden on franchisors and so since 
the 1970s there have been some attempts to harmonise the differing franchise laws. Some of 
these efforts were successful. For example the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular 
(“UFOC”) created by the Mid West Securities Commissioners Association, was copied by the 
North American Securities Commissioners Association and was widely used in those states 
that did not have a franchise law until 1 July 2008, when the new FTC Rule became 
mandatory and the Uniform Franchise Disclosure Document (the “UFDD”) replaced the 
UFOC. However, other attempts, such as for example the Uniform Franchise and Business 
Opportunities Act have not been successful. Even though this was adopted by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law in 1987, the proposal has yet to be 
                                                   
946 ibid. 
947 CCH, Business Franchise Guide, p. 457. 
948 Ibid, p. 458. 
949 Koch. D. W, The End of Franchising As We Know It; Federal Bar Association Annual Convention, 
Cleveland, Ohio Sept 22, 2000. 
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enacted by any state.950  (A similar fate may await any Common Frame of Reference adopted 
by the EU)951. 
There have also been numerous attempts to enact federal franchise laws which would replace 
or harmonise state laws. In 1990 the House Small Business Committee commenced a series 
of hearings about the need for further federal regulation of franchising. In 1992 the Chairman 
of the Committee, Representative John J. LaFalce, sponsored federal franchise laws dealing 
not only with disclosure but also relationship and termination issues. In 1993 Representative 
LaFalce introduced similar disclosure and relationship bills, but these failed to gain 
Committee approval. Undaunted by this failure though, the Congressman introduced another 
similar relationship bill in 1995952, which also failed. 
In 2007 the Federal Trade Commission’s Trade Regulation Rule “Disclosure Requirements 
and Prohibition Concerning Franchising” became effective. This fine tuned the differences 
between the FTC Franchise Rule and the UFDD. 
The complexity of the US regulatory regime is well summed up by the fact that although the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Franchise Rule, formally entitled “Disclosure 
Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising”953 (the new FTC Rule) clearly 
defines franchising, differing definitions have been adopted by fifteen states which have 
formulated their own franchising laws. The USA is a patchwork of overlapping and 
sometimes conflicting federal and state franchise laws954. What constitutes a “franchise” 
varies considerably from state to state and both the “marketing plan” and “community of 
interest approach” are found955. The marketing plan definition is more common and is used 
not only by the majority of States but also the FTC956. 
                                                   
950 CCH, ibid, p. 456. 
951 See Chapter 4 above 
952 CCH, ibid, p. 457. 
953 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 16, Chapter 1, Subchapter D, Part 436 (16 CFR 436), promulgated 
December 21, 1978, effective October 21, 1979 (effective date extended from July 21, 1979, 44 Federal 
Register 31170, May 31, 1979). Cited as “FTC Rule”. 
954 See 4.5 above. 
955 See 5.1 below for a fuller explanation.  
956 It has the following elements: 
(1) grant of a right to operate a business that is identified or associated with the franchisor’s trademark or to 
offer, sell or distribute goods, services or commodities that are identified or associated with the franchisor’s 
trademark; 
(2) the franchisor exerts or has authority to exert a significant degree of control over the franchisee’s 
method of operation or provides significant assistance in the franchisee’s method of operation; 
(3) the payment of fees is a condition of obtaining or commencing the operation of the franchise. 
FTC Rule 436.1(h). 
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Most state and federal laws have a “de minimis” exemption threshold for a franchise fee957 
element. If the franchise fees paid by the alleged franchisee do not reach this threshold, no 
“franchise” exists958.  
This lack of uniform approach to defining a franchise greatly increases the uncertainty and 
expense of franchising in the USA and is therefore a state of affairs that should be avoided in 
the EU.   
4.6.2 Australia 
The regulation of franchising in Australia rests on three basic pillars contained in the Trade 
Practices Act; Sections 51AD and 51AE; which prescribe the Franchise Code and make it 
mandatory; Section 51AC (which prohibits unconscionable conduct); and Section 52 of 
(which prohibits misleading or deceptive conduct) and the common law duty of good faith. 
The Franchise Code applies to franchise agreements entered into, renewed or extended after 
October 1998 and ensures that Section 51 of the TPA is directly applicable to franchising by 
giving clear definition to what amounts to unconscionable conduct. 
The mandatory code is designed to  
“……..induce behavioural change on the part of big business to smaller business, and 
to provide to small businesses that are unfairly treated, adequate means of redress.”959  
and  
“assist franchisees and franchisors make an informed decision prior to entering into a 
franchise agreement and to provide a framework for dispute resolution”960.  
The Code regulates the franchising sector by ensuring that franchisors disclose relevant 
information and documents to prospective franchisees; franchisees are aware of their rights 
under franchise agreements and appropriate and cost effective dispute resolution mechanisms 
are available. 
                                                   
957 The FTC rule provides that a sale is excluded from the scope of the regulation if the total required 
payments by the franchisee before and during the 6-month period after the business opens do not exceed 
$500. The amount thresholds under the various state laws range from $100 to $500. The time period over 
which franchise fees are aggregated for purposes of the amount threshold also varies. 
958 In a 1998 decision involving the Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act the US Court of Appeals in Chicago 
determined that a dealer’s payment of more than $1,600 for parts and service manuals over the course of 
eight years satisfied the statute’s $500 fee threshold. To-Am Equipment Co., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Caterpillar 
Forklift America, Inc., No. 95 C 0836, US 7th Circuit Court of Appeals (6 August 1998). 
959 Franchising Code of Conduct – Department of Workplace Regulations and Small Business / Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission 1 July 1998. 
960 Franchising Code of Conduct – Department of Workplace Regulations and Small Business / Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission 1 July 1998 p1. 
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It is administered by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission but may be 
enforced both by the government and by private civil actions961. To date, the Franchising 
Code is the only mandatory industry Code prescribed under the TPA. 
Since its introduction, there has been considerable ongoing debate in relation to the certain 
aspects of the Code. This led to a comprehensive review of the operation of the Code by the 
Franchising Policy Council. Following recommendations by the Policy Council, some 
amendments to the Code were made962 on 1 October 2001. Although the Regulations clarified 
some areas of concern, they did not address all the concerns of the franchise industry. It was 
further reviewed by the Federal government in 2006 and again in 2008, when the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporate and Financial Services held an 
enquiry into improving franchising conduct.  The government’s response to the enquiry was 
published on 5 November 2009 w 
hich led to the creation of an expert panel on franchising963. 
The Franchise Code regulates the franchise relationship in a number of ways.  It prohibits the 
general releases of liability in franchise agreements964, requires that franchisors  disclose 
materially-relevant facts not mentioned in the disclosure document965, regulates when the 
franchisor may withhold consent to a franchise transfer966, requires notice of termination and 
an opportunity to remedy a contract breach cited as the reason for termination967, and 
establishes a mandatory alternative dispute resolution procedures968. 
4.6.3 How successful are the US and Australian systems? 
The most striking characteristics of US franchise regulation are not its completeness and 
attention to detail but its complexity, relative lack of uniformity and obsession with form over 
substance.  None of these recommend themselves as hallmarks of effective and appropriate 
regulation. 
According to the Franchise Council of Australia969 the Australian system  
                                                   
961 See below. 
962 Trade Practices (Industry Code – Franchising Amendment) Regulations 2001. 
963 Minister of Innovation, Science and Research, Media Release: “Government Appoints Expert Panel on 
Franchising and Unconscionable Conduct” 27 November 2009 at 
http://minister.mnovation.gov.au/Emerson/pages/governmentappointsexpertpanelonfranchising 
964 Clause 16 of Franchising Code of Conduct. 
965 Ibid Clause 18 
966 Ibid Clause 20 
967 Ibid Clause 21 
968 Ibid Clauses 24-31 
969 Submission to the Federal Government Review 15 August 2006. 
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“strikes an ideal balance between contractual freedom and flexibility that encourages 
growth and entrepreneurial behaviour, and regulatory intervention to support the 
contractual process and ensure informal and fair bargains are made”970.  
It sees Australia as having  
“the most comprehensive franchise regulatory system in the world”971  
and declares that  
“it is now widely accepted that Australian franchising is world’s best practice in the 
relationship aspect of the franchisor/franchise partnership”972.  
It believes that this success is a direct result of the Franchising Code of Conduct and “Part 2” 
disclosure requirements. Together with the TPA, it considers these to provide 
“comprehensive legal protection from all forms of misrepresentation or illegal behaviour”973. 
It relies upon the low level of franchise disputes in Australia to support these bold claims. At 
around 1% it is substantially lower that the 6% in the USA estimated by the International 
Franchise Association974. It also points to the success of mediation in settling franchise 
disputes in Australia. 75% of franchise disputes in Australia are settled by mediation, whereas 
in the USA arbitration and litigation are the norm. 
Despite this apparent success, the changes being currently adopted975 evidence the perceived 
need to continuously reappraise the regulatory regime and ensure that it is fit for purpose.  
Notably, the Federal Government decided against a mandatory obligation of good faith in 
franchise agreements on the ground that it would “increase uncertainty in franchising”.  The 
Minister for Innovation, Industry, Science and Research, Dr Craig Emerson has announced 
the establishment of an expert panel to advise what other changes, if any, should be made to 
the Franchising Code976. 
So the US and Australian regulatory regimes suggest how the EU regulatory environment 
might be most appropriately re-engineered and what might best be avoided. 
                                                   
970 Ibid, Executive Summary 1.1. 
971 Ibid, Executive Summary 1.2. 
972 Ibid, Part B 1.5. 
973 Ibid, Executive Summary 1.2. 
974 Ibid, Executive Summary 1.1. 
975 Minister for Innovation, Industry, Science and Research, Media Release, “Government to Strengthen 
Franchising Code of Conduct and Unconscionable Law” 5 November 2009 at 
http://minister.innovation.gov.au/Emerson/Pages governmenttostrengthenfranchisingcodeof conduct 
976 Additional Information on Franchising Code and Unconscionable Conduct Reforms November 2009 at 
http://minister.innovation.gov.au/Emerson/Documents/Additional%information%20%on%20Franchising% 
20Code%20%and%20Unconscionable%20Conduct%20ReformsPdf 
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4.7 Conclusion  
The European Commission is unequivocal in its belief that a regulatory environment 
comprising harmonised legal eco-systems is necessary to ensure that franchisors and other 
businesses can operate across borders efficiently977.  The current heterogeneous regulatory 
environment creates obstacles that hinder franchisors from taking full advantage of the single 
market.  The same problem confronted commercial agency and was overcome by the 
adoption of a directive978.  Empirical research supports the case for harmonisation979.  The 
catalyst for such harmonisation could be either a directive or a common civil code.  It is 
suggested that a directive is more appropriate.  This is because the considerable difficulties 
involved in a common civil code means that proposals for a non mandatory common frame of 
reference have overtaken those for a common civil code and the non binding nature of such a 
“tool box” will not achieve the homogenised regulatory environment required980.  An 
examination of existing member state franchise laws suggests that there will be much debate 
about the substantive content of a franchise directive, whilst consideration of US and 
Australian franchise law offers suggestions as to what a franchise directive might contain. 
                                                   
977 See 4.1 above 
978 See 4.2 above 
979 See 4.3 above 
980 See 4.4 above 
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Chapter 5 Re-Engineering the Regulatory Environment for Franchising in 
the EU 
In previous chapters, this thesis has achieved its first and second objectives.  It has also 
established that a directive is the best catalyst through which to re-engineer the EU’s 
regulatory environment so as to enable franchising to better fulfill its potential in the EU and 
that EU member state franchise law and that of the US and Australia offer useful guidance 
and to what a franchise directive might contain and the difficulties it may encounter.  In doing 
so, the thesis has partly achieved its third objective.   
This chapter contains critical analysis towards achieving the third objective of this thesis and 
suggests how the directive should seek to re-engineer the regulatory environment so that it 
can better fulfill its potential in the EU, by imposing a harmonised approach across the EU 
which aims to accentuate the impact of three commercial imperatives; promoting market 
confidence in franchising, ensuring pre-contractual hygiene and ensuring that the franchise 
agreement imposes a mandatory taxonomy of rights and obligations on the franchise 
relationship. 
Franchising makes a positive contribution to the EU’s economy981 and has the potential to 
make a still greater contribution.  An EU franchise Directive should therefore promote and 
support the economic drivers that encourage franchisors and franchisees to become involved 
in franchising982.  It should also reduce the risks that face both franchisors and franchisees983. 
It is suggested that in order to achieve this, the EU’s regulatory environment should clearly 
define franchising and be re-engineered by accentuating the influence of three commercial 
imperatives on the legislative eco-systems.  These are market confidence in franchising, pre-
contractual hygiene and a mandatory taxonomy of rights and obligations which ensures that 
an appropriate level of protection is afforded to both franchisors and franchisees.  This 
necessitates a clear definition of what franchising is and a re-engineering process that results 
in environmental dynamics that are targeted, transparent, proportionate, accountable and 
consistent984.  
In other words, the fundamental objective of an EU Franchise Directive must be to define 
franchising as a specific, distinct and uniform business structure, to enable both franchisors 
                                                   
981 See 2.2 above 
982 See 2.4 above 
983 See 2.4 above 
984 www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/bre/index.html.  The UK’s Department of Business and Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Better Regulation Executive. 
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and franchisees to access the advantages which encourage them to become involved in 
franchising985 and to reduce, but not remove all of the risks involved986.   
An over-regulated environment with no chance of market failure or financial scandals would 
be undesirable as it would stifle innovation and competition987. It would be undesirable as it 
would discourage companies from franchising out their businesses. This is supported by 
recent research in the US988 which shows that over regulation leads to a reduction in both the 
number of franchised units and the total number of chain outlets.  Regulation must set, 
promote, monitor and enforce high standards, in order to contribute to the soundness of the 
system as a whole and to promote consumers’ and institutions’ confidence in its strength and 
integrity989. 
It is therefore important that a balance is struck between the need to afford protection to many 
of those entering into a commercial enterprise or making a financial  investment on the one 
hand and the commercial risk that naturally arises for anyone wishing to enter into a 
potentially money making enterprise, on the other990. 
It is suggested that it should do this by establishing franchise agreements as “type” or 
“nominate” contracts with mandatory and essential terms that seek to preserve the above 
advantages and reduce the above risks, create a scheme of incentives to encourage business to 
adopt franchising as part of their market strategy and create an educational infrastructure to 
support potential franchisees in deciding whether or not to buy a franchise. 
This approach has only been adopted by two of the EU member states that have adopted 
franchise laws991.  In the rush to regulate franchising in EU member states, be it by franchise 
specific legislation or the application of the general law, there has been little thought as 
regards what the overall purpose of the regulation is, or should be. It rarely goes beyond a 
                                                   
985 See 2.4 above 
986 See 2.4 above 
987 FSA, A new regulator for the new millennium, January 2000. 
988 Klick, Kobayashi, Ribstein, “The Effect of Contract Regulation: The Case of Franchising”, George 
Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 07-03, 2nd Annual Conference on Empirical legal Studies 
Paper, FSU College of Law, Law and Economics Paper No. 07/001.  Based upon the impact of the Iowa 
Franchise Law of 1992, which is uniformly regarded as unfavourable to franchisors. In addition to 
preventing termination at will by the franchisor, the Iowa requires that franchisors allow franchisees a right 
to remedy any defect and restricts waiver and choice of law clauses. 
989 Financial Services Authority, an outline, 28 October 1997. 
990 One of the draft bills placed before the Belgian Chamber of Deputies, whilst advocating the regulation of 
franchising acknowledged that; “As in all commercial sectors, there are clearly franchisees who consider 
that they have suffered loss as a result of the agreements they have entered into. However ….. these 
franchisees are in the minority, as 70% of franchisees are satisfied with their contracts. It is therefore 
necessary to place this information which is occasionally tainted with sensationalism in context. This does 
not mean however that those franchisees suffering loss do not merit protection. The matter should be treated 
in a way which does not adversely affect either the franchisors or the franchisees”. The Belgian House of 
Representatives, 30 Oct 2003, Article 16, Doc 51 9361/001. 
991 Lithuania and Estonia.  But neither has imposed appropriate mandatory terms. 
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general  feeling that franchisees are unsophisticated “consumers” who are often investing 
their life savings into complex businesses that may be run by unscrupulous business people 
with a great deal more experience and little regard for the franchisee’s welfare. The 
conclusion drawn is that they therefore deserve some kind of extra protection against being 
unfairly exploited.  
As Terry comments,  
“the world has embraced the US franchising concept but not the manner of its 
regulation”992.  
This lack of clarity and homogeneity has created difficulties and complications with the 
regulation of franchising in the EU. 
5.1 Defining Franchising 
This section provides critical analysis towards achieving the third objective of the thesis. 
Following the discussion in section 2.5.2 above, it is suggested that a definition of franchising 
should follow the Shared Marketing Plan approach and that franchising be established as a 
new “type agreement” by adopting an “Exchange of Benefits” approach, that affords 
franchisors a number of advantages in return for accepting a reasonable level of regulation. 
5.1.1 The Need for a Definition 
Establishing a working definition of franchising is an essential part of a Directive for at least 
four basic reasons993.  
Firstly a clear definition helps would-be franchisees assess, with a greater level of confidence, 
whether a business proposition is all it appears to be i.e. a definition can become a bench 
mark for potential franchisees. Secondly, a precise definition makes it easier to understand the 
size and role of franchising in the EU by differentiating it from other types of third party 
relationships. Thirdly, a sharper definition makes it easier to identify those schemes that are 
either ill-conceived or fraudulent. Fourthly, a clear definition may help to ensure that any 
regulation is appropriately phrased. 
However, although most of those considering the regulation of franchising generally agree 
that  
“it is necessary to have a clear-cut definition of franchising”994,  
                                                   
992 Terry A., Franchise Sector Regulation: The Australian Experience in Windsperger 
/Cliquet/Hendrikse/Tuunanen, Economics and Management of Franchising Networks. 
993 Op cit Felstead 
994 Italian President Caponi, Corriere della Sera on December 9th, 1997. 
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this is not the unanimous view995. 
5.1.2 Definitions are Self-Serving 
It is not surprising that all the definitions of franchising reflect the interests and concerns of 
the bodies or individuals providing them. Legislators are naturally trying to define a type of 
commercial behaviour that they wish to regulate. Trade bodies are trying to determine what 
types of business they wish to join them. Academics are more interested in the legal and 
economic dynamics at play than commercial reality. It is therefore only natural that the 
definitions emanating from such different sources often exhibit material differences to each 
other. 
It must be borne in mind that individuals and organisations will produce a definition that best 
suits their own purpose.  So, a trade association, an academic and a legislator will be seeking 
to achieve different ends by framing a definition of franchising.  It is therefore perhaps 
inevitable that they will produce definition that differ from each other. 
5.1.3 Questioning the Need for a Definition 
Some, following the French and Belgian lead, question the value of any definition996, as it  
“is less important than a model or “ideal type” which will enable  the area of 
economic activity with which we are concerned to be identified”997. 
Definitions can create problems of their own. Immediately a definition of franchising is 
adopted by the legislature in any jurisdiction, lawyers consider whether it is advantageous or 
disadvantageous for their clients to be deemed a franchise and then commence drafting their 
contracts and advising their clients to structure their businesses accordingly. In other words 
legal definitions can become the issue more than the business practices being controlled by 
them. Alluding to this problem one of the bills placed before the Belgian Chamber of 
Deputies stated998; 
                                                   
995 The French “Loi Doubin”, Law No. 89-1008 dated 31 December 1989 does not seek to define 
franchising. 
996 Op cit Adams and Jones, p.23 
997 They offer what they see as the three characteristics of franchising.  These are “(1) relatively long term 
relational contracts (usually five years or more);  (2) in which an independent undertaking carries out tasks 
which were, or might have been, carried out by the franchisor undertaking;  (3) a relatively high degree of 
integration of the franchisee undertaking’s business systems and activities and those of the franchisor 
undertaking” (Ibid Adams and Jones, p.23). 
998 The Belgian House of Representatives, Extraordinary Session, 8 October 2003; Introduction to Draft 
Parliamentary Bill Concerning pre-contract information in relation to contracts by which one person grants 
to another the right to carry on commercial activities (lodged by Mme Anne Brazing and MM. Serge Van 
Overt veldt and Philippe Collard). 
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“the problems encountered by a number of businesses do not arise in franchise 
networks strictly so called, but rather in commercial situations which are similar to 
franchise agreements (independent management agreements, sales concessions, 
know-how licences, commission agencies, commercial partnerships etc). One should 
therefore be aware that the regulations should apply also to these other distribution 
systems, which are not limited solely to franchise agreements. Otherwise the 
regulations would not have their desired effect. What would be the use of regulating 
solely franchise agreements when most contracts outwardly showing franchise 
characteristics, but which are not in fact franchise agreements, would not be subject to 
this regulatory regime? Unscrupulous franchisers would quickly be able to steer clear 
of franchise agreements by adopting formulas less all-embracing or advanced as the 
franchise, to the detriment of franchisees, in order to escape regulations which would 
otherwise defeat this objective. If a new law is to be introduced it must cover all types 
of agreement closely allied to franchise contracts”.  
This seems to be the view of the French government as when it enacted the Loi Doubin to 
regulate franchising, it opted to avoid the need to define it and instead decided to merely 
describe the main characteristics of a business that has a network of third parties using the 
same brand999. The Belgian government subsequently opted for the same approach1000. 
5.1.4 The Proposed Definition 
Maintaining market confidence in franchising means that an appropriate definition of 
franchising is essential1001. This inevitably determines the scope and therefore the commercial 
impact of an EU franchise directive.   
Although there is debate over whether or not it is worthwhile attempting to define franchising 
and if so how should it be done, it is suggested that in order to effectively regulate it, a “clear 
cut definition” of franchising1002 is imperative. The difficulty is how best to achieve this push 
for the black and white in a world of grey. A definition must facilitate the more effective 
regulation of franchising. The regulative approach proposed is one that not only regulates the 
actions of franchisors but also extends them certain commercial advantages. The definition 
must therefore have a qualitative threshold to it. A business can only be a franchise and 
therefore enjoy its privileges if it clears that threshold.  This is dealt with in the definition by 
the requirement for a “track record”. 
                                                   
999 Article L330-3 of the French Commercial Code (Article 1 of the “Loi Doubin”, Law No. 89-1008 dated 
31 December 1989). 
1000 Law of 19 December 2005 relative to pre-contractual information in the framework of agreements of 
commercial partnerships. 
1001 Also see Chapter 2 p. 1 for other reasons to clearly define franchising. 
1002 Italian President Caponi, addressing the Italian Parliament on 9 December 1997. 
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A shared marketing plan or prescribed system approach1003 which borrows from both the 
European Franchise Federation’s definition and the Italian franchise law is suggested as 
follows; 
“A Franchise exists where  
(a) one party (the “Franchisor”) who owns or has the right to license other parties 
to operate a business format offering, supplying or distributing goods or 
services or both  
(b) grants another party (a “Franchisee”)  
(c) the right to carry on a business using that business format under a system or in 
accordance with a marketing plan substantially determined, controlled and/or 
suggested by the Franchisor or one of its associates or otherwise assisted by 
the franchisor or one of its associates (a “Shared Marketing Plan”).   
(d) The operation of the business must be substantially or materially associated 
with a brand owned, used or licensed by the Franchisor or an associate of the 
Franchisor. 
(e) The Franchisee will pay monies to the Franchisor or its affiliate, by way of, 
for example only: 
(i) an initial capital investment and/or 
(ii) a payment for goods or services and/or 
(iii) an ongoing or periodic fee of any discharge from and/or 
(iv) a training fee and/or 
(v) repayment for a lien made by the Franchisor. 
(f) A business using the business format has been operated by the Franchisor or 
its affiliate for a period of 12 months.  
(g) For the avoidance of doubt, a franchise does not include, motor vehicle 
dealerships, employee/employer relationship, agencies, landlord and tenants 
and co-operatives.” 
(h) An affiliate is an entity in which the Franchisor has a controlling interest. 
 
                                                   
1003 See Chapter 2 pp. 24-27. 
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It is important to consider the main elements of this definition. 
5.1.4.1 Shared Marketing Plan 
Under this definition, a franchise does not have to expressly prescribe a Shared Marketing 
Plan  
“Control reserved over terms of payment by customers, credit practices, warranties 
and representations in dealings between franchisees and their customers, suggest a 
uniform marketing plan”  
as do  
“provisions concerning collateral services, which may or may not be rendered, or 
prohibiting or limiting the sale of competitive or non-competitive goods”1004.  
The key issue is the imposition of a duty to observe  
“the licensor’s directions or obtaining the licensor’s approval with respect to selection 
of locations, the use of trade names, advertising, signs, sales pitches, and sources of 
supply, or concerning the appearance of the licensee’s business premises and the 
fixtures and equipment utilized therein, uniforms of employees, hours of operation, 
housekeeping, and similar decorations”1005. 
“A marketing plan or system is “prescribed” where a specific sales program is 
outlined, suggested, recommended, or otherwise originated by the franchisor” 1006.  
So, a sales program may be “prescribed” by the franchisor where it supplies the franchisee 
with sales aids or props, such as demonstration kits, films, or detailed instructions for 
personal introduction and presentation of the product, possibly including the text of a sales 
pitch and especially where such a program is supported by training materials, courses, or 
seminars”1007..This view of a prescribed plan is not unique to California1008.   
It is preferable to adopt the broader definitions adopted by States such as Illinois, Rhode 
Island, Washington, and Wisconsin which take the view that the marketing plan or system 
does not have to be prescribed but it can merely be suggested in substantial part by a 
                                                   
1004 California Department of Corporations, Release 3-F (Revised) at B(2)(c) (June 22, 1994) (“CA Release 




1008 Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, and Virginia also define a “franchise” 
as existing when:  “A franchisee is granted the right to engage in the business of offering, selling or 
distributing goods or services at retail under a marketing plan or system prescribed in substantial part by a 
franchisor.” Cal. Corp. Code at § 31005(a)(1); Indy. Code Ann. at § 23-2-2.5-1(a)(3); Mad. Code Ann., 
Bus. Reg. § 14-201(e)(1)(i); Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.1502(3)(a); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law, § 681(3)(a) (1996); 
N.D. Cent. Code § 51-19-02.5.a(1); Or. Rev. Stat. § 650.005(4 a); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-559A(1). 
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franchisor1009. This is because the benefits being offered to franchisees must not be offered 
too widely. They must be restricted to well structured businesses that are clearly providing a 
business format. 
Whereas many jurisdictions require the payment of a franchise fee1010, only some require a 
minimum payment1011. It is proposed that there would be no minimum value of fees in the 
European law as it opens the door to the structuring of payments so as to avoid coming within 
the definition of a franchise. 
5.1.4.2 Trademarks 
The role of the trademarks also needs to be considered. There are a variety of approaches.  
For example, whereas California requires substantial association with the franchisor’s 
trademark1012, New York does not require the use of a trademark at all. Rather, a business 
arrangement will constitute a franchise if either the franchisor offers a marketing plan or 
permits the sale of trademarked goods or services. In Hawaii, Minnesota, and South Dakota, 
it is sufficient for a franchisor to grant the franchisee the right to use the franchisor’s 
trademark1013. As the brand is a fundamental element of a franchise, its use is specifically 
included in the proposed definition. The bigger issue is how the brand is used by the 
franchisee. 
The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Franchise Rule, (which also adopts the shared 
marketing plan approach) uses the phrase “identified or associated with” the franchisor’s 
mark as do states such as California that require that the franchisee obtain the right to use the 
franchisor’s mark. For example, “a service-oriented franchise operated out of a home, as 
opposed to a storefront, might not have a sign with the franchisor’s logo, or unique uniforms 
associated with the franchisor. Although the franchisee’s “association” with the franchisor’s 
mark may be limited (such as the right to use the franchisor’s mark on business cards, 
advertising, and in yellow page listings), it is sufficient to trigger the Rule’s disclosure 
obligations: in such circumstances, the use of the franchisor’s trademark leads consumers to 
identify the business with the franchisor”1014. States such as California, which uses the phrase 
“substantial association” with the mark, recognize that the grant of permission to use a 
                                                   
1009 Il Comp. Stat.815 ILCS 705/3(1)(a); R.I. Gen. Laws § 19-28.1-3(7)(i)(A); Wash. Rev.  
Code § 19.100.010(4)(a)(i); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 553.03(4)(a)1. 
1010 Cal. Corp. Code at § 31005(a)(3); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 482E-6; Indy. Code Ann.  
§ 23-2-2.5-2(a)(3); Mad. Code Ann., Bus. Reg. § 14-201(e)(iii); Mich. Comp. Laws  
§ 445.1502(3)(c); Minn. Stat. § 80C.01.4.3; N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law, § 681(3)(b); N.D. Cent. Code  
§ 51-19-02.5.a(3); Wash. Rev. Code § 19.100.010(4)(a)(iii); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 553.03(4)(a)3. 
1011 146 815 Ill Comp. Stat. at § 705/3(1)(c); R.I. Gen. Laws § 19-28.1-3(7)(i)(B); Va. Code Ann.  
§ 13.1-559(A)(3). 
1012 California Department of Corporations, Release 3-F (Revised) ibid 
1013 Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 482E-6; Minn. Stat. § 80C.01.4.1. 
1014 Code of Federal Regulations Rule 16 Part 436.2 
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franchisor’s trademark in the operation of a business would constitute “substantial 
association” with the mark1015.  
It is interesting to note that in its Staff Report, the FTC however rejected the need for 
association to be substantial on the basis that the need to show “substantial use” imposes a 
new and unnecessary burden of proof1016. The proposed definition overcomes this by 
requiring that the business is substantially or materially associated with the brand. 
5.1.4.3 Minimum Standard 
The European Franchise Federation1017 requires that franchisors  
“have operated a business concept with success, for a reasonable time and in at least 
one pilot unit before starting its franchise network”.  
The Italian franchise regulation has expanded on that requirement and requires the franchisor 
to have tested the concept for at least one year before it is franchised.1018  It originates from 
the non statutory requirement found in the Code of Ethics of the European Franchise 
Federation1019 (and in turn the Italian Franchise Association1020) for franchisors to have at 
least one-year’s experience of their business formula before embarking upon the roll out of 
their franchise1021.  No minimum period of time is stated for the testing period.  All that is 
required is that the results are disclosed to potential franchisees in a full and unambiguous 
                                                   
1015 See CA Release 3-F at 3 (“[I]f the franchisee is granted the right to use the franchisor’s  
symbol, that part of the franchise definition is satisfied even if the franchisee is not obligated to  
display the symbol.”). 
1016 Federal Trade Commission Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising Staff 
Report to the Federal Trade Commission and Proposed Revised Trade Regulation Rule (16 CFR Part 436) – 
Bureau of Consumer Protection August 2004 pp. 42. 
1017 www.eff-franchise.com  
1018 Law of 6 May 2004, No. 129 Article 3.2. 
1019 EFF’s European Code of Ethics 19th September 2008. 
1020 Regulations of the Italian Franchise Association, effective January 1 1995, Article 2: “Prior to the 
establishment of its own franchise system, the franchisor shall have implemented its formula in the market 
for a minimum period of one year, with at least a pilot unit, if applicable”. 
1021  The original proposal (in the draft bill approved by the Senate on March, 25th 2003 was far more 
challenging than the provision finally incorporated in the franchise law.  It provided for a two-year testing 
period carried out through at least two pilot units, located in different cities. The “Test Period” was deemed 
to be necessary because, “…cases of inexperience and improvisation may generate a serious litigation…” 
(Senator Gambini in the XIII Legislature ).  However, there was a fear that the test period – at one point 
proposed to be 3 years – would severely compromise the commercial success of franchises as it would rob 
them of  many of the advantages that being first to the market brings and so giving non franchised concepts  
an unfair commercial advantage.  In the first draft it was expressly stated that it had to be piloted in the 
Italian market. This effectively created a barrier to freedom of trade within the EU so contravening a basic 
tenant of EU law. There was also concern that the provision would discourage foreign franchisors from 
entering the Italian market.  These concerns were acknowledged and the current text of the law, provides 
that the “testing period” must be based upon the criteria of reasonableness and flexibility. Following the 
comments of the Commission for Constitutional Affairs (Remarks made on October 7th, 2003) that, “the 
present formulation of the law might involve an unjustified limitation of economic initiative” the meaning 
of “the market” was also amended to mean  any market, be it in Italy, Europe or elsewhere in the world. 
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manner.  The only other jurisdictions in the world which have this requirement are China and 
Vietnam1022. 
Like China, Italy ultimately rejected the suggestion that the pilot should be in its domestic 
market, due to the commercial inappropriateness of such a provision.  It effectively creates a 
barrier to entry into the market. 
Subjecting new franchisees to the rigorous regulatory regime proposed by this thesis from day 
one has the appeal of being straight forward, but could create substantial barriers to new 
entrants who are franchising their businesses because, inter alia, they lack capital and/or 
management resource1023.  It is therefore proposed that before franchisors are required to take 
on the burden of complying with the proposed franchise regulation and can enjoy the 
consequential benefits they establish a “track record”.  That is that they must have operated a 
business using the business format for twelve months or be operating, either by itself or 
through franchisees a total of four outlets.  Forbidding a business to franchise out its business 
without complying with the regulation would be too arduous for new entrants.  However, in 
practice, it is suspected that many new entrants will decide that it is more efficient to seek to 
comply from day one so as to avoid the duplication of effort involved in redrafting their 
documentation so soon after starting and in order to take advantage of the “Exchange of 
Benefits” offered to established franchisors. 
Another advantage of the initial period is that it enables potential franchisees to have the 
opportunity to consider the achievements of a year’s trading and base its decision whether or 
not to buy the franchise partly upon that information.  
Some commentators have suggested that before granting a franchise to a party within an EU 
member state a franchisor should operate a pilot operation in that member state for a 12 
month period. The justification for this proposal is that without experience of a particular 
member state a franchisor cannot properly franchise in it, although it is not justified in any 
meaningful way. If this approach were adopted it would in effect freeze foreign franchisors 
                                                   
1022 In China Franchisors are required to establish and operate two company-owned units for more than one 
year before granting franchises to third parties (Article 7 of the Regulation on Administration of 
Commercial Franchises 2007).  In the earlier regulation, the pilot had to be in China, but the current law 
removed this requirement, mirroring the debate in Italy as to where the pilot operation has to be.  In 
Vietnam, pursuant to Article 2 of the Commercial Law of 2001, which came into force on 1 January 2006, a 
franchisor must be a lawfully established enterprise either in Vietnam or in a foreign country and a 
franchise can only be granted to a franchisee who has a Vietnamese business licence (Article 6 of Decree 
No 35/2006/ND-CP issued by the Government to regulate franchises). In addition, the franchise system 
must have been in operation for at least a year before a franchise can be granted. In the case of a sub-
franchise granted to a Vietnamese master franchisee, the Vietnamese master franchisee must have operated 
the franchise business for at least a year before it can grant sub-franchises to unit franchisees (Article 5(1) 
of the Decree No 35/2006/ND-CP). 
1023 See section 2.4 below.  The so-called Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Theory, supported by 
empirical evidence obtained from the research done for this thesis. 
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out of smaller member states such as the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Slovenia. For this reason it must be rejected. The experience of both Italy and China has been 
that such a parochial approach is unworkable on a national level. The diverse economic and 
cultural profile of the EU makes it worthless on an EU level. 
Given the structures generally used for international franchising it would also seem to be 
inappropriate to require that testing be carried on in the EU. Such a requirement would 
probably make it very difficult for smaller non EU franchisors to enter the EU market. In 
order to comply with such a requirement smaller non EU franchisors would probably have to 
use joint venture structures. Whilst these are often used for more substantial businesses and 
by more sophisticated players, it is doubtful that they would be appropriate for smaller, less 
sophisticated and less well resourced franchisors. Further, with appropriate expert advice 
franchisors could work the structure to circumvent the main intent of the regulation by still 
placing the real burden of the EU pilot operation on the joint venture partner. 
It is therefore recommended that in order to come within the definition of a franchise a 
business must have been operated for a 12 month period in any market, not necessarily one in 
the EU.  This avoids burdening small start up businesses with too heavy a regulatory burden, 
so reducing barriers to entry.  Such small businesses are unlikely to have a material adverse 
impact on the market.  However, they should not be able to afford themselves of the benefits 
afforded to franchisors1024. 
The definition of a franchise must focus on substance rather than form. Merely because a 
business relationship is called a “franchise,” does not mean it should be treated as one if the 
relationship does not satisfy the definition. “Misdescriptions” of a business relationship as a 
franchise should not bring it within the definition of a franchise. This definition aims at both 
describing the essential elements of the business relationship and “qualifying” each system on 
the basis of its track record to enjoy certain privileges extended to franchise systems. 
5.1.5 Sub-conclusion 
It is suggested that franchising be defined in accordance with the Marketing Plan approach 
that originated in the US and is found in various forms in six of the eight EU member states 
with franchise specific regulations.  It focuses upon independence, economic interest, the 
brand, the business format, control and ongoing support.  It also includes a qualitative 
threshold to ensure that the advantages of being a franchise are only available to businesses 
that have a track record and that start up franchises are not overwhelmed with regulatory 
requirements.  A franchise that has not operated the business format for at least 12 months or 
                                                   
1024 Such as retail price control in the network and the ability to control a multi channel sales strategy 
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which is operating less than four outlets will not have to comply with the regulation and 
cannot enjoy the “Exchange of Benefits”1025. 
5.2 Accentuating the Influence of Commercial Imperatives on the EU’s Legal 
Eco-Systems 
This section provides critical analysis towards achieving the third objective of this thesis. 
Following the discussion in section 2.3 above about why people get involved in franchising, it 
is proposed that in order to enable franchisors and franchisees to access the economic drivers 
that attract them to franchising and reduce the risks involved, the regulatory environment 
must accentuate the influence of three distinct commercial imperatives on the legislative eco-
systems.  It must maintain market confidence in franchising as a way of expanding a 
business; maintain pre-contractual hygiene by increasing understanding of franchising 
amongst potential franchisees and ensure that they have access to information that allows 
them to make an informed decision; and impose a mandatory taxonomy of rights and 
obligations to protect the fundamental interests of both franchisors and franchisees1026. These 
commercial imperatives are not unique to franchising.  They apply to many regulatory 
systems and are articulated well in the UK’s Financial Services and Market Act 20001027. 
It is suggested that these three “commercial imperatives” should have a key influence on the 
way in which the regulatory environment for franchising in the EU is re-engineered.   
5.2.1 Identifying the Commercial Imperatives 
The first “commercial imperative” is the need to maintain market confidence in franchising 
and so ensure that it is used as an effective route to market by a wide spectrum of businesses 
across the single market.  Unless franchising is regarded by companies as an attractive way of 
growing their business both domestically and across borders in the EU, it will never be able to 
help them expand their networks or make its full potential contribution to the growth of the 
single European market, which will suffer as a consequence. Market confidence is essential.  
Maintaining market confidence,  
“involves preserving both actual stability …. and the reasonable expectation that it 
will remain stable”1028. 
                                                   
1025 See 5.3 below 
1026 These criteria are based on the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) which suggests four 
objectives that apply equally to the regulation of other areas of commerce, including franchising. FSMA 
2000 Part 1, Sections 2(1), 3, 4, 5 and 6. The fourth objective, prevention of crime, is not appropriate for 
franchising due to a comparatively low level of criminal activity in the franchise sector and the adequacy of 
existing criminal sanctions due to the relative lack of sophistication of crime involving franchising as 
compared to that involving financial services. 
1027 FSMA 2000 Part (1) Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 
1028 FSMA, A new regulator for the new millennium, January 2000. 
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It is therefore essential that the re-engineering of the regulatory environment for franchising 
in the EU accentuates the influence of this factor on the various legal eco-systems.   
The second “commercial imperative” is a matter of pre-contractual hygiene.  Unless potential 
franchisees fully understand what they are getting into when they buy a franchise, (that it is 
not a guarantee of success which allows them to abdicate any responsibility for their own 
performance), there will always be an inappropriately high level of disputes between 
franchisors and their franchisees. Increasing understanding amongst potential franchisees 
means “promoting awareness of both the benefits and risks” associated with the commercial 
activity being regulated and, “the provision of appropriate information and advice”1029. This 
means that regulation has an educational role in improving general understanding of 
franchising amongst potential franchisees and ensuring that relevant information is made 
available to them in good time and in an appropriate form, so rectifying the severe imbalance 
of information between potential franchisees and franchisors.  It is therefore essential that the 
re-engineering of the regulatory environment creates an educational infrastructure that 
ensures that potential franchisees have access to appropriate information and accentuates the 
influence of this factor on the EU’s legal eco-systems.  It is also essential that potential 
franchisees are given full access to the information that will enable them to take an informed 
decision as to whether or not they should purchase a particular franchise.   
The third “commercial imperative” is that the terms of the franchisor/franchisee relationship, 
as captured in the franchise agreement, must afford such protection to the parties that the 
economic drivers which attract them to franchising are supported and re-enforced and the 
consequential and inherent risks are reduced to an appropriate level.  There should be a 
mandatory taxonomy for franchise agreements. 
The appropriate level of protection afforded to franchisees and franchisors can be measured 
by reference to the differing degrees of risk involved for each party ; the differing degrees of 
experience and expertise that the parties may have; and the general principle that individuals 
should take responsibility for their decisions1030.  
As a result, a franchise directive must aim to ensure that both parties receive clear and 
adequate information about each other and the risks involved. It must also recognise the 
parties’ responsibility for their own decisions, whilst aiming to ensure that they are not 
exposed to risks that they should not reasonably be expected to assume. 
An effective franchise directive must therefore maintain market confidence in franchising, 
ensure pre-contractual hygiene and provide adequate protection to franchisors and 
                                                   
1029 FSMA 2000, Section 4. 
1030 FSMA 2000, Section 5(2). 
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franchisees.  All this must be done in a manner that does not stifle innovation and 
competition.  
5.2.2 The current impact of Commercial Imperatives  
As is evident from the discussion in Chapter 3 above1031 the EU’s current regulatory 
environment does not focus upon accentuating the impact of these three Commercial 
Imperatives on its constituent legal eco-systems.  None of the legal eco-systems endeavour to 
promote market confidence, educate potential franchisees, ensuring that they have an 
appropriate level of information to enable them to take an informed decision about their 
prospective purchase and provide adequate protection for both franchisors and franchisees on 
either an EU wide or national basis. 
Whilst EU member state franchise laws all seek, on a member state basis, to reduce 
misconduct by franchisors and maintain market confidence by imposing a degree of stability 
in their individual national markets, the lack of uniformity of approach and content means 
that on an EU level they lead to instability. They all fail to protect the franchisor’s legitimate 
interests. 
The Loi Doubin1032 requires the proprietor of a network in France working under a common 
brand to make pre-contractual disclosure 21 days before contract.  However, it does nothing 
to try and ensure that this information is imparted in a manner that potential franchises will 
easily understand or to try and ensure that they are educated about the need to take and follow 
advice about what is revealed by it.  Nor does it does identify franchising as a specific form of 
business and differentiate it from other forms of licensing, agency and distribution. It 
therefore does nothing to promote market confidence in it and encourage the use of 
franchising in preference to other forms of branded networks.  As it deals only with 
disclosure it also fails to deal with the risks involved for both parties or support the 
commercial drivers that attract franchisors and franchisees to franchising. 
German law does not categorise franchising as a “type agreement” and does nothing to 
promote it as a way of doing business.  Likewise it does nothing to educate potential 
franchisees.  It does seek to address the way in which the balance of the franchisor/franchisee 
relationship is reflected in the franchise agreement1033, although this is from the perspective of 
there being an inherent imbalance of bargaining power between the parties and a need to 
                                                   
1031 See 3.18 above 
1032 Commercial Code Article L.330-3 (Article 1 of the “Loi Doubin”, Law No. 89-1008 dated 31 
December 1989). 
1033 See 2.5 above 
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apply commercial agency, consumer, employment and other laws to redress the balance in 
favour of the franchisee.  It therefore fails to deal with the commercial imperatives.   
The “caveat emptor” approach of English law and a relative lack of relevant jurisprudence 
means that it fails to promote market confidence in franchising, does nothing to promote pre-
contractual hygiene and is loathe to interfere in the detail of the commercial bargain struck by 
the parties. 
None of the other member states have adequately tackled the commercial imperatives with 
their franchise focused laws either1034. 
The regulation of franchising in the other seven EU member states that have specific 
franchise laws also lacks any real harmonisation and so fails to promote confidence in 
franchising as a way of exploiting (and so expanding) the single market.  
5.2.3 The impact of the Commercial Imperatives on proposals to re-engineer the EU’s 
regulatory environment? 
Neither of the two main proposals to re-engineer the EU’s regulatory environment for 
franchising (the Amsterdam Team’s proposal for a Common Frame of Reference and 
UNIDROIT’s proposal for a model franchise law) focus on the three Commercial 
Imperatives.   
Although the Study Group describes itself as being composed of experts  who work  
“with the benefit of and from the standpoint of current legal science”1035,  
                                                   
1034 The Spanish law (Act 7/1996 and Royal Decree 2485/1998) provides for both disclosure and the 
registration of franchise documentation but does promote market confidence in franchising in any 
meaningful way.  The registration requirement is an attempt to help educate potential franchisees but it fails 
in part due to its lack of effective implementation and in part to the inherent shortcomings of a registration 
system. The Spanish law fails to acknowledge the risks accepted by franchisors. The Italian law (Law of 6 
May 2004, No. 129 Article 1.1)  fails to promote market confidence in franchising and fails to recognise the 
risks accepted by franchisor or seek to educate potential franchisees. The Belgian (Law of Commercial 
Partnerships—enacted in 2005 and came into force on February 1 2006) law takes a very heavy handed and 
paternalistic approach to protecting franchisees but fails to maintain market confidence in franchising. It 
fails to recognise the risks accepted by franchisors or the principle that franchisees should be responsible for 
their own actions and no attempt is made to educate potential franchisees.  The Swedish law (Franchise 
Disclosure Law No. 2006:484 – came into force on October 1, 2006) fails to effectively protect the interest 
of franchisors and franchisees and also fails to recognise the risks accepted by franchisors and promote 
franchising as a way of doing business.  It also fails to educate potential franchisees about it. Although by 
adopting a franchise law the Romanian, Estonian and Lithuanian legislatures were in a limited way 
attempting to promote the use of franchising and educate potential franchisees about it, they have failed. 
The Estonian (Estonian Law of Obligations Act) and Lithuanian (Lithuanian Civil Code Articles 6.766 to 
6.779) laws merely acknowledge the existence of franchising with rather turgid and ineffective provisions. 
They do not even provide for pre-contractual disclosure. The Romanian law (Ordinance no 52/1997 of 28 
August 1997 on the law governing franchising, modified by Law 79/1998) fails to provide franchisees with 
adequate protection. None of these laws seek to protect the franchisor’s legitimate interests. 
 
1035 The European Parliament (OJ C 158 (28.6.1989), resolution of 26th May 1989; OJ C 205 (25.7.1994), 
resolution of 6th May 1994) supports and some member states (The Speech by the Dutch Minister of Justice 
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unfortunately it offers no meaningful assistance in identifying how the influence of the 
commercial imperatives on the legal eco-systems can best be accentuated.  The chapter is full 
of broad statements and is dogged by uncertainty.   
It fails to address the first commercial imperative – maintaining market confidence - as it does 
not adequately capture franchising’s fundamental nature.  It defines franchising as  
“the rights granted by a party (the franchisor) authorising and requiring another party 
(the franchisee) in exchange of direct or indirect financial compensation to engage in 
the business of selling goods or services on its own behalf under a system designated 
by the franchisor…”.  
There is no mention of the brand, the franchisor’s control of the franchise or the support 
provided to the franchisees by the franchisor, which sets franchising apart from mere 
distribution1036. Its view of franchising is rooted in the civil law view that it is not a “type 
agreement” and so should have the law of “type agreements” such as commercial agency and 
distribution applied to it by analogy1037.  It therefore fails to produce recommendations that 
maintain market confidence in franchising and encourage its use. The Study Group’s lack of 
familiarity with the reality of franchising runs throughout the proposals and its failure to 
distinguish between franchising, agency and distribution undermines all of the Study Group’s 
recommendations.   
The Study Group Chapter fails to address the second commercial imperative – pre-contractual 
hygiene (educating potential franchisees and ensuring that they are given appropriate 
                                                                                                                                                        
at the opening of the symposium: Towards a European Civil Code, 28 February 1997, 9.45 h. at Carlton 
Beach Hotel, Scheveningen, Den Haag: 
http://www.minjust.nl:8080/C_ACTUAL/SPEECHES/SP0006.htm) support the Study Group on a 
European Civil Code’s aim “to produce a set of codified principles which constitute the most suitable 
private law rules for Europe-wide application” (http://www.sgecc.net, accessed 14 August 2009) which will 
take the form of “a draft codification …. complete with comments and illustrations explaining the 
provisions and how they apply” although its technocratic approach to harmonisation of member state law is 
not without dissent. Following a report by the Parliament's Directorate-General for Research in 1999 
(Directorate General for Research working paper the private law systems in the EU: Discrimination on 
grounds of nationality and the need for a European civil code. Comparative study of the systems of private 
law of the EU Member States with regard to discrimination on grounds of nationality and on the scope and 
need for the creation of a European Civil Code. Legal Affairs Series JURI - 103 EN 06-2000), in November 
2000 the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market commenced an initiative to 
create a Common Frame of Reference (“CFR”) which is “a kind of European contract law toolkit 
.…(which)….would draw together in one place best solutions based on the common principles 
underpinning national contract laws ……. (and) … provide tools which can be picked out and used as 
required to fix a particular problem.” (Robert Madelin, Director General DG Health and Consumer 
Protection, European Commission Joint European Parliament and Commission conference 28 April 2004, A 
Common Frame of Reference for a more coherent European Contract Law). Its day to day work is 
undertaken by a number of Working Teams concentrating on different areas of law. The so-called 
Amsterdam Team focuses on Commercial Agency, Franchise and Distribution Law (http://ecc.uvt.nl/). 
1036 However, rather inconsistently, the later provisions do refer to the franchisor providing ongoing 
assistance to the franchisee. Article 3:101 Commercial Agency, Franchise And Distribution Amsterdam 
Group 8th Draft (21 May, 2003). See Appendix 10. 
1037 Commercial Agency, Franchise And Distribution Amsterdam Group 8th Draft (21 May, 2003). 
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information) - because although it proposes a full set of rules for franchising, it makes no 
suggestion as to how potential franchisees can be educated into taking appropriate advice 
before they enter into a franchise agreement and use the information disclosed to them to 
make an informed decision as to whether they should enter into the franchise.  Further, the 
rules proposed are both excessive and inappropriate1038. They fail to deliver an appropriate 
balance between the economic drivers that encourage the parties to become involved in 
franchising and the consequential inherent risks.   
The chapter focuses upon the third commercial imperative, seeking to ensure that the 
franchisors’ and franchisees’ interests are protected.  Although it proposes certain mandatory 
clauses that are reasonable and underpin some of the economic drivers of the relationship1039 
it fails to appreciate where the balance between the interests of the franchisor and franchisee 
lies and so seeks to over protect the franchisee thereby eroding some of the economic drivers 
that attract franchisors to franchising.   
It suggests that the franchisee should have a number of appropriate obligations imposed upon 
it. These include paying all monies due to the franchisor under the contract1040 and informing 
the franchisor of any threat to its intellectual property rights1041. It also proposes that the 
franchisee must make reasonable efforts to operate the franchise business according to the 
business format of the franchisor, follow the franchisor’s reasonable instructions in relation 
with the business format and the maintenance of the reputation of the network and  take 
reasonable care not to harm the franchise network1042. The franchisee must also allow the 
franchisor reasonable access to its premises so as to enable the franchisor to check that the 
franchisee is complying with the franchisor's business method and instructions and audit the 
franchisee’s accounting books1043. This recognition of at least some of the risks accepted by 
the franchisor is very positive. However, it fails to identify other important concerns 
identified earlier in this study such as non compete provisions and respect of the franchisor’s 
intellectual property.   
                                                   
1038 Ibid Chapter 3. 
1039 Some of the provisions are reasonable, for example, if the franchisee is obliged or as a matter of 
practice required to purchase goods or services from the franchisor or a designated supplier, the franchisor 
must ensure that the goods or services ordered by the franchisee are supplied within a reasonable time, 
insofar as practicable provided that the order is reasonable (Article 3:204).  
1040 Article 3:301 Commercial Agency, Franchise And Distribution Amsterdam Team ibid. 
1041 Article 3:302 ibid. 
1042 Article 3:303 ibid. 
1043 Article 3:304 ibid. 
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Unfortunately the Study Group also seeks to impose provisions that are far too burdensome 
on the franchisor and which undermine the economic drivers1044 that attract franchisors to 
franchising.   
On the positive side, the Study Group does impose certain obligations on the franchisor which 
re-enforce the commercial drivers that encourage franchisees to become involved in 
franchising.  For example, it recommends that the franchisor must grant the franchisee a right 
to use the intellectual property rights to the extent necessary to operate the franchise business 
and make reasonable efforts to ensure the undisturbed and continuous use of the intellectual 
property rights,1045 and that throughout the duration of the contract, the franchisor must 
provide the franchisee with the know-how which is necessary to operate the franchise 
business1046.  It also states that the franchisor must provide the franchisee with on-going 
assistance in so far as it is necessary for the operation of the franchise business, without 
additional charge for the franchisee. 
However, its lack of specificity potentially causes problems when it states that any further 
assistance reasonably requested by the franchisee must also be provided at a reasonable cost.  
The lack of detail as to what “further assistance” and “a reasonable cost” means will have a 
direct impact upon the commercial viability of the franchise for both the franchisor and the 
franchisee.1047  It is an open invitation for endless litigation and uncertainty. 
Some of the obligations it proposes are far too wide and general.  As a result they undermine 
the economic drivers that attract franchisors to franchising.  For example, during the term of 
the contract the franchisor is required to provide the franchisee with information concerning a 
number of issues including market conditions, commercial results of the franchise network 
and characteristics of the goods and services1048. It is not clear what is meant by “market 
conditions” or whether the market is local, regional or national market. It is totally 
impractical and indeed unnecessary to expect a franchisor based in one member state (or 
indeed outside the EU) to know anything about market conditions in another member state. 
Indeed, its ignorance of those market conditions may well be one of the reasons that it 
                                                   
1044 For example, it must warn the franchisee, within a reasonable time when it foresees or ought to foresee, 
that the franchisor's or designated supplier’s ability to make the supplies will be significantly less than the 
franchisee had reason to expect (Article 3:206). This obligation may be difficult to comply with in practice 
and clearly borrows for existing agency laws.  The phrase “ought to foresee” places an arduous duty on the 
franchisor that is highly subjective and vague.  It is unlikely to encourage companies to franchise their 
business for fear of continual and unjustified litigation with any disenchanted franchisees. 
1045 Article 3:201 Commercial Agency, Franchise And Distribution Amsterdam Team ibid. 
1046 Ibid, Article 3:202. 
1047 Ibid, Article 3:203. 
1048 Ibid, Article 3:205. The other issues prices and terms for the sale of goods or services, any 
recommended prices and terms for the resale of goods or services, relevant communication between the 
franchisor and customers in the territory, advertising campaigns are not problematic. 
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decided to grant a franchise there in the first place. It is also unclear what is meant by 
“commercial results”. It could mean sales figures, balance sheets or profit and loss accounts 
of the franchisor or all the franchisees on the network. Franchisees are unlikely to welcome 
having details of their individual businesses shared with other franchisees, who in some 
circumstances are their most immediate competitors but any lesser level of detail would 
probably not be of any real use or interest to other franchisees.   
It also proposes that the franchisor is obliged to make reasonable efforts to promote and 
maintain the reputation of the franchise network and must design and co-ordinate the 
appropriate advertising campaigns aimed at the promotion of the franchise network without 
any additional charge. 1049 Yet again this provision is inappropriate. It suggests that the 
franchisees can abdicate responsibility for promoting their business to the franchisor.  That is 
totally at odds with the whole essence of the franchisor/franchisee relationship. 
Sadly, the Amsterdam Group’s proposals are a missed opportunity.  Although some of them 
do accentuate the impact of the third commercial imperatives on the legal eco-systems they 
fail to appreciate where the balance of interests between franchisor and franchisee lies.  Most 
of its proposals are little more than a distillation of existing European member state 
jurisprudence.  There is no originality of thought.  Just the regurgitation of ready made 
solutions to different problems.  It therefore fails to address the Commercial Imperatives in 
any meaningful way and so, for example, it fails to either analyse the fundamental 
characteristics of franchising or consider empirical evidence and academic comment about it 
fails to understand even the basic differences between agency and distribution on the one 
hand and franchising on the other.  This leads it to propose an indemnity for goodwill for the 
franchisee if the franchisor’s business volume has been increased by the franchisee, even 
when the contract was terminated for non-performance of one party.  It also leads it to 
propose that the franchisor must repurchase the franchisee’s stock at the end of the 
contract1050.  
                                                   
1049 Ibid, Article 3:207. 
1050 Ibid Article 1:306 and Article 1:307. 
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The UNIDROIT Model Franchise disclosure law1051 is the other proposal to re-engineer the 
regulatory environment for franchising.  It was issued in September 2002 and was 
supplemented by the second edition of its Guide to International Master Franchise 
Agreements which was issued in October 2007. UNDROIT is an independent 
intergovernmental organisation. Its model law is meant to represent international best 
practice. It is therefore appropriate to consider whether it addresses the three commercial 
imperatives identified above and if so, who successful it is in doing so. The fact that the 
UNIDROIT Model law only deals with pre-contractual disclosure clearly means that it cannot 
deal with two of the three Commercial Imperatives.  At best it can only deal with the second 
Commercial Imperative, pre-contractual hygiene, although even here it is lacking, as it 
proposes nothing to enable prospective franchisees to better understand any information 
disclosed to them about their potential purchase. 
UNIDROIT’s model law does propose that certain relevant information is disclosed to 
potential franchisees.  However, it fails to offer any new suggestions as to how to ensure that 
potential franchisees are informed of the nature of the relationship that they are about to enter 
into. It is no more than a distillation of what it deems to be best practice from existing 
franchise legislation around the world. Despite the input of practitioners (or perhaps because 
of it) the model is the sterile product of administrative endeavour. It lacks in the subtlety, 
originality and “context” necessary to effectively ensure that potential franchisees not only 
receive appropriate information but that it is delivered in a manner and style that the potential 
franchisee will be able to understand. It offers no proposal as to how the “Psychology of 
Failure” identified by the Australian authorities1052 can be overcome or how potential 
franchisees can be persuaded to take and follow advice given by appropriately qualified and 
experienced advisors.  It offers no fresh insight into the issues to be regulated or how that 
regulation must be applied. There is nothing in it that cannot be found in existing franchise 
laws. It gives no analysis of the commercial imperatives at play in the franchising sector and 
how to maintain market confidence and encourage new entrants. In short it fails to meet the 
                                                   
1051 The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) dismissed the suggestion of 
an International Convention on Franchising.  An international code of ethics a model contract – Guide to 
International Master Franchising Arrangements (second edition) pp xxxiv – xxxv Guide to International 
Master Franchise Arrangements (second edition) UNIDROIT 2007 originally issued in September 2002 
Franchise Arrangements (second edition) UNIDROIT 2007. See www.unidroit.org. It was set up in 1926 as 
an auxiliary organ of the League of Nations and following the demise of the League, was re-established in 
1940 on the basis of a multilateral agreement, the UNIDROIT Statute. Its purpose is to study needs and 
methods for modernising, harmonising and co-ordinating private and in particular commercial law as 
between States and groups of States.  It endeavours to prepare model and where appropriate harmonise 
uniform rules of private law. 
1052 The Franchise Council of Australia’s Submission to the Australian Federal Government Review dated 
August 2006 
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benchmarks that franchise regulations should aspire to. It is disappointing that so much 
collective endeavour has resulted in no original thought or proposals. 
Instead it declares that the fundamental principle that needs to be addressed is whether 
potential franchisees are more likely to protect themselves against fraud if they have access 
to truthful, important information before they enter into the franchise agreement. That misses 
a fundamental point.  Fraud is a criminal offence and should be regulated accordingly by the 
criminal law.  Disclosure should be about ensuring that franchisees enter into their franchises 
giving full informed consent to their obligations they take on and they acknowledge that they 
are taking on real risks1053.  
It is disappointing that it focuses upon fraud rather than the Commercial Imperatives. By 
identifying fraud as the priority they have to some extent proscribed the thrust of the model 
law and limited its potential use and impact1054. 
The Model Law merely lists matters to be disclosed 14 days1055  before “completion” and 
makes the obvious, but valid, point that legislators must consider the financial burden that 
new legislation can place upon franchisors and franchisees and compare these to the benefits 
that will be derived from any new disclosure law1056. 
It also provides for annual updating of the disclosure document linked to the franchisor’s 
financial year1057.  It does not propose any set form for the disclosure document but requires 
that it be in a single document1058 receipt of which is acknowledged by the potential 
franchisee in writing1059. 
It does, however, recognise the need to ensure that franchisees are not overwhelmed by 
unnecessary disclosure obligations and although the requirement for disclosure cannot be 
contracted out of1060, certain obvious exemptions to the need to issue a disclosure document 
are proposed. These are sales to those already involved in the franchise, franchisee sales, 
investments over a certain threshold, sales to potential franchisees of a certain minimum net 
worth, fractional franchises and renewals1061. 
                                                   
1053 UNIDROIT, Model Franchise Disclosure Law, Preamble. 
1054 See Chapter 14. 
1055 UNIDROIT, ibid, Article 3(A). 
1056 Ibid, Preamble. 
1057 Ibid, Article 3 (B). 
1058 Ibid , Article 4. 
1059 Ibid, Article 7. 
1060 Ibid, Article 10. 
1061 Ibid, Article 5. 
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The uninspiring nature of the model law is attested to by the fact that it has been in existence 
for more than 9 years so far but has had no impact on the many franchise laws that have been 
adopted during that period1062.  
Neither the Study Group proposal nor the UNIDROIT model law seek to accentuate the 
impact of the three Commercial Imperatives on the legal eco-systems that comprise the 
regulatory environment for franchising in the EU. 
5.2.4 Sub-Conclusion 
In order to ensure that the EU regulatory environment is fit for purpose as regards 
franchising and so enables franchisors and franchisees to access the economic drivers 
that attract them to franchising whilst reducing the risks involved to a reasonable 
level, its legal ecosystems must accentuate the influence of three Commercial 
Imperatives.  These are maintaining market confidence, ensuring precontractual 
hygiene and imposing mandatory terms onto the franchisor/ franchisee relationship 
through the franchise agreement. 
5.3 Accentuating the Impact of the First Commercial Imperative – Maintaining 
Market Confidence 
This section provides critical analysis towards achieving the third objective of this thesis. 
Further to the discussion in section 2.3, in order to maintain market confidence in franchising, 
a directive must promote franchising and the economic benefit that it can deliver both to the 
economy as a whole and to the companies that use it as part of their market strategy in 
particular. As the introduction to one of the draft bills placed before the Belgian Chamber of 
Deputies stated1063, it is  
                                                   
1062 In Italy the model law was rejected out of hand by the Senate as a basis for their law because “it did not 
reflect Italy’s legal tradition or deal with the issues of most concern to them” (Emanuele Rossi, La Scala 
law office – Milan – EFN Annual Conference London 24 March 2006). In Sweden, the only jurisdiction 
that one is aware of having considered the Model Law (due in no small part due to the fact that the Unidroit 
officer heading the project was Swedish), it was rejected as being inappropriate.1062  In 2004 the Swedish 
Ministry of Justice analysed the Unidroit Model Law and considered whether or not statutory provisions on 
franchising should be adopted in Sweden (Departementsserien Ds 2004:55). A survey was conducted 
among 60 franchise systems of varying size and within different business sectors (in total 550 
questionnaires were distributed, of which 310 were replied to) as part of the study.  It discussed termination, 
disputes and pre-contractual disclosure and concluded that there was no need to improve the position of 
franchisees in terms of statutory rules on termination of franchise agreements. The appropriateness of 
Arbitration clauses was also considered and the suggestion that they be prohibited in franchise agreements 
was dismissed. These conclusions were based on the notion that franchisees are legal entities with the 
ability to negotiate terms and as such should take commercial responsibility for their decision. The Study 
concluded that a Swedish law based on the Unidroit Model Law would not be appropriate, because it would 
not accord with “the Swedish model” (Departementsserien Ds 2004:55 page 150). 
1063 The Belgian House of Representatives, 30 October 2003. 
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“essential……… not to interrupt ……..the development …. of a commercial formula 
which having been successfully used in the American market has spread to Europe 
where there are more than 5,000 franchisors and almost 200,000 franchisees 
generating a turnover of 166 billion euros and  employing some 1,500,000 
personnel.” 
Franchising can make the single market a reality not only for large corporates with the capital 
and man power to set up in other member states, but also for smaller enterprises that have 
traditionally done business only in their own national markets.  
It is suggested that a directive must not only expressly state that it believes that franchising is 
a legitimate and respectable form of commerce that adds and has the potential to add further 
to the successful development of the Single Market by empowering SMEs and others to 
expand their businesses across national boundaries.  It must proactively encourage companies 
to use franchising as part of their market strategy.  Conflicting and confusing regulations 
impede the efficient functioning of the market and discourage entrepreneurship and 
commerce. Maintaining market confidence in franchising, involves preserving stability in 
franchising and the reasonable expectation that it will remain stable on an EU level1064. In 
order to do this, it is suggested that a new dynamic needs to be imposed on the various legal 
eco-systems.  One which can be called an “Exchange of Benefits” approach. 
The challenge of regulation is met by the EU’s current legal eco-systems, the CFR and the 
UNIDROIT Model Law in an almost one dimensional manner. They all focus on penalising 
non-compliant franchisors by way of civil and/or criminal penalties imposed through either 
governmental or private legal action1065.  The EU’s legal eco-systems do not seek to 
encourage franchising by offering franchisors appropriate commercial benefits in return for 
complying with certain appropriate requirements or recognise the risks faced by franchisors. 
As a result not only do the EU’s current legal eco-systems fail to accentuate the impact of the 
need to increase market confidence, but being a franchisor has become synonymous with 
accepting extra legal, administrative and financial burden.  
They have failed to understand the nature of those involved in franchising.  Not all 
franchisors are successful and wealthy multi-national corporations like, for example, 
McDonalds or Wyndham. The majority are far more modest organisations1066. Many are 
SMEs that are using franchising as a way of enabling themselves to compete meaningfully on 
                                                   
1064 FSMA, ibid Chapter 1, para. 2. 
1065 See Chapters 10, 11, 12, 15 and 17 above. 
1066 See 2.1 
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the European stage1067.  The equation which helps them to decide whether or not to franchise 
their business is delicately balanced.  By granting franchises, franchisors are exposing 
themselves to potential abuse by franchisees.  In order to be encouraged to franchise their 
business, companies must be able to see tangible benefits beyond the economic drivers 
already identified. 
An Exchange of Benefits approach is proposed as an effective way of accentuating 
the impact of the need for increased market confidence in franchising on the legal 
eco-systems 
A regulatory environment that not only controls the behaviour of franchisors but also protects 
them from abuse by franchisees will encourage businesses to take advantage of the single 
market and potentially transform the regulatory environment in the eyes of franchisors from a 
costly administrative, financial and legal burden to one which, in return for a reasonable 
investment, offers substantial financial, commercial and legal benefit. By adopting this 
“exchange of benefits” approach, regulators will potentially reverse the focus of the debate 
about what amounts to a franchise. Rather than businesses seeking to find ways of escaping 
from being classified as a franchise, they may endeavour to come within the definition. 
Disputes over whether or not a business amounts to a franchise would no longer be 
characterised by businesses trying to prove that they are not a franchise. They would also 
include cases where businesses were seeking to prove the opposite. 
In order for businesses to be able to enjoy these benefits they must come within the definition 
of a franchise, detailed above.  It is suggested that the benefits extended to franchisors should 
be such as re-enforce the economic drivers that attract them to franchising and reduce the 
consequential inherent risks to an appropriate level.  It is therefore proposed that the benefits 
offered include requiring franchisees to make pre-contractual disclosure to franchisors (at the 
franchisor’s request), focusing the regulation only where it is needed and reducing the 
disadvantages that franchisors suffer compared to corporate chains. 
5.3.1 The Benefits Extended to Franchisors  
The following section provides critical analysis towards achieving the third objective of this 
thesis. 
It is suggested that in order to increase market confidence in franchising and encourage 
companies to become franchisors, disclosure should not be just a one way process.  The 
degree of risk involved for both franchisors and franchisees must be reflected in the pre-
                                                   
1067 The BFA has 236 full and provisional members of which only around 10 are substantial corporates e.g. 
McDonalds and the Halifax. 
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contractual disclosure requirements of an EU franchise directive. Not only should franchisors 
have an obligation to give pre-contractual disclosure, but they should also have the right to 
require that franchisees provide them with pre-contractual disclosure too. This will help 
ensure that the risks to franchisors are taken into account and so encourage more companies 
to franchise their businesses. Effective disclosure by potential franchisees, should the 
franchisor require it, helps to ensure that inappropriately qualified individuals are less likely 
to be placed in a position in which they damage themselves, the franchisor and other 
franchisees. It also protects franchisors from being “duped” by prospective franchisors with 
inappropriate criminal, financial, business or personal backgrounds. The franchisor’s risk 
profile is correspondingly reduced.   
This will not of course prevent franchisors recruiting poor quality franchisees. It will however 
help to make it less of a surprise to them when a franchisee turns out to be inappropriate and 
so ensure that they are more clearly responsible for a poor recruitment. If a franchisee mis-
states its circumstances, the blame for the problems should be more equitably shared between 
the franchisee and the franchisor and so reduce the ability of undeserving franchisees to 
blame their franchisor for all their problems1068. 
 
                                                   
1068 Curiously, only the Vietnamese franchise regulation requires pre-contractual disclosure by potential 
franchisees, but unfortunately this is an extremely recent law and so offers no guidance as to its 
effectiveness.  The original Chinese franchise regulation also required it, but this was dropped when the 
second regulation was adopted.  No reason was given for its exclusion. 
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Franchisors should be given the right, but not the obligation, to require that at least 10 
working days before entering into any agreement which obliges or potentially obliges 
a Franchisor to grant a potential franchisee a franchise, the potential franchisee must 
provide the franchisor with the following information about itself and its 
spouse/partner, if any or if it is a limited liability company its shareholders and 
officers: 
(1) Full name and address including e-mail address and telephone number. 
(2) Details of education and employment. 
(3) Details of business experience including directorships and any direct or 
indirect shareholdings in privately held companies. 
(4) Personal bankruptcy history. 
(5) Details of the insolvency of any company in which he/she was a director or 
shareholder. 
(6) Details of family situation including details of any divorce, child maintenance 
and other such court orders and arrangements, a signed statement from the 
prospective franchisee’s spouse/partner that they fully support the prospective 
franchisees application. 
(7) Personal medical history and that of their spouse/partner and children.. 
(8) Criminal record and that of their spouse/partner. 
(9) Details of any judgment against it. 
(10) Copy of driving licence and passport. 
(11) Banker’s reference 
(12) Details of personal assets and those of spouse/partner including details of 
status of current home and any charges on those assets.  
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The consequences of a potential franchisee failing to supply all such information to 
any franchisor that has requested it, would be to give the franchisor the right to 
terminate the franchise agreement on the basis of defective consent1069 within twelve 
(12) months of the failure coming to the franchisor’s attention or within two (2) years 
of the franchisee signing the franchise agreement, whichever is the earliest.   
A franchisee that has made any material or substantial wrongful or lack of disclosure 
will be deprived of any right to claim damages or other remedy from the franchisor 
unless the franchisor is shown to have intentionally and materially breached the terms 
of the franchise agreement or intentionally and materially made wrongful or 
incomplete pre-contractual disclosure to the franchisee.  
This should avoid any franchisee being inequitably denied justice due to technical non 
compliance and prevent the franchisor from using a franchisee’s failures to excuse its own 
deliberately inappropriate behaviour. 
It is the obligation of any franchisor to ensure that it is aware of and complies with relevant 
laws that impose obligations upon it. However, one cannot expect potential franchisees to be 
aware of any such obligations that are placed upon it as a result of it deciding to become a 
franchisee. Therefore, if a franchisor decides to take advantage of its right to require pre-
contractual disclosure by a potential franchisee, the burden of ensuring that the potential 
franchisee knows of its obligation must lie with the franchisor.  
The franchisor must provide the potential franchisee with a written statement 
informing him/her that it wishes to exercise its right to require disclosure in plain 
language. This must be delivered to the potential franchisee at least 14 days prior to 
the date on which the potential franchisee must make the disclosure.  
It must also be accompanied by a form, in plain language and in a Question and 
Answer format, setting out exactly what information is required in order to comply 
with the obligation, so that the franchisee need only complete the form.  
It would be difficult, and indeed pointless, to oblige all potential franchisees to make pre-
contractual disclosure regardless of the franchisor’s desire for it. The franchisor should 
therefore have the right to require potential franchisees to make full pre-contractual disclosure 
and be able to rely upon the veracity of such disclosure if it is made. The Franchisor may at 
its own option decide that it does not need written pre-contractual disclosure from a potential 
                                                   
1069 This reflects the court’s approach to non-disclosure by franchisors under both the French and Spanish 
disclosure laws and German law.  See 3.3 below 
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franchisee. It may for some other reason fail to obtain such disclosure from a potential 
franchisee. In either such case the franchisor will lose its right of redress outlined above.  
As stated above, if a franchisor wishes to take advantage of its right to pre-contractual 
disclosure by a potential franchisee, it must deliver a notice to the potential franchisee stating 
that that is the case and clearly explaining the consequences of it not doing so. This notice 
should also be stated clearly on the cover sheet of the franchise agreement. 
Both notices of the potential franchisee’s pre-contractual disclosure obligations 
should be in prominent and easily legible form and read as follows; 
“THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT NOTICE. 
YOU MUST READ IT CAREFULLY AND DO AS IT SAYS BEFORE 
YOU ENTER INTO ANY AGREEMENT WITH US.   
IT REQUIRES YOU TO GIVE US CERTAIN INFORMATION ABOUT 
YOU AND YOUR SPOUSE/PARTNER/SHAREHOLDERS/OFFICERS (IF 
APPLICABLE). 
YOU MUST GIVE THIS INFORMATION TO US AT LEAST 14 DAYS 
BEFORE YOU SIGN ANY AGREEMENT WHICH ENTITLES YOU TO 
THE FRANCHISE  
YOU CAN GIVE US THIS INFORMATION BY ACCURATELY 
COMPLETING THE ATTACHED QUESTIONNAIRE. 
ALTERNATIVELY, IF YOU CHOOSE TO DO SO, YOU CAN GIVE IT IN 
ANY OTHER WRITTEN FORM. 
IF YOU DO NOT GIVE US ALL THIS INFORMATION, OR IF ANY OF 
THE INFORMATION THAT YOU GIVE US IS FALSE, INCORRECT OR 
INCOMPLETE,  YOU MAY LOSE YOUR RIGHT TO THE FRANCHISE 
AND SOME OF YOUR OTHER IMPORTANT LEGAL RIGHTS MAY BE 
SEVERELY RESTRICTED”. 
5.3.2 Focusing Regulation where it is needed 
This provides critical analysis towards the third objective of this thesis. 
It is proposed that the pre-contractual disclosure obligation of franchisors proposed below1070 
should not apply to all franchise sales.  The proposed EU franchise directive must encourage 
the use of franchising by taking into account its commercial realities. The size, commercial 
                                                   
1070 Chapter 5 .4.3 below 
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experience and sophistication of some franchisees will mean that they do not require the same 
level of protection as the majority of franchisees. The role a franchise will play in the overall 
business interests of some franchisees and the size of the investment being made in the 
franchise (be it very substantial or minimal) will also have an impact upon whether or not 
additional protection should be made available to franchisees. 
Substantial businesses that take on a franchise as an “add-on” to an existing business and 
other sophisticated individuals making substantial capital investments are dealing with 
franchisors on a more even footing and have sufficient commercial experience to mean that 
they do not need the same level of protection as the more usual type of franchisee. They can 
rely upon the usual contractual remedies available to businesses. Likewise a small investment 
by a franchisee may not justify imposing the same administrative burden as a more 
substantial one. 
Franchisors should only be required to make pre-contractual disclosure when it is 
appropriate and not in the case of fractional franchisees, de minimis franchisees, 
sophisticated franchisees, large investors, large franchisees and insiders. 
5.3.2.1 Excluding Fractional and De Minimis Franchises 
Fractional franchises are those that are taken on by an existing business which is seeking to 
expand its product line through taking a franchise.  
If (1) the franchisee or its principals have more than two years of experience in the 
same line of business or is otherwise already familiar with the products and services 
to be sold through the franchise; and (2) the parties reasonably expect that the 
franchisee’s sales from the new line of business will not exceed 20% of its total 
sales.1071 It is proposed that any disclosure requirement be excluded1072. 
A de minimis exemption will ensure that the directive focuses upon those franchisees who 
have made a personally significant monetary investment and who cannot extricate themselves 
from the relationship if it becomes burdensome without suffering a financial setback1073.  The 
threshold will exclude transactions where the prospective franchisee is at risk of losing an 
                                                   
1071 In the original SBP, the Commission reasoned, with respect to fractional franchisees, that pre-sale 
disclosure is unwarranted where the prospective franchisee already is familiar with the products and services 
to be sold through the franchise and where the prospective franchisee faces a minimal investment risk. 
Original SBP, 43 FR at 59707. 
1072 Section 436.1(g) of the US’s updated FTC Rule takes this approach. 
1073 In the US franchise sales under US$500; are exempted from the pre-contractual disclosure requirement. 
See 16 CFR 436.2(a)(3)(iii). 
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amount of money too small to justify imposition of the expense and burden of preparing a 
disclosure document upon sellers.  The threshold proposed is €1,000. 
It is proposed that any franchisee investing €1,000 or less in a franchise should not be 
entitled to a disclosure document. 
5.3.2.2 Excluding Sophisticated Franchisees 
Franchising often involves heavily-negotiated, multi-million pound deals between franchisors 
and highly sophisticated individuals and corporate franchisees with highly competent 
lawyers1074. In the course of such deals1075, prospective franchisees often demand and receive 
material information from the franchisor that equals or exceeds the disclosures required by 
the Rule. Such business arrangements do not require the same level of protection as those 
with similar investors. 
There are three types of sophisticated investors and those that make a large franchise 
investment, large franchisees and inside investors. 
In the USA, large franchise investments1076 are defined as franchises where the initial 
investment is at least US$1 million1077. The basis for a large investment exemption is not that 
“sophisticated” investors do not need pre-sale disclosure, but that they will demand and 
obtain material information with which to make an investment decision regardless of the 
application of any law. Where prospective franchisees are likely to demand and obtain pre-
sale material information regardless of external prompting or compulsion, then there is no 
case for legislative intervention. 
Such an exemption must, of course, be limited.  To ensure that the exemption is not too wide, 
the US FTC Rule1078 sets forth additional safeguards beyond the mere financial threshold1079. 
                                                   
1074 See FTC Staff Report. Gust Rosenfeld, at 7; J&G, at 7; Marriott, at 2-4; Starwood, at 2-3; 7-Eleven, 
NPR 10, at 2; NFC, NPR 12, at 17; IFA, NPR 22, at 7; AFC, NPR 30, at 2-3; Marriott, NPR 35, at 6. See 
also Kaufmann, ANPR, 18Sept.97 Tr., at 165; Wieczorek, id., at 187-88; Tifford, id., at 194 (noting that the 
Rule imposes unnecessary costs on sophisticated franchisees and adds unwarranted delay in the high-paced 
negotiation process, where parties often are anxious to cement their deals quickly to beat out the 
competition). 
1075 E.g. hotel franchises such as those offered by Wyndham, Marriott, Intercontinental and the like can 
require investments of US$10 million and more.  Large retail franchises such as that offered by Hamleys 
require a similar level of investment. 
1076 See the FTC Rule Section 436.8(a)(5)(i) which has such an exemption for franchise sales over US$1 
million exclusive of unimproved land and franchisor financing. 
1077 At least two US states provide some form of exemption for transactions involving large initial 
investments. Illinois permits a franchisor to apply for an exemption from both registration and disclosure 
where the investment for a single franchise unit exceeds $1 million. Maryland exempts franchises that 
require an initial investment of $750,000 or more from registration, but not from disclosure. 
1078 FTC Rule, Section 436.8(a)(5)(i). 
1079 These safeguards were included in the proposed version of this provision. Franchise NPR, 64 FR at 
57321 and 57345. 
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First1080, funds obtained from the franchisor (or an affiliate) cannot be counted toward the $1 
million initial investment threshold. Second1081, the prospective franchisee must sign an 
acknowledgment that the franchise sale is exempt from the Franchise Rule because the 
prospective franchisee will be making an initial investment over the threshold.  
Although franchisors may find a large initial investment exemption1082 appealing, wealth or 
the ability to make a large franchise investment does not necessarily equate with business 
sophistication1083. The franchisees’ business background is arguably more relevant.1084 
A large investment exemption would not consider the source of the prospective franchisee’s 
funds, which could be raised through a secured loan, pension fund and so on.  
“The fact that a franchisee may be ready to invest a highly leveraged franchise 
investment does not prove that such a person is so sophisticated that a disclosure 
document would be of no benefit.”1085 
However, on balance it appears that a large investment exemption is warranted and that the 
size of prospective franchisees investment is one measure of its sophistication.1086 
It is reasonable to conclude that investment level is a straight forward and unambiguous 
indication of sophistication. Franchisors need a clear objective standard that will indicate 
when and under what circumstances the sophisticated investor exemption will apply. An 
exemption based upon the specific business experience of each individual prospective 
franchisee would be burdensome to administer. Franchisors would not be able to take 
advantage of the exemption unless they first verified each prospective franchisee’s business 
background. Similarly, without verification, law enforcers would not be able to discern 
whether any specific franchise relationship was covered by the directive. This approach could 
create a regulatory nightmare for both franchisors and franchise law enforcers. 
                                                   
1080 Section 436.8(a)(5)(i). 
1081 Section 436.8(a)(5)(i). 
1082
 E.g .  PMRW, NPR 4, at 3; Wendy’s, NPR 5, at 2; McDonalds, NPR 7, at 2; H&H, NPR 9, at 4; Baer, 
NPR 11, at 16; NFC, NPR 12, at 20. Marriott, for example, stated that not only are sophisticated franchisees 
able to protect their own interests, but the self-interest of others involved in the project, such as bankers, is 
sufficient to protect those interests as well. Marriott, NPR 35, at 6. See, e.g., Baer, NPR 11, at 16; Gurnick, 
NPR 21, at 3; J&G, NPR 32, at 3. 
1083 Stadfeld, NPR 23, at 8; Karp, NPR 24, at 6. 
1084 Karp, at 7; Karp, NPR 24, at 6-7. See also Stadfeld, NPR 23, at 7-8 (“Being wealthy should not be a 
basis for being screwed.”). 
1085 Karp, ibid, at 8. 
1086 This view was supported by the Automobile Importers of America submission to the FTC, which 
observed that “Prospective motor vehicle dealers make extraordinarily large investments. As a practical 
matter, investments of this size and scope involve relatively knowledgeable investors or the use of 
independent business advisors, and an extended period of negotiation. The record is consistent with the 
conclusion that the transactions negotiated by such knowledgeable investors over time and with the aid of 
business advisors produce the pre-sale information disclosure necessary to ensure that investment decisions 
are the product of an informed assessment of the potential risks and benefits of the proposed investment.” 
45 FR 51763-64 (Aug. 5, 1980). 
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A large investment exemption offers tangible benefits to franchisors such as those operating a 
hotel business where the typical franchise investment is likely to exceed the large investment 
exemption’s monetary threshold will provide regulatory relief in those instances. A large 
franchise investment exemption, however, will provide only limited relief for franchisors that 
sell franchises both above and below the threshold. In such instances, the franchisor must 
prepare disclosure documents in order to sell at levels below the threshold.  
Obviously deciding what the financial threshold should be is vital. In the USA the FTC 
concluded that a $1 million threshold strikes the right balance between providing relief for 
sophisticated investors and protecting consumers. 
Interestingly, during its review of the FTC Rule no consensus emerged on the appropriate 
investment threshold for the large investment exemption. Several commenters supported a 
$1.5 million threshold1087, whilst others urged a higher threshold1088 so as not to place too 
many transactions outside the Rule’s protection.  Others, such as McDonald’s suggested that 
the threshold should be lower1089. The IFA proposed a $1 million threshold, excluding 
land.”1090 It observed that a 1997 update to the Profile of Franchising identified 52 franchise 
companies offering franchises with an initial investment exceeding $1 million, excluding 
land. This equates to 4.4% or less of all franchise systems1091. Thus, at a $1 million threshold 
for the exemption, more than 95% of all franchise systems would remain within the ambit of 
the Rule.1092 Some commentators recommended an even lower threshold1093. 
                                                   
1087 E.g., Baer, NPR 11, at 16; Gurnick, NPR 21, at 3; Marriott, NPR 35, at 6. 
1088 NASAA recommended a $3 million threshold.  NASAA, NPR 17, at 12. Seth Stadfeld added that it is 
not difficult to invest $1.5 million when there is a down payment plus financing of a substantial portion of 
the investment. “Indeed, because they are taking on larger obligations, there is all the more reason and 
urgency why they should get the material, factual and contractual information that is otherwise available 
under the Rule.” Stadfeld, NPR 23, at 8. See also NFA, NPR 27, at 3. 
1089For example, McDonald’s suggested that the threshold should be set at $1 million. “In our considerable 
experience, individuals purchasing franchises involving a $1 million investment have a clear understanding 
of the terms and conditions of the business arrangements and have obtained professional financial and/or 
legal advice before entering into the franchise agreement.” McDonald’s, NPR 7, at 2. See also 7-Eleven, 
NPR 10, at 3; NFC, NPR 12, at 20; BI, NPR 28, at 13. Wendy’s suggested that the threshold be lowered, 
but did not offer any specific amount. Wendy’s, NPR 5, at 2. 
1090 As discussed below, IFA initially stated that “real estate” should be excluded in calculating the large 
investment threshold. IFA, NPR 22, at 7. In its Staff Report comment, however, the IFA clarified that by 
“real estate,” it means raw, unimproved land. See IFA, at 3. 
1091 IFA, NPR 22, at 7. 
1092 The Staff Report recommended a $1 million threshold for the exemption, excluding land and franchisor 
financing, as discussed below. Staff Report, at 240. 
1093 PMR&W, NPR 4, at 3 (suggesting a $500,000 threshold). See also Cendant, ANPR 140, at 4 
(suggesting a $750,000 threshold); H&H, NPR 9, at 4 (advocating a lowered threshold, but not specifying 
an amount); Duvall & Mandel, ANPR 114, at 21 (suggesting a $250,000 threshold provided there is a 
showing that the purchaser, alone or with counsel, can understand the merits and risks of the investment). 
The Commission rejects this approach as unworkable, because it would require franchisors to make 
subjective judgments about each purchaser’s business acumen. 
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The Commission gave particular weight to the statements offered by franchisors such as 
McDonald’s and Marriott that, in their experience, a $1 million investment is likely to involve 
sophisticated investors1094. A review of franchise investment fees in the UK1095 suggests that a 
large investment threshold of €500,000 be adopted in the EU Franchise Regulation.  The 
average up front fee in the UK charged is £45,4001096. 
Excluding franchisor financing adds a measure of protection to the prospective franchisee 
because traditional lenders are very likely to require a due diligence investigation of the 
offering, whereas the franchisor or its affiliate likely would not1097. 
Although there is a risk that excluding financing might discourage franchisors from offering 
financing to prospects not to do so could tempt a franchisor to increase the cost of the initial 
investment to qualify for the large investment exemption, while simultaneously offering to 
finance the deal itself, all without proper pre-sale disclosures.  
It is therefore appropriate for the exemption to be dependent upon the franchisee having been 
given notice of the fact that the franchisor is exempt from the disclosure requirement. 
It is proposed that franchisees who invest €500,000 or more (excluding funds 
obtained from the franchisor or its affiliates) in a franchise and have signed an 
acknowledgement that the sale is exempt from the disclosure requirement because the 
initial investment is over the threshold, should be exempted from the disclosure 
requirement 
Large entities negotiating franchise deals – such as airports, hospitals, and universities – do 
not need the protection afforded by the regulation1098 1099. 
                                                   
1094 The Commission has a history of considering and granting petitions for exemption to the Franchise 
Rule under section 18(g) of the FTC Act. In numerous exemption petition proceedings, the Commission has 
considered the size of investment as an indicium of sophistication. E.g., Paccar, Inc., 68 FR 67442 (Dec. 2, 
2003); Rolls-Royce Corp., 68 FR 67443 (Dec. 2, 2003); Austin Rover Cars of North America, 52 FR 6612 
(Mar. 4, 1987); Volkswagen of America, Inc., 49 FR 13677 (Apr. 6, 1984); Automobile Importers of 
America, Inc., 45 FR 51783 (Aug. 5, 1980). Based upon this experience in analyzing various franchise 
systems, the Commission believes that a large investment typically entails a sophisticated purchaser: “As a 
practical matter, investments of this size and scope typically involve knowledgeable investors, the use of 
independent business and legal advisors, and an extended period of negotiation that generates the exchange 
of information necessary to ensure that investment decisions are the product of an informed assessment of 
the potential risks and benefits.” Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 57 FR 1745 (Jan. 15, 1992) 
(granting petition for exemption). 
1095 A review of the 44 franchisees advertised in Franchise World Feb/March 2009 Nos. 169 suggests a 
range of investment levels from £4,000 to £260,000 
1096 BFA/Nat West Survey page 36. 
1097 Section 436.8(5)(i) of the FTC Rule does not count monies that are obtained through franchisor (or 
affiliate) financing toward the large initial investment exemption’s $1 million threshold. 
1098 Section 436.8(a)(5)(ii) of the FTC Rule exempts sales to entities who have been in any business for at 
least five years and have a net worth of at least $5 million. 
1099 Net worth of an entity can readily be determined from the entity’s balance sheet or other financial 
information, typically submitted as part the application process. 
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The US FTC concluded that both $5 million net worth and five years experience are 
necessary to ensure that the Rule continues to protect businesses with limited experience, 
limited assets, and, by inference, limited prior success.  
As larger companies often have complex corporate group structures, it is appropriate for a 
franchisor to consider the prior experience and net worth of the franchisee’s affiliates and 
parents when determining whether the franchisee qualifies as a “large franchisee”.  
It is recommended that the EU Franchise directive adopts a large franchisee 
exemption with a threshold of €5 million and a requirement for 5 years experience. 
Where a company wishes to sell a franchise to experienced company personnel with 
substantial direct management experience of the business, it would be overly burdensome to 
force the company to have to deliver a disclosure document to them as the only beneficiaries 
of the disclosures are already knowledgeable individuals.  
The exemption should be company-specific. A manager of one franchised company should 
not be deemed to be sophisticated for all franchise sales.  
It is proposed that a manager or other officer seeking to purchase a franchise of a 
particular company that the individual in question has worked in the franchisor for 
two years or more.   
5.3.3 Reducing the Disadvantages Franchisors Suffer Compared to Corporate Chains 
This provides critical analysis towards the third objective of this thesis. 
Franchised businesses are disadvantaged when compared to corporate chains by the 
franchisor’s inability to impose uniform retail prices and restrict the franchisees’ use of the 
internet. 
Most franchisors would struggle to expand their businesses through conventional corporate 
means. Indeed, access to working capital and better motivated people are why many 
franchisors in the UK, Germany, Franchise and Spain franchise their business1100. The 
average cost of launching a franchise in the UK is £170,0001101 so the financial threshold for 
                                                   
1100 See Appendix 3. In the Survey of Franchisors 72% of UK respondents, 72% of German respondents, 
64% of French respondents and 52% of Spanish respondents stated that access to Capital was a very 
significant reason why they franchised their business and 24% in the UK, 16% in Germany, 1% in France 
and 16% in Spain stated that it was a significant reason.  72% of UK respondents, 60% of German 
respondents, 60% of French respondents and 32% of Spanish respondents stated that access to better 
motivated people was a significant reason why they franchised their business.  Whilst 88% in the UK, 96% 
in Germany, 88% in France and 96% in Spain saw franchising as being able to help them expand their 
business more quickly. 
1101 BFA/Nat West Survey 2007, p. 40. 
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entry is fairly low. They are very much at a disadvantage when compared to well capitalized 
and resourced corporate chains. 
Uniform pricing is a key element in ensuring the brand integrity of any business and so 
essential to allow franchise chains to compete effectively with corporate chains. The majority 
of franchisors surveyed believe that they are disadvantaged compared to non franchised 
businesses as regards their ability to set prices in all of their outlets1102. The presence of 
uniform prices across the network acts as a key attraction for potential new franchisees1103. 
Research suggests that a majority of potential franchisees1104 consider that one of the 
attractions of buying a franchise is that the franchisor has the appropriate experience and 
expertise to enable it to know the most appropriate price point for the goods/product and that 
when they buy a franchise they will not want other members of the franchise network 
undercutting them on price1105. The reasons given for this are the prevention of intra brand 
competition based on price1106 and the fact that price differentials would damage their brand 
and confuse the customers1107. 
Research suggests that franchisors believe that franchised businesses are disadvantaged as 
compared to non-franchised businesses with regard to their access to a “multi channel sales 
strategy”1108 due to their inability to set prices in all their outlets and to control the 
franchisee’s use of the internet1109.   
The development and execution of an appropriate multi channel sales strategy that involves 
the appropriate use of the worldwide web is essential to most businesses. Current EU law 
does not merely fail to encourage companies to use franchising as part of its corporate 
strategy, in some ways it positively discourages its use. EU anti trust law discriminates 
against franchising by denying it rights enjoyed by corporate chains in respect of both retail 
prices and use of the internet. Given that most franchisors are small or medium sized 
businesses1110 and that franchising greatly increases the chances of individuals with little or 
                                                   
1102 Appendix 3.  76% in the UK, 72% in Germany, 76% in France and 72% in Spain 
1103 OECD, Competition Policy and Vertical Restraints: Franchising Agreement. 
1104 Appendix 2. 80% of the sample interviewed in the UK, 75% in France and 58% in Spain. 
1105 Appendix 2. 75% in the UK, 65% in France and 58% in Spain. 
1106 Appendix 2. 23.2% of the UK sample, 35% of the French and 58% of the Spanish sample. 
1107 Appendix 2. 93.32% of the UK sample, 87.5% of the French sample and 68% of the Spanish sample. 
1108 Delloites LLP & Retail (2007) First Cross Channel Think Tank Focuses on Future of Retail Industry 
1109 Appendix 3. 56% in UK, 56% in Germany; 16% in France and 64% in Spain thought that franchised 
businesses are disadvantaged as compared to non-franchised business in respect of their ability to control 
the franchisees use of the internet 32% in the UK, 18% in Germany, 60% in France and 32% in Spain 
disagreed with this whilst 16% in the UK, 36% in Germany, 24% in France and 6.4% in Spain did not 
know. 
1110 See Chapter 2 p. 34. 
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no prior experience of business being successful1111. This amounts to institutionalised 
discrimination against small businesses. This discrimination is clearly anti-competitive. 
It is proposed that franchisors be allowed to set retail prices for its franchisees and 
dictate the network’s multi channel sales strategy. 
5.3.3.1 Pricing 
As detailed in Chapter 3 above1112 resale price maintenance is a hard core restriction under 
the Vertical Restraints Block Exemption and was ruled against in both the Pronuptia and 
Yves Rocher cases.  They are considered to be “per se” anti-competitive by the EU 
authorities.  As a result, vertically integrated corporate chains have a monopoly on the ability 
to deliver a price promise, so disadvantaging both franchisors and the consumer.  The 
OECD1113 however believes that resale price maintenance by franchisors can be pro-
competitive.  The US Supreme Court takes a similar view1114.  
It is suggested that the vertical restraints block exemption be amended to expressly 
state that franchisors may set retail prices for their franchisees where it promotes 
efficiency by improving vertical co- ordination between franchisor and franchisees, 
particularly where there is substantial inter brand competition. 
5.3.3.2 Multi Channel Sale’s Strategy 
The growing importance of a multi channel sales strategy, particularly on line sales and other 
commercial use of the internet, is clear. Here again, whilst large corporates have freedom to 
adopt whatever strategy they deem appropriate, franchisors are substantially limited in their 
commercial options by EU competition law – which provides that every franchisee must be 
free to use the Internet to advertise and sell products. The Commission’s apparent inability to 
understand the dynamic and interactive nature of the worldwide web means that it is using an 
outmoded approach to try to regulate the latest developments in electronic commerce. 
The EU Commission considers that the use of the internet is a passive form of promoting 
sales in the same way as advertising in the local press. It considers that the fact that it may 
have effects outside one’s own territory or customer group results merely from its distribution 
and accessibility. It is considered to be passive selling and any restriction on it is “per se” anti 
competitive. Insofar as a web site is not specifically targeted at reaching customers primarily 
inside the territory or customer group exclusively allocated to another distributor, for instance 
with the use of banners or links in pages of providers specifically available to these 
                                                   
1111 See Chapter 2 pp 23-27. 
1112 Section 3.8.3.2 
1113 ibid 
1114 Leegin Creative Leather Products Inc v PSKS Inc ibid 
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exclusively allocated customers, the website is not considered to be a form of active selling. 
Unsolicited e-mails sent to individual customers or specific customer groups are also 
considered to be active selling.   
By seeing the internet as a passive medium comparable to a journal or newspaper the 
importance of multi-channel sales strategies is totally missed. Over the past five years the 
retail market has changed substantially. For example, the percentage of UK retail sales made 
over the internet as a percentage of total retail sales has increased from 2.9% in November 
2006 to 3.7% in January 2009.1115 The non-geographical nature of the worldwide web, and 
practices such as wordstuffing, seeding, using materials that drive traffic to websites, the 
subtle use of meta tabs and other such practices mean that search engines will pick up sites 
wherever they are. Websites are not an inert medium. The issues caused for franchise 
networks because of this restriction and its extra-territorial nature are problematic for 
franchisors. They erode the exclusivity that franchisees often gave and so discourage some 
potential franchises from entering into franchise agreements.  
The franchisor’s ability to control the quality of its franchisees’ websites is not enough to 
enable franchised chains to compete on equal terms with corporate chains in a multi-channel 
environment. A less dogmatic approach by the EU Commission would be appropriate. As the 
OECD observed1116 territorial restrictions can have pro-competitive effects by limiting intra-
brand competition and increasing franchisees’ expected profits, thereby increasing the 
incentive for franchisees to invest in specific skills and effectively enter a market. Franchisors 
currently tend to use the internet to exclude and compete with their own franchisees because 
(amongst other things) they are unable to structure an overall internet strategy for the 
franchise network.   
It is proposed that franchisors be given a greater level of flexibility and control over 
internet strategy so that they can add greater value to both the franchisee’s business 
and their own by being more proactive in the use of the internet to increase 
operational efficiencies and communication.  
This collaborative approach to emerging technologies will strengthen the 
franchisor/franchisee relationship, rather than weaken it, as it currently tends to do so1117. It is 
therefore recommended that, to borrow the words of the OECD, that the Commission should 
                                                   
1115 Retail Sales Business Monitor (SDM28), Office of National Statistics. 
1116 OECD, Competition Policy and Vertical Restraints: Franchising Agreements, p. 196. 
1117 Dixon. H, 2010, “The Impact of the Internet on Franchising as a Growth Strategy and the Implications 
for Franchisors Engaging in E-Commerce”, Unpublished doctoral thesis submitted to the School of 
Business, Retail and Financial Services, Ulster Business School, University of Ulster.  
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“allow franchises to use either price or non-price vertical restraints in situations where the 
franchise faces strong market competition and collusion”. 
5.3.4 Sub-Conclusion 
It is proposed that the EU Franchise Directive actively promotes franchising and accentuates 
the impact of the need to increase market confidence on the EU legal eco-systems.  It should 
do this by enabling franchisors to require pre-contractual disclosure by franchisees, focusing 
regulation only where it is required (by excluding fractional franchisees, de minimis 
franchisees, sophisticated investors, large investors, large franchisees and insiders) and 
allowing franchisees to compete on a level playing field with corporate chains.  It should 
establish this partly by allowing franchisors to set the prices of their franchisees and restrict 
franchisee sales over the internet1118. These provisions will accentuate the impact of the need 
for increased market confidence in franchising on the EU’s legal eco-system. 
5.4 Accentuating the Impact of the Second Commercial Imperative  - Pre-
Contractual Hygiene 
This section provides critical analysis to achieve the third objective of this thesis. 
Further to the discussion in section 2.4, ensuring pre-contractual hygiene is essential.  It is 
suggested that this means ensuring that potential franchisees access appropriate information 
and are equipped to interpret it in an appropriate manner.  In order to be able to decide 
whether or not to buy a particular franchise potential franchisees must have access to certain 
basic information.  However, no matter how well drafted a disclosure law is, the practical 
issues that arise on a day to day basis can dilute its potential impact. Regardless of how 
complete any disclosure law is, at the end of the day its effectiveness does depend to a large 
extent upon prospective franchisees being appropriately educated and looking after their own 
interests. No disclosure law can, or indeed should, allow franchisees to abdicate responsibility 
for their own actions.   
 
                                                   
1118 Failing a wholesale change in the EU’s approach to competition law, Finland has found a way forward 
on this issue that may suggest a viable compromise. The EU authorities may be willing to accept this more 
readily than a more fundamental reappraisal of their “per se” approach. The Finnish Competition Authority 
issued an exemption on price cooperation by businesses while implementing a campaign of offers intended 
for consumers. ((Exemption No. 187/67/2003, dated 14.03.2003) This exemption was valid until 28 
February 2008. There is currently no intention to issue a new exemption. (Petri Rinkinen, Franchising 
Legislation in Finland, www.franchising.fi/ukindex.html ).  The effect of the exemption is that price 
campaigns within a chain are made possible as long as the campaign does not take place for a period of 
more than two months. In addition, the vendor must maintain the right to sell the product or service at an 
even lower price at any time (Petri Rinkinen, Franchising Legislation in Finland, 
www.franchising.fi/ukindex.html). 
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Potential franchisees must be able to understand what the information disclosed to 
them by the franchisor means and take appropriate legal and financial advice. The 
way to ensure this is to make it very clear what information is required, establish a set 
form of disclosure document which requires the use of plain language and provide for 
appropriate penalties to be imposed upon those franchisors who do not comply with 
the pre-contractual disclosure requirement. 
However unless potential franchisees understand the need to take professional advice upon 
their proposed investment and act upon it, disclosure will have only a limited impact.   
Potential franchisees must be educated into taking and following appropriate advice 
on their proposed purchase. 
5.4.1 Educating Potential Franchisees 
This provides critical analysis to the third objective of this thesis. 
It is suggested that an EU Franchise Directive must provide that potential franchisees 
are educated about franchising and their responsibilities if they wish to become 
involved in it.  
In its submissions to the Federal Government Review1119 the Franchise Council of Australia 
(FCA) identified the lack of education and the apparent unwillingness of potential franchisees 
to look after their own best interests as a substantial weakness in the Australian system of 
disclosure,  
“those involved in franchising and perhaps human nature in general”1120. 
It criticises potential franchisees for not reading the documentation or conducting appropriate 
due diligence before committing to a franchise.  It noted that some of the problems involving 
disgruntled franchisees brought to its attention may have been avoided if the prospective 
franchisee had a clearer understanding of the significant risks that were involved in becoming 
a franchisee1121. Significant risks may include decisions made by third parties relevant to the 
business (such as landlords, franchisor and franchisee associates), earnings projections, 
changing competition, franchisor rights to unilaterally amend the franchise agreement, 
franchisee rights and obligations on termination or expiration of the franchise agreement, 
economic cycles, legislative change, franchisor solvency, franchisor rights to unilaterally 
                                                   
1119 The Franchise Counsel of Australia’s submission to the Australian Federal Government Review dated 
15 August 2006. 
1120 Ibid. 
1121 Stephen Giles, Director of the Franchise Council of Australia, interview with author (11 October 2009.) 
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terminate the franchise agreement and a decision by the prospective franchisee not to take 
advice before entering into a franchise agreement. 
This tendency of franchisees to refuse to take advice and carry out proper due diligence is a 
real problem because it means that they do not understand the business, the costs involved, 
the time and effort required, the impact upon their lives and family, their exposure to risk, or 
the need to follow the franchise system. 
It would also seem to be a problem in the UK, Spain and France. Only 56.25% of potential 
franchisees surveyed in the UK, 36.66% in France and 22% in Spain stated that they intended 
to pay for both legal and financial advice on a franchise before legally committing themselves 
to it1122. Franchisors recognise this “human” failure in potential franchisees1123. 
One option would be to legally require potential franchisees to take appropriate advice.  
However the difficulties in enforcing such a requirement would be substantial.  At the end of 
the day it would probably only increase the cost and bureaucracy without having any real 
positive impact1124.   
A lack of pre-entry education of franchisees is the real problem, as is the “psychology of 
failure” which encourages failed franchisees to blame others for their failure and the 
willingness of the media to take pot shots at franchisors. This view that education is a key 
factor in the success of regulation is shared not only by the FCA but also the BFA and other 
franchising associations1125, franchisors and legal practitioners who specialise in franchising – 
“The education of people who are contemplating a franchise is fundamental to franchising’s 
ultimate success and that is why the BFA gives it so much priority through our website, 
exhibitions, publications and various seminars1126. 
                                                   
1122 Appendix 2 - Survey of potential franchisees. 
1123 Peter Neighbour, Franchise Director at LighterLife, 20 February 2008 stated in an interview conducted 
for this thesis “Some franchisees are simply unwilling to take responsibility for their own decisions. They 
seem to be totally ignorant of the fact that a franchise is not a 100% guarantee of commercial success 
regardless of what they do. Whatever you tell them seems to go in one ear and out the other. They see 
professional advice as an unnecessary luxury. They recklessly jump into an investment with boundless, 
naïve enthusiasm and then blame anything less than 100% success on the franchisor.  The problem for 
franchisors is that it is not always easy to screen these types out of the recruitment process” (Appendix 6 - 
Steve Mills, CEO of MRI). “It will make very little difference what disclosure laws are adopted unless you 
find a way of making potential franchisees take a real interest in the information they are given and use it as 
the basis of the decision whether or not they sign up.”  
1124 Peter Neighbour, Franchise Director at LighterLife, 20 February 2008 stated that “It is not a bad idea in 
principle but it would be a bloody nightmare to enforce and the real risk is that it would just put people off 
franchising altogether.”. 
1125 See the FFF’s “Les formations pro. Catalogue 2009” at http://www.franchise-fff.com/Seminaires-pro-
le-calendrier-2006.html  
1126 Interview with Brian Smart, Director General of the BFA, 18 September 2008. 
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The importance of education was explained by one staff member of the US Fair Trade 
Commission1127 as follows  
“How do you tell a guy who bought into a franchise as a 35 year old father of 2 young 
children that after 20 years of hard work just at the time that he is having to put his 
children through college, and with another 5 years of his home loan to pay off, he 
suddenly no longer has a business? How do you tell him at that time that he should 
have read the disclosure documents more carefully? That is why education is so 
important.” 
5.4.1.1 Delivery of Education to Potential Franchisees 
Education is important, but how should it be delivered? Due to a variety of factors including 
their knowledge of franchising, existing infrastructures, (in some EU member states) and 
vested interest in making franchising a success, it is suggested that national franchise 
associations should be empowered by each EU member state government to ensure that 
potential franchisees are consistently and persistently offered appropriate education about the 
franchising facts of life and so increase the likelihood of them understanding what they are 
entering into and the due diligence they should undertake before becoming committed to a 
franchise. Where there is no national franchise association, the government should mandate 
its creation and membership of the European Franchise Federation (EFF).  
The EFF has some 30 years experience of seeking to educate the public about franchising and 
create an appropriate self regulatory environment. Its failure to adequately do so is due more 
to the enormity of the task and its lack of any legal “locus standii” than its knowledge or 
intent.   
By relieving the EFF and its member associations of the task of attempting to self regulate 
franchising in Europe, an EU Franchise Directive would allow the EFF and its members to 
focus on educating the public and provide it with a legal mandate to do so. This would give it 
a greater chance of success and allow the EFF and its members to deliver real benefit to 
franchising, franchisors, franchisees and the public.   
It is proposed that each national franchise association be recognised as a legally 
acknowledged source of best practice in franchising and membership of it as an 
indication (but not a guarantee) that a franchisor has met certain minimum criteria as 
regards best practice. They should be charged with educating the public as to the 
benefits and risks of franchising. They should not however be charged with or be 
                                                   
1127 Interview with Craig Tregellis, senior administrator of the FTC, ABA Franchise Symposium October 
2008. 
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allowed to become involved with the regulation of franchising.  
It would be appropriate for the national franchise associations to meet certain basic minimum 
standards before they are entrusted with this task (such as being a not for profit organisation 
and being a member of the European Franchise Federation).   
5.4.1.2 A Minimal Level of Education for Potential Franchisees 
It is suggested that potential franchisees need to be educated in the basic facts of 
franchising. These facts are: 
1. The need for franchisees to work hard and for long hours. This is a clear and 
obvious factor of success in any business  
2. The need for franchisees to follow the franchise system. The whole reason for 
buying a franchise rather than starting a business from scratch is that the 
franchisor has, through its own experience, identified how the business should 
be run. 
3. The risk of failure and what this could mean in terms of both financial and 
personal terms.  Failure is inevitably a risk in running one’s own business. It 
is fundamentally different from employment.  
4. The importance of taking expert legal and financial advice from 
acknowledged experts before being legally committed to a franchise. In order 
to make an informed decision, advice is essential.  
The national franchise associations should be obliged to create an educational pack for 
potential franchisees spelling out the franchising “facts of life”. An EU contribution to the 
funding of the national franchise associations would be appropriate. 
It is recommended that the national franchise associations not only make publications 
and seminars freely available but also prepare an education pack that would include 
an audio visual presentation (by way of DVD, podcast or other digital media). All 
potential franchisees should be directed to this pack by franchisors.  
In the UK, the internet is the way that the majority of franchisees find out about specific 
franchises1128. It is likely that it plays an important role in other EU member states too, so the 
educational pack should be available from the web. As 41% of all franchisors responding to 
the BFA/Nat West 2007 survey stated how important the BFA website is to recruitment, it is 
in an ideal position to ensure that potential franchisees receive these educational packs1129. 
                                                   
1128 BFA/Nat West Survey 2007 p 32. 
1129 ibid p 17. 
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Again, it is likely that the website of national franchise associations in other EU member 
states has or in due course will have a similar impact on franchise recruitment. 
The EU Franchise Directive should require all potential franchisees to provide written 
confirmation that they have watched an audio visual presentation and completed a 
short Question and Answer “test”, filed with the franchisor, to confirm that they have 
understood its contents.  
This will not totally eliminate the problem of franchisees not understanding what they are 
getting into, of course, but it should reduce it. Some are cynical of what impact such a system 
will have. Octavia Morley, CEO of LighterLife, for example believes that,  
“…..it will not make a scrap of difference. Potential franchisees are focused totally 
upon the excitement of having their own business. We (LighterLife) have a rigorous 
process to try and make sure that no one enters our franchise with any misconceptions 
as to what being in business for yourself as one of our franchisees means – but we 
still fail to get that message across to some of our franchisees. The problem is that 
many potential franchisees are extremely naïve and point blank refuse to take in 
anything that might dampen their enthusiasm to become a franchisee.”1130 
Whether or not such cynicism is justified, it is suggested that an ongoing educational 
programme targeted at potential franchisees is appropriate, as part of a larger package of 
reform.  It will certainly do no harm and it is suggested is likely to help ensure that potential 
franchisees take a more responsible approach when purchasing a franchise. 
5.4.2 Ensuring Quality Advice for Potential Franchisees 
This provides critical analysis to the third objective of this thesis. 
It is suggested that a key element of education is ensuring that franchisees take advice from 
advisers with an appropriate level of experience. The FCA noted that in Australia the advice 
given to potential franchisees can vary and franchisees may rely on advice which is not 
adequate1131. There is no evidence to suggest that it is any different in the EU1132. This is 
another opportunity for the national franchise associations to play an active role in the 
regulation of franchising. By allowing affiliate membership of national franchise associations 
                                                   
1130 Interview with Octavia Morley, CEO, LighterLife (20 February 2008) – See Appendix 6. 
1131 FCA submission to the Federal Government Review dated 15 August 2006. 
1132 The authors’ personal experience as a franchise lawyer acting for franchisors is that many potential 
franchisees do not take legal advice and of those that do, many use solicitors with little or no experience or 
knowledge of franchising.   Indeed, he has even known for a potential franchisee to take advice from a 
personal injury lawyer, who offered to give the advice free of charge in return for the potential franchisee 
agreeing not to file a professional negligence case against him, in respect of a failed claim concerning 
injuries incurred in a motor vehicle accident. 
  272 
(as the BFA already do) for professional advisers such as lawyers and accountants with 
relevant experience, a reservoir of more suitably experienced professional advisers will be 
created. Obviously it is important that such affiliate status is open to all advisers with relevant 
experience and that the definition of relevant experience be clear and unambiguous. 
Relevant experience should be defined as having undertaken and successfully completed a 
short self study programme on the commercial aspects of franchising set by the national 
franchise association. It would not be appropriate for them to seek to test the technical 
knowledge of the relevant areas of law or financial accounting.  
Many franchisors feel that prospective franchisees do not read the pre-contractual disclosure 
documentation given to them1133. Empirical research in the UK, France and Spain suggests 
that that this feeling is correct1134. Only 56.25% of potential franchisees surveyed in the UK, 
36.66% of those surveyed in France and 22% of those surveyed in Spain said that they 
intended to pay for both legal and financial advice on the franchise before committing 
themselves to it. It would be possible to legally require potential franchisees to read the 
disclosure document but it is doubtful that this would have any meaningful impact. 
It is proposed that if a franchisee is required to invest a sum greater than  €20,000, 
legal and financial advice from advisers affiliated to the national franchise 
associations should be mandatory. There should be a certificate from the potential 
franchisee’s legal and financial advisors stating that the potential franchisee has taken 
appropriate advice from them and that they have completed the self study module. 
Potential franchisees should also certify that they understand that they are taking a 
substantial risk if they do not follow appropriate advice and accept that they may be 
responsible for any loss they suffer as a result of not taking such advice. 
As detailed above, the problem is that not all national franchise associations are as well 
developed as the BFA or the FFF and so such a scheme is unlikely to be effective on a 
practical level in all EU member states in the immediate future. It will therefore be 
appropriate for national governments to provide support and encouragement to the less 
developed national franchise associations. Indeed, the establishment of more effective 
national franchise associations in those EU member states should be a key part of the 
“regulatory package”. 
                                                   
1133 Appendix 2 – 52% of franchisors in the UK and Germany, 40% in France and 36% in Spain believe that 
franchisees do not read extensive documentation on the franchise. 
1134 Appendix 2 - survey of potential franchisees. 
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5.4.3 Pre-Contractual Disclosure 
This section provides critical analysis to the third objective of this thesis. 
It is suggested that franchisors should be obliged to deliver standard form pre- 
contractual disclosure to potential franchisees 15 working days before execution of 
any agreement which commits the potential franchisee to take up the franchise or 
payment of any fees in connection with the franchise sale.  It should deliver details of 
the identity and experience of the franchisor, the target market and the franchise 
network, the terms of the franchise agreement and any earning claims.  There should 
be a five working day cooling off period.  Failure to comply should enable both the 
franchisee and national regulatory authorities take action. 
The challenge for legislators considering pre-contractual disclosure by franchisors is to secure 
optimal impact for minimal effort. This can be achieved, at least in part, by focusing on the 
two key factors of pre-contractual disclosure. Timing of the disclosure and the quality of the 
information disclosed. Beyond certain basic facts, it is suggested that the amount of 
information disclosed can be largely irrelevant. Indeed, above a certain threshold there is an 
inversely proportionate relationship between the amount of information disclosed and its 
effectiveness. The greater the volume of information given, the less likely it is that 
franchisees will analyse it. In this sense “less” is “more”. This was certainly the conclusion of 
the government review of the Australian Franchising Code in 20061135, which was launched 
due to an increase of complaints of more than 100% over a period of 5 years ending June 
20061136. 
An obligation of pre-contractual disclosure is not universally considered to be appropriate1137. 
It is considered by some that if a person who has invested in the search for information is 
forced to give it away to the co-contracting party, he will have an incentive to reduce (or 
curtail entirely) his production of such information in the future1138. The law should maximise 
the production of socially useful information by allowing those who discover it to benefit 
from it1139. A conceptual distinction is made between information which has been gained 
“with investment” and that which has been “casually obtained”; although in practice this 
                                                   
1135 Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct – Report to the Hon. Fran. 
Bailey M.P, Minister of Small Business and Tourism, October 2006 – Secretariat Office of Small Business. 
1136 The ACCC reported 252 complaints related to disclosing issues during the period. 
1137 For Example: Kronman. A, 1978, “Mistake, Disclosure Information and the Law of Contracts”, Journal 
of Legal Studies, Volume 7 
   Posner. R, 1986, Economic Analysis of Law, 3rd edition, p.96 conseq.  
   Atiyah. P, 1989, An Introduction to Contract Law, 4th edition, p.265 conseq. 
1138 Op cit Kronman. T, 1978  
1139 Fabre-Magnan. M, 1995, “Duties of Disclosure and French Contract Law”  
   Contribution to the “Economic Analysis” in “Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law” ed. Beatson and 
Friedmann p.108 – Clarendon Paperbacks. 
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becomes a difficult distinction to make. In terms of franchisors it would suggest that 
information about the franchised business, which has been obtained without investment 
should be disclosed but information about the target market1140 should not. 
Another approach to identifying what should be disclosed and what should not is advanced by 
Cooter and Ullen1141. They distinguish between information that can be used to increase 
wealth and redistributive facts, that is information that creates a bargaining advantage, that 
can be used to redistribute wealth in favour of the knowledgeable party but that does not lead 
to the creation of new wealth. The conclusion is that economic efficiency requires that wealth 
creating facts should be disclosed but redistributive ones should not. Cooter and Ullen also 
identify a third type of fact, so called destructive facts, information, that if not disclosed will 
harm someone’s property or person. In franchising detail about the targeted marked should be 
disclosed by the franchisor to its potential franchisees. Likewise facts about franchisee failure 
and disputes. However, information about the franchisor’s margins on products and general 
profitability should not be disclosed to potential franchisees. 
Both of these arguments are based upon the economic efficiency of disclosure but, in the case 
of franchising, come to different conclusions. 
Perhaps the reality is that economic efficiency is better measured by having regard as what 
facts, if disclosed to the potential franchisee by the franchisor, are most likely to avoid the 
disputes that are occasioned by a mismatch of expectations between the parties. 
Prospective franchisees are often relatively unsophisticated in terms of business. They lack 
the relevant education to be able to process, analyse and draw appropriate conclusions from 
large amounts of financial and other information. They are also often loathe to spend money 
on legal and financial advice at a time when they feel that they need to inject all the financial 
resources they have into their new business1142. This  
“weakness of those involved in franchising and perhaps human nature in general”1143  
underlines the reality that no matter how complete any pre-contractual disclosure law is, no 
matter how potential franchisees are educated about franchising and pushed to take 
appropriate advice, at the end of the day its effectiveness does depend upon the information 
disclosed being relevant and easy to understand. It also depends upon it being disclosed at an 
appropriate time during the “recruitment” or sales process. 
                                                   
1140 As required by the French and Belgian Franchise focused Laws. 
1141 Cooter. R and Ullen. T, 1988, Law and Economics, 3rd edition, HarperCollins 
1142 Appendix 2. Only 55% of potential franchisees in the UK, 36.66% in France and 22% in Spain intended 
to pay for both legal and financial advice before committing themselves to a franchise. 
1143 FCA submission – 15 August 2006. 
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5.4.3.1 Can pre-contractual disclosure help provide adequate protection? 
One of the biggest causes of disputes between franchisors and their franchisees is a “mis-
match of expectation” caused by inadequate communication between them as to what they are 
looking for from the relationship1144. Pre-contractual disclosure seeks to prevent this 
mismatch by ensuring that franchisees have all relevant information about the franchise 
before they commit themselves to it.  
If they have been appropriately educated they can then assess the likelihood of their 
expectation being met by the franchisor.  Effective disclosure by the franchisor helps 
appropriately educated potential franchisees to more fully understand the franchise 
relationship that they are entering, as well as the legal and financial commitments they are 
undertaking. This reduces conflict in franchise systems.   
As the then Chairman of the BFA said1145  
“Complete transparency during the recruitment process can help avoid most of the 
problems that franchisors encounter with their franchisees”. 
This view seems to be supported by many of the franchisors surveyed for this thesis. A 
majority believe that appropriate regulation of the pre-contractual process would substantially 
reduce the amount of franchise disputes1146. 
Analysis of a number of franchise disputes in the UK similarly supports the view.  It shows 
that 85% of the sample considered involved allegations of misrepresentation by the 
franchisee1147. None of the sample issued pre-contractual disclosure documents to their 
potential franchisees. 
5.4.3.2 The US Experience of Pre-contractual Disclosure 
The US has the most comprehensive and complex1148 pre-contractual disclosure requirements 
in the world. It is suggested that its experience supports the view that mandatory set form pre-
                                                   
1144 This is certainly supported by empirical research by the author. Appendix 7 – 85% of the sample 
1145 Brain Lewis at the BFA Annual Convention, Warwick University 30 June 2005 
1146 See Appendix 3.  76% in the UK, 72% in Germany, 76% in France and 72% in Spain. 
1147 Appendix 8. 85% of those disputes considered were due at least in part to allegations of 
misrepresentation. 
1148 The complexity of the US disclosure system is witnessed by the fact that the disclosure document is 
prepared by reference to no less than 6 different sources.  The Amended FTC Franchise Rule: 16 C.F.R. 
Part 436; The Statement of Basis and Purpose to the Amended FTC Franchise Rule: 72 Fed. Reg. 15445-
15544 (March 30, 2007) (“Statement of Basis and Purpose”); The FTC’s Frequently Asked Questions, 
known as “Amended Franchise Rule FAQs”.  See http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/franchise/amended-rate-
faqss.shtml (“FAQs”); FTC Staff Advisory Opinions: will be published in CCH’s Business Franchise 
Guide. (Note: the FTC is currently using the FAQs to respond to inquiries rather than issuing staff advisory 
opinions); State franchise registration and disclosure law statutes and regulations (as amended or 
unamended): See CCH’s Business Franchise Guide 3000 to 3530, and 5050 to 5490; The North American 
Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) Statement of Policy, including Instructions for Filing a 
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contractual disclosure can increase the protection afforded to potential franchisees to an 
appropriate level.  It also suggests issues that it should be taken into account when 
considering the EU’s legal eco-system and its impact on franchising. 
Pre-contractual disclosure is regulated at both federal and state level in the US. Predictably 
these laws are not identical, making life somewhat complex for franchisors.  
The FTC Rule 436 (the “Amended Rule”)1149 aims inter alia to prevent the misrepresentation 
of material facts and ensure the presentation of material facts as a franchisor offers franchises 
to prospective franchisees. Franchisors are required to deliver a disclosure document at least 
14 days before the franchisee signs a contract with the franchisor or pays any money 
whichever occurs earlier. The Federal Trade Commission is responsible for enforcing the 
Amended Rule1150. 
The Amended Rule provides that the franchise agreement and all related agreements (i.e. 
supply contracts, leases and security agreements) must be delivered to the prospective 
franchisee in final form, ready for execution, at least 7 days prior to the date on which they 
are to be executed1151. 
The timings of the disclosure varies and under some state laws disclosure has to take place 
earlier than under the Amended Rule, i.e. at the first personal meeting1152.  This causes 
unnecessary complexity on a practical level and so the North American Securities 
Administrations Association is recommending that these states adopt the FTC rules 14 day 
requirement in order to simplify matters1153. 
The offering circular must have a cover page bearing language specified by the Amended 
Rule1154 and a table of contents1155. It must contain comments that either positively or 
negatively respond to each disclosure question required to be answered under the Amended 
FTC Rule. The offering circular may take one of two forms.  The first is prescribed by the 
Amended Rule. The second format is the Uniform Franchise Disclosure Document (the 
“UFDD”1156) as developed by the North American Securities Administrators Association. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
Uniform Registration Application Using the “New FTC Franchise Rule” after July 1, 2008. See 
http://www.nasaa.org/content/Files/2008UFOC.pdf (“NASAA Statement of Policy”) 
1149 Which came into effect in October, 1979, as amended in January 2007 and implemented July 1 2007 
with interim provisions until July 1 2008. Federal Register Vol 72, No. 61, 15444-15563 March 30, 2007. 
1150 Section 5 of the FTC Act 1914 as amended. 
1151 FTC Rule at 436.1(g). 
1152 Maryland, Michigan, New York, Rhode Island and Washington. 
1153 Per Fox Rothschild Newstand Elizabeth Sigety August 2009. 
1154 FTC Rule at 436.3. 
1155 ibid at 436.4. 
1156 Formerly known as the “Uniform Franchise Offering Circular” or “UFDD” (UFDD/UFOC) which has 
been amended to comply with the Amended FTC Rule. 
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two formats cannot be combined, but following the amendment of the FTC Rule, the 
differences between the two are now relatively minor. 
The Amended Rule format is often shorter and more easily prepared than one following the 
UFDD format.  However, it is accepted in only 42 states1157. The UFDD format is accepted in 
all 50 states and complies with the requirements of those states with franchise disclosure 
laws. 
Both forms of disclosure are similar to each other. The Amended FTC Rule format and the 
UFDD both include 21 different items of information. In fact the 21 different items (plus the 
franchise contract and the receipt) are identical. However, the level of disclosure required 
differs in respect of certain items. This disharmony makes the disclosure process far more 
complex than it need be.  The UFDD complies with the Amended Rule but the laws and 
regulations of each state must be consulted in order to ensure compliance with its individual 
registration and disclosure provisions. This caused a great deal of debate and discussion 
amongst the US franchise bar during 2007 and 2008. It clearly demonstrates the importance 
of an integrated and straight forward approach to the regulation of franchising in the EU. 
Disclosure under the Amended Rule is not necessary in certain circumstances1158. 
The Federal Trade Commission has the sole authority to bring actions to enforce the law and 
disclosure rule and there is no express or implied private right of action under the Amended 
Rule although parties with an interest in the consumer redress aspects of FTC suits have been 
allowed1159 to intervene in the FTC action for the limited purpose of addressing those issues. 
Both civil and criminal penalties may be imposed for violation of the Amended Rule or of the 
franchise disclosure rule. The Commission may mitigate civil damages in view of the 
financial condition of the defendant. 
The corporate veil of a Franchisor breaching the disclosure rule can be pierced, rendering 
individual officers and directors of the entity liable1160. 
                                                   
1157 The eight states in which the FTC format has not been accepted for use each require a franchisor to 
register a franchise offering before beginning sales efforts in the state.  They are California, Indiana, 
Maryland, Minnesota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia and Washington.  Eight other states also have 
registration or specific disclosure requirements.  They are Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, New York, North 
Dakota, Oregon and Wisconsin. Texas has a Business Opportunity Law which applies to franchise 
arrangements. However the Act specifically excludes any arrangement which is defined as a “franchise” 
under the FTC Rule if the franchisor complies with the disclosure requirements and prohibitions of the FTC 
Rule in its operations in the State of Texas and the Secretary of the State has been notified before the offer 
or the sale of a franchise, §41.004(b)(8). 
1158 FTC Rule at 436.8. See Appendix 10. 
1159 E.g. FTC v. American Legal Distributors, Inc., 1989-2, Trade Cases. 68,867. 
1160 FTC v. Jordan Ashley, Inc., 93 2257-Civ-Nesbitt (S.D. Fla.) three greeting card display rack 
franchisors, and their three principal officers, were liable for various misrepresentations violating the FTC 
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State disclosure/registration laws generally provide civil remedies and criminal penalties for 
violations. The civil remedies include rescission and the recovery of legal fees and other 
costs. A number of states, such as Florida, have laws focused on misrepresentation in the sale 
of franchises1161. This makes it unlawful when selling or establishing a franchise to 
“intentionally misrepresent the prospects or chances for success of a proposed or existing 
franchise, the known required total investment for a franchise and efforts to sell or establish 
more franchises than is reasonable to expect the market or market area for the particular 
franchise to sustain” 
In some jurisdictions, fraud or gross misrepresentation1162 may lead to the award of punitive 
damages. 
Rescission is another possible remedy although failure to comply with a 
disclosure/registration law does not, in itself, void the agreement.  It provides a party with the 
opportunity to rescind or seek damages. In some states, such as Wisconsin, rescission is the 
exclusive remedy for disclosure violations1163. In contrast, in California1164 actions to remedy 
violations such as failure to register are in contract only and not for rescission; only wilful 
violations give rise to rescission rights under the California statute. 
The need for a specific franchise law has been discussed in great detail for many years in the 
USA1165 culminating in the publication in August 2004 of a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
Report1166 and the adoption of an amended FTC Rule in 2007.  Part of this process involved 
the preparation of an FTC Staff Report. A large number of franchisors and professional 
                                                                                                                                                        
Act.  The liability was extendable to the officers upon demonstration that they had control over the 
wrongful acts and had some knowledge of the misrepresentations. 
1161 The Florida Business Opportunity Act, Florida Statutes s 559.802. 
1162 Cox v. Doctor’s Associates, Inc., 245 III. App. 3d 186, a terminated fast food franchisee recovered $1 
million in punitive damages for overtly fraudulent oral and printed misrepresentations that amounted to an 
independent tort. 
1163 Lulling v. Barnaby’s Family Inns, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 1353 E.D. (Wisc.1980), a franchisee that  
rejected rescission on advice of counsel was, in effect, subjected to a take-nothing judgment that allowed 
the Franchisor to gain possession plus damages and costs. 
1164 Pizza Time Theatre, Inc. v. Topeka Inn Management, Inc.., CCH, Business Franchise Guide / 1980 - 
1983 ¶ 7790, (N.D. Cal. 1981) 
1165 Since 1995 the FTC has considered amending its rule entitled “Disclosure Requirements and 
Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures” (the “Franchise Rule”). This 
process began with a regulatory review in 1995 which was followed by the publication of an Advanced 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“ANPR”) in 1997 and a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPR”) in 
1999. As part of these and the FTC Staff Report there were numerous public workshops held by the FTC 
and some 281 submissions were received by the FTC from interested parties. 
1166 Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising- Staff Report to the Federal Trade 
Commission and Proposed Revised Trade Regulation Rule (16 CFR Part 436) – Bureau of Consumer 
Protection August 2004 (“the FTC Staff Report”) – The report, as required by Section 1.13(f) of the 
Commission’s Rules of Practice, contains the staff’s analysis of the rule amendment record and its 
recommendations as to the form of the final revised Franchise Rule. The Report has not yet been reviewed 
or adopted by the Commission. The Commission’s final determination in this matter will be based upon the 
record taken as a whole, including the Report and comments on the Report received during the 75-day 
period after the report is placed on the public record. 
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advisers, (many of them lawyers practising exclusively in the field of franchising,) made 
lengthy submissions about the need for franchise specific regulations1167. Many of them made 
it clear that pre-sale disclosure “helps franchisees more fully understand the franchise 
relationship that they are entering as well as the legal and financial commitments they are 
undertaking thereby reducing conflicts in franchise systems and potential litigation costs”1168. 
The vast majority of these not only supported the need for pre-contractual disclosure1169 but 
also felt it to be  
“a cost effective way to provide material information to prospective franchisees so 
they can assess the costs, benefits and potential financial risks involved in entering 
into a franchise relationship”1170.  
It was seen as enabling prospective franchisees to  
“investigate the franchise offering by providing information that is not available, such 
as the franchisor’s litigation history and franchisee failure rates”1171. 
Some commentators expressed the view that repeal of the US Franchise Rule would increase 
a franchisor’s costs and compliance burdens by opening the door for individual states to enact 
franchise disclosure laws that may be inconsistent, making it difficult for franchisors to 
conduct business on a national basis1172. A uniform pre-sale disclosure rule enables prospective 
franchisees to comparison shop for the best franchise offering1173 and so reduces future 
disputes.  In short, the FTC concluded that  
“free and informed consumer choice is the best regulator of the market”1174. 
5.4.3.3 The Australian Experience of Pre-Contractual Disclosure 
Australia has a highly developed franchise disclosure law.  It is suggested that its experience 
supports the view that mandatory pre-contractual disclosure helps to ensure that the 
protection is extended to an appropriate level.  It also suggests issues that should be taken into 
account when considering the EU’s legal eco-system’s impact on franchising. 
                                                   
1167 The FTC Staff Report III A pp 6.  These included major  franchisors such as Cendant, a publicly traded 
company that owns several franchise systems such as Howard Johnson, Ramada, Century 21, Coldwell 
Banker, ERA and Avis-Rent-a-Car, Re/Max, Snap-on-Tools, Little Ceasars, The Southland Corporation (7-
11) Pepsico Restaurants ( Pizza Hut, Taco Bell, KFC), Papa John’s Pizza, Forte Hotels and Medicap 
Pharmacies. 
1168 The FTC Staff Report III A p. 6 and H&H, ANPR 28, at 2. 
1169 62 Fed. Reg. at 9,120; the FTC Staff Report III A p. 6. 
1170 The FTC Staff Report III A p 6. 
1171 The FTC Staff Report III A p 6; e.g. Marks ANPR 19 Sept 97 Tr, at 8-9, 29 and Wieczorek, Rule 
Review Comments (RR), Sept 95 Tr, at 62-63. 
1172 E.g., WA Securities, ANPR 117; Shay, RR, Sept.95 Tr., at 104. 
1173 Kaufmann, ANPR 33, at 3. 
1174  The FTC Staff Report III A pp 11. 
41
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The Australian Franchise Code, prescribed by Section 51AE (which prohibits unconscionable 
behaviour) of the Trade Practices Act (TPA), focuses on creating an environment where a 
prospective franchisee can make an informed business decision whether to enter into a 
franchise agreement.  Its provisions include comprehensive disclosure obligations on the part 
of a franchisor that intends to enter into, extend or renew a franchise agreement covered by 
the Code1175. A franchisor must provide to a prospective franchisee at least 14 days prior to 
signing a franchise agreement a detailed disclosure document. It must also provide a copy of 
the Code and a copy of the franchise agreement. The disclosure document requires the 
franchisor to provide approximately 250 items of information listed under 23 categories. The 
information required to be disclosed includes details of the franchisor, the business 
experience of those involved, litigation history, existing franchisee contact particulars, and 
information concerning intellectual property ownership, any territorial or supply restrictions, 
marketing or other cooperative funds, range of costs and payments relevant to the franchise 
and the franchisor’s financial position.   
Section 51AC of the TPA, which prohibits unconscionable conduct, gives legal teeth to the 
Franchising Code of Conduct. Non compliance with the Code amounts to unconscionable 
behaviour and leads to prescribed remedies. This is clean and simple and avoids any 
confusion in Australia. 
Other relevant provisions of the Code are a 7 day cooling off period for franchisees1176; 
requirement that the franchisor obtain from the prospective franchisee signed statements 
before entering into a franchise agreement confirmation that the franchisee has been given 
legal, business and accounting advice, or has been told to obtain that advice but has decided 
not to; and a requirement that the franchisor to provide financial statements for any marketing 
or other cooperative funds to which franchisees have made financial contributions. 
The recruitment of franchisees is also regulated by section 52 of the TPA which prohibits 
misleading or deceptive conduct and is a comprehensive provision of wide impact. 
Franchisors are frequently the subject of claims based on misleading or deceptive conduct in 
the context of franchisee recruitment1177 particularly as regards projected turnover and 
profitability.  Section 52 applies the equivalent of a more general duty of good faith in pre-
contractual negotiations to prevent prospective and actual franchisees from being misled or 
                                                   
1175 Clause 6 of Franchising Code of Conduct. 
1176 Clause 13 of Franchising Code of Conduct. 
1177  Franchisors should also be aware of the prohibitions against:  
• offering gifts, prizes or other free items with no intention of actually providing them, or with 
no intention of providing them as described (section 54).   
• bait advertising, which is advertising a product or service at a lower than normal price, where 
the product is unavailable at that price, or available only in limited quantities (section 56); and  
• advertising partial prices (section 53C). 
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deceived by the conduct in question. However, it does not go so far as the German concept of 
“culpa in contrahendo” to impose a duty of care to disclose.  A failure to observe the standard 
of conduct required by section 52 has its consequences under Part VI of the TPA 
(enforcement and remedies), including both remedies available at common law (such as 
injunctions and damages) and other compensatory remedies under section 87 which apply 
when loss or damage is likely to be suffered by a franchisee (e.g., orders declaring the 
franchise agreement void or varied, for specific performance of the franchise agreement, 
accounting for profits made by the franchisor, payment of other compensation, or refunds or 
returns of property). 
The ACCC take the view that advertisements must tell the full story and create an accurate 
impression.  Phrases such as “conditions apply”, “to approved applicants” and “special offer” 
have been scrutinised to ensure that conditions or fine print terms were consistent with the 
thrust of the advertisement.  It is important that the fine print is consistent with the impression 
created by the advertisement.  
Section 61 TPA also impacts upon the recruitment of franchisees in that whilst it prohibits 
pyramid selling, the section is drafted broadly enough that it has the potential to catch multi-
level product distribution agreements.  
Any individual who suffers loss or damage as a consequence of a breach of section 51AD 
may seek injunctions under section 80 of the TPA; seek remedial orders under section 87 of 
the TPA; and/or recover damages under section 82 of the TPA. There are no criminal 
sanctions for a breach of section 51AD. The court may grant an injunction to the ACCC or 
any other person on such terms as it deems appropriate if a person has engaged in, or 
proposes to engage in, conduct that contravenes the Code. 
A person who suffers loss or damage by the conduct of another person that was done in 
contravention of the Code, may recover the amount of the loss or damage by action against 
that other person or any person involved in the contravention. The ACCC cannot bring an 
action for damages under section 82 on its own behalf, as it is not a person who suffers loss 
and damage by reason of a contravention of the TPA. Actions for damages pursuant to 
section 82, for breach of section 51AD must be brought within six years of the date on which 
the applicant suffered loss or damage. 
A breach of the TPA could have very serious consequences for a franchise system.  Breaches 
of the anti-competitive conduct provisions attract fines of up to $10 million per offence for 
corporations and $500,000 per offence for those individuals involved in committing the 
breach. Breaches of the consumer protection provisions such as unconscionable behaviour 
may attract fines of up to $1.1 million per offence for corporations, and $220,000 per offence 
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for individuals1178. The courts can set aside or vary contracts and make other orders affecting 
the franchise relationship. Negative publicity and corrective advertising have a significant 
effect on brands, image and reputation. Such penalties are particularly significant in the 
franchising sector where a strong brand image is essential.   
Since the introduction of the Code, the ACCC has commenced and successfully concluded 
litigation in 15 cases1179.  All cases were found to be in breach of the TPA and the Code, and 
a variety of remedies were ordered by the courts including injunctions, court orders and the 
implementation of a trade practices compliance program. 
Of these 15 cases, 14 involved a failure by the franchisor to fully comply with the disclosure 
provisions of the Code. Most cases involved situations where the franchisor did not provide 
disclosure documents to potential franchisees or, if the disclosure documents were provided, 
they were misleading or inadequate. Some of these cases also involved franchise systems that 
wrongly represented themselves as distributorships or licence agreements, to avoid the 
stringent requirements of the Code. 
The Code seems to have increased compliance costs for franchisors but  has generally been 
well received.  It has also provided an opportunity for those franchisors who comply with the 
Code and give full disclosure, as a mechanism to avoid or reduce likely claims by franchisees. 
Compliance with the Code reduces the opportunities for the application of section 51AC.  
The government is proposing further amendments to the Code including, enhancing the 
ACCC’s powers to conduct random audits of franchisors, enabling the ACCC to alert the 
public of franchisor’s misconduct by issuing public warnings and permitting the ACCC to 
seek redress on behalf of franchisees where large numbers of franchisees have been affected 
by the franchisor’s non-compliance1180.  In addition, the government is proposing to include a 
list of examples of specific behaviour in the Code that constitute inappropriate behaviour.  
These may include: unforeseen capital expenditure, unilateral contract variation; attribution of 
legal costs; confidentiality agreements; franchisor initiated charges to franchise agreements 
when a franchisee is trying to sell the business1181. 
                                                   
1178 Government’s response to the Report into the Franchising Code of Conduct by the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer 
Law) Bill 2009. 
1179 Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, .Report to the Hon Fran 
Bailey M.P. 
1180 Minister for Innovation, Industry, Science and Research, Media Release, “Government to Strengthen 
Franchising Code of Conduct and Unconscionable Law” 5 November 2009 
http://minister.innovation.gov.au/Emerson/Pagesgovernmenttostrengthenfranchisingcodeofconduct 
1181 Minister for Innovation, Industry, Science and Research, Media Release, “Government Appoints Expert 
|Panel on Franchising and Unconscionable Conduct” 27 November 2009 
http://minister.innovation.gov.au/Emerson/Pagesgovernmentappointsexpertpanelonfranchising 
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In Australia, pre-contractual disclosure is credited with reducing the number of disputes 
between franchisors and franchisees. This is in no small part due to the fact that failure to 
comply with the disclosure process in both these jurisdictions is subject to significant legal 
sanctions which the authorities are ready, able and willing to apply.  The Australian 
experience suggests that “prevention” in the form of legally prescribed disclosure can reduce 
the need for or at least lessen the drastic measures required for a “cure” in the form of the 
imposition of penalties1182. 
5.4.3.4 The French Experience of Pre-Contractual Disclosure 
The provisions of the Loi Doubin are detailed above1183.  Its failure to define franchising the 
requirement of exclusivity or quasi-exclusivity in order for it to apply and its failure to require 
disclosure of the details of all ongoing fees that must be paid seem to have reduced the 
potential impact of the law, and so are not approaches that should be incorporated into an EU 
franchise directive. 
5.4.3.5 What Should be Disclosed to Potential Franchisees? 
Disclosure must help potential franchisees assess the potential benefits of taking a 
franchise1184 and reduce, but not remove entirely the consequential inherent risks 
involved1185.   
Current requirements in EU member states, the USA and Australia are helpful in determining 
exactly what should be incorporated in the franchisor’s pre-contractual disclosure document 
to ensure that it helps to provide adequate protection for franchisees. 
Common themes emerge when considering the six European disclosure regulations and the 
US and Australian franchise regulations. However, the European laws are generally less 
formulaic and are somewhat narrower in their scope. Some of these differences, such as that 
concerning the involvement of public figures in the franchise in the USA are due to cultural 
and commercial differences and so can be ignored. Others, such as exclusivity, reflect the 
differences in both the saturation/maturity of the markets and the propensity for litigation in 
each jurisdiction. 
It is suggested that disclosure should comprise information about the identity and 
experience of the Franchisor; the franchise network; the terms of the franchise 
agreement and any earning claims made. 
                                                   
1182 See 4.6 above 
1183 See 3.3 above 
1184 See 2.3 above 
1185 See 2.4 above 
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These are all straight forward matters of fact which potential franchisees clearly require and 
which the franchisor can easily provide and are reflected to some extent in the proposals of 
both the Amsterdam Team1186 and the UNIDROIT Model law1187. However, it is the quality 
and relevance of the information and the way in which it is communicated rather than the 
mere type and quantity of the information that is important. “More is sometimes less” and as 
one experienced in-house US franchise lawyer has commented,  
“The American UFDD goes far too far, obscuring important and relevant information 
with masses of less important detail”1188. 
Details of the identity and experience of the franchise and its directors should include 
the franchisor’s litigation history over the previous 36 months and the bankruptcy 
history of the franchisor and its directors and substantial shareholders (holding over 
25% of the issued shares). 
Details of the franchise network should include details of the franchise network in the 
target market (or, if there are none, an analogous market), including the contact 
details of existing franchisees and any franchisees that have failed in the previous 12 
months.  
There are significant differences between the different EU member states. The proposed 
obligation should be restricted to knowledge that the Franchisor actually has and will not 
include information that it ought to have. 
A summary of the terms of the franchise agreement should be detailed in the 
disclosure document.  These are; 
• the Initial and Ongoing Fees,  
• Intellectual Property,  
• Franchise Territory,  
• Supply of Goods and Services,  
• Marketing and other co-operative funds,  
• any financing arrangements provided by the franchisor,  
• the Franchisor’s Obligations,  
                                                   
1186 Article 3:102 Commercial Agency, Franchise and Distribution Amsterdam Team 8th Draft (21 May, 
2003). 
1187 Ibid 
1188 Interview with Christopher Nowak, Vice President and General Counsel, Wyndham Worldwide 
Corporation (10 March 2006). 
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• the Franchisee’s Obligations and Restrictions,  
• Related Agreements,  
• Renewal,  
• Termination,  
• Post-termination restrictions 
• Dispute Resolution 
• Earning claims 
Prospective franchisees want to know their likely level of earnings in the franchise and so this 
should be covered by the disclosure document.  However, a prescriptive approach to what 
should be disclosed to potential franchisees about their likely earnings (as is found in the US), 
is not recommended. 
It is proposed that the Italian approach to earning claims of “loyalty, fairness and 
good faith”1189 be adopted.  
This is because artful draftsmen can get around detailed provisions so giving misleading 
information that complies with the law whilst this general approach makes it more difficult to 
evade and more adaptable to local conditions. 
5.4.3.6 Inappropriate Disclosure 
It is suggested that it is not appropriate to disclose the characteristics of the 
franchisor’s relevant know- how to potential franchisees. 
Although the Amsterdam Team recommend this, to do so would compromise the franchisor’s 
trade secrets and so discourage companies from becoming franchisors1190. 
The Franchisor should not be under an obligation to deliver to the potential franchisee 
details about the market conditions.   
This is contrary to the Study Group’s recommendation (and the provision of the French and 
Belgian disclosure laws). 
However to require the franchisors to do so removes from the franchisee responsibility for its 
own commercial decisions and so encourages the unsuitable individuals and nurtures the 
blame culture condemned by the Australian government1191. 
                                                   
1189 Law of 6 May 2004, No. 129 Article 6.1. 
1190 Article 3: 102 Commercial Agency, Franchising and Distribution.  Amsterdam Team 8th Draft (21 
May, 2003) 
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5.4.3.7 Renewal 
There is a reasonable case for suggesting that on the renewal of a franchise agreement the 
incumbent franchisee has sufficient information about the franchised business to make any 
disclosure document a meaningless and unnecessary administrative burden for the franchisor. 
This is particularly so for mature systems that are no longer actively recruiting new 
franchisees. 
However, the counter argument is, on balance, more persuasive. The renewal of a franchise is 
an important commercial event which requires the franchisee and the franchisor to carefully 
consider their options. In order to do this both need accurate and up to date information. 
The franchise network will have developed during the term of the expiring franchise 
agreement and the new franchise agreement may differ from the original agreement in 
important ways. 
The franchisee’s circumstances may have also changed and the franchisor should be given 
formal notice of these.  
It is proposed that the EU franchise directive provide that on each renewal of a 
franchise agreement the franchisor and the franchisee must comply with the pre- 
contractual disclosure obligations as if they did not have an existing 
franchisor/franchisee relationship. 
5.4.3.8 The Timing of Disclosure 
Timing of disclosure is important.  The franchisee must have sufficient time to properly 
consider it but too long a period risks it becoming out of date and unduly slowing down the 
commercial process.   
Delivery of the disclosure document to the prospective franchisee should be 15 
working days before the execution of any agreement which commits the prospective 
franchisee to take up the franchise or payment of any fees in connection with the 
franchise sale.  
This follows the Swedish example1192 and is similar to the approach taken by both the US’s 
FTC Rules1193 and the Australian Franchise Code1194 . 
                                                                                                                                                        
1191 See 5.4.1 above 
1192 The Swedish law requires a reasonable period of no less than 14 days. 
1193 See 16 CFR 436.1(g), 436.2(a), and 436.2(c). 
1194 See 4.6.2 above 
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5.4.3.9 Who Should it be Delivered to? 
The disclosure document must be delivered to a “prospective franchisee”. A 
prospective franchisee any person (including any agent, representative, or employee) 
who approaches or is approached by a franchise seller to discuss the possible 
establishment of a franchise relationship.   
This follows the US lead1195. Representatives of a prospective corporate franchisee must be 
permitted to accept delivery of the disclosure document on the prospective franchisee’s 
behalf. The requirement that the parties must  
“discuss the possible establishment of a franchise relationship,”  
makes it clear that for an individual to become a “prospective franchisee” he or she must 
communicate with the franchisor about a franchise offering. Merely perusing a franchisor’s 
website alone, for example, will not turn an ordinary internet surfer into a prospective 
franchisee.  
5.4.3.10 What Constitutes Delivery of the Disclosure Document? 
It is important to avoid confusion over whether or not the disclosure document has been 
delivered.  
It is suggested that the Directive should lay down a clear and unambiguous definition 
of what amounts to delivery to the prospective franchisee.  
Evidence that the duty of disclosure has been complied with is important in order to prevent 
any future dispute as to compliance. This issue is dealt with in both the US1196 and 
Australian1197 legislation. 
With the increasing use of email and other forms of electronic communication, the Directive 
must also deal with issue of electronic disclosure. There are three key issues that need to be 
considered as regards this1198. 
The first issue to be addressed is whether the electronic disclosure document has to be exactly 
the same as the hard copy document. Enhancements such as audio, video, pop-ups and 
                                                   
1195 Section 436.1(r) of the FTC Rule. The term “franchise seller” is used in lieu of “franchisor, or franchise 
broker, or any representative, agent, or employee thereof.” See section 436.1(i). 
1196 In the USA Item 23 of the UFDD requires that the last page of the offering circular must be a 
detachable document acknowledging receipt of the offering circular by the prospective Franchisee. The 
prospective Franchisee signs the receipt and returns it to the Franchisor. The Franchisor is also required to 
furnish the franchise agreement containing all material terms at least five business days before signing. 
1197 According to the Australian Franchise Code of Conduct, the last page of the disclosure document must 
contain “a statement to the effect that the prospective franchisee may keep the disclosure document”, and “a 
form on which the prospective franchisee can acknowledge receipt of the disclosure document” (The Code, 
Annexure 1, item 23). 
1198 Plave, LJN’s Franchising Business & Law Alert, April 2007, Vol. 13, No. 7, pp. 1, 1, 2, 4. 
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external links to websites could erode the integrity of the disclosure document so are best 
avoided although limited electronic enhancements, such as scroll bars, search features and 
internal links to facilitate franchisee navigation of the document are appropriate. 
Secondly, there are a multitude of options available to the franchisor: e.g., e-mail, a password 
protected Internet site or CD-ROM although e-mail is likely to be the favoured option due to 
cost efficiency and ease of use. To ensure that a franchise prospect realises that alternative 
disclosure formats are available, the franchisor should add information to the cover page of 
the disclosure document indicating that such alternative formats are available. 
Thirdly, the greater ease of using electronic disclosure potentially increases the administrative 
burden of recording who was served with the disclosure document and when. The US 
requirement for the delivery of disclosure documents to be acknowledged by the recipient1199 
has lead to detailed provisions as to how this must be effected if disclosure is made 
electronically1200. 
It is proposed that receipt of the disclosed document can be acknowledged by any 
affirmative action by the recipient to authenticate his/her identify and confirm receipt. 
This could include, for example, a handwritten signature, an electronic signature, 
passwords or a security code. The fast changing nature of electronic commerce means 
that this general statement is more appropriate than detailed and specific provisions 
that are likely to become out of date in a short period of time. 
5.4.3.11 What documents should be given to the potential franchisees 
It is proposed that the disclosure document should be accompanied by a copy of the 
franchise agreement in the form in which it is to be executed.  
The franchisor should also provide the prospective franchisee with all other documents 
required by the franchise agreement to be signed, in the form each is intended to be executed. 
Whilst this may seem all very obvious and straight forward, in practice complications can 
arise1201.  
The prospective franchisees should receive the franchise agreement in the form in which it is 
intended to be executed at the same time as they receive the disclosure document. However in 
practice all documents may not be available in their final form at that time1202. 
                                                   
1199 Statement of Basis and Purpose, Section II.B.2,b, 72 Fed. Reg at 15469. See Appendix 10. 
1200 Section 436.1(4) Statement of Purpose, Section III, A21, 72 Fed Reg at 15467 FTC FAQs Question 15. 
1201 See the Italian franchise law in section 4.5 above 
1202 A similar provision found in the Australian Franchising Code of Conduct, Part 2, Division 2.1, section 
6C and Annexure 1, section 18.  
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Research in Australia1203 suggests that despite the requirements of the Code1204, the final form 
of such documents is sometimes are not provided until after the franchise agreement is signed 
and their existence is only alluded to briefly during preliminary meetings or brushed off as 
not being of any significance. 
The Loi Doubin, requires that potential franchisee must be provided with all information 
which is indispensable for the franchisee to contract with full knowledge of the facts1205. 
It is suggested that if there is any material difference between the summary of any such 
document and the one presented to the franchisee for execution, it should entitle the 
franchisee to withdraw from the franchise without penalty and cost. 
Clearly a franchisor may have difficulty providing all documents required to be signed by the 
franchisor to the prospective franchisee 15 working days before the franchise agreement is 
expected to be signed.  If the documents are available, they should be provided at least 15 
working days before the franchise agreement is expected to be signed. A latest draft of 
documents not available in final form at that time must be provided. When the final draft is 
ready, a red lined copy illustrating any changes should be provided. This must be at least 5 
working days before executing the Franchise Agreement and other relevant documents. If 
necessary, the execution of documents must be delayed to ensure that there are 5 working 
days between delivery of the final document and execution. 
5.4.3.12 The Accuracy of the Information being Disclosed 
It is important that the standard of the franchisor’s liability for drafting the disclosure 
document is established. If the information disclosed is inaccurate the disclosure process is 
pointless. The simplest solution would be to place the Franchisor under a strict liability to 
ensure the accuracy of the information it supplies. However,  
“as anyone who has drafted a (US) Offering Circular can testify, there is no certainty as 
to the nature of the information that has to be included in the various disclosure 
sections of the Offering Circular and reasonable persons often differ in good faith as 
to what has to be disclosed”1206. 
                                                   
1203 Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct – Report to the Hon. Fran. 
Bailey M.P, Minister of Small Business and Tourism, October 2006 – Secretariat Office of Small Business. 
1204 It requires the franchisor to provide a summary of any requirements under the franchise agreement for 
the franchisee to enter into other agreements as a result of signing the franchise agreement. These include 
leases and sub-leases for premises, chattel leases or hire purchase agreements, guarantees, mortgage 
security deposits, confidentiality agreements and agreements not to carry out business in the area for a time 
after the franchise agreement is terminated. Federal Trade Commission Rule on Disclosure Requirements 
and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures (FTC Rule) §436. 
1205 Commercial Court of Creteil, 9 May 2000, L’Off De la. fr No. 30 p. 94. 
1206 FTC Staff Report Baer, NPR 11, at 10. 
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The Directive should follow the French and Spanish approach to accuracy of disclosure and 
focus upon the subjective test of defective consent rather than a technical failure to comply 
with the technical requirement of disclosure1207.   
It is therefore proposed that even if disclosed information is inaccurate it will be 
immaterial if the inaccuracy has not led to defective consent being given by the 
franchisee and that  it is a violation for a franchisor to fail to use best endeavours to 
ensure the accuracy of the disclosed information.   
Liability for inaccurate disclosure that lead to defective consent should attach not only 
to the franchisor, but also to any individual working for or with the franchisor who 
can be shown to have been responsible for the disclosure of the inaccurate 
information, who knew (or should have known) the legal or commercial significance 
of those facts, and was in a position to influence the outcome of the matter.  
A secretary could “know” that incorrect financial performance data was routinely provided to 
buyers, but neither knew the significance of doing so nor was in a position to stop the 
practice.  Failure to comply should lead to the imposition of a fine by the authorities and 
liability in damages if despite consent being valid the franchisee is disadvantaged in some 
tangible way. 
In the interests of clarity and practicality it is also appropriate to impose an obligation upon 
the Franchisor to update the disclosure document on a regular basis. 
It is suggested that the Australian approach be adopted by the EU Franchise Directive 
and that the Disclosure Document be updated within 6 months of the end of each 
financial year.  
A shorter period might create too much compliance urgency for franchisors without adequate 
resources to comply. 
5.4.3.13 Language 
The different languages of the 27 member states can create complications with precontractual 
disclosure. 
                                                   
1207 See 3.3 above 
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It is proposed that the disclosure document should be in the plain language(s) of the 
member state in which the franchisee will be operating its business or, in member 
states in which there is more than one official language, the official language which 
the franchisee designates as its preference.   
For example, a franchisee in Belgium could require the disclosure document to be Flemish, 
French or German.   
Plain language should be defined as “the organization of information and language 
usage understandable by a person unfamiliar with the franchise business. It 
incorporates short sentences; definite, concrete, everyday language; active voice; and 
tabular presentation of information, where possible.  
It avoids legal jargon, highly technical business terms, and multiple negatives”1208. 
5.4.3.14 Risk Statement 
Potential franchisees need to be reminded in clear and unambiguous terms that buying a 
franchise can be a risky business. There is no guaranteed return on their income and they may 
lose everything they invest. The proposals regarding educating potential franchisees made 
above1209 should be re-enforced by a Risk Statement on the disclosure document. 
If prospective franchisees are made aware of these significant risks then they should be better 
informed in making their decision about entering a franchise agreement and will be better 
equipped to manage the risks. 
The US approach is to ensure that franchisors  
“present all material facts accurately, clearly, concisely, and legibly”1210. 
There are no such requirements in the EU member states. 
It would be appropriate to place on the front of the disclosure document a clear and 
unequivocal risk statement.  
                                                   
1208 This definition is based upon the definition of “plain English” used in Part 436 of the final amended 
FTC Rule, Section 436.1(o). 
1209 See 5.4.1 above 
1210 See UFOC Guidelines, General Instruction 150. The phrase “plain English” is defined separately in 
section 436.1(o), consistent with the UFOC Guidelines. 
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A Risk Statement which identifies known significant risks that could have a material 
impact on the franchisee should be placed on the front of the disclosure document.  It 
should read as follows;  
“Investing in a franchise can be a risky business. There is no guarantee that 
your franchise will be a success. You could lose your investment. In order to 
succeed you will have to work long and hard.  It is not a road to instant 
success and riches. You must think about it carefully before you enter into the 
franchise agreement. Some of the information you need in order to make an 
informed decision” is contained in this disclosure document. Take your time, 
read all documents carefully, talk to other franchisees and assess your own 
financial resources and capabilities to deal with requirements of the 
franchised business. You should also make your own enquiries, get 
independent legal, accounting and business advice, prepare a business plan 
and projections for profit and cash flow and consider educational course, 
particularly if you have not operated a business before”. 
It is also recommended that the front of each franchise agreement be endorsed with 
the following statement: 
“This franchise will not provide a guaranteed income to you. In entering into 
this franchise you are accepting the risk that you may lose your investment. If 
you get into financial trouble whilst operating your franchised business your 
franchisor has no obligation to rescue you. It is therefore essential that before 
entering this franchise you take legal and financial advice from professionals 
with a proven track record of advising prospective franchisees on their 
intended investment and that you follow their advice. You must also carefully 
read the disclosure document. It contain important information that you must 
read before entering into the franchise agreement. Remember, if your 
franchised business fails depending upon your circumstances you could end 
up losing your home and becoming bankrupt.”  
5.4.3.15 Cooling Off Period 
A number of jurisdictions with franchise focused laws impose a “cooling off” period on the 
parties after the execution of the franchise agreement, ranging from 5 to 30 days1211. 
                                                   
1211 Mexico - Decree No 35/2006/ND-CP, article 142 of Mexico’s Industrial Property Law. 
Malaysia - The Franchise Act 1998 Part III Section 18 (2)(h) and 18(4). 
Taiwan - Article 5 of the Standards Governing Disclosure of information by Franchisors by the Fair Trade 
Commission 
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In Germany BGB 507 imposes a cooling off period in certain circumstances1212 as does 
Austria1213 and the UK1214. 
This extra time for a franchisee to reflect upon their decision is a small investment in helping 
to ensure that franchisees are really committed to making the franchised business a success.  
It is an investment in favour of franchisor and franchisee alike.   
It is therefore proposed that a period of five working days following the day on which 
the franchise agreement is executed by both parties the franchisee has the right to 
withdraw by written notice, without penalty 
5.4.3.16 Foreign Franchisors 
Should an EU disclosure law impact only on franchisors based in the EU or should it also 
have jurisdiction over those based outside of the EU but granting franchises into member 
states?  
The answer to the question  about the effect of the franchisor’s location may seem an obvious 
one. However, until a recent change of law, Australia exempted foreign franchisors from the 
need to provide disclosure to an Australian Franchisee so long as the franchisor was resident 
outside of Australia and only granted one franchise or master franchise to be operated in 
Australia1215. The main reason for this exemption seems to have been to ensure that there was 
nothing that discouraged foreign franchisors entering into the geographically remote and 
demographically small Australian market. However, it seems that this concern was misplaced 
and  the AFC’s recommendation1216 that this exemption be dropped has recently been 
accepted by the Australian government.   
If one views individual member states as separate markets then some of the smaller markets 
such as the Baltic States, Slovenia and Slovakia may merit such treatment. They are 
demographically small and are noticeably more remote than the western and central member 
states.  Perhaps a US franchisor would appreciate an exemption that removed its obligation to 
make disclosure to, say, a Latvian franchisee.  
However, given the size and wealth of the EU as a whole, the justification for such an 
exemption for foreign franchises entering an EU member state could not be that it is 
necessary in order to encourage new franchises to enter the EU. One could argue that foreign 
concepts entering an EU member state for the first time are entirely untested in the target EU 
                                                   
1212 See Section 3.5 above 
1213 Ibid 
1214 Ibid 
1215 Section 5 of the Australian Franchise Code of Conduct. 
1216 Submission of the Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchise Code of Conduct – 15 August 
2006. 
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market, and therefore do not have that much information about the target market to disclose. 
There is, of course, some merit in that argument, but it is not sufficiently persuasive. There is 
a good deal of important non-market specific information that needs to be disclosed to 
potential franchisees, in addition to which, as one franchise executive stated,  
“whilst for some businesses the details of the business outside of the target member 
state might well be irrelevant and possibly confusing, for many including our business 
such disclosure is extremely useful and important to potential franchisees.”1217   
All franchisors should give some form of disclosure. Although, a franchisor with no 
experience of the market in a particular member state should not be under any obligation to 
furnish potential franchise information about that member state.  
“To expect a franchisor to have a real detailed knowledge of foreign jurisdictions in 
which it has no operational experience is nonsensical and dangerous. Often it is the 
franchisors’ very lack of such knowledge that leads it to franchise in a foreign 
jurisdictions in the first place”1218.  
Such requirements can create barriers to successful cross border franchising and show a real 
lack of understanding of what master franchisees and developers are expected to bring to the 
party. 
However such a franchisor must make some type of disclosure about the business and about 
how it has fared in at least one market. A Master Franchisee who tries to establish a franchise 
system in an EU member state from scratch would be compromised by a lack of knowledge 
of how the system has performed in other markets. A potential franchisee needs the protection 
afforded to it by formal disclosure and the location of the franchisor is irrelevant. Although a 
system’s performance in foreign markets and other member states may be totally different to 
its potential performance in a particular member state, so long as such information is 
furnished to the potential franchisee with an appropriate health warning clearly stating that it 
is for a different market and that it may perform very differently in the franchisee’s market, it 
can be useful. 
 
                                                   
1217 Interview with Christopher Nowak, Vice President and General Counsel, Wyndham Worldwide 
Corporation (10 March 2006). 
1218 Interview with Jane Colton, Vice President & Legal Counsel, Vanguard Rental GMbH (1 June 2006) 
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It is therefore proposed that: 
(1) A franchisor granting a franchise to a party in a member state in which it is 
not based (the target member state) should disclose details of its franchise in 
the target member state. 
(2) If a franchisor does not have outlets in the target market it should disclose 
details of its business in another member state. 
(3) If the franchisor does not have any outlets in the whole of the EU, it should 
disclose details of its franchise in the country in which it is based or another 
country which it can reasonably justify as being appropriate (“the analogous 
market”). 
The disclosure requirement will not apply to Franchisors based in the EU granting franchises 
to potential franchisees who are based outside of the EU. 
When a franchisor is disclosing details of outlets in a market other than the target member 
state, it must clearly state that this is the case and that performance in a different market is not 
necessarily a reliable guide to performance in the target market due to economic, cultural and 
commercial differences and that the potential franchisee should therefore treat them with 
caution. 
5.4.3.17 Regular Review of the Law 
It is proposed that the EU Directive be reviewed every five (5) years to ensure that 
the contents of the Disclosure Document continue to be relevant to the market. 
It is important that the required contents of the disclosure document and indeed other aspects 
of it are not fossilised, but are regularly updated to reflect the concerns of the market and so 
ensure that it continues to meet the benchmarks of good regulation. 
Such reviews have recently been conducted on an ad hoc basis in both Australia and the USA.  
The disclosure provisions of the Australian Franchising Code were reviewed on behalf of 
government in 20061219 due to a marked increase of complaints (more than 100% increase) on 
                                                   
1219 Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct – Report to the Hon. Fran 
Bailey M.P, Minister of Small Business and Tourism – October 2006 – Secretariat Office of Small 
Business. The Review, completed on 31 October, was conducted by a committee chaired by Mr Graeme 
Matthews, National Managing Partner, KPMG Middle Market Advisory, supported by a secretariat from 
the Office of Small Business and a team from the law firm Corrs Chambers Westgarth. 
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the 5 year period to June 20061220. The US Federal and State franchise laws are being 
continually re-assessed and amended1221. 
It is therefore suggested that  
“the format of the statutory disclosure document should be reviewed every 10 years 
or so to ensure that as franchising develops along with the sophistication of potential 
franchisees it also changes to ensure that the disclosures are relevant and useful”. 
5.4.3.18 The consequences of inadequate disclosure 
A disclosure law is meaningless unless the consequences of non compliance are such as to 
deter franchisors from failing to give full disclosure and afford sufficient remedy to the 
wronged party. The wronged franchisee always has a right of redress against a franchisor who 
has made wrongful or inadequate disclosure.  However, in some jurisdictions the government 
agencies have an independent right of action1222.  Failure to make adequate disclosure under 
disclosure laws1223 is generally sanctioned by nullity/recission of the franchise agreement1224; 
                                                   
1220 The ACCC reported 252 complaints related to disclosure issues in the five year period – Review of the 
Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct – Report to the Hon Fran Bailey M.P. etc. 
1221 For example: (1) in the last 20 years, Congressman LaFalce has twice proposed stricter federal 
regulation, (2) the FTC has twice reviewed its FTC Rules as part of the process that ultimately led to the 
recent changes, (3) states such as Iowa have adopted new franchise laws, (4) the Supreme Court has relaxed 
the law on price control in the Leegin case, (5) innumerable states have amended their existing franchise 
laws. 
1222 In Spain for example, both private parties and the Ministry of Economy and Finance may bring legal 
action for violation of the disclosure requirements before the administrative courts. In addition, franchisee 
can file a request to the government to commence action against a franchisor. The Government does not 
have to do this, but if failure to bring action results in damages to the franchisee, the franchisee may have a 
claim against the government. In the USA, the FTC itself can bring a civil action for rescission of contract 
(FTC Act s.19 (15 U.S.C. s57b)). The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) also has 
power to act against offending franchisors. It can bring actions in relation to a violation of the Franchising 
Code of Conduct or of Section 52 of the TPA. It can order the contract fully or partly void and can refuse to 
enforce all or any provisions of the franchise agreement. 
1223 USA: Federal Trade Commission Act; 
Australia: Trade Practices (Industry Codes-Franchising) Regulations known as the Franchising Code of 
Conduct enacted as Section 51AE of the Federal Trade Practices Act 1974 (the TPA); Spain: Article 62 of 
Act 7/1996 and Royal Decree 2485/1998; France: The “Loi Doubin”, Law No. 89-1008 dated 31 December 
1989 on Pre-contractual Disclosure; Italy: Law of 6 May 2004, No. 129 Article 1.1; Belgium: Law relative 
to pre-contractual information in the framework of commercial partnership agreements adopted December 
19, 2005, modified December 27, 2005; effective February 1, 2006, Art. 5; Sweden: Disclosure Act 2006; 
Romania: Government Ordinance No. 52/1997 as amended by Law No. 79/1998. 
1224 Nullity/recission of the franchise agreement is a formalistic approach to non compliance aimed at 
ensuring that franchisors comply with the disclosure law, sometimes regardless of proportionality. All 
jurisdictions except Sweden recognise the right for individual franchisees to rescind agreements but not all 
give the regulatory authorities the same rights.  Misrepresentation under English and Irish law can render 
the agreement void “ab initio”.  Although the Loi Doubin is silent as to the consequences of inadequate or 
wrongful disclosure, failure to comply can give rise to a retroactive cancellation (Cass. Com., 10 February 
1998, Bull. Civ.IV No. 71 recently confirmed by Cass. Com., 7 July 2004, No.02-15950). However, in 
recent years French courts have only voided or cancelled a franchise agreement if the franchisor’s failure to 
disclose has meant that the franchisee’s consent was vitiated (Cass. Com., 10 February 1998, Bull., Civ IV 
No. 71, recently confirmed by Cass. Com., 7 July 2004, No. 02-15950). Article 1304 of the French Civil 
Code imposes a time bar of 5 years from the time that the franchisee on any action for rescission of 
contract.  Inadequate or incorrect disclosure may give rise to the nullity of the franchise agreement in Spain. 
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prohibition of further franchising by the franchisor1225; cease and desist orders and injunctive 
relief1226; financial penalties1227; damages1228; and criminal sanctions1229.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Some Spanish courts have declared several franchise agreements to be null and void due to a lack of 
compliance with disclosure requirements, whereas other courts have deemed the failure to comply with 
disclosure obligations a mere administrative default. If the misrepresentation has been minor, the Spanish 
courts will award the franchisee an extraordinary right to terminate the agreement rather than to declare it 
null and void from the beginning.  Failure to disclose may lead the Italian courts to rescind the agreement or 
declare it null and void.  Article 5 of the Belgian franchise law provides that failure to provide the 
disclosure document enables the franchisee to seek a declaration that the franchise agreement is null and 
void within two years following the execution of the contract. 
1225 In some jurisdictions if a franchisor is a serial offender and is regularly breaching the disclosure 
obligations the authorities have the right, in the public interest, to disqualify it from granting further 
franchises. In the UK the Companies Investigation Branch of the Insolvency Service can petition the High 
Court to place franchisors who misrepresent their businesses to potential franchisees into liquidation (In 
November 2008 the Queensbury and Richmond vending franchises were placed into liquidation as a result 
of the CIB’s investigation showing that their recruitment literature contained centred around untested 
claims about what franchisees could earn;  Franchise World, Dec/Jan 2009, p. 6). 
1226 In a number of jurisdictions, the courts can make orders for specific performance in addition to fines 
and awarding damages.  However in Sweden this is the only order that the Market Court can make (Lag 
(2006:484) om franchisegivares informationsskyldighet).  As the right to recission or damages may not 
always be immediate enough to provide a franchisee with adequate remedy both the wronged franchisee 
and the regulatory authority are often able to apply for injunctive relief.  For example, in both the USA and 
Australia, cease and desist orders can be issued by the regulatory authorities and obtained from the courts 
on application by the franchisee. 
1227 Financial penalties rather than damages can also be imposed by the regulatory authorities in the USA, 
Australia and certain EU member states.  In the USA, monetary penalties of up to US$10,000 a day for each 
violation can be imposed (S.5 of the FTC Act (U.S.C. §45)); whilst in New South Wales payment of money 
is a possible remedy under section 106 of the Industrial Relations Act 1996 (New South Wales).  Article 2 
of the Loi Doubin provides for specific fines for failure to comply with disclosure obligations (€1,500 for a 
single violation and €3,000 for repeat violation) even when lack of intent, whilst the Spanish government 
can impose fines of up to €3,000 for the first offences, up to €15,000 for repeated violations and if turnover 
of the Franchisor is over €600,000 fines of up to €600,000. 
1228 Failure to comply with the disclosure obligation usually also gives the franchisee the right to damages. 
For example, in the UK and Ireland the franchisee can affirm the contract and opt for damages instead of 
rescission.  In the USA, franchisees can bring common law action for damages (even penal damages) 
against franchisors, but may not be able to obtain rescission or legal fees.  The Australian courts will grant 
damages. Remedies for contravention of the Code or the unconscionable conduct provisions in section 51 
AC of the TPA may be brought by the ACCC or by a person who suffers loss or damage as a result of 
conduct. Even if there has been no breach of the code, the conduct of a franchisor may contravene section 
52 of the TPA which prohibits a corporation from engaging in conduct that is misleading or deceptive or is 
likely to mislead or deceive. Franchisees have evoked this to recover losses from failed franchised 
businesses on the grounds of misrepresentations during the sales process (Silver Fox Company PTY 
Limited v Lenards PTY Limited [2005] FCAFC 131 (19 July 2005); Cut Price Deli Pty Ltd v 
Jacques(1994) 49 FCR 397; 126 ALR 413; (1994) ATPR 46-128). The general limitation period is six years 
from the date on which the cause of the action accrued.  Damages can be claimed under Article 1382 of the 
French Civil Code (law of tort); but the French courts will only award them in cases of fraud or gross 
negligence. There are no punitive damages. Actions for damages under tort liability are time-barred after 
five years from the time that the damage occurred. There is no contractual claim.  In Italy, damages can be 
awarded if there is a direct relation between any loss suffered and the Franchisor’s failure to disclose. In 
Romania, civil damages can be claimed for both actual loss and anticipated loss. The time bar for such 
claims is three years. 
1229 Some jurisdictions also impose criminal sanctions on franchisors for inaccurate disclosure in some 
circumstances. In France, criminal penalties can be imposed if fraud, false advertising or abuse of power are 
involved.   Article 515 of the Italian Criminal Code provides for a criminal penalty up to two years of 
imprisonment or up to €2,065.83 in case of fraud.  In Romania, intentional misrepresentation can result in 
criminal charges. 
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These sanctions are imposed either by individual franchisees exercising their rights in the 
courts or by the regulatory authorities who either have a right to take court action against the 
franchisor or impose an administrative penalty.  
The Amsterdam Group’s recommendation for a model Civil Code was that if failure to make 
“full and proper disclosure” leads to a “fundamental mistake”1230 the franchisee is entitled to 
damages1231 unless the franchisor had reason to believe that the information was adequate and 
it was given in reasonable time. It is uncertain what “full and proper” disclosure, a 
“fundamental mistake”, “adequate information” and “reasonable time” are. Such details are of 
fundamental importance and their absence renders the proposal both meaningless and 
dangerous. Such an approach is unlikely to encourage either new franchisors or franchisees. 
Failure to comply with the disclosure obligation which leads to defective consent being given 
should enable both the franchisee and the appropriate regulatory authority (e.g. the 
Department of Trade and Industry in the UK) to rescind the franchise and related agreements 
or, in the case of the franchisee, to affirm the agreement and sue for damages instead, subject 
to certain chronological limitations. The franchisee’s right to withdraw from a contractual 
relationship into which it has been wrongfully enticed is clearly of fundamental importance, 
although there comes a point at which it must be deemed to have affirmed the relationship. 
The right to walk away from the franchise due to inadequate disclosure cannot continue in 
perpetuity. 
Empirical research suggests that franchisees’ allegations of misrepresentation by the 
franchisor are not restricted to those franchisees who have entered into the franchise 
agreement within the past two years. Allegations are raised by franchisees who have been in 
the franchise system for more than two years1232. 
It is suggested that the right to walk away or claim damages due to inadequate 
disclosure should be restricted so that it must be exercised by the franchisee (or the 
government authorised) within 12 months of the franchisee becoming aware of the 
failure or 24 months of the date of the franchise agreement, whichever is the later1233. 
If the agreement continues after this time the franchisee, will be deemed to have 
affirmed the franchise agreement and so lose both its right to terminate the agreement 
and the right to sue for damages (as would the government agency). If the franchisee 
                                                   
1230 Article 4:103 Commercial Agency, Franchise And Distribution Amsterdam Team 8th Draft (21 May, 
2003). 
1231 Article 4:117 (2) and (3) Commercial Agency, Franchise And Distribution Amsterdam Team 8th Draft 
(21 May, 2003). 
1232 Appendix 8. 
1233 Article 5 of the Belgian law provides similar limitations – As does Section 339 Ptk of the Hungarian 
Civil Code. 
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has not taken action by that time the failure to comply with the disclosure obligation 
could not be sufficiently damaging as to justify the franchisor having access to such 
remedies.  This should encourage a reasonable level of confidence and stability in 
franchising. 
The cut off is necessary to ensure that the franchisor can enjoy a degree of certainty and avoid 
having to work with the franchisee under the burden of uncertainty for a prolonged period of 
time. 
Member state regulatory authorities should have the right to require a franchisor to 
desist from making wrongful or inadequate disclosure if there is found to be an 
established pattern of such behaviour.  Failure to comply with the prohibition should 
lead to the imposition of substantial fines on the franchisor and the disqualification of 
its directors as directors of a company for up to 5 years. 
Penalties for non disclosure should also be imposed on franchisees.  Franchisors should also 
have the right (but not obligation) to require potential franchisees to give them precontractual 
disclosure.   
Failure by a franchisee to comply with a franchisor’s request for disclosure by the 
franchisee will result in the franchisor having the right to terminate the franchise 
agreement within 12 months of the failure coming to the franchisor’s attention or 
within two years of the franchisee signing the franchise agreement, whichever is the 
earlier.  The franchisee will also be deprived of any right to claim damages or other 
remedy unless the franchisor has intentionally and materially either breached the 
franchise agreement or made wrongful or incomplete disclosure to the franchisee. 
5.4.4 Prohibition on Misleading or Deceptive Behaviour 
This provides critical analysis to the third objective of this thesis. 
Following the discussion at 3.6 above, it is suggested that in addition to set form pre-
contractual disclosure, there should also be a pre-contractual duty on the franchisor not to do 
anything which is misleading and deceptive.  However, franchisees and potential franchisees 
are not consumers and should not be allowed to enjoy any consumer rights vis a vis their 
relationship with franchisors. 
In Germany the pre-contractual duty to make full disclosure (culpa in contrahendo) seeks to 
ensure that potential franchisees are able to make a decision to enter the franchise based on all 
relevant facts1234.  In the UK it has been suggested that there is a pre-contractual duty of care 
                                                   
1234 BGB 242. Ibid pp.[103] 
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owed by the franchisor to the franchisee which means that pre-contractual representations are 
actionable in tort as well as contract1235.  In Australia there is a similar approach taken under 
the Trade Practices Act (TPA).   
A pre-contractual duty to disclose similar to that found in the Australian TPA would comprise 
two parts.  Firstly, it would impose an obligation to comply with the pre-contractual 
disclosure required by the EU Franchise Directive. Secondly, it would prohibit all conduct 
constituting pre-contractual disclosure that could objectively be considered to be misleading 
and deceptive.  The Directive will need to give details of what amounts to misleading and 
deceptive behaviour.  The term “misleading” is mentioned in many EU directives and is 
defined in two1236.  These lead one to understand the term to mean “anything which contains 
false information and is therefore untruthful or which in any way (including its presentation), 
deceives or is likely to deceive a person, even if the information is in part factually correct”. 
The term “deceptive” is mentioned but is not defined in a number of Directives1237.  
Misleading and deceptive behaviour would include a franchisor’s statement, (whether made 
publicly or in private negotiations by the franchisor)1238, which although literally true, 
misleads or deceives or is likely to mislead or deceive. Even reasonable and honest conduct 
by a franchisor could be misleading or deceptive conduct in certain circumstances1239. 
Although a franchisor must be permitted to bargain “hard”1240, silence by a franchisor may, in 
                                                   
1235 MGB Printing & Design Limited v KallKwik UK Ltd (QBD) – 31 March 2010 – [2010] EWHC 624 
(QB) 
1236 In Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 
concerning misleading and comparative advertising has defined …"misleading advertising" means any 
advertising which in any way, including its presentation, deceives or is likely to deceive the persons to 
whom it is addressed or whom it reaches and which, by reason of its deceptive nature, is likely to affect 
their economic behaviour or which, for those reasons, injures or is likely to injure a competitor" or 
Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair 
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 
84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive’) has defined..."Section 1 -Misleading commercial practices Article 6 - Misleading 
actions 1. A commercial practice shall be regarded as misleading if it contains false information and is 
therefore untruthful or in any way, including overall presentation, deceives or is likely to deceive the 
average consumer, even if the information is factually correct, in relation to one or more of the following 
elements, and in either case causes or is likely to cause him to take a transactional decision that he would 
not have taken otherwise" 
1237 Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 
concerning misleading and comparative advertising.  2000/520/EC: Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 
pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the 
protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by 
the US Department of Commerce.  80/271/EEC: Council Decision of 10 December 1979 concerning the 
conclusion of the Multilateral Agreements resulting from the 1973 to 1979 trade negotiations.  Regulation 
(EC) No 1980/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 July 2000 on a revised 
Community eco-label award scheme. 
1238 Bevanere Pty Ltd v Lubidineuse (1985) 7 FCR 325. 
1239 Hornsby Building Information Centre Pty Ltd v Sydney Building Information Centre Ltd (1978) 140 
CLR 216. 
1240 Poseidon Ltd v Adelaide Petroleum NL (1991) 105 ALR 25. 
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all of the circumstances constituted by its acts, omissions and representations, constitute 
conduct likely to mislead or deceive a franchisee1241. Representations and opinions by a 
franchisor, as to future matters, could be misleading unless the franchisor can prove that it 
had reasonable grounds for making the representation.   
Such a “duty to disclose”, obliging all parties to act in an objectively reasonable manner when 
making the relevant pre-contractual disclosure would be practical and would work to further 
ensure that each party receives all the information it needs during the pre-contractual phase to 
make a decision whether or not to join the franchise/grant a franchise. It would amount to 
what some commentators call “good faith purchase”1242. However it would preserve the 
required degree of certainty by falling short of the amorphous duty of a good faith that 
regulates the ability of the parties to treat with third parties during their negotiations and 
allows the courts to  imply collateral terms  as they deem fit. 
Failure to comply with the pre-contractual disclosure requirements would only amount to 
misleading and deceptive behaviour if the franchisor would have made a different decision 
had it been complied with, so following the French and Spanish approach to disclosure of 
relying upon the need for defective consent rather than a failure to comply with a technical 
requirement1243.  It is also similar to the English law concept of misrepresentation. 
Negotiating parties will always have adversarial interests. Each party is interested in making a 
profit and to get “the best deal possible”. However, there can be little objection to them 
having to behave in an objectively reasonable manner when making their pre-contractual 
disclosures to each other. They would not be under any other pre-contractual duty of good 
faith that restricts their ability to deal with other parties, as is the case in Germany. Breach of 
the pre-contractual disclosure requirement would give rise to the remedies detailed above. 
This will homogenise the pre-contractual disclosure obligations of franchisors in the EU in an 
appropriate manner delivering a high degree of certainty but avoiding some of the difficulties 
found under German law. 
A pre-contractual duty that both focuses upon the disclosure made by the parties and prohibits 
misleading and deceptive conduct, as articulated above, will serve to maintain market 
confidence in franchising. 
 
                                                   
1241 Demagogue Pty Ltd v Ramensky (1992) 39 FCR 31 and Fraser v NRMA Holdings Ltd (1995) 55 FCR 
452. 
1242 Farnsworth, “Good Faith Performance and Reasonableness under the Uniform Commercial Code”, 
University of Chicago Law Review, 1968, Vol. 30, p. 666. 
1243 See 3.8 above 
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It is therefore proposed that any pre-contractual duty of care or consumer right 
currently imposed by member state law be disapplied to franchising and replaced with 
the following provisions in the franchise directive; 
(1)  The proposed parties to a franchise agreement and related documentation 
must comply with the duty of the pre-contractual disclosure expressly 
provided for in this Directive. Failure to do so will be deemed to be 
unconscionable behaviour.   
(2) In addition to this all parties must refrain from any misleading or deceptive 
conduct when making any pre-contractual disclosure.  This will include, but is 
not limited to, making statements which, although literally true misleads or 
deceives or is likely to mislead or deceive. 
(3) If the misleading or deceptive behaviour leads to defective consent by the 
franchisee the courts will be able to make orders preventing such misleading 
or deceptive behaviour and preventing the franchisor from enjoying the 
benefits acquired by such behaviour being set aside or varying the franchise 
agreement or related documents and awarding damages.  When considering 
what remedy to apply the court shall give priority to the best interests of the 
franchise network as a whole.  The parties involved and the regulatory 
authorities may apply for such remedies. 
5.4.5 Registration of Franchise Documentation 
This provides critical analysis to the third objective of this thesis. 
Another way of trying to ensure that potential franchisees have access to relevant information 
when deciding whether or not to invest in a franchise and enable them to compare what they 
are being offered with other franchises is to require all franchisors to place key information 
on a public register.  In order for the information to be placed on the register it must be 
approved by the administrators who administer the register.  The idea is that this not only 
enables potential franchisees to “comparison shop” but ensures that all franchisors meet 
certain minimum levels as regards their offerings.  It is suggested that such an approach is 
inappropriate as it is unwieldy and cost ineffective.  
The aim of those jurisdictions that require the registration of documentation at a public 
registry is to ensure that it is reviewed and approved before the franchisor begins offering 
franchises in that jurisdiction. The general rationale is that “prevention is better than cure”. 
The registration authority provides a minimum quality assurance by only registering 
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documents that comply with the law. However this creates substantial challenges for both 
franchisors and the administrators who run the registry. 
It is suggested that registration is not an appropriate way to accentuate the impact of 
the second commercial imperative on the EU’s legal eco-system, and should therefore 
not be required by the Directive. 
In the USA, 15 states1244 require advance registration.  13 of these states require that the 
Disclosure Document and contractual documents be submitted for review and approval before 
franchises can be offered in those states1245.  The documents have to be modified in  slightly 
different way for each state.  This obviously creates a great deal of administrative compliance 
work for franchisors, and results in not insubstantial costs being incurred. 
It also results in delay.  Franchises cannot lawfully be granted in registration states until the 
franchisor has complied with the registration requirements. Failure to do so can result in 
administrative proceedings, public or private civil actions, or even criminal prosecution1246. 
Waiting periods of up to 30 days are something imposed in order to give the regulators the 
opportunity to review the documents filed1247. The cost and delay is not confined to when the 
franchise is launched as many states require franchisors to renew a registration or file a 
report, annually1248. 
The consequence of non-compliance can be severe.  Officials in some states have the 
authority, without a prior hearing, to order a halt to franchise sales if there has been a failure 
to register successfully. Failure to comply with such an order can amount to a criminal 
offence1249. In other states, any violation of the registration laws is a criminal offence, 
regardless of whether there is a stop order in effect1250. 
Each state offers exemptions to franchisors but there is no homogenous approach1251.  The 
various registration regimes are all implemented by well financed and heavily resourced state 
administrative regimes. 
                                                   
1244 These states include California, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, 
North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin.  Oregon has 
specific disclosure requirements but does not require registration. Michigan does not require prior 
submission and approval of the franchise offering documents.  
1245 Michigan and Texas do not require this. 





1251 Franchise offerings can be exempt from the registration requirements of state laws based on 
characteristics of the franchisor, the franchisee, or the offering. These exemptions can be conferred by 
statute, by regulation, or by a state regulator and must be considered in light of a state’s registration 
requirements. One state might declare an offering to be exempt from registration while another simply does 
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Registration is a pre-emptive attempt to ensure that franchisors comply with their various 
legal requirements as regards disclosure and other franchise specific requirements laid down 
by the relevant state law. This means that the state administrative agencies review the 
franchisor’s application to register the franchise, the proposed disclosure statement, financial 
statements, the franchise’s advertising materials, information about the persons who will 
engage in the sale of the franchise, the franchise agreement and all other agreements that the 
franchisee must sign to acquire the franchise. 
The purpose of the state review of the application is to determine whether the franchisor has 
complied with all legal requirements; whether all documents contain all of the required 
information in a understandable form; whether advertising materials contain any prohibited 
claims or representations, whether the franchise is fraudulent, deceptive, unfair or inequitable 
and whether the franchisor has sufficient financial resources to fulfil its obligations the most 
common problems encountered by the registration authorities are incomplete financial 
statements, deficient disclosure documents, inconsistent advertisements, illegal activities, 
outdated information in disclosure, other State specific issues, financial assurance 
documentation, revenue disclosure, rebate/supplier payments, expense estimates, and 
assistance with  the advertising fund, site selection and training. Most of the agencies also 
have the power to suspend or revoke any registration.   
Australia does not have a registration system, but there is some support for such a system by 
those who believe that if a franchisee enters into a franchise agreement due to misleading 
material, “the only recourse it has is to law and, by the time a franchisee is in a position where 
it needs recourse to law, it usually has no money [to fund a legal action]”1252.  The Franchise 
Council of Australia recently recommended that the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) be empowered to administer a mandatory franchisor registration system 
requiring annual filing of the most current disclosure material and other prescribed 
information1253. However, the Government declined to follow their suggestion on the grounds 
of cost and practicality.  This underscores the problems inherent in any attempt to establish a 
registration system for franchising, namely the compliance burden placed on franchisors 
(which would be significant); the difficulties the authorities would have in ensuring the 
                                                                                                                                                        
not include it within those transactions that must be registered. For example, Illinois excludes from the 
definition of a franchise a transaction requiring the payment of a fee of less than $500, while Michigan 
defines the arrangement as a franchise but exempts it from registration. Registration exemptions based on 
the net worth of the franchisor or the franchisor’s holding company are perhaps the most important and 
exist in nine states (California, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South 
Dakota and Washington). The experience of the franchisor and the sophistication of the prospective 
franchisee might also qualify an offering for an exemption. 
1252 The Hon. D.P Beddall, President of the Franchisee Association of Australia, speaking to the Economic 
and Finance Committee of the Parliament of South Australia – Hansard Report, 2 April 2008. 
1253 Submission of the Franchise Council of Australia dated 15 August 2006, Part E8-11. 
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quality or substance of the documents lodged; the potential liability of the authorities if they 
were seen to endorse and provide credibility to registered franchisors and lodged disclosure 
documents; and the fact that it would increase the regulatory burden on business. 
The only mandatory registration regime in the EU is found in Spain1254. Once an Agreement 
is executed, the Franchisor must register it1255.   However, it has not been successful, despite 
recent attempts to re-invigorate it1256.  The new law introduces the concept of an “Established 
Franchisor”1257. This is an attempt to distinguish between established franchisors with a track 
record of demonstrable success and newcomers. Franchisors who have a minimum of 4 
establishments, two of which must be exploited directly by the Franchisor and who have been 
operating the franchise network for a period of at least 2 years qualify for the status of 
“Established Franchisor”. 
                                                   
1254 (Royal Decree 2485/1998 Articles 5 to 10). Franchisors must register with the Autonomous 
Government in the territory where they are headquartered. Franchisors intending to do business in more 
than one Autonomous Region must be included in the federal Register under the Directorate General for 
Domestic Trade of the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Royal Decree 2485/1998 Articles 5). The Federal 
Register includes franchisors registered by the Autonomous Governments (.Royal Decree 2485/1998 
Article 6) Applications for inclusion in the Federal Register must be made by the Autonomous 
Governments where the franchisor is headquartered.  In Lithuania there is an obligation to register, but it 
can be contracted out of the franchise agreement must be in writing, and must be registered in the Register 
of Legal Entities of the Republic of Lithuania to be enforceable against third parties (Lithuanian Civil Code 
Article 6.767(1)). If the franchisor is not Lithuanian, the franchise agreement must be registered by the 
franchisee. This obligation could in theory be contracted out of by the parties, but it would render the 
agreement legally unenforceable. The practical impact of this is that the franchise agreement must always 
be registered. The information required to obtain registration with the Franchisor’s Registry includes 
(Echarri. A, 2006, “New Regulations on the Spanish Franchisor’s Registry”, International Journal of 
Franchising law, Volume 4, Issue 3, p 3: the franchisor’s details such as company name, registered office, 
details of registration with the Spanish Commercial Registry, taxpayer or business identification number; 
details of the intellectual property rights included in the franchise and a certificate verifying ownership; a 
description of the franchised business, including the number of franchises in the network and the number of 
units, indicating whether they are directly operated by the franchisor or franchised, the time period for 
which the franchisor has been in the franchising business and the name of the franchisees which have left 
the franchise network within the last two years; if the franchisor is a master franchisee, the name, registered 
address, legal status, and duration of an agreement for franchisees that have the power to grant sub 
franchises as well as the master franchise agreement itself (Royal Decree 2485/1998 Article 7); In the event 
that the franchisor is registered through a representative, proof of its authority. Foreign franchisors must 
submit the original and translated copies of the relevant documents (Royal Decree 419/2006 Article 
7(1)(f)). In addition, there are some details which can voluntarily be filed with the Registry for information 
purposes only, such as (Royal Decree 419/2006 Article 11): A quality standards certificate evidencing 
compliance with quality standards; Adherence to an alternative dispute resolution system; Adherence to any 
franchising codes of conduct; Adherence to consumer arbitration systems or other ADR procedure in regard 
to consumer complaints; Other information of general interest 
1255 Royal Decree 2485/1998. 
1256 The first 8 years of the Spanish law were confused, with the authorities and franchisors alike being 
uncertain as to where the documents should be registered. As a result, there was a very low level of 
compliance with, and no enforcement of, the law. To try and remedy this, Royal Decree No 419/2006 was 
enacted on 27 April 2006. It has not changed the registration system as such but seeks to improve it. The 
new law obliges registered Franchisors to file a report at the beginning of each calendar year even if the 
data registered remain unchanged (the new sections 3 and 4 of Article 8) 
1257 Article 12 
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Failure to comply with the registration obligation can result in the following imposition of a 
fine of between 3,000 up to 15,000 Euros subject to a maximum amount not exceeding the 
total invoicing of the Franchisor. 
The history of the registration of franchise agreements in the EU has not been distinguished 
by notable success. In Spain franchisors are required to register the franchise agreement and 
certain relevant information with the relevant authorities1258 and file an annual update1259. 
Failure to comply can result in the imposition of a fine. The purpose is to help maintain a 
certain level of quality amongst franchisors. This has not been achieved.   
The registration of franchise agreements in Spain has not been a success. There appears to be 
no qualitative or other analysis of the documentation and it has become nothing more than a 
“tick the box” administrative task. Registration, has become the hall mark of respectability, 
but without any qualitative consideration of the documentation registered, this has obvious 
and dangerous implications. The introduction of the concept of an “Established 
Franchisor”1260 is a weak attempt to try to remedy this fault by distinguishing between newly 
established franchisors and those with a track record (regardless of how good that record is).  
So far it shows little sign of making any impact. 
One therefore concludes that a registration requirement places a substantial administrative 
burden (and possibly a substantial cost) on the regulator. It imposes an equally great 
administrative on the franchisor, which has to constantly update the registration to keep it 
current and so avoid being penalised.  This burden would be increased further by the large 
number of languages used in the EU Any registry would have to be on a member state basis 
due to the linguistic differences between member states. It would create financial and 
technical barriers to the establishment of a true single market within the EU.   
The cost effectiveness of a registration system is an issue that cannot be ignored.  To set up 
the necessary regulatory framework, train the regulators, keep them updated on all relevant 
changes, and expect them to regularly audit the registered documents is a substantial and 
expensive undertaking. Given the size and scale of franchising in the EU, it seems to be an 
unwieldy and disproportionate response to the issues involved. The contrast between the 
Californian registration requirements and Spain’s feeble attempt to it could not be greater.  
Neither could the budget of the two system. The Californian registration system serves to 
show that a registration law requires the creation of a substantial administrative infra structure 
which in turn demands a substantial financial investment. It proved to be impossible to obtain 
                                                   
1258 Article 62(2) of Act 7/1996  
1259 Royal Decree No 419/2006 (new sections 3 and 4 of Article 8). 
1260 ibid (New Article 12). 
  307 
any estimate of the Spanish budget for its registration system other than “probably not a great 
deal”1261. In California the registration of franchising is dealt with by the Department of 
Corporations, which publishes its annual expenditure. In 2008-09 the Department's total 
expenditure was US$40,161,000. This deals with many more areas than just franchising. The 
cost directly attributable to franchising alone in 2008-09 was US$1,456,0001262. However, 
this excludes all of the indirect costs involved, such as accommodation, infrastructure, 
technology support and so on.  
The Department estimates that it processes up to 600 franchise registrations and renewals 
each year. There is a charge US$675 for an application for registration and US$450 for a 
renewal. If there were 600 applications for registration in one year that would amount to 
US$405,000 in fees for applications. If all of these were renewals it would be US$270,000. 
The professional costs of compliance with the Californian registration requirement are 
estimated1263 at around US$1,500 for the initial filing and US$400 for renewals. 
These costs are for a state with a population of approximately 36,500,0001264 the working 
language of which is English. The EU has a population of approximately 500,000,000 and 23 
official languages1265. The likely cost of a pan EU registration system is therefore substantial 
and unlikely to be proportionate to any benefit it might provide. At Californian type rates, the 
professional legal costs of filing a franchise in 27 EU member states could be around 
US$40,500 or €28,196 with US$10,800 or €7,518 annual renewal fees1266. The administrative 
filing cost in 27 EU member states at Californian levels would be US$18,225 or €12,688 with 
annual renewal costs of US$12,150 or €8,4591267. Such professional and administrative filing 
costs would be a real barrier to franchising between EU member states. 
Although appropriately resourced and well implemented registration may maintain market 
confidence in franchising, it is unlikely to encourage companies to use franchising as part of 
their corporate growth strategy as it will inevitably result in increased costs and bureaucracy. 
                                                   
1261 Joana Banda, Jimenez de Parga law offices, Barcelona “Franchising in Spain” at EfN Annual 
Convention 2006. 
1262 Interview with Tim Lebas, Corporation Deputy Commissioner in charge of franchise registration, 
Californian Department of Corporations, (telephone interview, March 2009). 
1263 An estimate supplied by leading franchise lawyer, Ken Costello, partner in the LA office at the Bryan 
Cave law firm. 
1264 US Census Bureau 2007 estimate blocks http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html  
1265 http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/languages-of-europe/index_en.html  
1266 At 6 January 2010 exchange rate. 
1267 At 6 January 2010 exchange rate. 
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5.4.6 Sub-Conclusion 
It is suggested that in order to help ensure pre-contractual hygiene potential franchisees must 
be given access to appropriate information and equipped to interpret it in an appropriate 
manner.  
This means that potential franchisees must be educated out of the ‘psychology of failure’ that 
encourages failed franchisees to blame others for their own failures.  They must understand 
what they are committing themselves to when they buy a franchise and the need to take and 
follow appropriate expert professional advice.  It is proposed that advisors are required to take 
short on-line franchise education courses if they are to advise potential franchisees and that 
potential franchisees investing more than US$20,000 must produce a certificate from their 
advisers to prove that they have taken such advice.  National franchise associations can play 
an important part in educating potential franchisees about the facts of life of franchising – 
they have to work hard, follow the format, risk failure and take and follow expert advice from 
appropriately experienced professionals.   
Pre-contractual disclosure should be given in a set form 15 working days before execution or 
payment, covering details of the identity and experience of the franchisor, the franchise 
network, the terms of the franchise agreement and any earning claims.  It should be in plain 
language and contain an appropriate risk statement.  A copy of the franchise agreement in the 
form in which it is to be executed should accompany the disclosure document.  There should 
also be a five day cooling off period after execution.  Failure to comply with the disclosure 
requirements should lead to the right for the franchisee and government authorities to 
terminate or claim damages within 12 months of the franchisee becoming aware of it or 24 
months of the date of execution, whichever is the later if it resulted in defective consent 
having been given.  Electronic disclosure should be permitted.  There should be personal 
liability for any individual responsible for the disclosure document being inaccurate.  Those 
disclosure obligations should apply to foreign franchisors with no presence in the relevant 
member state who should be under an obligation to disclose relevant information about 
analogous markets. 
There should be a regular review of the law every 5 years.  Failure to comply with the 
disclosure requirements, if it leads to defective consent, should enable both the franchisee and 
the appropriate regulatory authority to rescind the franchise and related agreements or claim 
damages.  The claim must be made within 12 months of the franchisee becoming aware of the 
failure or 24 months of it taking place, whichever is the latest.  The regulatory authorities 
should be able to impose penalties including disqualification. 
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Misleading and deceptive behaviour should be prohibited.  Such behaviour comprises failing 
to comply with the pre-contractual disclosure obligations and making any statement which 
although literally true, misleads or deceives is or likely to mislead or deceive.  
It is suggested that registration of documentation on a public register is not appropriate due 
not only to the practical difficulties it would give rise to in the 27 EU member states, but also 
due to the cost effectiveness of it and the law likelihood of it making any tangible 
contribution to accentuating the impact of the second commercial imperative on the EU’s 
legal eco-systems. 
5.5 Accentuating the impact of the Third Commercial Imperative – A Mandatory 
Taxonomy 
This section provides critical analysis towards achieving the third objective of this thesis. 
Further to the discussion in sections 2.5 and 3.3, it is suggested that accentuating the impact 
of the need for adequate protection on the EU’s legal eco-systems is most effectively 
achieved by imposing mandatory terms upon the franchise agreement and a prohibition of 
unconscionable behaviour. 
The risks that both the Franchisor and Franchisee are exposed to are detailed in Chapter 21268 
above.  Franchise agreements seek to address these risks1269 but the sample examined 
above1270 suggests that they do not always deliver sufficient protection. The EU’s legal eco-
systems need to compensate for this failure.  In doing so they need to balance the risks that 
both parties face with the general principle of independence that both parties are responsible 
for their own decisions. Franchisees cannot abdicate their responsibility for their own 
decisions.  A franchise is not a guarantee of success.  Good regulation provides adequate not 
total protection.  
It is suggested that in order to achieve an appropriate balance in the franchisor/franchisee 
relationship it is necessary to re-engineer the EU’s legal eco-systems so that the regulatory 
environment ensures that all franchise agreements contain certain minimum terms which re-
enforce the economic drivers that encourage both franchisors and franchisees to become 
involved in franchising and reduce the inherent consequential risks to both parties to an 
appropriate level. 
As evidenced by the sample franchise agreements, a fairly standard architecture has evolved 
for franchise agreements1271. They define the rights granted, the term and renewal, the 
                                                   
1268 See 2.4.2 above 
1269 See 2.5.4 above 
1270 See 2.5 above 
1271 See 3.4 above 
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obligations of the parties, confidentiality, non-compete clauses, impose targets, regulate 
termination, stipulate the ownership of goodwill and set out the franchisee’s right to sell its 
business.  However, this architecture fails to fully re-enforce the economic drivers that 
encourage franchisees to become involved in franchising.  It also fails to reduce the inherent 
consequential risks to which the franchisees are exposed1272. 
The legal eco-systems of EU member states do not improve matters.  They create a regulatory 
environment for franchise agreements which reduces their ability to re-enforce the economic 
drivers which encourage franchisors to become involved in franchising and fails to reduce the 
inherent consequential risks to which franchisors are exposed1273.  It is therefore suggested 
that franchise agreements should incorporate mandatory clauses that impose certain 
obligations upon franchisors and franchisees and grant them certain rights so that the 
franchisor/franchisee relationship is one which will continue to attract franchisors and 
franchisees and reduce the consequential inherent risks to an appropriate level.  However, that 
alone will not be sufficient.  The franchisor/franchisee relationship is a dynamic one.  It 
changes over time, which means that the contractual terms of the relationship may become 
dated, irrelevant or even oppressive.  A more flexible tool which takes account of the 
changing nature of the franchise relationship is also needed to ensure that the re-engineering 
of the legal eco-system is successful.  A prohibition of unconscionable behaviour is therefore 
proposed. 
5.5.1 The US Experience 
Although at federal level in the USA, there are no franchise specific relationship laws.  
Twenty states – plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands – have 
enacted laws of general application that govern franchise relationships and terminations1274.  
They aim to prevent franchisees being abused by franchisors by preventing discrimination, 
franchisor competition, market encroachment and dilution, or change of competitive 
circumstances. They also regulate terminations, cancellations and non-renewals.  Some 
relationship/termination laws also govern alterations in franchise relationships. For example, 
in Indiana1275, it is unlawful for a franchise agreement to provide for or allow substantial 
modification of the franchise agreement by the franchisor without written consent of the 
franchisee.  Many relationship/termination laws, require franchisors to be “fair,” “just,” and 
act with “good cause,” or in “good faith” when terminating a franchise or not renewing.  
                                                   
1272 See 3.5 above 
1273 See 3.8 above 
1274See Appendix 10. 
1275 Section 1 of the Indiana Deceptive Franchise Practices Law. 
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However, despite vigorous lobbying by franchisees and their advisors there is no regulation 
of the ongoing franchise relationship at a federal level1276.  Although the FTC Staff Report1277 
concluded that  
“there is little doubt that some franchisees are dissatisfied with their franchise 
purchase”1278,  
it felt unable to identify how much that dissatisfaction was due to the franchisor and how 
much was due to  
“other factors, such as downturns in the economy or shifting consumer preferences”.  
It therefore concluded that “substantive franchise rulemaking is unwarranted”1279. 
5.5.2 The Australian Experience 
The Australian approach to regulating the ongoing relationship contrasts to that found in the 
USA and relies more upon prohibition of unconscionable behaviour and misleading and 
deceptive conduct.   
The Australian common law duty of good faith is apparently in a state of some confusion 
with different states taking different views. There is doubt as to whether a duty of good faith 
is  a broad duty implied into all commercial contracts as held by the Burger King v Hungry 
Jack decision in the New South Wales Court of Appeal1280, or is implied only where the facts 
and circumstances of a particular case warrant it, so supporting contractual certainty, as held 
in Esso Australia Resources Pty v Southern Pacific Petroleum NL in the Victorian Supreme 
                                                   
1276 US franchisees and their advisers commenting on the proposed changes for the FTC Rule suggested that 
“the greatest problem in franchising today” is “post-sale abusive franchise relationships”. They urged that 
the Rule be amended so as to  “prohibit post-contract covenants not to compete (e.g. Brown, ANPR 4, at 3; 
AFA, APNR 62, at 3; Slimak, ANPR 130; Leap, ANPR at 1-2; Vidulich, ANPR, 22Aug97 Tr, at 21.), 
encroachment of franchisees’ market territory (Brown, ANPR 4, at 2; Donafin, ANPR 14; AFA, ANPR 62, 
at 1; Buckley, ANPR 97; Zarco & Pardo, ANPR 134, at 2.), and restrictions on the sources of products or 
services(e.g. Brown, ANPR 4, at 2; Weaver, ANPR 17, Colenda, ANPR 71; Haines, ANPR 100, at 3; 
Chiodo, ANPR, 21Nov 97 TR, at 293-94), among other practices”(The FTC Staff Report III A p.7).  They 
also recommended that the Commission prohibit the inclusion into franchise agreements of mandatory 
arbitration, jurisdiction and choice of law provisions that either impede a franchisee from bringing suit or 
favour the franchisor (the FTC Staff Report III A p.7 Brown, ANPR 4, at 3; Bell, ANPR 30; D. Iuliano, 
ANPR 56; AFA, ANPR 62, at 3; Johnson ANPR 67. 
1277 The FTC Staff Report III A p. 7. 
1278 ibid p. 8. 
1279 The FTC Staff Report A III p. 10. This position is supported by a staff review of post-sale franchise 
relationship issues, as reflected in the Commission’s complaint database – the Consumer Information 
System (“CIS”) During the period 1993 through June 1999, franchisees raised post-sale relationship issues 
involving 110 companies. The FTC Staff Report concludes that this means that about 95% of the 
approximately 2,50036 franchise systems operating in North America at that time did not generate even a 
single relationship complaint to the Commission. Moreover, the vast majority of companies that were the 
subject of a complaint generated only one complaint, See Bond’s Franchise Guide (11th ed. 1998) at 9, 25 
(estimating there are 2,500 American and Canadian franchisors). Currently, Bond’s maintains a database of 
2,500 North American franchisors, and its Franchise Guide (13th ed. 2001) provides information on 
approximately 2,150 of those systems, that in its view, are actively engaged in franchising. 
1280  (2001) NSWCA 187 
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Court1281.  In contrast to the common law position however there is absolute clarity under the 
Trade Practice Act, which prohibits unconscionable conduct under section 51 and misleading 
and deceptive conduct under section 52. 
Section 51AC prevents a range of abusive conduct including charging excessive prices for 
good supplied to franchisees; secret rebates and commissions from suppliers, encroachment 
on the franchisees geographical trading area and failing to provide adequate service and 
support to franchisees1282. 
Unconscionability of conduct has to be judged by reference to 7 factors1283 1284 which include 
the relative bargaining position of the parties, the reasonableness of the conditions protecting 
the franchisors, the franchisees ability to understand the documents, undue influence, 
alternative suppliers, discrimination and the amount of negotiation that took place.  
The most instructive case concerning unconscionable behaviour under Section 51AC is 
ACCC v Simply No Knead1285.  In this case the company had a number of franchisees to 
which it supplied training and materials for baking bread and related products in the home.  
Sandberg J found that the franchisor’s behaviour had disclosed “an overwhelming case of 
unreasonable, unfair, bullying and thuggish behaviour” against five franchisees.  The 
franchisor’s conduct included refusing to deliver products to franchisees, refusing to negotiate 
with franchisees and discuss matters of concern to them; deleting franchisee’s telephone 
numbers from the Telephone Directory Assistance Service without their knowledge or 
consent; producing and distributing advertising and promotional material for its products in 
the territories of the franchisees and refusing to provide current disclosure documents in 
response to written requests. 
                                                   
1281 [2005] VSCA 228 This case rejects the concept of a blanket duty of good faith in favour of contractual 
certainty.  However, the relevance of the common law duty of good faith, no matter how confused it is, has 
been reinforced by the government’s current proposals to insert a new provision in the Franchise Code 
stating that nothing in the Code limits any common law requirements of good faith in relation to the 
franchise agreement.  Additional Information on Franchising Code and Unconscionable Conduct Reforms 
November 2009 at http://minister, 
innovation.gov.au/Emerson/Documents/Additional%information%20%on%20Franchising% 
20Code%20%and%20Unconscionable%20Conduct%20Reforms.pdf 
1282 Giles, Redfern & Terry – Franchising Law and Practice, Lexis Nexis, para 11.0200.  Others include 
fraud and misrepresentation in inducing the contract; unjust terms in the contract; bad faith in the operation 
of the contract; discrimination in terms of trading between company owned outlets and franchised outlets; 
failure to address lack of viability of franchise outlets; making substantial increases to renewal fees; 
unwillingness to discuss and negotiate problems using advertising levies for other purposes; intimidation 
and victimisation of franchisees; and unfair terminations. 
1283 TPA Section 51AC 
1284 The provision excludes from its ambit listed public companies and the acquisition of goods and services 
of no more than Aus $ 3 million. 
1285 ACCC v Simply No Knead (Franchising) Pty Ltd & Cameron Bates (2000) ATPR. 104 FCR 253 
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None of the cases so far suggest, as feared by some1286, that the courts have taken an over 
lenient approach to finding unconscionable behaviour based solely upon a disparity of 
bargaining power in franchising. Reflecting the common law’s distrust of a general concept 
of good faith1287 there were concerns that equitable notions of unconscionability would pose a 
real threat to the doctrine of freedom of contract1288 and bring uncertainty to commercial 
transactions by either enabling1289 or even requiring the courts to make value judgments and 
expand the notion far beyond the equitable notion as set out in section 51AA1290. However so 
far this does not seem to have happened. 
Section 51AC (along with section 51AD and the Franchising Code of Conduct) amounts to a 
legislative attempt to re-engineer the regulatory environment for franchising by accentuating 
the impact of the economic drivers that encourage franchisees to become involved in 
franchising1291. 
5.5.3 Protecting the Franchisor’s Interests 
The franchisor’s interests are best protected by re-enforcing the economic drivers that attract 
them to franchising and reducing the inherent consequential risk that they expose themselves 
to.  
As detailed in Chapter 3 above franchise agreements generally endeavour to re-enforce these 
economic drivers and reduce the inherent consequential risk to a reasonable level.   
However, some of the legal eco-systems that comprise the EU’s regulatory environment tend 
to limit the franchise agreements’ ability to reduce the risks1292.  Commercial agency law, 
employment law and consumer law in some member states inhibit the ability of the franchisor 
to prevent “free riding” by terminating erstwhile franchisees1293.  The duty of good faith can 
also reduce the franchisor’s ability to prevent Free Riding and other misdemeanours, not only 
by limiting its right to terminate the agreement, but also by removing its ability to make 
                                                   
1286 Finlay. A, 1999,“Unconscionable Conduct and the Business Plaintiff: Has Australia Gone Too Far?”, 
Anglo American Law Review, Volume. 28, p. 470. 
1287 ibid 
1288 Baxt. R and Mahemoff. J, 1998, “Unconscionable Conduct Under the Trade Practices Act – An Unfair 
Response by the Government: a Preliminary View”, Australian Business Law Review, Volume 26, p. 5; Op 
cit Finlay, 1999; Duncan. B and Christensen. S, 1999,“Unconscionability in Leasing Transactions”, 
Australian Business Law Review, Volume 27, p. 280. 
1289 Ibid Duncan and Christensen, 1999; Cornwall. J, 2000, “Breach of Contract and Misleading Conduct: 
A Storm in a Teacup?”, Melbourne University Law Review, Volume 24, p. 10 
1290 Op cit Finlay, 1999, p. 470; Cecere. C, 2003, Australia section 51AC of the Trade Practices Act: Impact 
on franchising sector, International Journal of Franchising Law, Volume 1, p.8-24; Op cit Baxt. R and 
Mahemoff. J, 1998, p. 5. 
1291 Corones believes it to be an attempt to limit the ability of franchisors to exploit the vulnerability of 
franchisees.  Corones, Australian Business Law Review, 2000, Vol. 28, No. 6, pp. 462-469 
1292 See 3.8 above 
1293 ibid 
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decisions at its sole discretion1294, without regard for the franchisee’s interests.  This is 
particularly pronounced in Germany.  Unfair Contract Term laws can also restrict the 
franchisor’s discretion in respect of how it deals with its franchisee’s1295.  Anti-trust law tends 
to undermine some of financial drivers by denying the franchisor the right to determine a 
uniform pricing and multichannel strategies.  
It is suggested that the franchise directive should impose mandatory clauses which re-enforce 
the economic drivers and reduce the inherent consequential risks to franchisors.   In other 
words franchise agreements should become Nominate or Type agreements in civil 
jurisdictions.  Although German law does not recognise franchise agreements as nominate 
agreements, it protects the franchisors’ rights to receive fees from the franchisee, recognises 
the franchisee’s obligations to purchase tied goods from the franchisor and protects the 
franchisor’s know-how from abuse by the franchisee1296.  These should be included in the 
directive, but by themselves are not sufficient to protect the franchisor’s interests. 
                                                   
1294 ibid 
1295 ibid 
1296 BGH, WBI 1989, 131 
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The Directive should ensure that regulatory environment takes into account the 
economic drivers that encourage franchisors to become involved in franchising and 
the inherent commercial risks they assume.  Franchisees must therefore be placed 
under a general duty of confidentiality as regards the franchisor’s trade secrets, 
including its know-how, providing that they are not placed in the public domain by or 
with the consent of the franchisor.  This means that franchisees must be under an 
obligation not to act in an unconscionable manner and, in particular, must; 
(1) Not in any way challenge the validity or ownership of the franchisor’s 
intellectual property rights and to keep the franchisors know-how confidential 
and only use it in operating the franchise; 
(2) Fully and faithfully implement the franchisor’s system, including but not 
restricted to undertaking all training required by the franchisor; 
(3) Not compete with the franchisor or its franchisees during the term of the 
franchisee’s franchise agreement; 
(4) Not compete with the franchisor or its franchisees for a reasonable time 
within a reasonable geographical area following the termination of the 
franchisee’s franchise agreement; 
(5) Allow the franchisor to purchase the franchisee’s business on termination for 
a reasonable valuation, which will include all premises and fixtures used in 
the business and stock but exclude all goodwill.  The franchisor will not 
however have an obligation to purchase the franchisee’s business; 
(6) Allow the franchisor to terminate the franchise agreement for breach without 
having to pay the franchisee any compensation; 
(7) Allow the franchisor to sell, transfer or licence its business to a third party 
subject to that third party purchaser agreeing to honour the franchisor’s 
obligations to the franchisee, without recourse against the franchisor in the 
event that the assignee/transferee/purchaser fails to honour such obligations; 
(8) Purchase tied goods and services from the franchisor or its nominated 
suppliers.  
A franchisee’s failure to respect these rights of the franchisor should give the 
franchisor the right to terminate the franchise agreement and sue for damages or loss 
of future profits.   
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5.5.4 Protecting the Franchisee’s Interests 
As identified in Chapter 2, the key economic drivers that attract franchisees to franchising are 
an increased chance of success due to access to a proven format, a recognised brand, ongoing 
support, economies of scale and so on1297.  The inherent consequential risks to which they are 
exposed are misrepresentation, encroachment, poor quality business formats and inadequate 
support1298. 
The franchise directive should impose mandatory clauses which re-enforce these economic 
drivers and reduce the inherent consequential risks.  In civil jurisdictions, franchise 
agreements should be recognised as “nominate” or “type” agreements. 
Although German law does not recognise franchise agreements as “nominate” or “type” 
agreements, it identifies the franchisees’ interests as including receiving advice and 
supervision from the franchisor1299, the franchisor refraining from interfering in the 
franchisee’s business1300 and not being forced to pay inflated prices for product supplied by 
the franchisor1301.  It also prohibits what it deems to be inappropriate rights for the franchisor 
such as the right to determine what its contractual duties are and reducing or enrolling the 
franchisee’s exclusivity as a result under performance without a right to remedy and 
termination on short notice1302. 
 
                                                   
1297 See 2.3 above 
1298 Ibid 
1299 Gesler, Franhiseverträge 1. Introduction; BAG 30.05.1978, BB 1979, 325 
1300 Op cit, Petsche. A, Riegler. S and Theiss. W, 2004, p.3,4 
1301 Giesler, Franhiseverträge, Rn 60 
1302 BGB 305-310 – see 3.10.4 pp 128 
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It is suggested that the Directive should provide that the franchisor should not act in 
an unconscionable manner and in particular should; 
(1) be the owner of, or have the legal rights to use, the network’s trade name, 
trade mark and other distinguishing identification1303;  
(2) provide the franchisee with a reasonable level of initial training and 
continuing commercial and/or technical training during the entire life of the 
agreement1304;  
(3) render reasonable ongoing technical and consulting assistance to the 
franchisee1305;  
(4) refrain from  encroachment on the territory of an exclusive franchisee1306; 
(5) allow the franchisee to sell its franchise on to a third party approved by the 
franchisor as an appropriate franchisee (subject to the franchisor’s pre-
emptive right of purchase on the same terms), 
(6) not supply goods or services to the franchisee at inflated prices or which are 
unfit for purpose. 
For the avoidance of doubt it should be expressly stated that, as regards their 
relationship with the franchisor, franchisees and potential franchisees are not 
consumers and are not entitled to enjoy any of the rights afforded to consumers as 
regards their relationship with the franchisor. 
Termination on short notice or without an opportunity to remedy (unless it was a fundamental 
breach) would be deemed to be unconscionable.  This will ensure that the franchisee obtains 
what it entered into the franchise agreement to gain.  
5.5.5 The Prohibition of Unconscionable Conduct  
By identifying mandatory provisions for a franchise agreement, and so establishing it as a 
specific “type-agreement” it is possible to re-enforce many of the economic drivers that 
attract franchisors and franchisees to franchising and reduce many of the inherent 
consequential risks they both expose themselves to.  However, the dynamic and ever 
                                                   
1303  As provided for by the European Franchise Federation in their Code of Ethics - www.eff-franchise.com 
1304 Ibid - www.eff-franchise.com  
1305 As per Lithuanian Civil Code Article 6.770(2). 
1306 As held by the case of Scheck v Burger King Corp 756 F Supp. 548 (S.D. Fla. 1991). See Chapter 19 p. 
279. 
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changing nature of the franchisor/franchisee relationship1307 means that these mandatory 
provisions by themselves will not reduce those risks to an appropriate level. 
It is suggested that in order to reduce the risks to both franchisor and franchisee to an 
appropriate level a more dynamic and flexible approach is also needed.  One that can deal 
with the tensile stresses resulting from the franchise relationship’s long term and changing 
nature.  However this in itself brings about other challenges.   
It is therefore proposed that the EU Franchise Directive expressly disapply to 
franchising any general duty of good faith found in EU member state law and replace 
it with a specific prohibition of  unconscionable conduct  by parties to a franchise, 
breach of which will enable the courts to act in a restrictive and adaptive manner. 
In order to give effect to this, the EU Franchise Directive should provide that all 
parties to a franchise agreement and related documentation must refrain from 
exercising their rights and obligations under the agreement, and must not otherwise 
conduct themselves, in an unconscionable manner during the term of the franchise 
agreement.  
The franchise relationship’s ongoing nature differentiates it from “one-off” transactions1308 
such as the sale of goods, which are “discrete transactions …. of short duration, involving 
limited personal interactions and with precise party measurements of easily measured objects 
of exchange”1309. Franchise relationships are fundamentally different. They are relational and 
are characterised by  
“long duration, personal involvement by the parties and the exchange, at least in 
party, of things difficult to monetize or otherwise measure”1310.   
As a result  
“obligations are not frozen in an initial bargain.  They evolve over time and 
circumstances change. The object of contracting is to establish and define a co-
operative relationship, not merely to allocate risk”1311. 
This means that  
“parties are obliged to behave in a way that promotes the relationship, and ….. is 
consistent with the needs and expectations of both parties”1312. 
                                                   
1307 See 3.4 above 
1308 ibid 
1309 Op cit Gudel 1998, p.763 
1310 Ibid. 
1311 Op cit Leichtling 1994, p.671 
1312 Ibid Leichtling quoting Parritt at 717. 
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However, franchise agreements do not evolve or change over the years as the franchise 
system develops1313. They are static documents fixed for a term of years.  They require 
mutual performance over a number of years and therefore do not always define the parties’ 
full obligations.  Because of their longevity and the multilateral nature of franchising they 
inevitably vest the Franchisor with an amount of discretion as to how the rights and 
obligations of both parties will be performed.  How the franchisor exercises its discretion will 
inevitably impact upon the franchisees’ operation of its business.  
“In making discretionary decisions, franchisors can extract value from the franchisees 
in many ways, such as granting additional franchises in close proximity, raising the 
price of goods sold to franchisees, increasing rent on the franchisees locations, 
increasing inventory and growth requirements, as well as increasing advertising 
funds. Conflicts invariably arise when the franchisee perceives the franchisor’s 
exercise of discretion to be unfair”1314.  
The implied covenant of good faith is  
“the doctrinal tool necessary to bring the resolution of franchise contract disputes into 
line with the realities of the franchise relationship”1315.   
It helps to restrain the franchisor from over-stepping the mark.  Its flexibility is what enables 
it to do this.  However it is that very flexibility which also creates the uncertainty that can 
undermine the economic drivers that attract franchisors to franchising. 
It is the way in which such a flexible approach has manifested itself in a number of 
jurisdictions, including Germany1316, France1317 and (to a limited extent) the USA.  It has a 
substantial impact upon the regulation of franchising in Germany and a number of other EU 
member states1318. However, few jurisdictions include it in their franchise specific 
regulations1319, it takes a different form in each jurisdiction. 
In the USA for example, the doctrine of good faith has very limited impact upon franchising 
at Federal level. The statutory concept only relates to the supply of goods1320 whilst the 
common law concept, despite once being the centre of great debate in the celebrated case of 
                                                   
1313 See 3.4 above 
1314 Whitner/Brito/Spandorf, paper at ABA Franchising Forum Oct. 2007. 
1315 Hadfield. G, 1990, “Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts”, 
Stanford Law Review, Volume 42, p. 927-992 
1316 See 3.3 above 
1317 Ibid  
1318 See 3.8 above 
1319 ibid 
1320 The Uniform Commercial Code concept of good faith applies only to transactions in goods Article 2 (§2 
– 102). 
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Scheck v Burger King Corp1321, seems to be of little real relevance nowadays.  The Australian 
government have failed to accept the Australian Franchise Federation’s suggestion that a 
franchise specific duty of good faith be adopted1322. 
Uncertainty, the flip side of its flexibility, presents a real difficulty in franchising.  This is 
succinctly described by the Australian government in its response to the Commonwealth Joint 
Committee on Corporation and Financial Services 2008 Inquiry into improving franchising 
conduct1323.   It is considered that1324 as  
“the inclusion of a general obligation of good faith in the Franchising Code would 
increase uncertainty in franchising.  Neither franchisors nor franchisees would be 
certain of the occurrence of a breach: court proceedings would be required to 
establish whether or not these had been a breach”1325.  
The uncertainty arising from a general duty of good faith was felt to have adverse commercial 
consequences for franchisees.   
“Franchisors would seek compensation for the extra risk they faced through larger 
franchise fees and more onerous terms and conditions in other parts of the agreement.  
And banks and other financiers would be more reluctant to provide credit to 
franchisees and franchisors in these more rising commercial circumstances.”1326   
It concludes that a general undefined good-faith obligation would only make matters worse 
for franchisors and franchisees alike. 
This uncertainty is increased still further given the wide range of ways in which member 
states interpret that duty of good faith1327. Similar circumstances involving franchising can 
therefore lead to very different outcomes in different member states. This does not maintain 
market confidence in cross border franchising in the EU or encourage its use as a tool to 
increase inter state trade.  
                                                   
1321 In this case the court ruled that “lack of franchisee exclusivity did not allow Burger King to open other 
neighbouring franchises regardless of their effect on the existing franchisee” destroying the right of the 
franchisee to enjoy the fruits of the contract”. 756 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Fla 1991). 
1322 See 4.5 above 
1323 Minister for Innovation, Industry, Science and Research, Media Release, “Government to Strengthen 
Franchising Code of Conduct and Unconscionable Law” 5 November 2009 at 
http://minister.innovation.gov.au/Emerson/Pages Governmenttostrengthenfranchisingcodeofconduct 
1324 Finding a Balance: Towards Fair Trading in Australia (The Fair Trading Report), May 1997. 
Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct – Report for the Hon. Fran Bailey 
M.P, Minister of Small Businesses and Tourism – October 2006 





1327 See 3.8 above 
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However, as evidenced by the sample agreements considered in Section 3.3 above, franchise 
agreements do not impose heavy obligations on the franchisor to support the franchisee and 
there is no standard of performance specified.  Indeed, the ever changing nature of the 
franchise relationship and the demands of the market in which the franchise network operates 
makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to stipulate in detail the support that the 
franchisor must deliver to the franchisee.  This enables unethical franchisors to act 
unconscionably and abuse their contractual rights. 
The challenge is balancing the flexibility that good faith delivers with the lack of certainty it 
presents1328. Adopting a finely tuned franchise specific prohibition of unconscionable conduct 
would help find this balance.  If the EU Franchise Directive could prevent unconscionable 
behaviour in franchising in a more specific manner, it would reduce the uncertainty.   
An EU wide franchise specific prohibition of unconscionable conduct could reduce 
uncertainty and help ensure that member state courts take a more uniform approach to 
contractual interpretation, so reducing barriers to cross border franchising. However, that will 
only be achieved if what amounts to unconscionable behaviour in franchising is clearly spelt 
out in the Directive.  Without this guidance the judicial tradition of each member state is 
likely to lead to different results in similar circumstances.   
As the German concept of good faith is the most developed and influential one in the EU, its 
three pronged approach1329 would certainly be a popular way of preventing unconscionable 
behaviour in some member states1330 as potentially being the least disruptive option.  
However, it is difficult to see how such a broad and general ability of the courts to impose 
new obligations upon parties to the franchise agreement and even change the legal 
relationship as a result of a change in circumstances will do much to limit uncertainty and so 
maintain market confidence in franchising. Franchisors would have to accept that the courts 
could effectively rewrite the franchise agreement at will. There would be no guarantee that 
the risks to the franchisor’s business would be properly recognised and respected. There 
would be a very real probability that the German tendency to view franchisees as  consumers 
would take hold and reduce  the franchisee’s obligation to be responsible for its own actions.  
The differing approach of the German and French courts to good faith also suggests that there 
would be no uniform EU wide approach to how good faith would be applied to franchising.  
That would severely reduce the positive impact of the franchise Directive on removing 
                                                   
1328 Article 7 of Romanian Ordinance 52/1997 as amended by Law No 79/1998. 
1329 Collateral, adaptive and restrictive. See 3.8 above 
1330 Austria, Greece and Portugal 
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artificial borrowing to the use of franchising as a way of increasing trade between member 
states. 
A more focused, better defined prohibition of unconscionable conduct is required.  One such 
as that laid out in the Australian Trade Practices Act 19981331. 
It is proposed that the Directive restricts the parties from unreasonably exercising 
their rights in a way that would damage market confidence and discourage new 
entrants of the right calibre whilst recognising and respecting the risks adopted by 
both the franchisees and the franchisor is needed.   
This will help to strike the appropriate balance between flexibility and uncertainty1332. The 
amorphous nature of good faith, (which is what many believe makes the implied covenant 
work, allowing it to be applied effectively on a case by case basis)1333 must be tempered by a 
reasonable degree of certainty.  
The EU Franchise Directive must balance the flexibility and uncertainty presented by a 
franchise specific prohibition of unconscionable conduct1334.  Rather than refer to good faith, 
like the TPA it should prohibit unconscionable conduct.  A detailed description of 
unconscionable conduct is required to reduce any uncertainty. 
The prohibition of unconscionable behaviour1335 will impact upon unjust contractual terms, 
bad faith in the operation of the contract, excessive pricing, hidden rebates and commissions, 
discrimination between franchisees, encroachment and so on.   
Prohibiting unconscionable conduct offers a way in which the certainty demanded by the 
commercial imperatives can be balanced with the flexibility that the franchising relationship 
requires. A way that is based more on the real commercial needs of the relationship rather 
than the views of individual judges with little or no understanding of the dynamics of the 
franchise relationship. 
Franchisees will be able to take advantage of the prohibition of unconscionable conduct 
regardless of  
                                                   
1331 See Chapter 12. It prohibits unconscionable, misleading and deceptive conduct. 
1332 The so-called restrictive approach.  See 3.8 above 
1333 Iglesias. J, 2004, “Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Franchises”, 
Houston Law Review, Volume 40, p.1423 
1334 Whilst the Australian Trade Practices Act 1998 has not replaced the common law doctrine of good faith, 
it has substantially reduced its role.  The common law doctrine of good faith is “still evolving and ….[lacks] 
a single definition or standard set of behaviours” 
(http://ministerinnovation.gov.au/Emerson/Documents/Additional%information%20%on%20Franchising% 
20Code%20%and%20Unconscionable%20Conduct%20Reforms.pdf.   
1335 TPA s. 51AC 
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“whether they be astute or gullible, intelligent or not so intelligent, well-educated or 
poorly educated franchisees”1336, 
although franchisees who are “extraordinarily stupid” or gullible, or whose reactions are 
“extreme or fanciful” are unlikely to be used as the standard against which a franchisor’s 
conduct will be judged1337.   
By striking the right balance between flexibility and certainty, an obligation that prohibits 
unconscionable behaviour by either party to a franchise will maintain market confidence in 
franchising, re-enforce the economic drivers that attract franchisees to franchising and 
provide adequate protection for franchisors and franchisees without stifling innovation and 
competition. As evidenced by the Australian Hungry Jack case1338 even the most reputable 
franchisors can act in unconscionable ways to further their own best interests. If it is to re-
enforce the economic drivers that encourage franchisors to become involved in franchising, 
an EU Franchise Directive should not grant courts the power to modify agreements which are 
one-sided and favour the franchisor simply because the franchisee is considered the weaker 
party and the courts take pity upon it. Franchisees are entrepreneurs even though they might 
not have a great deal of experience.  Unconscionability must be the key. 
The prohibition of unconscionable conduct is what should enable the courts to restrict the 
parties’ ability to exercise their contractual rights.   
However, although unconscionability is mentioned in a number of EU directives it is not 
defined in any of them.  It is necessary to define it so as to increase certainty. 
It is therefore proposed that for conduct to be regarded as unconscionable, serious 
misconduct or something clearly unfair or unreasonable must be demonstrated. 
Unconscionable should  mean actions showing no regard for conscience or that are 
irreconcilable with what is right or reasonable.1339 
                                                   
1336 Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike International Ltd [2005] E.T.M.R. 1. 
1337 Ibid. See also Telstra Corp Ltd v Cable & Wireless Optus Ltd [2002] FCAFC 296 and Taco Co of 
Australia Inc v Taco Bel Pty Ltd [1982] FCA 136. 
1338 [1999] NSW SC1029. See Chapter 12 above. 
1339 ACCC v Simply No Knead (Franchising) Pty Ltd & Cameron Bates (2000) ATPR n.68, 40,585. 
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Examples of unconscionable behaviour should be detailed so as to keep uncertainty to a bare 
minimum. 
A prohibition of unconscionable conduct should require a party “not to act 
capriciously.”1340  It should also require it not to act in a way that allows either party 
to the franchise agreement to obtain an unreasonable material commercial advantage 
or suffer a material commercial disadvantage that neither party would have 
contemplated had they been aware of the change in circumstances that lead to the 
behaviour in question.  It should take account of the varying levels of experience of 
the parties in seeking to deliver an appropriate level of protection. 
Having defined ‘unconscionable conduct’, in order to reduce uncertainty as far as possible, it 
is then necessary first to outline the grounds upon which unconscionability will be judged and 
secondly to provide examples of what will amount to unconscionable behaviour.   
 
                                                   
1340 Finkelstein, J. (1999) ATPR 41-703 n.61, 43,014. 
  325 
It is proposed that the grounds on which unconscionability will be judged should be 
as follows; 
(a)  The relative strengths of the bargaining positions of the franchisor and the 
franchisee. 
(b)  Whether, as a result of conduct engaged in by the franchisor, the franchisee 
was required to comply with conditions that were not reasonably necessary 
for the protection of the legitimate interests of the franchisor. 
(c)  Whether the franchisee was able to understand any documents relating to the 
franchise and the supply or possible supply of the goods or services. 
(d)  Whether any undue influence or pressure was exerted on, or any unfair tactics 
were used against the franchisee by the franchisor in relation to the franchise 
or the supply of the goods or services. 
(e)  The amount for which, and the circumstances under which, the franchisee 
could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or services from a person 
other than the franchisor. 
(f)  The extent of which the franchisor’s conduct towards the franchisee is 
consistent with the franchisor’s conduct towards its other franchisees. 
(g)  The requirements of “best practice” as detailed in the European Code of 
Ethics. 
(h)  The extent to which the franchisor unreasonably failed to disclose to the 
franchisee: 
(1) any intended conduct of the franchisor that might affect the interests of the 
franchisee; and 
(2)  any risks to the franchisee arising from the franchisor’s intended conduct 
(being risks that the franchisor should have foreseen would not be apparent to 
the franchisee) 
(i)  The extent to which the franchisor was willing to negotiate the terms and 
conditions of the franchise agreement with the franchisee. 
(j)  The extent to which the franchisor and franchisee act to protect the legitimate 
interests of other franchisees and the franchise network as a whole. 
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It is proposed that examples of unconscionable conduct should include, but not be 
limited to, the following: 
(a) unreasonably encroaching upon an exclusive territory1341  
(b) failing to provide the franchisee with a reasonably sufficient level of training 
and support 
(c) unreasonably withholding, delaying or conditioning consent or approval, 
forcing franchisees to purchase goods or services at what , on a like for like 
basis and having regard to the obligations of the franchisor and its affiliates 
and the full financial and other terms of the agreement,  amount to  an 
unreasonably excessive price  
(d) unreasonably refusing to discuss matters of dispute with the other party 
(e) unreasonably terminating a franchise over a dispute of an insubstantial 
amount of money  
(f) using the confidential information of the franchisor in a manner that is against 
the best interests of the franchisor or the franchise network 
(g) unreasonably competing with the franchisor or other franchisees in the 
network in a manner not expressly allowed by the franchise agreement, during 
the term of the franchise agreement and for a reasonable period after its 
termination or expiry 
(h) making an unreasonable profit on goods or services supplied to franchisees 
which they cannot or are not permitted to purchase from independent third 
parties 
(i) include terminating a franchise over a dispute of an insubstantial sum of 
money;  
(j) threatening to terminate franchise agreements rather than negotiate and 
consider important issues;  
                                                   
1341 In Dymocks Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors v Top Ryde Book Sellers Pty Ltd & Ors (2000)217 ALR 615; 
[2000] NSWSC 390; BC200002404 the court passed direct comment on the issue of encroachment. The 
case related in part to a dispute between a franchisor and some of its franchisees as a result of the franchisor 
establishing a website for the purpose of selling books directly to consumers. The dispute was essentially 
contractual, although it does illustrate how much the Internet market can change in a short period. Dymocks 
were in essence seeking a court ruling to help them unwind a commercial arrangement they had established 
in good faith and for valid commercial reasons a couple of years earlier. They had set up their Internet site 
such that it was to be owned and run by the advertising fund and administered by a joint committee of 
franchisor and franchisee representatives. Less than two years later it became obvious that the site needed 
funding on a major scale beyond the capacity of the marketing fund. Dymocks successfully obtained the 
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(k) unreasonably forcing franchisees to buy supplies from the franchisor at a 
greater cost than they could buy elsewhere;  
(l) preventing franchisees and their staff from wearing appropriate uniforms;  
(m) refusing to allocate jobs to franchisees in order to force them into accepting 
settlements in respect of totally unrelated disputes;  
(n) penalising, suspending or threatening to penalise or suspend franchisees 
because they were associating with other franchisees; requiring franchisees to 
attend seminars unrelated to the core business of the franchise;  
(o) unreasonably refusing franchisees access to its records to ensure all payments 
due to the franchisees by the franchisor had in fact been made1342; 
(p) unreasonably discriminating against individual franchisees. 
 
The risks to both franchisors and franchisees need to be addressed through an objective 
analysis of what is reasonable bearing in mind the best interests of the franchise network. As 
appreciated by the Romanian franchise law1343 the best interests of an individual franchisee or 
the franchisor may be at odds with those of the majority of franchisees involved in the 
franchise. In such circumstances it should be the interests of the franchise network as a whole 
that takes priority1344. If the interests of the network as a whole are not adversely affected by 
the circumstances then an objective  analysis of what is reasonable as regards the parties 
involved in the dispute should be made.  This approach will help avoid the difficulties 
sometimes presented by Article 242 of the German Civil Code.  The duty of “Treu und 
Glauben”1345 can mean that the interests of a single franchisee can take precedent over those 
the entire network.   
                                                                                                                                                        
declaration they sought, to the effect that the franchisor was the legal and beneficial owner of the web site, 
the domain name and the content. However the respondents were awarded damages for breach of contract 
on the basis of the memoranda sent by Dymocks to the franchisees. 
1342 Many of these are listed in the unreported Australian case of ACCC v Cheap as Chips Franchising Pty 
Ltd & P Hudousek - Gadens Lawyers, Franchising Update, September 1999. 
1343 See 3.5.2.2 above 
1344 Article 3 of the Romanian franchise ordinance expressly states that the duty of good faith requires that 
the agreement reflects the interests of the members of the franchise network. This seems to suggest that any 
exercise of the duty of good faith would require that it takes into account the interests of all of the 
franchisees not merely the one who is in dispute with the franchisor. 
1345 See 3.3 above 
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A prohibition of unconscionable behaviour during the term of a franchise agreement that 
gives priority to the interests of the franchise network as a whole over those of an individual 
franchisee, should maintain market confidence1346. 
The prohibition on unconscionable conduct does not focus on “fuzzy” subjective concepts of 
honesty, loyalty and good morals but rather upon objectively unconscionable conduct which 
results in an unanticipated and unreasonable gain or loss for one of the parties. The 
prioritisation of the interests of the whole network over those of an individual will certainly 
encourage new entrants as it greatly increases the security of the investment made by both the 
franchisees and the franchisor. 
The proposed prohibition of unconscionable conduct therefore strikes an appropriate 
equilibrium between flexibility and certainty.  It presents franchisees with an adequate, but 
not over burdensome level of protection against franchisors behaving badly towards them by 
acting inappropriately within the terms of the franchise agreement. 
Unconscionable conduct will result in the courts being able to make orders to restrict the 
party acting unconscionably from enjoying its contractual rights or other benefits resulting 
from that unconscionable conduct, set aside or vary the franchise agreement and other related 
agreements, to require the unconscionable conduct to cease and to award damages to the party 
suffering from the effects of the unconscionable conduct. When considering what remedy to 
apply the court shall give priority to the best interests of the franchise network as a whole, 
before considering what is reasonably appropriate for the parties in dispute.  The parties 
involved and the regulatory authorities may apply for such remedies. 
5.5.6 Sub-Conclusion 
In order to reinforce the economic drivers that attract both franchisors and franchisees to 
franchising and reduce the inherent consequential risk to an appropriate level it is suggested 
that franchise agreements have mandatory clauses imposed on them.  Franchisees must not 
challenge the franchisor’s intellectual property; implement the business format, not compete 
with the franchisor during the term and for a reasonable period thereafter allow the franchisor 
the right to purchase the franchisees business on termination, allow termination for cause 
without compensation, allow the franchisor or pre-emptive right of purchase, impose a duty 
of confidentiality and purchase tied goods and services from the franchisor or its nominated 
supplier. 
                                                   
1346 This was proposed by the failed Belgian Parliamentary bill of 17 March 2004. Doc 51 0924/001 – See 
4.5 above 
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In return the franchisor must be the owner of or have the right to licence the intellectual 
property rights on which the franchise is based, provide a reasonable level of training, refrain 
from encroachment, allow the franchisee the right to sell its business (subject to the 
franchisor’s pre-emptive right) and not supply goods or services to the franchisee at inflated 
prices or which are unfit for purpose.  In order to take account of the franchise agreement’s 
long term and changing nature unconscionable conduct must be prohibited.  Unconscionable 
conduct is conduct showing no regard for conscience or that is irreconcilable with what is 
objectively right or reasonable taking into account the best interests of the franchise network 
before those of individual franchisees and the franchisor.  In order to increase certainty details 
of the grounds upon which unconscionability will be judged and examples of what amounts 
to unconscionable conduct should be given in the directive. 
The Proposed Draft Franchise Directive in Appendix 1 offers an appropriate way to 
implement these proposals. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The critical analysis in this chapter achieves the third objective of this thesis.  It establishes 
how the regulatory environment in the EU can be re-engineered to enable franchising to 
better fulfil its potential in the EU1347.  It is suggested that franchising be defined in 
accordance with the Marketing Plan approach that originated in the US and is found in 
various forms in six of the eight EU member states with franchise specific regulations1348.  It 
focuses upon independence, economic interest, the brand, the business format, control and 
ongoing support.  It also includes a qualitative threshold to ensure that the advantages of 
being a franchise are only available to businesses that have a track record and that start up 
franchises are not overwhelmed with regulatory requirements1349.  A franchise that has not 
operated the business format for at least 12 months or which is operating less than four outlets 
will not have to comply with the regulation and cannot enjoy the “Exchange of Benefits”1350. 
In order to ensure that the EU regulatory environment is fit for purpose as regards franchising 
and so enables franchisors and franchisees to access the economic drivers that attract them to 
franchising whilst reducing the risks involved to a reasonable level, its legal eco-systems 
must accentuate the influence of three Commercial Imperatives1351.  These are maintaining 
market confidence, ensuring pre-contractual hygiene and imposing a mandatory taxonomy of 
                                                   
1347 See 5.2 above 
1348 See 5.1 above 
1349 ibid 
1350 ibid 
1351 See 5.2 above 
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rights and obligations onto the franchisor/ franchisee relationship through the franchise 
agreement. 
None of the EU’s legal eco-systems currently do this1352.  Likewise neither do either of the 
proposals to re-engineer the EU’s regulatory environment for franchising made by the 
Amsterdam Team or UNIDROIT1353. 
It is proposed that the EU Franchise Directive actively promotes franchising and accentuates 
the impact of the need to increase market confidence on the EU legal eco-systems1354.  It 
should do this by enabling franchisors to require pre-contractual disclosure by franchisees, 
focusing regulation only where it is required (by excluding fractional franchisees, de minimis 
franchisees, sophisticated investors, large investors, large franchisees and insiders) and 
allowing franchisees to compete on a level playing field with corporate chains1355.   
It should establish this partly by allowing franchisors to set the prices of their franchisees and 
restrict franchisee sales over the internet1356.  
These two provisions will accentuate the impact of the need for increased market confidence 
in franchising on the EU’s legal eco-system1357. 
It is suggested that in order to help ensure pre-contractual hygiene potential franchisees must 
be given access to appropriate information and equipped to interpret it in an appropriate 
manner1358.  
This means that potential franchisees must be educated out of the ‘psychology of failure’ that 
encourages failed franchisees to blame others for their own failures.  They must understand 
what they are committing themselves to when they buy a franchise and the need to take and 
follow appropriate expert professional advice1359.  It is proposed that advisors are required to 
take short on-line franchise education courses if they are to advise potential franchisees and 
                                                   
1352 ibid 
1353 See 5.2.3 above 
1354 See 5.3 above 
1355 See 5.3 above 
1356 Failing a wholesale change in the EU’s approach to competition law, Finland has found a way forward 
on this issue that may suggest a viable compromise. The EU authorities may be willing to accept this more 
readily than a more fundamental reappraisal of their “per se” approach. The Finnish Competition Authority 
issued an exemption on price cooperation by businesses while implementing a campaign of offers intended 
for consumers. ((Exemption No. 187/67/2003, dated 14.03.2003) This exemption was valid until 28 
February 2008. There is currently no intention to issue a new exemption. (Petri Rinkinen, Franchising 
Legislation in Finland, www.franchising.fi/ukindex.html ).  The effect of the exemption is that price 
campaigns within a chain are made possible as long as the campaign does not take place for a period of 
more than two months. In addition, the vendor must maintain the right to sell the product or service at an 
even lower price at any time (Petri Rinkinen, Franchising Legislation in Finland, 
www.franchising.fi/ukindex.html) 
1357 See 5.3 above 
1358 ibid 
1359 ibid 
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that potential franchisees investing more than US$20,000 must produce a certificate from 
their advisers to prove that they have taken such advice1360.  National franchise associations 
can play an important part in educating potential franchisees about the facts of life of 
franchising – they have to work hard, follow the format, risk failure and take and follow 
expert advice from appropriately experienced professionals1361.   
Pre-contractual disclosure should be given in a set form 15 working days before execution or 
payment, covering details of the identity and experience of the franchisor, the franchise 
network, the terms of the franchise agreement and any earning claims1362.  It should be in 
plain language and contain an appropriate risk statement1363.  A copy of the franchise 
agreement in the form in which it is to be executed should accompany the disclosure 
document1364.  There should also be a five day cooling off period after execution1365.  Failure 
to comply with the disclosure requirements should lead to the right for the franchisee and 
government authorities to terminate or claim damages within 12 months of the franchisee 
becoming aware of it or 24 months of the date of execution, whichever is the later if it 
resulted in defective consent having been given1366.  Electronic disclosure should be 
permitted1367.  There should be personal liability for any individual responsible for the 
disclosure document being inaccurate1368.  Those disclosure obligations should apply to 
foreign franchisors with no presence in the relevant member state who should be under an 
obligation to disclose relevant information about analogous markets1369. 
There should be a regular review of the law every 5 years1370.  Failure to comply with the 
disclosure requirements, if it leads to defective consent, should enable both the franchisee and 
the appropriate regulatory authority to rescind the franchise and related agreements or claim 
damages1371.  The claim must be made within 12 months of the franchisee becoming aware of 
the failure on 24 months of it taking place, whichever is the latest1372.  The regulatory 
authorities should be able to impose penalties including disqualification1373. 
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Misleading and deceptive behaviour should be prohibited1374.  Such behaviour comprises 
failing to comply with the pre-contractual disclosure obligations and making any statement 
which although literally true, misleads or deceives is or likely to mislead or deceive1375.  
It is suggested that registration of documentation on a public register is not appropriate due 
not only to the practical difficulties it would give rise to in the 27 EU member states, but also 
due to the cost effectiveness of it and the law likelihood of it making any tangible 
contribution to accentuating the impact of the second commercial imperative on the EU’s 
legal eco-systems1376. 
In order to re-enforce the economic drivers that attract both franchisors and franchisees to 
franchising and reduce the inherent consequential risk to an appropriate level it is suggested 
that franchise agreements have mandatory clauses imposed on them1377.  Franchisees must not 
challenge the franchisor’s intellectual property; implement the business format, not compete 
with the franchisor during the term and for a reasonable period thereafter allow the franchisor 
the right to purchase the franchisees business on termination, allow termination for cause 
without compensation, allow the franchisor or pre-emptive right of purchase, impose a duty 
of confidentiality and purchase tied goods and services from the franchisor or its nominated 
suppliers. 
In return the franchisor has mandatory obligations1378.  It must be the owner of or have the 
right to licence the intellectual property rights on which the franchise is based, provide a 
reasonable level of training, refrain from encroachment, allow the franchisee the right to sell 
its business (subject to the franchisor’s pre-emptive right) and not supply goods or services to 
the franchisee at over inflated prices or which are unfit for purpose.  In order to take account 
of the franchise agreement’s long term and changing nature unconscionable behaviour must 
be prohibited1379. Unconscionable conduct is conduct showing no regard for conscience or 
that is irreconcilable with what is objectively right or reasonable taking into account the best 
interests of the franchise network before those of individual franchisees and the franchisor.  In 
order to increase certainty details of the grounds upon which unconscionability will be judged 
and examples of what amounts to unconscionable conduct should be given in the directive1380. 
These proposals could be implemented by the EU Commission adopting the Proposed Draft 
Franchise Directive detailed in Appendix 1. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
6.1 The Three Objectives of this Thesis 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that franchising has failed to fulfil its potential in the EU, that 
this is in part due to the regulatory environment and that this failure can be remedied by re-
engineering the legal eco-systems that comprise the regulatory environment in the EU. 
This thesis has three primary objectives.  
The first objective is to establish that although franchising is specific, distinct and uniform 
type of commercial activity with a positive influence in the EU which stimulates economic 
activity by improving distribution, giving business increased access to other activity by 
offering economic advantages to all those involved and improving distribution and giving 
businesses increased access to other EU member state markets, it is not fulfilling its potential 
to contribute to the realisation of the single market.  It seeks to achieve this by providing 
critical analysis in respect of franchising’s basic architecture, its historical development, its 
rationale and its contextualisation, differentiating it from other business models and 
identifying why franchisors and franchisees are attracted to franchising and are prepared to 
accept the inherent consequential risks.  It considers the spread of franchising amongst all 27 
EU member states and then bench marks the contribution of franchising in the EU with that in 
the USA and Australia.  It concludes that it is not fulfilling its potential in the EU.  
The second objective is to establish whether the regulatory environment in the EU is in any 
way responsible for this underachievement of franchising in the single market.  It does this by 
providing critical analysis in respect of the need for regulation, the difficulties encountered by 
member states in seeking to regulate it, the lack of homogeneity between the legal eco-
systems that constitute the regulatory environment within the single market and the failure of 
those eco-systems to re-enforce the economic drivers that attract franchisors and franchisees 
to franchising or to reduce inherent consequential risks.  It analyses the nature of these 
shortcomings and the difficulties they impose on franchising. 
The third objective is to consider how the regulatory environment in the EU can be re-
engineered to enable franchising to better fulfil its potential in the EU.  It seeks to achieve this 
by providing critical analysis of how the legal eco-systems comprising the regulatory 
environment can be re-engineered, by way of a directive, so that it imposes a harmonised 
approach across the EU which accentuates the impact of three commercial imperatives – 
market confidence, pre-contractual hygiene and a mandatory taxonomy of rights and 
obligations.  It also proposes a draft franchise directive that will implement these 
recommendations. 
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6.2 The First Objective 
Critical analysis in Chapter 2 has achieved the first objective of this thesis. 
As explained in Chapter 2, business format franchising is the latest incarnation of a long 
established business structure1381.  Its importance is acknowledged by a wide range of 
institutions1382 and it has emerged as an important vehicle for entrepreneurship that has appeal 
to large corporations and small businesses alike.  The 9,971 or so franchise networks 
operating in the EU and the 405,000 or so outlets make a substantial contribution to the GDP 
of a number of member states,  with a roughly estimated total turnover of €215 billion 
(US$300 billion)1383.  It has great potential to stimulate economic activity within the EU by 
improving the distribution of goods and/or services within and between member states.  
However, it is over concentrated in a small number of EU member states1384 and a 
comparison with the size of franchising in the USA and Australia suggests that its potential to 
contribute to the single market and the growth of trade between member states is far from 
being fulfilled at present1385.  An estimated 83.5% of its turnover being concentrated in only 
25% of the member states. 
The economic drivers that lead franchisors and franchisees to become involved in franchising 
and the consequential inherent risk differ1386.   
As detailed in Chapter 2, improved access to both appropriately qualified managerial resource 
and capital (the Agency, Transaction Cost and Resource Scarcity theories) and other 
economic drivers such as bulk purchasing, economies of scale and enhanced product 
development explain why businesses use franchising as part of their commercial strategy. A 
number of economic incentives resulting in an increased chance of success (such as a access 
to a proven format, a nationally recognised brand, ongoing support, economies of scale and so 
on) supported by various situational, personality and economic correlatives explain the 
attraction of franchising to franchisees.  
There are a number of different risks inherent in franchising for franchisors and 
franchisees1387. As explained in chapter 2, franchisors are exposed to risks arising from 
information asymmetry and moral hazard (such as underpayment, in term competition, abuse 
of the franchisor’s brand and non compliance with the business format).  Whilst franchisees 
                                                   
1381 See 2.1 above 
1382 See 2.1.2 above 
1383 See 2.2 above 
1384 ibid 
1385 ibid 
1386 See 2.3 above 
1387 See 2.4 above 
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are exposed to the risk of misrepresentation, encroachment, poor quality business formats and 
inadequate support. 
Franchising is a symbiotic relationship between two legally independent businesses that is 
used in a wide range of sectors and on a broad spectrum of scale and value which can be 
differentiated from commercial agency and distribution.  Chapter 2 establishes that the 
architecture of franchising comprises six basic features; independence of the parties involved, 
economic interest, a business format, a brand, control of the franchisee by the franchisor and 
the provision of assistance to the franchisee by the franchisor.  It is distinct from agency and 
distribution, the main difference being the business format and the ongoing support. These 
features are not impacted by either economic or sectoral contextualisation1388.  The legal 
architecture is uniform regardless of the legal system in which the franchise operates1389. 
Despite the differing nature of the sectors in which franchising is used these differences do 
not impact upon the architecture of franchising.  Likewise although the value of investment 
required from franchisees inevitably defines the type of franchisee attracted to each franchise 
system, the resulting differences in economic bargaining power does not change the 
fundamental architectural features of franchising1390. 
This architecture is subjected to tensile stresses as a result of the long term and ever changing 
nature of the franchise relationship.  In order to withstand these stresses the franchise 
agreements give the franchisor a degree of flexibility that can result in abuse of the 
franchisee1391. 
6.3 The Second Objective 
Critical analysis in Chapter 3 has achieved the second objective of this thesis. 
It has been established that the regulatory environment in the EU is partly responsible for 
franchising’s under achievement in the single market.  It has established that franchising 
needs to be regulated1392 and that the contractual1393 and regulatory1394 environment in the EU 
(both self regulatory1395 and legal) within which franchising operates does not adequately 
protect and re-enforce the economic drivers that attract franchisors and franchisees to become 
involved in franchising.  Nor does it adequately reduce the consequential inherent risks1396.  
                                                   
1388 See 2.5.1 above 
1389 See 2.5.5 and 2.5.6 above 
1390 ibid 
1391 See 2.5.4 above 
1392 See 3.2 above 
1393 See 3.3 and 3.4 above 
1394 See 3.8 above 
1395 See 3.6 above 
1396 See 3.8 above 
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In some cases it over protects the franchisees, so increasing the risks to franchisors and 
eroding the economic drivers that attract them to franchising in the first place. 
As detailed in Chapter 3, the contractual environment tends to support and re-enforce the 
economic drivers that encourage franchisors to become involved in franchising and reduces 
their consequential risk to a reasonable level1397.  However, it does not always re-enforce the 
economic drivers that encourage franchisees to become involved in franchising and it fails to 
reduce the consequential risks for franchisees adequately1398. Self regulation of franchising 
does not work1399.  Although the BFA sees its mandate as seeking “to deliver self-regulation 
frameworks and then (delivering) that product to prospective franchisees”1400, it seems to 
have achieved little. Such intransigence gives little credibility to those advocating self-
regulation. If the franchisor’s trade body fails to respond to its member’s request for a higher 
level of self-regulation, how can self-regulation be expected to gain the confidence of either 
the public or the legislature? Historically it has been unwilling to take steps to enforce its 
code of conduct1401. These are substantial flaws in the BFA’s credentials as an effective self 
regulatory body. 
The inevitable conclusion made in Chapter 3 is that franchising needs to be legally regulated 
in the EU and that self regulation lacking transparency, consistency, accountability and 
proportionality will never be able to provide franchisees, potential franchisees or indeed 
franchisors with the level of protection that they require.1402  Even the most mature national 
franchise associations are struggling to make the change from representing the interests of 
franchisors to representing those of franchising.  Even if they successfully make that change, 
they only account for just over a fifth of franchisors in the EU. Given the international nature 
of franchising, any self regulatory system must cover all 27 EU member states, and that is 
extremely unlikely to happen in a consistent manner given the current state of national 
franchise associations in the EU. There is a lack of suitably experienced, authoritative, fully 
representative and sufficiently resourced franchise associations. 
As even the Director General of the BFA admits that self regulation is “simply not viable on a 
pan EU basis”1403, one is led to conclude that the self regulatory environment in the EU does 
not adequately support the economic drivers or reduce the consequential risks inherent in the 
franchisor/franchisee relationship. 
                                                   
1397 See 3.5.1 above 
1398 ibid 
1399 See 3.6 above 
1400 ibid 
1401 Between 1997 and 2007 the BFA expelled fewer than 5 members. 
1402 www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/bre/index.html, accessed 08.10.2009. 
1403 Brian Smart in an interview with the author on18 September 2008. 
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Chapter 3 establishes that despite clear and substantial differences between the civil and 
common law approaches to drafting commercial contracts franchise agreements exhibit a 
uniform architecture which comprises provisions detailing the grant made by the franchisor to 
the franchisee, the term and renewal, targets, the obligations of both parties, confidentiality, 
non competition, transfer, product and services ties, good will and termination1404.  There is a 
contractual asymmetry due to the multi-lateral nature of the franchise relationship (each 
franchisor having several/many franchisees) and the long term, dynamic and changing nature 
of the franchisor/franchisee relationship1405. 
The contractual environment in the EU supports the economic drivers that encourage 
franchisors to become involved in franchising1406.  It does not adequately support all of the 
economic drivers that encourage franchisees to become involved in franchising1407. It 
provides for a brand, a format and support but it does not impose a qualitative measure for the 
format or assistance provided. 
The contractual environment in the EU reduces the consequential risk inherent for the 
franchisor to a reasonable level, but it does not do so for the franchisee1408. 
The self regulatory environment does not effectively support or re-enforce the drivers that 
attract either franchisors or franchisees to franchising.  Neither does it reduce the 
consequential inherent risks for either party1409. 
Chapter 3 establishes that the self regulatory environment in the EU is marked by a complete 
lack of homogeneity, the lack of a clear or consistent approach to enforcement, a significant 
conflict of interest between the interests of franchisors and franchising as a whole and an 
inability to have any influence whatsoever on nearly 80% of franchise chains in the EU, as 
they are not members of the national franchise associations1410. 
The regulatory environment in the EU seeks by way of franchise specific laws in six member 
states to reduce to risks to which franchisees are exposed by ensuring that they have sufficient 
information to allow them to take a view of the adequacy of the business format and the 
support delivered by the franchisor to its franchisees and the franchisor’s historical approach 
to encroachment.  Its success in reducing those risks is dependent on the franchisee carefully 
considering the information it receives, particularly the feedback from existing franchisees 
and is comprised by the inevitable fact of life that the franchisor’s historical conduct may not 
                                                   





1409 See 3.6 above 
1410 ibid 
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be indicative of its future behaviour.  The lack of homogeneity of approach between the 
different EU member states further substantially dilutes its impact on cross border 
franchising.  The lack of any uniform approach to pre-contractual disclosure further weakens 
the impact of franchise specific laws1411. 
They do not seek to reduce the risks of informational asymmetry and moral risk to which the 
franchisor is exposed1412.  Some regulatory regimes seek to redress this imbalance by 
imposing a duty of pre-contractual disclosure on the potential franchisee1413 but that is not 
part of the EU pre-contractual regulatory environment. 
Chapter 3 establishes that the economic drivers which attract franchisors into franchising and 
those that attract franchisees to it are neither supported nor eroded in any particular way by 
the pre-contractual disclosure franchise specific regulatory environment in the EU1414. 
Non franchise specific laws impact upon the pre-contractual regulatory environment in the 
EU in five distinct ways.  They impose a duty not to misrepresent facts1415, an obligation to 
disclose relevant information to potential franchisees1416, an extra contractual obligation to 
disclose relevant information to potential franchisees1417, an extra contractual obligation of 
confidentiality1418, an obligation to enter into the franchise agreement once negotiations have 
passed a certain point1419 and a right to withdraw from the contract within a limited time 
period1420.  Each member state takes a different approach to each of these issues resulting in 
the lack of any homogenous approach.  This in turn substantially weakens their impact upon 
cross border franchising within the EU and creates a technical barrier to franchising between 
EU member states1421. 
                                                   
1411 See 3.8 above 
1412 ibid 
1413 In Vietnam not only does the franchisor have to disclose information to the franchisee, but so does the 
franchisee to the franchisor. In order to assist a franchisor when deciding to grant commercial rights, Article 
9 of the Commercial Law provides that, upon receiving a reasonable request from the franchisor  the 
franchisee is under an obligation to supply the franchisor with information about itself  The earlier Chinese 
franchise law (the Measures for the Regulation of Commercial Franchises issued by the Ministry of 
Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, December 31, 2004, Chapter III Article 9) also provided for 
this but it was dropped (without any explanation) from the most recent Chinese statute. 
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The ongoing franchisor/franchisee relationship in the EU is impacted by a regulatory 
environment that comprises a duty of good faith, anti-trust, unfair competition and consumer 
law1422. 
Chapter 3 establishes that the common law and civil law takes a very different approach to 
the concept of good faith1423. Whereas the German and French approach is loose and 
amorphous based upon the Roman law concept of bona fides, the common law takes a for 
more literal approach to contracts, using a variety of legal tools to ensure fairness on the 
relationship. However, even with the Civil approach to the concept of good faith differences 
exist between member states.  The influence of Article 101 of the TFEU mean that all 
member states take a similar approach to the regulation of vertical restrictions within the 
franchisor/franchisee relationship whereas Unfair Competition and Confidentiality lies very 
substantially on a member state by member state basis. Unfair Contract term provisions are 
harmonised by the Unfair Competition Terms Directive. 
Thus there is a complete lack of harmony between the various regimes seeking to regulate the 
franchise relationship by statute in the EU1424.   Some issues, deemed worthy of specific 
regulation in certain jurisdictions outside of the EU are not dealt with at all1425.  Franchisors 
embarking upon a European “roll out” of their concept must expect to encounter delays and 
costs that are a direct result of this heterogeneous approach– an artificial barrier to pan 
European expansion.  The duty of good faith has a significant impact upon the economic 
drivers that encourage franchisors and franchisees to become involved in franchising and 




1425  The role of third parties in franchising is not regulated by any of the EU member states.  However, 
there are examples of such regulation in other jurisdictions such as Malaysia (Malaysia governs the 
activities of Franchise Brokers "doing business as an agent or representative of a franchisor to sell a 
franchise to any person for a certain consideration but does not include any director, officer or employee of 
the franchisor or franchisee” (The Franchise Act 1998 Part I Section 4)), Korea (In Korea the law 
provides for the registration at the Fair Trade Commission of Franchise Consultants (Act on Fairness in 
Franchise Transactions Chapter III Article 28) and impose on them a duty to act “with dignity” and honesty 
(Act on Fairness in Franchise Transactions Chapter III Article 30) and can be struck off for inappropriate 
behaviour (Act on Fairness in Franchise Transactions Chapter III Article 31)) and Kazakhstan (in 
Kazakhstan Licence brokers, (those “engaged in mediation activities in the course of concluding and 
performance of the complex business license contract”) are expressly acknowledged by the  law which 
states that they “may act both on their own behalf and at their own risk, and on behalf and at the risk of the 
licensor, licensee or other subjects of franchising relations in consideration for a license broker's fee which 
can be payable in the form of a fixed single or periodic payment, fixed payments or otherwise, as provided 
by the contract” (Law on Complex Business Licence (Franchising) (Law No 330: June 24, 2002.) Chapter 3 
Article 13)).  None of the EU member states stipulate a minimum term for franchise agreements.  However, 
two jurisdictions outside of the EU do.  In Malaysia the franchise agreement must be for a minimum period 
of five years (The Franchise Act 1998 Part III Section 25.).  In Indonesia, there is a minimum period of 5 
years (The Provisions on and Procedure for the Implementation of Franchised Business Registration 
(Decree of the Minister of Industry and Trade No. 259/MPP/Kep/7/1997, dated July 30, 1997) Chapter II, 
Article 8.) and ten years for master franchise agreements (Cornwallis, International Journal of Franchising 
Law, 2006, Vol. 4 Issue 3 p. 5)). 
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reduces the consequential inherent risk.  The lack of homogeneity through the EU greatly 
dilutes this impact on cross border franchising.  The regulation of vertical restraints has an 
undermining impact upon the economic drivers that encourage franchisors to become 
involved in franchising.  
Chapter 3 establishes that the legal regulatory environment in the EU does not support any of 
the economic drivers that encourage franchisors to become involved in franchising and does 
not significantly reduce any of the risks that franchisors are exposed to1426.  However, it over 
reduces the risks to which franchisees are exposed and an over re-enforces the economic 
drivers that encourage them to become involved in franchising1427.  All member states 
recognise the right to terminate for breach, although some (e.g France) are more formulaic in 
how it has to be exercised than others1428.  However the duty of good faith in some member 
states, such as Germany over protects franchisees, entitling them to refunds of upfront fees on 
termination in some circumstances1429.  An inappropriate use of employment law in some 
member states can also over protect some franchisees1430.  Likewise the application by 
analogy of commercial agency law in Germany erodes the economic drivers that attract 
franchisors to franchising and excessively de-risk it for franchisees1431.  Post-termination 
restrictive covenants are an essential element in reducing the risks inherent in franchising for 
franchisors, but German law applies commercial agency by analogy to erode this 
protection1432. 
This thesis therefore achieves its second objective and establishes in Chapter 3 that the 
regulatory environment in the EU is in part responsible for the underachievement of 
franchising in the EU. 
6.4 The Third Objective 
Critical analysis has achieved the third objective of this thesis.  As detailed in Chapter 4 the 
European Commission is unequivocal in its belief that a regulatory environment comprising 
harmonised legal eco-systems is necessary to ensure that franchisors and other businesses can 
operate across borders efficiently1433.  The current heterogeneous regulatory environment 
creates obstacles that hinder franchisors from taking full advantage of the single market.  The 
same problem confronted commercial agency and was overcome by the adoption of a 
                                                   







1433 See 4.1 above 
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directive1434.  Empirical research referred to in Chapter 4 supports the case for 
harmonisation1435.  The catalyst for such harmonisation should be either a directive or a 
common civil code1436.  It is suggested in Chapter 4 that a directive is more appropriate.  This 
is because the considerable difficulties involved in a common civil code means that proposals 
for a non mandatory common frame of reference have taken over those for a common civil 
code and the non binding nature of such a “tool box” will not achieve the homogenised 
regulatory environment required. 
The regulatory environment in the EU should be re-engineered to enable franchising to better 
fulfil its potential in the EU.  This can be achieved as explained in Chapter 5 and is 
summarised below.  The Draft Proposed Franchise Directive in Appendix 1 suggests how the 
EU Commission could implement these recommendations. 
It is suggested in Chapter 5 that Franchising should be defined in accordance with the 
Marketing Plan approach and focuses upon: 
• independence,  
• economic interest,  
• the brand,  
• the business format,  
• control and  
• ongoing support.   
A franchise that has not operated the business format for at least 12 months or which is 
operating less than four outlets will not have to comply with the regulation and cannot enjoy 
the “Exchange of Benefits”1437. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, in order to ensure that the EU regulatory environment is fit for 
purpose as regards franchising and so enables franchisors and franchisees to access the 
economic drivers that attract them to franchising whilst reducing the risks involved to a 
reasonable level, its legal eco-systems must accentuate the influence of three Commercial 
Imperatives.  These are  
• maintaining market confidence,  
• ensuring pre-contractual hygiene and  
                                                   
1434 See 4.2 above 
1435 See 4.3 above 
1436 See 4.4 above 
1437 See 5.1 above 
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• imposing mandatory terms onto the franchisor/ franchisee relationship through the 
franchise agreement1438. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, it is proposed that the EU Franchise Directive actively promotes 
franchising and accentuates the impact of the need to increase market confidence on the EU 
legal eco-systems by  
• enabling franchisors to require pre-contractual disclosure by franchisees,  
• focusing regulation only where it is required (by excluding fractional franchisees, 
de minimis franchisees, sophisticated investors, large investors, large franchisees 
and insiders),  
• allowing franchisees to compete on a level playing field with corporate chains1439.  
It should establish this by  
• allowing franchisors to set the prices of their franchisees and  
• restricting franchisee sales over the internet1440.  
These two provisions will accentuate the impact of the need for increased market confidence 
in franchising on the EU’s legal eco-system. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, it is suggested that in order to help ensure pre-contractual hygiene 
potential franchisees must be given access to appropriate information and equipped to 
interpret it in an appropriate manner1441.  It is therefore proposed that  
• advisors are required to take short on-line franchise education courses if 
they are to advise potential franchisees;  
• potential franchisees investing more than US$20,000 must produce a 
certificate from their advisers to prove that they have taken such advice; 
• national franchise associations play an important part in educating 
potential franchisees that they have to  
o work hard,  
o follow the format,  
o risk failure and  
                                                   
1438 See 5.2 above 
1439 See 5.2 above 
1440 See 5.3 above 
1441 See 5.4 above 
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o take and follow expert advice from appropriately experienced 
professionals1442. 
Pre-contractual disclosure should 
• be given in a set form 15 working days before execution or payment 
• cover details of the identity and experience of the franchisor, the franchise 
network, the terms of the franchise agreement and any earning claims  
• be in plain language  
• contain an appropriate risk statement 
• be accompanied by a copy of the franchise agreement in the form in which it 
is to be executed  
• include a five day cooling off period after execution 
• if not complied with, lead to the right for the franchisee and government 
authorities to terminate or claim damages within 12 months of the franchisee 
becoming aware of it or 24 months of the date of execution, whichever is the 
later if it resulted in defective consent having been given 
• enable the appropriate regulatory authority to rescind the franchise and related 
agreements or claim damages 
• allow the regulatory authorities to impose penalties including 
disqualification1443 
• be allowed electronically   
• give rise to personal liability for any individual responsible for the disclosure 
document being inaccurate 
• apply to foreign franchisors with no presence in the relevant member state 
who should be under an obligation to disclose relevant information about 
analogous markets1444 
There should be a regular review of the disclosure law every 5 years. 
                                                   
1442 ibid 
1443 ibid 
1444 See 5.4.3 above 
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Misleading and deceptive behaviour (failing to comply with the pre-contractual disclosure 
obligations and making any statement which although literally true, misleads or deceives is or 
likely to mislead or deceive) should be prohibited1445.   
As detailed in Chapter 5, registration of documentation on a public register is not appropriate 
due not only to the practical difficulties it would give rise to in the 27 EU member states, but 
also due to the cost effectiveness of it and lack of impact1446. 
In order to reinforce the economic drivers that attract both franchisors and franchisees to 
franchising and reduce the inherent consequential risk to an appropriate level it is suggested 
that franchise agreements have mandatory clauses imposed on them.   
As detailed in Chapter 5, franchisees must not  
• challenge the franchisor’s intellectual property,  
• implement the business format,  
• not compete with the franchisor during the term and for a reasonable period 
thereafter  
• allow the franchisor the right to purchase the franchisees business on 
termination,  
• allow termination for cause without compensation,  
• allow the franchisor or pre-emptive right of purchase,  
• impose a duty of confidentiality and  
• purchase tied goods and services from the franchisor or its nominated 
suppliers1447. 
The franchisor must  
• be the owner of or have the right to licence the intellectual property rights on 
which the franchise is based,  
• provide a reasonable level of training,  
• refrain from encroachment,  
• allow the franchisee the right to sell its business (subject to the franchisor’s 
pre-emptive right) and  
                                                   
1445 See 5.4.4 above 
1446 See 5.4.5 above 
1447 See 5.5.3 above 
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• not supply goods or services to the franchisee at over inflated prices or which 
are unfit for purpose1448.   
In order to take account of the franchise agreement’s long term and changing nature 
unconscionable behaviour must be prohibited. 
This thesis therefore achieves its third objective and suggests how the regulatory environment 
in the EU can be re-engineered to enable franchising to better fulfil its potential in the EU.  It 
does this by proposing to re-engineer the regulatory environment so that it imposes a 
harmonised approach across the EU which accentuates the impact of the three commercial 
imperatives. 
The proposed draft Franchise Directive, detailed in Appendix 1 offers a way in which the EU 
Commission can implement this. 
6.5 Conclusion 
In conclusion, this thesis achieves all three of its objectives and so proves the hypothesis that 
franchising has failed to fulfil its potential in the EU and that this is in part due to the 
regulatory environment.   
It recommends seismic changes in the EU’s Regulatory environment to remedy this failure.  
This creative destruction of key parts of those parts of the legal eco-systems that impact upon 
franchising results in a vigorous re-engineering of the regulatory environment in the EU. This 
re-engineering involves accentuating the impact of three commercial imperatives.  Market 
confidence, pre-contractual hygiene and a mandatory taxonomy of rights and obligations. 
 
“A perfection of means and a confusion of aims, seems to be our main problem” 
Albert Einstein, 1879-1955 
                                                   
1448 See 5.5.4 above 
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Appendix 1 
Proposed Draft Franchise Directive 
Council Directive 
The Council of the European Communities 
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union  
Whereas, the approximation of the laws of the member states impacting upon franchising is 
necessary because the existing divergence may distort competition and affect the movement 
of goods and services within the common market and regulate franchising differently on each 
member state.  
Whereas, business format franchising is a specific, distinct and uniform type of Commercial 
activity with significant beneficial economic impact in the EU.  It stimulates economic 
authority by offering economic advantages to all those involved, improving distribution and 
growing business increased access to other member states.  However, compared to its scale in 
other markets business format franchising is not realising its full potential in the single market 
and there is a disproportionate concentration of it in the larger national economies in the EU. 
Whereas, there is a lack of homogeneity between the laws of member states an regards how 
they regulate business format franchising and these differences creates a barrier to business 
format franchising between member states.  Existing member state laws that regulate business 
format franchising fail to reduce the inherit risks to which those involved in business format 
franchising are exposed to an appropriate level.  These laws also fail to re-enforce the 
economic drivers that encourage both corporations and individuals to become involved in 
business format franchising as a way of carrying on business between member states. 
Whereas, the harmonisation of member state laws that regulate business format franchising 
will encourage the use of business format franchising on a way of doing business between 
member states and remove barriers to it. 
Whereas, harmonised laws regulating business format franchising should promote market 
confidence on it, ensure pre-contractual hygiene during the franchise sale process and impose 
mandatory rights and obligations on both franchisors and franchisees. 
The Commission has adopted this Directive: 
Article 1 
This directive applies only to Business Format Franchising 
A Business Format Franchise exists where;  
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1.1 (a) one party (the “Franchisor”) who owns or has the right to license other parties to 
operate a business format offering, supplying or distributing goods or services or both  
(b) grants another party (a “Franchisee”)  
(c) the right to carry on a business using that business format under a system or in 
accordance with a marketing plan substantially determined, controlled and/or 
suggested by the Franchisor or one of its associates or otherwise assisted by the 
franchisor or one of its associates (a “Shared Marketing Plan”).   
(d) The operation of the business is substantially or materially associated with a brand 
owned, used or licensed by the Franchisor or an associate of the Franchisor. 
(e) The Franchisee pays monies to the Franchisor or its affiliate, by way of, for example 
only: 
(i) an initial capital investment and/or 
(ii) a payment for goods or services and/or 
(iii) an ongoing or periodic fee of any discharge from and/or 
(iv) a training fee and/or 
(v) repayment for a lien made by the Franchisor. 
(f) A business using the business format has been operated by the Franchisor or its 
affiliate for a period of 12 months.  
1.2 For the avoidance of doubt, a franchise does not include, motor vehicle dealerships, 
employee/employer relationship, agencies, landlord and tenants and co-operatives. 
1.3 An affiliate is an entity in which the Franchisor has a controlling interest. 
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Article 2 
2.1 Franchisors have the right, but not the obligation, to require that (at least 10 working 
days before entering into any agreement which obliges or potentially obliges a 
Franchisor to grant a potential franchisee a franchise) the potential franchisee 
provides the franchisor with the following information about the franchisee and its 
spouse/partner, if any, or if it is a limited liability company, its shareholders and 
officers: 
(1) Full name and address including e-mail address and telephone number. 
(2) Details of education and employment. 
(3) Details of business experience including directorships and any direct or indirect 
shareholdings in privately held companies. 
(4) Personal bankruptcy history. 
(5) Details of the insolvency of any company in which he/she was a director or 
shareholder. 
(6) Details of family situation including details of any divorce, child maintenance and 
other such court orders and arrangements, a signed statement from the prospective 
franchisee’s spouse/partner that they fully support the prospective franchisees 
application. 
(7) Personal medical history and that of their spouse/partner and children. 
(8) Criminal record and that of their spouse/partner. 
(9) Details of any judgment against it. 
(10) Copy of driving licence and passport. 
(11) Banker’s reference. 
(12) Details of personal assets and those of spouse/partner including details of status of 
current home and any charges on those assets.  
2.2 The consequences of a potential franchisee failing to supply all such information to 
any franchisor that has requested it, is to give the franchisor the right to terminate the 
franchise agreement on the basis of defective consent within twelve (12) months of 
the failure coming to the franchisor’s attention or within two (2) years of the 
franchisee signing the franchise agreement, whichever is the earliest.   
2.3 A franchisee that has made any material or substantial wrongful or lack of disclosure 
will be deprived of any right to claim damages or other remedy from the franchisor 
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unless the franchisor is shown to have intentionally and materially breached the terms 
of the franchise agreement or intentionally and materially made wrongful or 
incomplete pre-contractual disclosure to the franchisee.  
Article 3 
3.1 The franchisor must provide the potential franchisee with a written statement 
informing him/her that it wishes to exercise its right to require disclosure in plain 
language. This must be delivered to the potential franchisee at least 14 days prior to 
the date on which the potential franchisee must make the disclosure.  
3.2 The statement must also be accompanied by a form, in plain language and in a 
Question and Answer format, setting out exactly what information is required in order 
to comply with the obligation, so that the franchisee need only complete the form. 
3.3 Notices of the potential franchisee’s pre-contractual disclosure obligations should be 
in prominent and easily legible form and read as follows: 
“THIS IS A VERY IMPORTANT NOTICE. 
YOU MUST READ IT CAREFULLY AND DO AS IT SAYS BEFORE YOU 
ENTER INTO ANY AGREEMENT WITH US.   
IT REQUIRES YOU TO GIVE US CERTAIN INFORMATION ABOUT YOU 
AND YOUR SPOUSE/PARTNER/SHAREHOLDERS/OFFICERS (IF 
APPLICABLE). 
YOU MUST GIVE THIS INFORMATION TO US AT LEAST 14 DAYS BEFORE 
YOU SIGN ANY AGREEMENT WHICH ENTITLES YOU TO THE FRANCHISE  
YOU CAN GIVE US THIS INFORMATION BY ACCURATELY COMPLETING 
THE ATTACHED QUESTIONNAIRE. ALTERNATIVELY, IF YOU CHOOSE TO 
DO SO, YOU CAN GIVE IT IN ANY OTHER WRITTEN FORM. 
IF YOU DO NOT GIVE US ALL THIS INFORMATION, OR IF ANY OF THE 
INFORMATION THAT YOU GIVE US IS FALSE, INCORRECT OR 
INCOMPLETE,  YOU MAY LOSE YOUR RIGHT TO THE FRANCHISE AND 
SOME OF YOUR OTHER IMPORTANT LEGAL RIGHTS MAY BE SEVERELY 
RESTRICTED”. 
3.4 Failure by a franchisee to comply with a franchisor’s request for disclosure by the 
franchisee will result in the franchisor having the right to terminate the franchise 
agreement within 12 months of the failure coming to the franchisor’s attention or 
within two years of the franchisee signing the franchise agreement, whichever is the 
earlier.  The franchisee will also be deprived of any right to claim damages or other 
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remedy unless the franchisor has intentionally and materially either breached the 
franchise agreement or made wrongful or incomplete disclosure to the franchisee. 
Article 4 
4.1 Franchisors are only required to make pre-contractual disclosure when it is 
appropriate and not in the case of fractional franchisees, de minimis franchisees, 
sophisticated franchisees, large investors, large franchisees and insiders. 
4.2 A franchisee is a fractional franchisee if (1) the franchisee or its principals have more 
than two years of experience in the same line of business or is otherwise already 
familiar with the products and services to be sold through the franchise; and (2) the 
parties reasonably expect that the franchisee’s sales from the new line of business will 
not exceed 20% of its total sales the disclosure requirement. 
4.3 A franchisee is a de minimis franchise if it pays €1,000 or less for the franchise. 
4.4 A franchisee is a sophisticated franchisee if it invests €500,000 or more (excluding 
funds obtained from the franchisor or its affiliates) in a franchise and has signed an 
acknowledgement that the sale is exempt from the disclosure requirement because the 
initial investment is over the threshold. 
4.5 A franchisee is a large franchisee if it pays an upfront fee of €5 million or more and 
has at least 5 years experience of the type of business being franchised. 
4.6 A franchisee is an insider franchisee if a franchisor sells a franchise to one of its 
current or former (someone who has worked in the franchisor for two years or more) 
managers or other officers. 
Article 5 
5.1 It is the franchisor’s obligation to ensure that if a franchisee is required to invest a 
sum greater than  €20,000, the franchisee takes legal and financial advice from 
advisers affiliated to the national franchise associations. This obligation is satisfied by 
the franchisor being presented with a certificate from the potential franchisee’s legal 
and financial advisors stating that the potential franchisee has taken appropriate 
advice from them and that they have completed the self study module. Potential 
franchisees must also certify that they understand that they are taking a substantial 
risk if they do not follow appropriate advice and accept that they may be responsible 
for any loss they suffer as a result of not taking such advice. 
5.2 Franchisors are obliged to deliver standard form pre- contractual disclosure to 
potential franchisees 15 working days before execution of any agreement which 
commits the potential franchisee to take up the franchise or payment of any fees in 
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connection with the franchise sale.  Franchisors must deliver details of the identity 
and experience of the franchisor, the target market and the franchise network, the 
terms of the franchise agreement and any earning claims.  There must be a five 
working day cooling off period.  Failure to comply will enable both the franchisee 
and national regulatory authorities take action against the franchisor. 
5.3 Potential franchisees must be informed by the franchisor in the disclosure document 
that: 
5.3.1 Franchisees must work hard and for long hours. This is a clear and obvious factor of 
success in any business. 
5.3.2 The franchisees must follow the franchise system. The whole reason for buying a 
franchise rather than starting a business from scratch is that the franchisor has, 
through its own experience, identified how the business should be run. 
5.3.3 There is a risk of failure and what this could mean in terms of both financial and 
personal terms.  Failure is inevitably a risk in running one’s own business. It is 
fundamentally different from employment.  
5.3.4 It is important to take expert legal and financial advice from acknowledged experts 
before being legally committed to a franchise. In order to make an informed decision, 
advice is essential. 
5.4 Details of the identity and experience of the franchise and its directors must include 
the franchisor’s litigation history over the previous 36 months and the bankruptcy 
history of the franchisor and its directors and substantial shareholders (holding over 
25% of the issued shares). 
5.5 Details of the franchise network must include details of the franchise network in the 
target market (or, if there are none, an analogous market), including the contact 
details of existing franchisees and any franchisees that have failed in the previous 12 
months.  
5.6 A summary of the terms of the franchise agreement must be detailed in the disclosure 
document.  These are; 
• the Initial and Ongoing Fees,  
• Intellectual Property,  
• Franchise Territory,  
• Supply of Goods and Services,  
• Marketing and other co-operative funds,  
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• any financing arrangements provided by the franchisor,  
• the Franchisor’s Obligations,  
• the Franchisee’s Obligations and Restrictions,  
• Related Agreements,  
• Renewal,  
• Termination,  
• Post-termination restrictions 
• Dispute Resolution 
• Earning claims 
5.7 All earning claims made by the franchisor must be accurate, fair and made in good 
faith.  
5.8 On each renewal of a franchise agreement the franchisor and the franchisee must 
comply with the pre- contractual disclosure obligations as if they did not have an 
existing franchisor/franchisee relationship. 
5.9 Delivery of the disclosure document to the prospective franchisee should be 15 
working days before the execution of any agreement which commits the prospective 
franchisee to take up the franchise or payment of any fees in connection with the 
franchise sale.  
5.10 The disclosure document must be delivered to a prospective franchisee, that is any 
person (including any agent, representative, or employee) who approaches or is 
approached by a franchise seller to discuss the possible establishment of a franchise 
relationship.   
5.11 Receipt of the disclosed document can be acknowledged by any affirmative action by 
the recipient to authenticate his/her identify and confirm receipt. This can include, for 
example, a handwritten signature, an electronic signature, passwords or a security 
code.  
5.12 The disclosure document should be accompanied by a copy of the franchise 
agreement in the form in which it is to be executed.  
5.13 The Disclosure Document must be updated by the Franchisor within 6 months of the 
end of each financial year.  
5.14 The language of the disclosure document should be the plain language(s) of the 
member state in which the franchisee will be operating its business or, in member 
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states in which there is more than one official language, the official language which 
the franchisee designates as its preference.   
5.15 Plain language is the organization of information and language usage understandable 
by a person unfamiliar with the franchise business. It incorporates short sentences; 
definite, concrete, everyday language; active voice; and tabular presentation of 
information, where possible. It avoids legal jargon, highly technical business terms, 
and multiple negatives. 
5.16 A Risk Statement which identifies known significant risks that could have a material 
impact on the franchisee must be placed on the front of the disclosure document.  It 
must read as follows:  
“Investing in a franchise can be a risky business. There is no guarantee that your 
franchise will be a success. You could lose your investment. In order to succeed you 
will have to work long and hard.  It is not a road to instant success and riches. You 
must think about it carefully before you enter into the franchise agreement. Some of 
the information you need in order to make an informed decision” is contained in this 
disclosure document. Take your time, read all documents carefully, talk to other 
franchisees and assess your own financial resources and capabilities to deal with 
requirements of the franchised business. You should also make your own enquiries, 
get independent legal, accounting and business advice, prepare a business plan and 
projections for profit and cash flow and consider educational course, particularly if 
you have not operated a business before.” 
5.17 
5.17.1 A franchisor granting a franchise to a party in a member state in which it is not based 
(the target member state) should disclose details of its franchise in the target member 
state. 
5.17.2 If a franchisor does not have outlets in the target market it should disclose details of 
its business in another member state. 
5.17.3 If the franchisor does not have any outlets in the whole of the EU, it should disclose 
details of its franchise in the country in which it is based or another country which it 
can reasonably justify as being appropriate (“the Analogous Market”). 
Article 6 
6.1 Inadequate or inaccurate disclosure by the franchisor will entitle the franchisee who 
received such disclosure and/or the relevant government agency the right to terminate 
the resulting franchise agreement ab initio or claim damages.  This right to terminate 
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or claim damages due to inadequate disclosure must be exercised by the franchisee 
(or the member state regulatory authority) within 12 months of the franchisee 
becoming aware of the failure or 24 months of the date of the franchise agreement, 
whichever is the later. If the agreement continues after this time the franchisee, will 
be deemed to have affirmed the franchise agreement and so lose both its right to 
terminate the agreement and the right to sue for damages (as does the member state 
regulatory authority). 
6.2 If disclosed information is inaccurate it will be immaterial if the inaccuracy has not 
led to defective consent being given by the franchisee and that  it is a violation for a 
franchisor to fail to use best endeavours to ensure the accuracy of the disclosed 
information.  Liability for inaccurate disclosure that lead to defective consent attaches 
not only to the franchisor, but also to any individual working for or with the 
franchisor who can be shown to have been responsible for the disclosure of the 
inaccurate information, who knew (or should have known) the legal or commercial 
significance of those facts, and was in a position to influence the outcome of the 
matter.  
6.3 Member state regulatory authorities have the right to require a franchisor to desist 
from making wrongful or inadequate disclosure if there is found to be an established 
pattern of such behaviour.  Failure to comply with the prohibition will lead to the 
imposition of substantial fines on the franchisor and the disqualification of its 
directors as directors of a company for up to 5 years. 
6.4 During a period of five working days following the day on which the franchise 
agreement is executed by both parties the franchisee has the right to withdraw by 
written notice, without penalty and receive a full refund of all monies paid by it to the 
franchisor. 
Article 7 
All pre-contractual duties of care and consumer rights applied by member states on 
franchising  be disapplied and replaced with the following provisions; 
(1)  The proposed parties to a franchise agreement and related documentation must 
comply with the duty of the pre-contractual disclosure expressly provided for in this 
Directive. Failure to do so will be deemed to be unconscionable behaviour.   
(2) In addition to this all parties must refrain from any misleading or deceptive conduct 
when making any pre-contractual disclosure.  This will include, but is not limited to, 
making statements which, although literally true misleads or deceives or is likely to 
mislead or deceive. 
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(3) If the misleading or deceptive behaviour leads to defective consent by the franchisee 
the courts have the power to make orders preventing such misleading or deceptive 
behaviour and preventing the franchisor from enjoying the benefits acquired by such 
behaviour being set aside or varying the franchise agreement or related documents 
and awarding damages.  When considering what remedy to apply the court shall give 
consideration to the best interests of the franchise network as a whole and not just the 
best interests of the franchisee concerned.  The parties involved and the regulatory 
authorities may apply for such remedies. 
Article 8 
Registration of Franchise Agreements, disclosure documents and related documents should 
not be required. 
Article 9 
9.1 Franchisors are allowed to set retail prices for its franchisees and dictate the 
network’s multi channel sales strategy. 
9.2 Franchisors can control the Franchisee’s use of the internet so that they can add 
greater value to both the franchisee’s business and their own by being proactive in the 
use of the internet to increase operational efficiencies and communication. 
Article 10 
10.1 Franchise Agreements must provide that the Franchisee is under an obligation not to 
act in an unconscionable manner and, in particular, must; 
(1) Not in any way challenge the validity or ownership of the franchisor’s intellectual 
property rights and to keep the franchisors know-how confidential and only use it in 
operating the franchise; 
(2) Comply with a general duty of confidentiality as regards the franchisor’s trade 
secrets, including its know-how, providing that they are not placed in the public 
domain by or with the consent of the franchisor; 
(3) Fully and faithfully implement the franchisor’s system, including but not restricted to 
undertaking all training required by the franchisor; 
(4) Not compete with the franchisor or its franchisees during the term of the franchisee’s 
franchise agreement; 
(5) Not compete with the franchisor or its franchisees for a reasonable time within a 
reasonable geographical area following the termination of the franchisee’s franchise 
agreement; 
  356 
(6) Allow the franchisor to purchase the franchisee’s business on termination for a 
reasonable valuation, which will include all premises and fixtures used in the business 
and stock but exclude all goodwill.  The franchisor will not however have an 
obligation to purchase the franchisee’s business; 
(7) Allow the franchisor to terminate the franchise agreement for breach without having 
to pay the franchisee any compensation; 
(8) Allow the franchisor to sell, transfer or licence its business to a third party subject to 
that third party purchaser agreeing to honour the franchisor’s obligations to the 
franchisee, without recourse against the franchisor in the event that the 
assignee/transferee/purchaser fails to honour such obligations; 
(9) Purchase tied goods and services from the franchisor or its nominated suppliers.  
A franchisee’s failure to respect these rights of the franchisor gives the franchisor the right to 
terminate the franchise agreement and sue for damages or loss of future profits.   
10.2 Failure to comply with the provisions of this Article will render the Franchise 
Agreement null and void ab initio. 
Article 11 
11.1 Franchise Agreements must provide that the Franchisor must not act in an 
unconscionable manner and in particular must; 
(1) be the owner of, or have the legal rights to use, the network’s trade name, trade mark 
and other distinguishing identification1449;  
(2) provide the franchisee with a reasonable level of initial training and continuing 
commercial and/or technical training during the entire life of the agreement1450;  
(3) render reasonable ongoing technical and consulting assistance to the franchisee1451;  
(4) refrain from  encroachment on the territory of an exclusive franchisee1452; 
(5) allow the franchisee to sell its franchise on to a third party approved by the franchisor 
as an appropriate franchisee (subject to the franchisor’s pre-emptive right of purchase 
on the same terms), 
                                                   
1449  As provided for by the European Franchise Federation in their Code of Ethics - www.eff-franchise.com 
1450 Ibid - www.eff-franchise.com  
1451 As per Lithuanian Civil Code Article 6.770(2). 
1452 As held by the case of Scheck v Burger King Corp 756 F Supp. 548 (S.D. Fla. 1991). See Chapter 19 p. 
279. 
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(6) not supply goods or services to the franchisee at inflated prices or which are unfit for 
purpose. 
For the avoidance of doubt as regards its relationship with the franchisor, franchisees and 
potential franchisees are not consumers and are not entitled to enjoy any of the rights afforded 
to consumers as regards its relationship with the franchisor. 
11.2 The front of each franchise agreement must be endorsed with the following statement: 
“This franchise will not provide a guaranteed income to you. In entering into this 
franchise you are accepting the risk that you may lose your investment. If you get into 
financial trouble whilst operating your franchised business your franchisor has no 
obligation to rescue you. It is therefore essential that before entering this franchise 
you take legal and financial advice from professionals with a proven track record of 
advising prospective franchisees on their intended investment and that you follow 
their advice. You must also carefully read the disclosure document. It contain 
important information that you must read before entering into the franchise 
agreement. Remember, if your franchised business fails depending upon your 
circumstances you could end up losing your home and becoming bankrupt.”  
11.3 Failure to comply with the provisions of this Article will render the Franchise 
Agreement null and void ab initio. 
Article 12 
12.1 Any general duty of good faith found in EU member state law is disapplied to 
franchising and replaced with a specific prohibition of  unconscionable conduct  by 
parties to a franchise, breach of which will enable the courts to act in a restrictive and 
adaptive manner. 
12.2 All parties to a franchise agreement and related documentation must therefore refrain 
from exercising their rights and obligations under the agreement, and must not 
otherwise conduct themselves, in an unconscionable manner during the term of the 
franchise agreement.  
12.3 To be regarded as unconscionable, serious misconduct or something clearly unfair or 
unreasonable must be demonstrated. Unconscionable  means actions showing no regard 
for conscience or that are irreconcilable with what is right or reasonable.  No party 
should act capriciously or act in a way that allows either party to the franchise 
agreement to obtain an unreasonable material commercial advantage or suffer a 
material commercial disadvantage that neither party would have contemplated had 
they been aware of the change in circumstances that lead to the behaviour in question.  
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This must take account of the varying levels of experience of the parties in seeking to 
deliver an appropriate level of protection. 
12.4 The grounds on which unconscionability will be judged are as follows; 
(a)  The relative strengths of the bargaining positions of the franchisor and the franchisee. 
(b)  Whether, as a result of conduct engaged in by the franchisor, the franchisee was 
required to comply with conditions that were not reasonably necessary for the 
protection of the legitimate interests of the franchisor. 
(c)  Whether the franchisee was able to understand any documents relating to the 
franchise and the supply or possible supply of the goods or services. 
(d)  Whether any undue influence or pressure was exerted on, or any unfair tactics were 
used against the franchisee by the franchisor in relation to the franchise or the supply 
of the goods or services. 
(e)  The amount for which, and the circumstances under which, the franchisee could have 
acquired identical or equivalent goods or services from a person other than the 
franchisor. 
(f)  The extent of which the franchisor’s conduct towards the franchisee is consistent with 
the franchisor’s conduct towards its other franchisees. 
(g)  The requirements of “best practice” as detailed in the European Code of Ethics. 
(h)  The extent to which the franchisor unreasonably failed to disclose to the franchisee: 
(1) any intended conduct of the franchisor that might affect the interests of the franchisee; 
and 
(2)  any risks to the franchisee arising from the franchisor’s intended conduct (being risks 
that the franchisor should have foreseen would not be apparent to the franchisee). 
(i)  The extent to which the franchisor was willing to negotiate the terms and conditions 
of the franchise agreement with the franchisee. 
(j)  The extent to which the franchisor and franchisee act to protect the legitimate 
interests of other franchisees and the franchise network as a whole. 
12.5 Examples of unconscionable conduct include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(a) unreasonably encroaching upon an exclusive territory  
(b) failing to provide the franchisee with a reasonably sufficient level of training and 
support 
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(c) unreasonably withholding, delaying or conditioning consent or approval, forcing 
franchisees to purchase goods or services at what , on a like for like basis and having 
regard to the obligations of the franchisor and its affiliates and the full financial and 
other terms of the agreement,  amount to  an unreasonably excessive price  
(d) unreasonably refusing to discuss matters of dispute with the other party 
(e) unreasonably terminating a franchise over a dispute of an insubstantial amount of 
money  
(f) using the confidential information of the franchisor in a manner that is against the best 
interests of the franchisor or the franchise network 
(g) unreasonably competing with the franchisor or other franchisees in the network in a 
manner not expressly allowed by the franchise agreement, during the term of the 
franchise agreement and for a reasonable period after its termination or expiry 
(h) making an unreasonable profit on goods or services supplied to franchisees which 
they cannot or are not permitted to purchase from independent third parties 
(i) include terminating a franchise over a dispute of an insubstantial sum of money;  
(j) threatening to terminate franchise agreements rather than negotiate and consider 
important issues;  
(k) unreasonably forcing franchisees to buy supplies from the franchisor at a greater cost 
than they could buy elsewhere;  
(l) preventing franchisees and their staff from wearing appropriate uniforms;  
(m) refusing to allocate jobs to franchisees in order to force them into accepting 
settlements in respect of totally unrelated disputes;  
(n) penalising, suspending or threatening to penalise or suspend franchisees because they 
were associating with other franchisees; requiring franchisees to attend seminars 
unrelated to the core business of the franchise;  
(o) unreasonably refusing franchisees access to its records to ensure all payments due to 
the franchisees by the franchisor had in fact been made; 
(p) unreasonably discriminating against individual franchisees. 
Article 13 
Each member state must have a national franchise association which is recognised as a legally 
acknowledged source of best practice in franchising and membership of it as an indication 
(but not a guarantee) that a franchisor has met certain minimum criteria as regards best 
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practice. They must educate the public as to the benefits and risks of franchising but not the 
regulation of franchising.  The franchise association must be not-for-profit organisations and 
be funded by membership subscriptions and member state subsidies. 
Article 14 
This EU Directive will be reviewed every five (5) years to ensure that the contents of the 
Disclosure Document continues to be relevant to the market. 
Article 15 
Member states shall bring into force, not later than two years from the date of notification of 
this Directive, the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with 
this Directive.  They shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof. 
Article 16 
Member states shall communicate to the Commission the texts of the main provisions of 
national law which they subsequently adopt in the field governed by this directive. 
Article 17 
Every five years the Commission shall present a report to the Council on the application of 
this Directive and, if necessary, shall submit appropriate proposals to it. 
Article 18 
This Directive is addressed to the member states. 
 
Done at Brussels, [               ] 2011 
For the Council 
The President 
[              ] 
  361 
Appendix 2 
Survey of Potential Franchisees 
A. BASIS ON WHICH SAMPLE WAS CHOSEN 
Conducted during 2008 through interviews with individuals attending franchise exhibitions in 
London, Paris and Madrid who stated that they had an interest in buying a franchise.   
B. REASONS FOR QUESTIONS ASKED 
The aim was to try to identify the profile of potential franchisees and their reasons for 
considering purchasing a franchise.  The questions are based upon the reasons identified by 
research conducted by Stanworth and Kauffman and other commentators referred to in 
Chapter 2. 
C. HOW THE SURVEY WAS CONDUCTED 
60 potential franchisees were surveyed at the British Franchise Exhibition at Olympia on 4 
April 2008.  
60 at the Salon de Franchise in Paris at Porte de Versailles on 16 March 2008.  
50 potential franchisees at the Spanish Franchise exhibition at EXPO FRANQUICIA ’08 on 
22 June 2008. 
 
Question UK Sample French Sample Spanish Sample 
1 Gender:  Male 75% 83% 92% 
  Female 25% 37% 8% 
Age 20 – 30 22.5% 34% 10% 
 30 – 40 42.5% 40% 30% 
 40 – 50 30% 25% 42% 
2 
 50 – 60 5% 1% 18% 
3 University degree: 35% 45% 42% 
4 What are the attractions to 
you of buying a franchise 
rather than starting up your 
own business? 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
(a) Guarantee of Success 65% 35% 55% 45% 72% 28% 
(b) Access to a well known brand 95% 5% 100% 0% 96% 4% 
(c) Access to a tried + tested 
formula 
100% 0% 100% 0% 98% 2% 
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Question UK Sample French Sample Spanish Sample 
(d) Access to franchisor’s 
knowledge of the most appropriate 
pricing structure for the 
goods/services 
72% 28% 62.5% 37.5% 58% 42% 
(e) Access to an established supply 
chain 
60% 40% 80% 20% 76% 24% 
(f) Access to on-going support and 
guidance 
91.66% 8.33% 60% 40% 68% 32% 
g) Any other reasons? None  None  None  
5 If you buy a franchise would 
you expect the franchisor to 
have the experience to 
enable it to set an 
appropriate price for the 
goods/services and require 
that all other members of the 














If yes, is this because 
(a) It prevents them competing 














(b) Different pricing structures 
would damage the brand to reduce 
the attraction of it to potential 
customers due to the lack of 
uniform pricing? 
93.32% 6.68% 87.5% 12.5% 68% 32% 
6 Do you have any prior 














7 How will you finance your 
investment in a franchise? 
      
 













(b)  Redundancy payment or other 
lump sum received by you such as 
an inheritance? 
11.66% 88.34% 45% 55% 28% 72% 
(c)  Unsecured borrowing 40% 60% 65% 35% 66% 34% 
(d)  Borrowing secured on your 
main asset (e.g. your home) 
86.66% 23.34% 54% 46% 58% 42% 
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Question UK Sample French Sample Spanish Sample 
(e)  Other 0% 100% 0% 100% 2% 98% 
8 Do you intend to pay for 
both legal and financial 
advice on the franchise 
before legally committing 
yourself to it? 
   







(b)  No 35% 40% 14% 
(c)  Maybe 10% 23.33% 64% 
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Appendix 3 
Survey of Franchisors 
A. THE BASIS ON WHICH THE SAMPLE WAS CHOSEN 
25 Franchisors were interviewed in the UK,  25 in Germany, 25 in France and 25 in Spain. 
They were chosen because they are all undertaking business in more than one EU Member 
State or have stated their intent to do so. 
B. HOW THE SURVEY WAS CONDUCTED 
Interviews were conducted by way of a mixture of face to face and telephone interviews.   
All of the face to face interviews in Paris were conducted at the Salon de Franchise in Paris 
on 16 March 2008.   
All of the face to face interviews in Spain were conducted at Expofranquicia ’08 on 22 June 
2008.  
Some of the face to face interviews in the UK were conducted at the British Franchise 
Exhibition at Olympia on 4 April 2008.  All other interviews were conducted at a variety of 
meetings and through telephone interviews. 
All of the interviews with German franchisors were conducted by way of telephone in May 
2008. 
C. THE FRANCHISORS SURVEYED 
French Franchisors interviewed 
Ecole Banette Proximed 
Beauty Success Résponse Lit 
Ecoute! Ecoute! Rouge Tendance 
Elyse Avenue Soleil Sucré 
Espace Revetements Café Leffe 
Family Dom Petit Casino 24 
Keops Cuisinella 
Kidzy Pasta Pates 
Le Piment Bleu Patchagogo 
Liberto Petit Petons 
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Maisons Pierre Pizza Mania 
Mary Cohr Le Jardin Des Soins Yves Rocher 
Potiron  
Spanish Franchisors interviewed 
By-print Clean & Clean 
Chocolate Graphics Expense Reduction Analysts 
Farmarosa Funk Fish 
Happy Days Kool 
La Pizza Laggera Macson 
Neck & Neck October 
Pet’s Place Pic Ouic 
Real Colour RK Rock & Ribs 
Restaurantes “El Don Juan” Senior Stores 
Serjent Major Smartec 
The Soap Story Total Line Protection 
Toma Jamon KA International 
 Naturhouse 
German Franchisors interviewed 
MBE Deutschland GmbH Schweinske Franchise-Management GmbH 
MINIT Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG TopaTeam AG 
Morgengold Frühstücksdienste Franchise 
GmbH 
Tchibo 
OPTICO Auto-Spezialreinigung Town & Country 
Paint Express HESSE GmbH & Co Town & Country Haus Lizenzgeber GmbH 
PC Spezialist (SYNAXON AG) TUI Leisure Travel Management Gmb 
PC-Feuerwehr Computer Service GmbH Türenfein Färber GmbH 
Personal Total Franchise AG VARIA Franchise GmbH 
PIRTEK Deutschland GmbH Vergölst GmbH Franchise Deutschland 
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Point of Colour (RELIUS COATINGS 
GmbH & Co. KG) 
vfm Versicherung+Fiinanz Makler GmbH 
Franchise 
Premio (GDHS GD Handelssysteme GmbH 
& Co. KG) 
WAP Waschbär (ALTO Deutschland GmbH) 
PTE Franchise GmbH WINTEC (Novus AG) 
UK Franchisors interviewed 




ChipsAway National Car Rental 
Clapham House Caffe Nero 
Coffee Republic Regus 
Costa Coffee Specsavers 
Domino’s Pizza Swisher 
Dream Doors Wagamama 
Hair on Broadway Wyndham Hotels 
Hamleys Yo! Sushi 
KallKwik  
D. REASONS FOR THE QUESTIONS ASKED 
The aim was to: 
1. understand the risks, advantages franchisors perceive in franchising their business.  
The questions reflect the reasons proposed in Chapter 2 in this thesis 
2. understand their views of the regulation of franchising in the EU. 
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Questions contained in the Survey of Franchisors 
1. What are the main barriers to franchisors expanding into other EU member states?  
Do you consider the following factors to be very significant, significant or 
insignificant barriers 
2. What are the greatest risks that a franchisor incurs in deciding to franchise its 
business? 
3. Why did you franchise your business?  Do you consider the following factors to have 
been very significant, significant or insignificant? 
4. Which of the following obligations are very significant, significant or insignificant in 
protecting your business from franchisee abuse? 
5. Are you in favour of the Statutory Regulation of Franchising in the EU? 
6. If franchising is regulated by law, should it be done at an EU level rather than a 
national level? 
7. Has the statutory regulation of franchising in your country had an adverse impact 
upon your business? 
8. Do you believe that specific statutory regulation of pre-contractual disclosure is more 
effective than self regulation in preventing abuse of franchisees? 
9. Do you believe that the legal regulation of duties and obligations of franchisors and 
franchisees during the term of the franchise agreement would significantly reduce 
disputes between franchisors and franchisees? 
10. Do you believe that statutory regulation of franchising is more likely to improve the 
quality of franchising than self regulation? 
11. Do you think that statutory regulation of pre-contractual disclosure in franchising will 
enable disputes between franchisors and franchisees to be resolved in a more effective 
manner? 
12. Are franchised businesses disadvantaged as compared to non-franchised businesses as 
regards 
(a)  Their ability to set prices in all of their outlets 
(b) Their ability to control the franchisees use of the internet 
13.  In your experience if prospective franchisees are given lengthy documentation to read 
giving details about the franchise, its performance and the role of franchisees do they 
read it? 
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14. In your experience do the cultural and commercial differences between different 
national markets give rise to  different problems and issues for franchisors? 
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Appendix 4 
Survey of Franchise Lawyers 
A. BASIS ON WHICH SAMPLE WAS CHOSEN 
All members of the sample are all listed as experts in Franchising in the International Who’s 
Who of Franchising, published by Law Business Research Ltd. 
B. HOW WAS THE SURVEY CONDUCTED 
An e-mail survey of the 25 lawyers detailed below, was conducted in June 2008.   
C. THE INDIVIDUALS IN THE SAMPLE  
- Penny Ward, Baker McKenzie, Sydney  
-  Stephen Giles, Deacons, Sydney  
-  Carl Zwisler, Haynes & Boone, Washington D.C. 
-  Remi Delforge, Donald Manasse & Remi Delforge Avocats Associes, Paris  
-  Andrew Selden, Briggs & Morgan, Minneapolis  
-  Ronald T. Coleman, Jr., Paul Hastings Janofsky Walker, Atlanta  
-  Kenneth R. Costello, Bryon & Eve, Los Angeles  
-  Gayle Cannon, Haynes & Boone, Dallas 
-  Franklin C. Jesse, Gray Plant Mooty, Minneapolis  
-  David Holmes, Holmes & Lofstorm, St Louis Obispo, California  
-  Richard Asbill, Paul Hastings Janofsky Walker, Atlanta  
-  Dr. Christoph Wildhaber, Streichenberg, Zurich 
-  Quentin Wittrock, Gray Plant Mooty, Minneapolis 
-  Ned Levitt, Gowlings, Toronto  
-  Rupert Barkoff, Kilpatrick Stockton, Atlanta  
-  William L. Kilion, Faege Benson, Minneapolis  
-  Paul D. Jones, Jones & Co, Toronto  
-  John F. Baer, Sonnenscheins, Chicago  
-  Gaylen L. Knack, Gray Plant Mooty, Minneapolis  
-  Lew Rudnick, DLA Piper, Chicago  
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-  Gary Duvall, Dorsey & Whitney, Seattle  
-  Joyce Mazero, Haynes & Boone, Dallas 
-  Michael Santa Maria, DLA Piper, Dallas 
-  Frank Zaid, Oster Hoskins, Toronto  
-  John Rogers, Davis & Co, Toronto  
D. REASONS FOR QUESTIONS ASKED 
This was to obtain the view of highly reputed, international expert franchise practitioners. 
The questions posed to the franchise lawyers surveyed 
A. Which of the following obligations are of fundamental importance to the 
protection of a franchised business from franchisee abuse? 
Percentage of respondents who rated each obligation in order of importance with 1 being the 
most important and 5 being the least important 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Non competition by franchisee during term of the 
Franchise Agreement 
16% 48% 28% 8% 0% 
Non competition by former franchisees for a 
reasonable period after the expiry of the Franchise 
Agreement 
8% 0% 56% 16% 12% 
No challenge of the Franchisor’s Intellectual Property 
rights 
20% 20% 20% 36% 4% 
Franchisees must follow the Franchisor’s system 56% 24% 0% 20% 0% 
Others e.g. timely payment, failure to participate in 
advertising programmes 
0% 4% 4% 4% 88% 
B. Is Statutory Regulation more effective than Self Regulation? 
Yes 22    88% 
No 2      8% 
Maybe 1      4% 
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C. Should the EU regulate franchising uniformally? 
Yes 19 (76%) 
No 2 (8%) 
Maybe 4 (16%) 
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Appendix 5 
Survey of Franchisees 
A. BASIS ON WHICH SAMPLE WAS CHOSEN 
The sample comprised UK franchisees who were currently running a franchised business 
from a broad spread of businesses. 
B. HOW AS THE SURVEY CONDUCTED? 
This survey of 30 franchisees was conducted through a mix of telephone and face to face 
interviews between January 2004 and April 2007.  In order to encourage a candid response, 
anonymity of the respondents was essential. 
C. REASONS FOR QUESTIONS ASKED 
The aim was to understand the view of UK franchisees on self regulation and the reason they 
became franchisees (based upon the reasons proposed in Chapter 2 in the thesis. 
D. WHO COMPRISES THE SAMPLE 
• 3 Green Thumb franchisees (a garden care business) 
• 2 Kumon franchisees (a home education business) 
• 2 Domino’s franchisees (a pizza business) 
• 8 Minuteman franchisees (a printing business) 
• 2 Hair on Broadway franchisees (a hairdressing business) 
• 2 Mahogany franchisees (a hairdressing business) 
• 8 Durham Pine franchisees (a retail business) 
• 3 Kall Kwik franchisees (a printing business) 
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Do you feel disadvantaged as a franchisee compared to a corporate owned business as 




Don’t know 2 
Do you see the British Franchise Association as represents the interests of 
Franchising in general? 4 
Franchisors? 26 
Franchisees? 0 
The BFA has a three pronged dispute resolution procedure comprising conciliation, 
mediation and arbitration. 
Do you trust its impartiality? 
Yes  2 
No 26 
Don’t know 2 
Would you use BFA arbitration rather than litigation to settle disputes with your 
franchisor? 
Yes  2 
No 18 
Don’t know 10 
Would you be willing to try to resolve a dispute with your franchisor by non binding 
conciliation or mediation? 
Yes  30 
No 0 
Don’t know 0 
If yes, why? 
Cost 29 
Speed  30 
Effectiveness 12 
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Why did you purchase your franchise? 
 Yes No Don’t know 
• The training/know-how available 18 8 4 
• Opportunity to own your own business 30 0 0 
• Ongoing support to be delivered by franchisee 28 2 0 
• The brand 30 0 0 
• Less chance of failure 26 4 0 
• Increased willingness of banks to lend 16 4 0 
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Appendix 6  
Franchise Executive Interviews 
A. BASIS ON WHICH SAMPLE WAS CHOSEN 
Members of the sample were all senior executives in companies that franchise in the EU. 
B. HOW WERE THE INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED 
They were either face to face or telephone interviews, sometimes complimented by written 
questions and answers. 
C. REASONS FOR QUESTIONS ASKED 
To obtain a better understanding of the commercial realities of the issues considered in this 
thesis. 
The following Executives were interviewed by the author during the period March – July 
2006 
D. THE INDIVIDUALS COMPRISING THE SAMPLE 
1. Chris Nowak, Vice President and Legal Counsel at Wyndham (a hotel business) 
2. Nuns Moodliar, General Counsel Hertz Europe (a car rental business) 
3. Jane Colton, Vice President and Legal Counsel, Vanguard Rental EMEA (a car rental 
business) 
4. Roger Wilde, Managing Director, ChipsAway Limited (a car repair business) 
5. Paul Currie, Franchise Director Hamleys Ltd (a retail business) 
6. Rosalynde Harrison, Head of Legal Monsoon Plc (a retail business) 
7. Steve Mills, International Director, MRI (a recruitment business) 
8. Adam Goldman, Head of Legal, Arcadia Plc (a retail business) 
9. Peter Neighbour, Franchise Manager, LighterLife (a weight loss business) 
10. Octavia Morley, CEO, LighterLife (a weight loss business) 
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Appendix 7 
Survey of Franchise Disputes 
A. BASIS ON WHICH SAMPLE WAS CHOSEN 
40 franchise disputes advised upon by Field Fisher Waterhouse during the period 2006-2010 
were considered.  “Dispute” is not limited to litigation but includes disagreements which 
result in the involvement of legal advisers by at least one side.  It is important to note that 
these grounds of dispute are those raised by the parties, not always proved to the satisfaction 
of a court. 
B. HOW WAS THE SURVEY CONDUCTED 
Face to face interviews with individuals involved in the disputes. 
C. REASONS FOR QUESTIONS ASKED 
The aim was to understand the reason for disputes between franchisees and their franchisor. 
D. THE MEMBERS OF THE SAMPLE 
Anonymity was essential to obtain any responses.   
The disputes involved franchisees of the following brands.  This includes a mix of retail, 
service and fast food businesses and a range of different size franchisees. 
- Agent Provocateur (1) – retail  
- Chips Away (3) – service  
- Durham Pine (8) – retail 
- Green Thumb (1) – service  
- LighterLife (2) – service  
- Domino’s (3) – fast food  
- Minuteman Press (1) – service  
- Flowers Forever (1) – retail  
- Kallkwik (10) – service  
- Prontaprint (10) – service  
- Snappy Snaps (5) – service/retail  
- Dollond & Aitchison (3) – retail  
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90% of the disputes arose 2 years or more after the parties entered into the franchise 
agreement. 
 
Cause of Dispute Total %age 
Franchisee competing with Franchisor during term of Franchise (28) 70% 
Alleged failure by Franchisor to adequately support Franchisee (32) 80% 
Failure to maintain brand standards by Franchisee*  (36) 90% 
Alleged misrepresentation by Franchisor in recruiting the Franchisee (34) 85% 
Alleged encroachment by the Franchisor (28) 70%  
 
There are multiple claims on each dispute, so the total percentage exceeds 100% 
* failure to meet brand standards means not following the business format prescribed by the 
franchisor by, for example, selling/providing inappropriate or substandard goods or services 
or failing to follow key procedures.  
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Appendix 8 
Analysis of Franchise Agreements  
The samples represent both civil and common law, a variety of sectors and a range of 
investment profiles. 
A. Jurisdiction 
The agreements are of franchisors doing business in the three largest franchise markets in the 
EU (the UK, Germany and France) and two other jurisdictions in which franchising is 
common (the USA and Australia).  The sample therefore includes agreements drafted under 
both civil and common law.   
B. Sectors 
The sample includes franchises in the retail, service, food and hotel sectors.  Some are mobile 
some are location based. 
C. Investment Scale 
The sample includes small scale “man in a van” job franchises and large scale hotel and 
restaurant franchises.  It is generally the start up investment rather than the upfront franchise 
fee that requires most funding.  The higher the start up investment the higher the upfront fees 
tend to be.  The upfront fees and the upfront investment costs vary from country to country 
depending on a wide range of external variables, such as, for example, the cost of real estate.  
Therefore the exact level of the upfront franchise fee and start up investment are not exactly 
the same on a like for like basis.  This sample details the type of start up investment required 
not the exact figure.  It categorises them as low, medium, substantial and high.  In the UK, 
low is nothing to £10,000, medium is over £20,000 to £100,000, substantial is over £100,000 
to £500,000 and high is over £500,000.  In the other countries in the sample it is the same 
number in the local currency (e.g. £20,000 becomes €20,000 and US$20,000), not the sterling 
figure converted into the local currency.  This is sufficient to give an appropriate 
understanding of the scale of investment and therefore the type of franchisee involved in each 
franchise.   
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Australian Agreements 
Business Sector  Level of Investment  
BB’s Coffee & Muffins Food/Restaurant Medium investment in prime retail 
location and fit out 
Bartercard Services/Mobile Low investment required 
Cash Converters Retail Substantial investment required 
Choice Hotels Hotels High investment required 
Expense Reduction Analysts Other services/mobile Low investment required 
US Agreements 
Business Sector  Level of Investment  
Intercontinental Hotels Retail High investment required 
Coverall Other services Low investment required 
Domino’s Pizza  Food (Mobile) Substantial investment required 
Snap-on-tools  Retail (Mobile)  Medium investment required 
National Car Rental Car Rental  Substantial investment required 
UK Agreements 
Business Sector  Level of Investment  
Costa Coffee Food/Restaurant Medium level investment required 
Hertz Car rental High investment required 
Ramada Hotels High investment required 
Jani-King Other services 
(mobile) 
Low investment required 
Kall Kwik Retail Substantial investment required 
German Agreements 
Business Sector  Level of Investment  
Applebees Restaurant Substantial investment required 
Starwood Hotels High investment required 
Hertz Services/Car Rental High investment required 
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Eismann Retail (Mobile) Low investment required 
Polo Ralph Lauren Retail Medium investment required 
French Agreements 
Business Sector  Level of Investment  
Yves Rocker Retail Medium investment required 
Ibis Hotel High investment required 
Pronuptia Retail Substantial investment required 
Artezia Other services Low investment required 
La Boîte à Pizza Food (mobile) Substantial investment required 
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Categorisation of Sample by Sectors 
Categorisation of Sample by Investment Required 
 Australia UK Germany France USA 
Low ? ? ? ? ? 
Medium ? ? ? ? ? 
Substantial ? ? ? ? ? 
High ? ? ? ? ? 
Categorisation of Sample by Mobile/Location Based Criteria 
 Australia UK Germany France USA 
Totally 
Mobile 
0 1 1 3 2 
Location 
Based 
3 4 4 1 2 
Both 2 0 0 1 1 
 Australia UK Germany France USA 
Hotel ? ? ? ? ? 
Retail ? ? ? ? ? 
Other Services ? ? ? ? ? 
Food/Restaurant ? ? ? ? ? 
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Appendix 9 
Excerpts of Foreign Franchise Legislation 
Australia 
Section 51AC of the TPA - The factors are: 
(a)  The relative strengths of the bargaining positions of the supplier and the business 
consumer. 
(b)  Whether, as a result of conduct engaged in by the supplier, the business consumer 
was required to comply with conditions that were not reasonably necessary for the 
protection of the legitimate interests of the supplier. 
(c)  Whether the business consumer was able to understand any documents relating to the 
supply or possible supply of the goods or services. 
(d)  Whether any undue influence or pressure was exerted on, or any unfair tactics were 
used against, the business consumer or a person acting on behalf of the business 
consumer or a person acting on behalf of the business consumer by the supplier or a 
person acting on behalf of the supplier in relation to the supply or possible supply of 
the goods or services. 
(e)  The amount for which, and the circumstances under which, the business consumer 
could have acquired identical or equivalent goods or services from a person other 
than the supplier. 
(f)  The extent of which the suppliers conduct towards the business consumer was 
consistent with the suppliers conduct in similar transactions between the supplier and 
other like business consumers. 
(g)  The requirements of any applicable industry code. 
(h)  The requirements of any other industry code, if the business consumer acted on the 
reasonable belief that the supplier would comply with that code. 
(i)  The extent to which the supplier unreasonably failed to disclose to the business 
customer: 
(1) any intended conduct of the supplier that might affect the interests of  the 
business consumer; and 
(2)  any risks to the business consumer arising from the suppliers intended 
conduct (being risks that the supplier should have foreseen would not be 
apparent to the business consumer) 
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(j)  The extent to which the supplier was willing to negotiate the terms and conditions of 
any contract for supply of the goods or services with the business consumer. 
(k)  The extent to which the supplier and the business consumer acted in good faith. 
Belgium 
The Belgian House Of Representatives, 30 Oct 2003, Clause 10: 
“If the annual turnover of the franchisee's business has decreased by 7% or more, or the 
survival of the franchisee’s business is compromised, the franchisee can require at the 
franchisor’s expense either that the franchise agreement be terminated together with the 
payment of damages, or he can require the payment of damages alone”. 
The Belgian House Of Representatives, 30 Oct 2003, Clause 13: 
Agreements for a fixed period are to be automatically renewable either “for an indefinite 
period or for any period envisaged in any implied renewal clause, in the absence of either 
party giving notice by registered letter at least six months or at most nine months before the 
agreed due termination date” and “where a franchise agreement entered into for a fixed 
period has been renewed twice, whether or not the terms of the original agreement have been 
modified by the parties, or where the franchise agreement has been impliedly extended on two 
occasions by the operation of one of the clauses of the agreement, any further extension will 
be deemed to have been agreed for an indefinite period”. 
Article 4 para 1 1° of the Law Governing Pre-contractual Information Within the 
Framework of Commercial Partnership Agreements: 
“reference to whether or not the commercial partnership agreement is made in consideration 
of the person; the obligations; the consequences of failure to comply with the obligations; the 
method of calculation of the remuneration paid by the recipient of the right, and the method 
of any review during the course of the contract period and upon renewal of the contract; non-
competition clauses, including their duration and conditions; the duration of the commercial 
partnership agreement the conditions of renewal; notice provisions and provisions for 
termination of the agreement, in particular in relation to charges and investments; the right 
of pre-emption or the purchase option in favour of the grantor of the right and the rules 
governing the valuation of the business when such a right or option is exercised and terms of 
exclusivity reserved for the grantor of the right”. 
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Canada 
Alberta Franchises Act Section 1(d): 
“franchise” means a right to engage in a business: 
(i)  in which goods or services are sold or offered for sale or are distributed under a 
marketing or business plan prescribed in substantial part by the franchisor or its 
associate; 
(ii)  that is substantially associated with a trademark, service mark, trade name, logotype 
or advertising of the franchisor or its associate or designating the franchisor or its 
associate, and 
(ii)  that involves: 
(A) a continuing financial obligation to the franchisor or its associate by the 
franchisee and significant continuing operational controls by the  franchisor 
or its associate on the operations of the franchised business, or  
(B)  the payment of a franchise fee;  
and includes a master franchise and a sub-franchise;” 
France 
French Commercial Code Article L.330-1: 
“Any person who provides another person a corporate name, trademark or trade name, by 
requiring therefrom an exclusivity or quasi-exclusivity undertaking in order to carry out their 
activity, shall be required, prior to the signature of any contract concluded in the common 
interest of both parties, to provide the other party with a document giving truthful 
information allowing the latter to commit to this contract with full knowledge of the facts. 
This document, whose content shall be fixed by decree, shall specify in particular the age and 
experience of the undertaking, the state and prospects for development of the market 
concerned, the size of the network of operators, the term and conditions of renewal, 
cancellation and assignment of the contract and the scope of the exclusive rights. 
When the payment of a sum is required prior to the signature of the contract indicated above, 
particularly to obtain the reservation of an area, the benefits provided in return for this sum 
shall be specified in writing together with the reciprocal obligations of the parties in the event 
of renunciation. 
The document specified by the first paragraph and the draft contract shall be notified at least 
twenty days before the signature of the contract or, where applicable, before the payment of 
the sum indicated in the above paragraph.” 
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Italy 
Law of 6 May 2004, No. 129 Article 1.1: 
“franchising is an agreement by which one party grants to the other, for a consideration, the 
use of a combination of intellectual property and/or industrial rights, related to trademarks, 
trade names, utility models, industrial designs, copyright, know-how, patents, technical and 
commercial assistance or consulting , as well as the opportunity to be part of a franchising 
network.” 
Korea 
Act on Fairness in Franchise Transactions Chapter1 Article 2.1 defines a franchise as: 
“a continuous business relationship in which a franchisor provides a franchisee with the right 
to use his trademarks, service marks, trade name, signs and other business marks (hereinafter 
"business marks") and provides a right to offer products (including raw materials and 
supplementary materials) and services under specified quality standards in which the 
franchisor supports, educates and controls a franchisee in relation to the management and 
business operations in connection with the above rights and in which the franchisee pays 
franchise fees to the franchisor as consideration for the right to use the franchisor's business 
marks and for support and education related to the franchise's management and business 
operations”. 
Lithuania 
Lithuanian Civil Code Article 6.766(1): 
“Under a franchise contract, one party (the rightholder) shall undertake to grant the other 
party (the user) for a remuneration and for a specified or unspecified period of time the right 
to use in the course of the user’s entrepreneurial activity a complex of exclusive rights 
belonging to the rightholder (the right to use the firm name, the trade mark, the service mark, 
protected commercial information, and the like), and in return the other party shall undertake 
to pay a remuneration stipulated by the contract.” 
Lithuanian Civil Code Article 6.766(2): 
“The franchise contract shall provide for the use of complex of exclusive rights, business 
reputation and commercial expertise of the rightholder to a specified extent (establishing the 
minimum or maximum method or other form of use). The franchise contract may also provide 
for the territory of the application of such exclusive rights, business reputation or commercial 
expertise, or the sphere of entrepreneurial activity to which it shall be applied (sales of 
goods, provision of services, etc.).” 
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Lithuanian Civil Code Article 6.766(1): 
“one party (the rightholder) shall undertake to grant the other party (the user) for a 
remuneration and for a specified or unspecified period of time the right to use in the course of 
the user’s entrepreneurial activity a complex of exclusive rights belonging to the rightholder 
(the right to use the firm name, the trade mark, the service mark, protected commercial 
information, and the like), and in return the other party shall undertake to pay a 
remuneration stipulated by the contract.” 
Mexico 
Law on Industrial Property, Title 4 Chapter VI Article 142: 
defines franchising as existing whenever: “in conjunction with the license to use a trademark, 
technical knowledge is transmitted or technical assistance is furnished in order to enable the 
licensee to produce or sell goods or render services in a uniform manner and with the 
operating, commercial and administrative methods established by the holder of the 
trademark, aimed to maintain the quality, prestige and image of the products or services 
distinguished by the trademark”. 
Romania 
Ordinance Regarding the Legal Status of Franchises (Government Ordinance 52/1997) 
as approved and modified by Law 79/1998, Chapter 1 Article 1(a): 
“a trading system based on a continuous collaboration between financially independent 
natural persons or legal entities, whereby a person referred to as the franchisor (franciza) 
grants to another person referred to as beneficiary (beneficiar) the right to make profit from 
or develop a business, product, technology or service.” 
USA 
FTC Rule Section 436.1(h): 
“Franchise means any continuing commercial relationship or arrangement, whatever it may 
be called, in which the terms of the offer or contract specify, or the franchise seller promises 
or represents, orally or in writing, that: 
(1)  The franchisee will obtain the right to operate a business that is identified or 
associated with the franchisor’s trademark, or to offer, sell, or distribute 
goods, services or commodities that are identified or associated with the 
franchisor’s trademark; 
(2)  The franchisor will exert or has authority to exert a significant degree of 
control over the franchisee’s method of operation, or provide significant 
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assistance in the franchisee’s method of operation; and 
(3)  As a condition of obtaining or commencing operation of the franchise, the 
franchisee makes a required payment or commits to make a required payment 
to the franchisor or its affiliate.” 
FTC Rule Section 437.2: 
“As used in this part, the following definitions shall apply: 
(a)  The term business opportunity means any continuing commercial relationship created 
by any arrangement or arrangements whereby: 
(1)  A person (hereinafter ‘business opportunity purchaser’) offers, sells or 
distributes to any person other than a ‘business opportunity seller’ (as 
hereinafter defined) goods, commodities or services which are: 
(i)[A]  Supplied by another person (hereinafter ‘business opportunity seller’) 
or 
[B]  Supplied by a third person (e.g. supplier) with whom the business 
opportunity purchaser is directly or indirectly required to do business 
by another person (hereinafter ‘business opportunity seller’); or 
[C]  Supplied by a third person (e.g. a supplier) with whom the business 
opportunity purchaser is directly or indirectly advised to do business 
by another person (hereinafter “business opportunity seller”) where 
such third person is affiliated with the business opportunity seller; 
and 
(ii)  The business opportunity seller: 
[A]  Secures for the business opportunity purchaser retail outlets or 
accounts for said goods, commodities, or services; or 
[B]  Secures for the business opportunity purchaser locations or sites for 
vending machines, rack displays, or any other product sales displays 
used by the business opportunity purchaser in the offering, sale, or 
distribution of said goods, commodities, or services; or 
[C]  Provides to the business opportunity purchaser the services of a 
person able to secure the retail outlets, accounts, sites or locations 
referred to in paragraphs (a)(ii)[A] and [B] of this section; and 
(2)  The business opportunity purchaser is required as a condition of obtaining or 
commencing the business opportunity operation to make a payment or a 
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commitment to pay to the business opportunity seller, or to a person affiliated 
with the business opportunity seller.” 
FTC Rule Section 436.8(a): 
Exemptions. The provisions of part 436 shall not apply if the franchisor can establish any of 
the following: 
(1)  The total of the required payments, or commitments to make a required payment, to 
the franchisor or an affiliate that are made any time from before to within six months 
after commencing operation of the franchisee’s business is less than $500. 
(2)  The franchise relationship is a fractional franchise. 
(3)  The franchise relationship is a leased department. 
(4)  The franchise relationship is covered by the petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 
U.S.C. 2801. 
(5) (i) The franchisee’s initial investment, excluding any financing received from the 
franchisor or an affiliate and excluding the cost of improved land, totals at 
least $1 million and the prospective franchisee signs an acknowledgment 
verifying the grounds for the exemption. The acknowledgment shall state: 
“The franchise sale is for more than $1 million - excluding the cost of 
unimproved land and financing received from the franchisor or an affiliate – 
and thus is exempted from the Federal Trade Commission’s franchising Rule 
disclosure requirements, pursuant to 16 CFR 436.8(a)(5)(i); or 
(ii)  The franchisee (or its parent or any affiliates) is an entity that has been in 
business for at least five years and has a net worth of at least $5 million. 
(6)  One or more purchasers of at least 50% ownership interest in the franchise: within 60 
days of the sale, has been, for at least two years, an officer, director, general partner, 
individual with management responsibility for the offer and sale of the franchisor’s 
franchise or the administrator of the franchised network; or within 60 days of the 
sale, has been, for at least two years, an owner of at least a 25% interest in the 
franchisor. 
(7)  There is no written document that describes any material term or aspectof the 
relationship or arrangement. 
FTC Rule at 436.8: 
(i)  The total amount of payments required to be made any time or within 6 months after 
commencing operation of the franchisee’s business is less than USD $500; 
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(ii)  The franchise relationship is a fractional franchise; 
(iii)  The franchise relationship is a leased department; 
(iv)  The franchise relationship is governed by the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 
U.S.C 2801; 
(v)  The franchises is making a major initial investment of more than USD $1 mil. (excl. 
real estate and franchisor-financed amounts;  
(vi)  The franchisee in question is a ‘large’ franchisee, i.e. at least five years in business 
with a net worth of at least USD $5 mil.; or 
(vii)  The franchise sale in question is an ‘insider’ franchise purchase involving owners or 
officers of the franchise system or managers with at least two years’ management 
experience in the franchise system. 
Article 2-302 provides of the Uniform Commercial Code: 
“If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been 
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may 
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit 
the application of any unconscionable clause so as to avoid any unconscionable result.” 
Statutes of the twenty states – plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin 
Islands – that have enacted laws of general application that govern franchise 
relationships and terminations: 
Alaska Statutes, 45.25, 
Arkansas Franchise Practices Act, Sec. 4-72-204, 
California Franchise Relations Act, Secs. 20021, 20025, 20026, 20030, 
Connecticut Franchises Law, Sec. 42-133f, 
Delaware Franchise Security Law, Sec. 2554, 
District of Columbia Franchising Act, Sec. 29-1122, 
Hawaii Franchise Rights and Prohibitions Law, Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 482E-6,  
Illinois Franchise Disclosure Act, Sec 815 ILCS 705/19, 815 ILCS 705/20,  
Indiana Deceptive Franchise Practices Law, Sec 23-2-2.7-3,  
Iowa Franchises Law, Secs. 523H.8,  
Kentucky- 2000 KY Acts Ch 23, Section 3 [KRS 190.045] 
Michigan Franchise Investment Law, Sec. 445.1527,  
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Minnesota Franchises Law, Sec. 80C.14, 
Mississippi Franchises Law, Sec. 75-24-53,  
Missouri Franchises Law, Sec. 407.405,  
Nebraska Franchise Practices Act, Sec. 87-404,  
New Jersey Franchise Practices Act, C.56  
South Dakota Codified Law Title 37 Chapters 5, 5A, 5B, 
Washington Franchise Investment Protection Act, Sec. 19.100.180, 
Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law, Wisconsin Statute Section 135.04,  
Virgin Islands Franchised Business Law, Sec. 131; 
Virginia Code Title 13.1, Chapter 8 
Section II.B.2,b, 72 Fed. Reg at 15469, Statement of Basis and Purpose: 
“The Commission intends that the 14 days commence the day after delivery of the disclosure 
document and that the signing of any agreement or receipt of payment can take place on the 
15th day after delivery.  That ensures that prospective franchisees have at least a full 14 days 
in which to review the disclosures.” 
European Union 
EU Franchise Block Exemption Regulation EC 4748/88 definitions: 
"Know-how” is defined as a body of non-patented practical information, resulting from 
experience and testing by the Franchisor, which is secret, substantial and identified, 
http://www.eff-franchise.com/IMG/article_PDF/article_13.pdf page 3 accessed 7 September 
2009; 
"secret" means that the know-how, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of 
its components, is not generally known or easily accessible; it is not limited in the narrow 
sense that each individual component of the know-how should be totally unknown or 
unobtainable outside the Franchisors business, http://www.eff-
franchise.com/IMG/article_PDF/article_13.pdf  
"substantial" means that the know-how includes information which is of importance for the 
sale of goods or the provision of services to end users, and in particular for the presentation of 
goods for sale, the processing of goods in connection with the provision of services, methods 
of dealing with customers, and administration and financial management; the know-how must 
be useful for the Franchisee by being capable, at the date of conclusion of the agreement, of 
improving the competitive position of the Franchisee, in particular by improving the 
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Franchisee's performance or helping it to enter a new market, http://www.eff- 
franchise.com/IMG/article_PDF/article_13.pdf  
"identified" means that the know-how must be described in a sufficiently comprehensive 
manner so as to make it possible to verify that it fulfils the criteria of secrecy and 
substantiality; the description of the know-how can either be set out in the franchise 
agreement or in a separate document or recorded in any other appropriate form.  
Study Group on a European Civil Code’s Recommendations 
Article 3:101 Commercial Agency, Franchise And Distribution Amsterdam Team 8th 
Draft (21 May, 2003): 
It defines franchising as “contracts whereby one party (the franchisor) grants the other party 
(the franchisee), in exchange for remuneration, the right to conduct a business (franchise 
business) within the franchisor’s network for the purposes of selling certain goods or services 
on the franchisor's behalf and in the franchisor's name, and whereby the franchisee has the 
right and the obligation to use the franchisor’s trade name or trademark, the know-how and 
the business method.” 
UNIDROIT 
Model Franchise Disclosure Law, Article 2: 
“franchise means the rights granted by a party (the franchisor) authorising and requiring 
another party (the franchisee), in exchange for direct or indirect financial compensation, to 
engage in the business of selling goods or services on its own behalf under a system designed 
by the franchisor which includes know-how and assistance, prescribes in substantial part the 
manner in which the franchised business is to be operated, includes significant and 
continuing operational control by the franchisor, and is substantially associated with a 
trademark, service mark, trade name or logotype designated by the franchisor. It includes: 
(A)  the rights granted by a franchisor to a sub-franchisor under a master franchise 
agreement; 
(B)  the rights granted by  a sub-franchisor to a sub-franchisee under a sub-franchise 
agreement;  
(C)  the rights granted by a franchisor to a party under a development agreement. 
For the purposes of this definition “direct or indirect financial compensation” shall not 
include the payment of a bona fide wholesale price for goods intended for resale.” 
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Appendix 10 
Statutes of the 21 countries outside of the EU that have franchise specific laws 
Albania 
Civil Code of the Republic of Albania Approved by Law no. 7850, dated 29.7.1994 
Australia 
Trade Practices Act 1974 
Barbados 
The Barbados Franchises (Registration and Control) Act 
Belarus 
Decree of the Cabinet of Ministers of 21 March 2009 N 346 on the registration of license 
contracts, contracts of a concession and pledge contracts of the rights to objects of the 
industrial property and contracts of the complex enterprise license (franchise) 
Brazil 
Law No 8.955 of 15 December 1994 providing for the contract of franchise business , and 
other measures 
Canada 
The Alberta Franchise Act 1995, The Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure) 2000 
(Ontario), The Prince Edward Island Franchise Act 2007, The New Brunswick Franchises 
Act 2009 
China 
Regulation on Administration of Commercial Franchise 2007 
Georgia 
Civil Code Book Three, Title One; Chapter Seven Articles 607-614 
Indonesia 
The Provisions on and Procedure for the Implementation of Franchised Business Registration 
-Decree of the Minister of Industry and Trade No. 259/MPP/Kep/7/1997, dated July 30, 1997 
Japan 
FTC Franchise Guidelines April 2002 
Kazakhstan 
Law on Complex Business Licence (Franchising) Law No 330 June 24, 2002 
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Korea 
The Fair Franchise Transaction Act 2002 
Malaysia 
The Franchise Act 1998 
Moldova 
Law on Franchising No. 1335 of 1 January 1997 
Mexico 
Decree No 35/2006/ND-CP 
Russia 
Civil Code Pt II Chapter 54 
Taiwan 
The FTC’s Guidelines on Standards Governing Disclosure of Information by Franchisors; 
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Appendix 11 
European Franchise Associations and membership 
The aggregate membership is approximately 1,577: 
Austrian Franchise Association 
45 members 
Belgian Franchise Association 
30 members 
British Franchise Association 
350 members 
Czech Franchise Association 
20 members 
Danish Franchise Association 
46 members 
Finnish Franchise Association 
105 members 
French Franchise Federation 
125 members 
German Franchise Association 
200 members 
Greek Franchise Association 
48 members 
Hungarian Franchise Association 
46 members 
Italian Franchise Association 
204 members 
Netherlands Franchise Association 
193 members 
Portuguese Franchise Association 
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24 members 
Slovenian Franchise Association 
107 members 
Swedish Franchise Association 
51 members 
Ireland Franchise Association 
57 members 
N.B. Some brands are members of more than one national franchise association. 
The number of brands represented by national franchise associations is therefore less than 
1,577. 
The estimated number of brands in the EU is 9,971. 
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